
HOFSTRA
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
DISCARD

BC

E 182 .L96 G4
Gleaves, Albert, 1858-1937.
Life and letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce : U.S. Navy, founder of the Naval War College.



S. B. Luce.

Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Naval Forces on North Atlantic.
1886–1889.

Life and Letters of

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce

U. S. Navy

Founder of the Naval War College

By

Rear Admiral Albert Gleaves, U. S. N., LL.D.

Formerly Admiral U. S. Navy, Commander-in-Chief U. S. Asiatic Fleet

Author of

"History of the Transportation Service in the World War"
"Life of James Lawrence of the Chesapeake"
"Life of an American Sailor"

WITH 16 ILLUSTRATIONS

G. P. Putnam's Sons
New York & London
The Knickerbocker Press
1925

182
.L96
G4

Copyright, 1925
by
Albert Gleaves

Made in the United States of America

There is no history properly speaking, only biography

EMERSON

Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025

https://archive.org/details/bwb_T4-AQL-851

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

For valuable assistance in the preparation of this volume my grateful acknowledgments are due to Mrs. A. T. Mahan, Quogue, L. I., and Miss M. E. Powel of Newport, R. I., and to Rear Admiral P. F. Harrington, U. S. Navy, Rear Admiral C. F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy, Rear Admiral W. M. Folger, U. S. Navy, Brig. Gen. Geo. Richards, U. S. M. C., and Commander Jay H. Sypher, U. S. Navy.

My thanks are also due to the authorities of the Naval War College and the Training Station at Newport, and to the Editors of *The Youth's Companion.*

A. G.

A PARAPHRASE

I have not hesitated to take colors from the palettes of others, and have borrowed largely from those whose work has shaped my own. Their words and phrases have refined and strengthened my own diction, and I make this acknowledgment in a sort of "omnium gatherum," as obviously I cannot do so individually.

After all, did not a well known historian observe that the idea of originality as something one makes up in his own head is incorrect—that originality consists of the methods in which ideas new or old are employed?

There is eminent precedent for this. Virgil shared with his contemporaries the habit of transferring good lines from the pages of others to his own, and Professor Jastrow tells us that in the time of Ecclesiasticus it was considered a sufficient compliment to an author to quote from his works without mentioning his name.

A. G.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I.	Introductory Remarks. Early Life. First Duty in Line-of-Battle Ship *North Carolina*	3
II.	Cruises in the *Congress* and the *Columbus*	14
III.	In Trouble at the Naval Academy. Cruise of the *Vandalia*	35
IV.	Astronomical Work. Coast Survey. Marriage. Cruise in the *Jamestown*. Ordered to Naval Academy. The Civil War. Ordered to U. S. S. *Wabash*	60
V.	In Action at Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal. Returns to Naval Academy. Commands Practice Squadron	72
VI.	Commands U. S. Ironclad *Nantucket* off Charleston. Returns to Naval Academy as Commandant of Midshipmen	91
VII.	A Cruise in Europe. 1868–1872	107
VIII.	Nautical School Ships. The Naval Training System	134
IX.	The Training Ship *Minnesota*. The Training Squadron	149
X.	The Naval War College	168
XI.	Commander-in-Chief. Canadian Fisheries Question	197

CHAPTER PAGE

XII.—Commander-in-Chief (Continued). Affair of the *Haytien Republic*. Hauls down Flag 213

XIII.—Naval Administration 227

XIV.—The General Board 242

XV.—Correspondence Relating to the Merchant Marine 254

XVI.—Letters (First Part) 267

XVII.—Letters (Continued) 291

XVIII.—Letters from Admiral Mahan to Admiral Luce 312

XIX.—Signals. The School of Naval Architecture at Boston. The Line and Staff Controversy 330

XX.—Last Years 349

XXI.—The End 354

Chronological Record of Services of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U.S.N. . 363

Appendix A 367

Appendix B 369

Index 371

ILLUSTRATIONS

FACING PAGE

S. B. Luce, Commander-in-Chief of U. S. Naval Forces on North Atlantic . . *Frontispiece*

Mother and Father of Admiral Luce . . . 6

Midshipman Luce, 1842 16

The U. S. S. "Columbus" and "Vincennes" in Japan 30

Departure of the U. S. S. "Columbus" and "Vincennes" from Jeddo Bay, July the 29th, 1846 . 32

In the Lee Gangway of the "Richmond" . . 56

Mrs. Stephen B. Luce, at the Time of Her Marriage 70

Commander Luce, Commandant Midshipmen, 1866–1869 70

Chart of Vicinity of Port Royal, S. C., 1862, Made by Lieutenant Luce 76

European Squadron, "Wabash" Flagship . . 118

European Squadron at Villefranche . . . 126

U. S. S. "Hartford," 1876 146

U. S. Training Ship "Minnesota" . . . 152

U. S. Training Squadron at Newport . . . 160

The Old Administration Building, Coaster's Harbor Island (1885) 178

FACING PAGE

Rear Admiral Luce, from Portrait at War College 224

The United States Naval War College . . 264

Luce Hall, Seamanship Building at United States Naval Academy, Annapolis 340

Mrs. Stephen B. Luce 350

U. S. Destroyer "Luce" 356

Life and Letters of
Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy

Life and Letters of Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce, U. S. Navy

CHAPTER I

Introductory Remarks. Early Life. First Duty in Line-of-Battle Ship *North Carolina*

OUR country is essentially non-maritime notwithstanding its thousands of miles of sea coast, its far flung island possessions, and its enormous seaborne trade. We are first of all mercantile and industrial, and there are millions of our people who have never heard "the dreamy wash of the sea," and to whom ships and sailors are objects of curiosity.

Naval officers, save in time of war, play a small and inconspicuous part in national affairs. War alone brings them and other sea folk into public notice; when peace comes they recede into comparative obscurity. During the War of 1812 the exploits of the navy were acclaimed throughout the thirteen states, and the naval Captains of that war were the heroes of fireside stories in every home on the Atlantic seaboard. Then followed a long period when the Navy was practically forgotten. The Civil War brought some laudation, as when Dr. Holmes writing of the battle between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* said, "Is it not the age of fables, and of heroes, and demi-gods over again?"[1]

But the operations of the Army so overshadowed those of the Navy that the latter as a rule received scant atten-

[1] Rhodes' *History of the United States*, vol. iii., p. 613.

tion, although it was the United States Navy by its wonderful blockade, that made Appomattox possible in 1865. To paraphrase Mahan, it was those storm-tossed ships on the Atlantic upon which Lee's armies never looked that stood between them and their dreams of an Independent South.

It will be understood then in some measure why Admiral Luce is not better known to his countrymen, although he stands in the front rank of American sea officers.

The many changes in the material conditions of the Navy during Admiral Luce's sixty-seven years of service never threw him behind. He kept himself always just ahead of the crest of the successive waves of progress and reorganization that swept over the Navy during what is called the transition period which followed the two decades of stagnation and demoralization succeeding the Civil War. "His horizon was always ahead of him."

Admiral Luce's qualities as a seaman with all the word implies were pre-eminent, but are apt to be lost sight of in the reputation he established as the founder of the War College, and the father of the Training System.

Of his early life in the old sailing ships but little is known; none of his letters of that period exist and his journals, as a rule, are the conventional excerpts from the ship's log. With the exception of his cruise in the *Vandalia*, and to a certain degree in the *Jamestown* there are no pictures or details of the life on board ship under the old system; in the exceptions noted the "remarks" of the log are expanded into a personal narrative, and for this reason it has been thought not inappropriate to quote them at some length because of the light they throw on the customs of the day, and also to introduce the terminology of the Navy as it was seventy years ago.

Admiral Luce firmly believed that a sailor could only be made at sea and in sailing ships, and the establishment of the Training System as will be seen was built upon the doctrine that the efficiency of the Navy would be in-

creased 100 percent if every officer and every man were a trained seaman.

He spoke the language of the sea in every day conversation, but naturally and without affectation, and in appearance he was every inch the typical sea officer.

Long before he turned his attention to the training of enlisted men, and the higher education of officers, he produced his book on *Seamanship*. For this task he was especially qualified, as his experience at sea had been unusually varied, and as deck officer he had made his mark as a ship-handler under sail.

By the Training System he gave the country a class of seamen who generally considered embody the sound mind in the sound body. He entered the Navy in the days of hard drinking and hard fighting when men were allowed to go ashore only at long intervals, and were brought back to their ships sodden with liquor, maimed and bruised and insensible, and were hoisted over the side like so much beef. Days when a large proportion of the crew could neither read nor write. As the type of bluejacket improved, Luce saw the necessity of training them by some methodical plan, and while his efforts attracted but little attention at first, his ideas gradually took hold and became a fixed policy of the Navy Department, with the result that raw recruits were developed into men of self-respect and independent character, with a sense of fearless devotion to duty.

When the Training System became a permanent policy of the Navy Department, Admiral Luce gave his best efforts, guided by mature experience and sound judgment, to the founding of a Naval War College. He was the first in any Navy to recognize that war at sea is a game of science as well as skill, and that it was essential for a sea officer to be familiar with tactics, and strategy and logistics in order to carry on successfully a campaign on the ocean. Seventy years before Scharnhorst had established a school of the General Staff in Berlin, and Von

Moltke was one of his pupils. That was the beginning of the German War Machine that brought about the downfall of the French Empire.

By the light of that school, Luce visioned a school on similar lines for our naval officers.

The Naval War College, out of which grew the General Board, was the culmination of his long career, accomplished in the full maturity of his powers, and by it his technical and professional reputation will be longest remembered. It entitles him to a secure place in American Naval History.

Stephen Bleecker Luce was born March 25, 1827, in Albany, New York. His father, Vinal Luce, and his mother, Charlotte Bleecker, were descendants of the early colonists. His father was the ninth in descent from William White, one of the passengers in the *Mayflower*, and the eleventh signer of the Compact.

One of his ancestors was Henry Luce who settled in Martha's Vineyard and died there in 1689. Some generations later this branch of Luces moved to Ashfield, Massachusetts, and in time young Vinal went to Albany to study medicine and there he met his wife, Charlotte Bleecker. The Bleeckers were descended from Jan Jansen Bleecker who emigrated from Holland in 1658 and settled in Albany, New York, where he became prominent in public affairs, being Mayor, and one of the first Aldermen mentioned in the Charter and member of the General Assembly of the Province. The Bleeckers married among their Dutch neighbors with one exception; Charlotte Bleecker's mother was of English descent.

When Stephen was about eight years old his parents moved to Washington, D. C., with their growing family of boys and girls—the boys getting schooling in Washington. Vinal Luce and his wife were members of the old Dutch Reformed Church in Albany but after they moved to Washington, they became members of St. John's Epis-

Charlotte Bleecker Luce.

Vinal Luce.

Mother and father of Admiral Luce.

copal Church. The very strict early religious training the children received had a lasting effect upon Stephen's character "and accounts," writes his daughter, "for my father's unconquerable aversion to all forms of gambling and also his strict observance of Sunday."

Stephen early expressed a wish to enter the Navy, and his father took him to the White House and presented him to President Van Buren who after a few questions promised to appoint him a midshipman. This was four years before the establishment of the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

Shortly after his interview with the President, young Luce received the appointment and was ordered November 4, 1841, to the line-of-battle ship *North Carolina*, which was the receiving ship or "Guardo," as the sailors phrased it, at New York. She was anchored in the Hudson River and was flying the broad pennant of Commodore M. C. Perry. There he was to await his assignment to a sea-going ship.

The *North Carolina* was a fine specimen of the naval architecture of the period. She was rated as a seventy-four but actually carried eighty-four guns, and her total complement of officers and men was eight hundred and twenty. She had just returned from a cruise in the Pacific Ocean where she had been the Flagship of Commodore Ballard, a veteran of the War of 1812.

She was a handsome ship and attracted as much attention and admiration as does a superdreadnought off Riverside Drive.

"A modern sailor," says John Masefield speaking of the 18th century frigates,[1] "accustomed to the keen iron ships of the present day, would have called such a ship a sea-wagon, qualified or otherwise, before spitting and passing by. But when the great sails were set and the hull began to move through the sea, the cumbrous hulk took on attributes of beauty and nobility. There has

[1] *Sea Life in Nelson's Time.*

been perhaps, no such beautiful thing on earth, the work of man's hands, as an old seventy-four under sail."

Of his experiences and impressions of his first months of service Luce wrote:

"To be suddenly cut adrift from one's mother's apron strings and landed on the deck of such a ship was, for a boy of fourteen, a tremendous change.

"I reported to the Commodore and was sent by him to the Captain, and passed on by the Captain to the first lieutenant, and thence to the officer of the deck. My name was entered in the log book, and finally I reported to the midshipman of the watch and was shown by him down a labyrinth of ladders to the gun-room. The place seemed full of young officers.

"But I did not stop there. Still downward I was taken to another deck, where it was so dark that I had to grope my way along, and was in constant fear of falling through into some nameless abyss. One sickly lantern shed its pale light around but it was too feeble to define a single object.

"This place was called the orlop and it was here that my modest little trunk had preceded me.

"My conductor was a midshipman of about my own age, and as he had been on board already some three or four weeks, he seemed to 'know the ropes.' He pointed out the locker where I was to stow my clothes, and the billet where my hammock was to hang, and many other things the meaning of which I could not understand.

"I was appalled at first by the very idea of living in such a dreadful place, but my eyes adapted themselves in a little while to the darkness, and as the humorous remarks and cheerful voice of my companion reassured me, I soon began to think it might be possible to become reconciled to such life if others could.

"I passed my first day without getting quite beside myself, but the attempt at 'turning in' that night was not attended with entire success. My hammock stretched

taut from beam to beam was considerably higher than my head, and swung away from my hand at the least pressure on its edge. I made several fruitless efforts, and it was only with the aid of a marine on guard over the after magazine that at last I got in. By standing on a campstool and clutching a convenient hammock hook I soon learned to swing myself in as deftly as the best of them."[1]

From the beginning Luce was diligent and adventurous. He quickly learned the names of the ropes, and how they were rove and what they were for; how the sails were set, and reefed and furled and how to sail a boat. He made friends with the sailors and loved to pass hours off duty in the main top, and learned his first lessons in knotting and splicing from the captain of the top who was "a fine looking man and one who evidently had some pretensions to a good English education. He wore his tarpaulin jauntily stuck on the back of his head, and his frock collar wide open, displaying on his ample chest a tattooed picture of the *Constitution* under royals. In his ears were small plain gold rings. Always extremely neat in his person and dress, he was a type of an American man-of-war's man of the period."[2]

In the confidence of those top meetings, this mariner impressed upon the midshipman the necessity of having at least the national emblem tattooed on his arm, declaring that no American sailor who was a sailor would be without it.

"This opinion he uttered in such an authoritative tone and supported it by such sound reasoning that no doubt was left in our minds as to the antiquity of the custom and the wisdom of following it. The tattooing outfit consisted of several needles tied closely together on the end of a small piece of bamboo, and saucers of India ink of various colors. The design was first sketched on the skin, and then pricked in. The operation sometimes

[1] Admiral Luce in *Youth's Companion*, December 22, 1892.
[2] *Ibid.*

produced painful swelling, but I have never heard of it being followed by blood poisoning or other serious result. The captain of the top would accept no recompense from the midshipmen except a glass of grog."[1]

As the Receiving Ship was a sort of distributing reservoir for midshipmen and sailors, the personnel was constantly changing. The younger midshipmen banded together to resist the hazing of the older ones, as well as to haze in turn those who joined the ship later.

"The gun-room was the mess-room of the passed midshipmen, the youngsters being admitted on sufferance. The passed midshipmen we regarded as belonging to a superior order of beings. They were in truth the finest specimens of manly beauty I had ever seen; and to hear them recount to one another, as they frequently did, their experiences at sea and in foreign lands, was almost an education in itself."[2]

Luce's earliest associations in the Navy were with officers and men who had fought in the *Constitution* or in the *United States* when she took the *Macedonian*, and others who had been in the *Hornet* with Lawrence, and with Perry and MacDonough on the Lakes. It was the custom to get the old MacDonough sailors into the gun-room at night to sing the old naval ditties of the *Constitution* and the *Guerrière*, the *Wasp* and the *Frolic*, the *Enterprise* and the *Boxer*, etc.

Among Luce's messmates in the Receiving Ship were William Harwood Parker and Hunter Davidson, both of whom gained distinction in the Confederate Navy, and the ill-fated Spencer who it will be recalled was hanged the following summer at the yardarm of the *Somers* for alleged mutiny. Spencer was the son of the then Secretary of War, and a nephew of a captain in the Navy. The affair created a profound sensation in the country and the memory of it still lingers in the Navy. Parker in

[1] *Youth's Companion*, December 22, 1892.
[2] *Ibid.*

his *Recollections* says that officers generally at the time refused to discuss it, and it was not until recent years that Luce referred to it. He has left, however, a brief picture of Spencer in a conversation with Miss M. E. Powel, of Newport. "He said," she writes, "Spencer was extremely peculiar. He was not all there; he would go aloft and sit in the mizzen-top with his eyes fixed and glaring for hours. When his messmates guyed each other, they never interfered with Spencer. I asked the Admiral if Spencer was a crank. 'He was more than that; he was a bit off.' I am sure he added, 'I have always thought Mackenzie did right, he could not have done otherwise. I went out to the Mediterranean in the *Congress* the winter of 1842–43. We were with Commodore Morgan whose flagship was the *Columbus*, commanded by Spencer's uncle, Captain W. A. Spencer. When the news of the mutiny of the *Somers* and the hanging of young Spencer was received, Captain Spencer applied for his detachment and went home.'"[1]

[1] Of Commander Mackenzie's return to his own home after the mutiny Miss Powel writes an account given her by Mrs. Odell, Mackenzie's sister-in-law.

Mrs. Odell said in substance, that Mackenzie had been crazy to go to sea and was so anxious to be off that he took on a crew made up of the very worst blackguards in New York. Commodore M. C. Perry was the officer who made out the detail in New York and he had two sons on board the *Somers*. He received an order from Washington to send midshipman Spencer also. Officers protested against Spencer's orders saying that he was not fit, and that if the Department insisted on his going the Commodore should not allow his sons to go. However, Spencer was sent as he was a son of the Secretary of War. When the ship was at sea, a paper was found in Spencer's neck-cloth planning to take the ship to the Isle of Pines and make her a pirate, and murder those who did not join them. When it was decided to put him to death, Captain Mackenzie asked Spencer if he would like for him to pray with him and read the Bible. Spencer replied that it would be useless. Mrs. Odell said that Mackenzie's family in New York first heard of the mutiny through the newspapers. Upon his return to the United States Captain Mackenzie came direct to her father's house carrying a small carpet bag which he kept very near him on a chair. When the family were at dinner Mackenzie suddenly started and said, "My God, where is my bag?" And when he saw it he dropped his head and half whispered, "It might cost me my life, it might cost me my life." He was

The conditions in the Navy and life on board ship in the early forties were not unlike those described in Marryat's novels. Midshipmen entered the service when mere boys.[1] There was a schoolmaster or a Chaplain who looked out for their training in the three R's and taught them the rudiments of navigation. Their promotion and their education depended upon their own efforts and not as a rule upon political or family influence.

Their uniform was a dark blue double-breasted coat or jacket with rolling collar and a double row of nine buttons, with an anchor of buff cloth inserted in the collar. A cocked hat was worn in full dress. The cap was dark blue with an anchor and star over the vizor, and in the tropics they wore a straw hat six inches in height, with rim three and a half inches in width.

The pay was small—a midshipman receiving only $19 per month plus one ration (30 cents), and the discomforts were many, of crowded quarters below the water line, the air often foul from stench of bilge water and smoky lanterns. The furniture consisted of campstools and a table, and each midshipman had a locker in which to stow his clothes. He was permitted to have a hammock boy whom he paid a small sum to "lash and carry." The midshipmen elected their own caterer and had their own mess, such as it was. It was a rough and ready existence—there was some fun and some philosophy, and taking it full and by it was a hard life for a sensitive boy.

It was in this atmosphere that a midshipman received his first impressions of the service. Naturally his duties

---

very sad and depressed. Mrs. Odell said that all the family received threatening letters and denunciations and vows to kill Captain Mackenzie. Mrs. Mackenzie never felt sure of his safety.

It was generally supposed that Captain Mackenzie was killed by a fall from his horse near Morristown, but Mrs. Mackenzie believed that his death was not an accident, but due to heart failure.

[1] Farragut was only 13 years old when he served with the elder Porter in the battle of the *Essex* with the *Phœbe* and *Cherub* in Valparaiso harbor.

were not over important, consisting chiefly of carrying orders, reports, etc., when on watch, and being general assistant to the lieutenant officer of the deck, but he was unconsciously absorbing the fundamental principles of his profession, and his character was being moulded by his association, not too familiar, with the officers of whom Luce says, "to an extensive practical knowledge of their profession they added a chivalric sense of honor"; the midshipmen of those days he writes, "were being educated all the while, silently, unobtrusively and in a manner according to each individual character effectively. Two educational processes were in continual operation—*absorption* and *habituation*."[1]

Luce remained the usual six months on board the *North Carolina* before he was ordered to a sea-going ship.

[1] Prince de Joinville who served in the French Navy fourteen years before he entered the French Army, wrote in his *Memoirs*, "I learnt most of all by observation, and from the outset I had that indescribable thing that nobody can teach another—the seafaring instinct.

CHAPTER II

Cruises in the *Congress* and the *Columbus*

MIDSHIPMAN LUCE had been attached to the *North Carolina* six months when he was ordered to the new frigate *Congress*, a 44-gun ship fitting out at New York for a cruise in the Mediterranean.

The *Congress* recently completed at the Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Navy Yard, was the fourth of her name. She was 179 feet long, 48 feet beam, and 23 feet depth of hold. Her displacement was less than 2,000 tons, a big ship for that time. Her complement of officers and men was 480.

The Captain was Philip F. Voorhees. He had served with distinction in the War of 1812 under Decatur and Warrington, having participated in the capture of three British men-of-war, and had been awarded a medal by Congress for conspicuous service. Captain Voorhees was a courtly gentleman of the old school, as the saying is, and was much liked by his officers and men.

Luce's orders to the *Congress* were dated April 2, 1842, and a month later he received his warrant as a Midshipman. His report of fitness, as it is called now, was in the shape of a letter from the Captain of the *North Carolina*. Captain Moorhead said, "Persevere in the course you have commenced, and you may confidently anticipate success."

Of his first cruise, Luce has left no records, either in letters or journals. The *Congress* arrived at Gibraltar, August 21, 1842, and during the few months she was in

European waters, she cruised as far east as Alexandria and Jaffa. From Jaffa Luce went to Jerusalem. He got there a bloodstone on which was engraved the Temple and the motto of the city. He mounted it in a ring which he wore throughout his life, and it was not removed until after his death. There are several incidents of this cruise in which Luce was not individually concerned, but they serve as a necessary part of the background of his life during its formative period, and they are interesting comparatively as revealing the great changes in naval life which have taken place in the last eighty years.

In October, 1842, when the *Congress* was at Port Mahon, the sailing-master of the *Congress*, Lieutenant John S. Patterson, was murdered on shore one night when returning to his ship, presumably by a jealous Spaniard. A short distance behind Patterson, and in sight of him, were Lieutenant Hunter (afterwards well-known as "Alvarado" Hunter), and the Surgeon of the *Congress*. Hunter saw the shadow of the murderer in the moonlight, and chased him without success. It was a brutal attack, and the culmination of a long series of quarrels between the natives and the Americans. The affair was reported by the Commodore of the Squadron to the Navy Department, but there is no record of it in the files of the State Department. It is probable that Commodore Morgan was satisfied with the apologies and regrets of the Governor of the Island. So far as is known now, nothing came of it except that the Naval Station which the United States had maintained there was shifted to Lisbon. Port Mahon had been a favorite resort of our squadron since the early days, when our ships were fighting the Barbary States. Farragut's ancestors came from there. Many of our officers married there, so many in fact that in 1839 the Secretary of the Navy issued an order prohibiting marriage of our officers with the natives on account of the international difficulties that might arise from large families of mixed Spanish and American-

Englishman, who had committed several outrages on American shipping and even fired into the U. S. Brig *Bainbridge*. With splendid initiative Voorhees captured the squadron and retained it pending an apology. Somehow his action failed to strike the popular sentiment at home; instead of the applause that was in after years given to Commander Ingraham at Smyrna and Hollins at Greytown, Voorhees was tried and sentenced by Court Martial. He simply guessed wrong. Shortly after this, his first court martial, Captain Voorhees was tried again. It had become a custom in the Navy to allow the deck officers (lieutenants) to discipline the crew for minor offenses, without reference to the Captain, who by law is the only person on board ship empowered to administer punishment. Lieutenants were permitted to flog only with a light cord and *over* the shirt, but not on the bare back, and never with the cat. Captain Voorhees authorized the use of the cord by the lieutenants by written order; this concession of authority was not approved by the Commodore, and the Captain was court martialed for inflicting illegal punishment.

The *Congress* arrived in Hampton Roads in March, 1845, having completed a cruise of three years less a few days, during which time she had been two hundred and fifty-seven days actually at sea.

Among the lieutenants of the *Congress* were David Dixon Porter, afterwards Admiral, and Thornton A. Jenkins who commanded the *Richmond* at the battle of Mobile Bay. In the midshipmen's mess there were twenty young officers, among them Habersham of Georgia, Charles C. Bayard and John H. Upshur. These three were Luce's *intimes*.

Habersham resigned the year before the war and went South. Bayard died in early life, and Upshur who lived to advanced age, died only three months before Luce. Luce's nickname was "Tibby," and Upshur called him so to the end.

On May 28, 1845, after a few weeks on shore Luce joined the frigate *Columbus:*[1] which like the *North Carolina* was a seventy-four gun ship of the line and was one of the finest ships of her time. She was fitting out at the Navy Yard, New York, for service in the East Indies as flagship of Commodore James Biddle,[2] a distinguished veteran of the last war with England, and was commanded by Captain Thomas W. Wyman who as we shall see belonged to a type that has long since passed away. The captains of his day had only less power than those during the Napoleonic Wars. Says Masefield, "His word was absolute. He had power over his subjects almost to the life. He had power to loose and to bind and to flog a man senseless. He lived alone like a little God in heaven, shrouded from view by the cabin bulkheads."

It was so when Luce first went to sea, a captain was a law unto himself, and some of them had not been nearly tamed by regulations and laws of Congress. "Often his moods varied with his digestion. Under favorable circumstances he would pleasantly address his midshipmen when he came on deck in the morning. 'Good morning young gentlemen' he would say with a sixteen-year-old smile to the midshipmen of the watch, and in a stage whisper to the officer of the deck, 'Capital young officers,

[1] The story of the cruise of the *Columbus* has been told by Charles Nordhoff in his *Life on Board a Man-of-War.*

[2] Commodore Biddle had been a midshipman on board the *Philadelphia* under the renowned Bainbridge in 1803, when that ship was engaged in the war against Tripoli, and was with Bainbridge and other officers of the *Philadelphia* incarcerated in a Tripolitan prison for nineteen months. He was on board the *Wasp* when she captured the *Frolic* and was made prize-master of the latter, both ships being picked up immediately after the action by the *Poictiers*, seventy-four. He commanded the *Hornet* when she ran the blockade of New London by the English, and on the 23rd March, 1815, captured the *Penguin.* The *Hornet* was subsequently chased by an English line of battleship—the *Cornwallis*, but escaped capture through the exercise on the part of Captain Biddle of seamanship of the highest order. She arrived in New York in June of the same year, without a boat or an anchor, and with but one gun, having hove all her heavy weights overboard during the exciting chase.

Sir. I have the finest midshipmen in the Navy.'" But says Admiral Luce, "after thrashing to windward for a couple of weeks against strong trade winds it was quite a different matter. 'Where are all the midshipmen,' he would roar when anything went wrong, and in a scarcely less audible voice declare, 'a more worthless set of young officers I have never seen.'"[1]

Before the *Columbus* sailed from New York it was decided in Washington to act upon the proposal which had been made in 1843 to the State Department by Mr. Cushing, our Commissioner in China, to make an effort to induce Japan to follow the example of China and to throw open to commerce, at least some of her ports. About the time the *Columbus* was getting ready for sea Mr. H. A. Everett who had been appointed to succeed Mr. Cushing was authorized to take passage in the *Columbus*, and upon his arrival on the China Station to initiate negotiations for a commercial treaty with Japan should opportunity arise.

On the 4th June, 1845, the *Columbus* wearing the broad pennant of the Commodore in company with the *Vincennes*, Captain Hiram Paulding, got underway and in tow of a steamer stood out to sea past Sandy Hook having Mr. Everett and his family on board.

The voyage was uneventful, not even bad weather was encountered and the days were only marked in the language of the log book by "making and reducing sail as occasion required." On June 15th, the log records that a private of marines was given "twelve lashes over the bare back with the cats for sleeping on post." Another day there is an entry to the effect that the crew were "piped to prayers," and that the text was Matthew 15:4. Once or twice when the winds were light the Commodore "signalized" as they used to say to Captain Paulding to come on board presumably for conference.

On June 30th the *Columbus* arrived at Rio, having

[1] *Youth's Companion.*

sailed according to the meticulous log writer 6961½ miles in 56 days, 11 hours and 30 minutes.

The Commodore was instructed to land Mr. Everett at Canton and to afford him every facility for accomplishing his purpose but on account of ill health, the Commissioner was put ashore at Rio de Janeiro, and his duties devolved upon the Commodore.

The ship remained at Rio three weeks, then proceeded on her voyage around the Cape of Good Hope. The day after the *Columbus* sailed from Rio de Janeiro the brig was emptied of the prisoners who were brought on deck, assigned punishments by the Captain and set at liberty. Flogging was never done in port. Twenty men were flogged. Masefield describes the operation[1]: "The Captain's first order was to 'rig the gratings.' The carpenter and carpenter's mates at once dragged aft two of the wooden gratings which covered the hatches. One of these was placed flat upon the deck. The other was placed upright and secured in that position against the ship's side or poop railings. When the gratings had been reported rigged, the Captain called forward the first offender on the list, and told him that he had transgressed the rules of the service, knowing the penalty. If he had nothing to say the order was 'Strip.' The man flung off his shirt and advanced bare-shouldered to the gratings, and extending his arms upright. The Captain then gave the order, 'Seize him up.' The Quartermasters advanced with lengths of spun yarn, with which they tied the man's hands to the gratings. They then reported, 'Seized up, Sir.' At this point the Captain produced a copy of the Articles of War and read that article which the offender had infringed. As he read he took off his hat to show his respect for the King's commandments. Every man present did the same. While the article was being read, the boatswain's mate undid a red baize bag and produced a red-handled cat with which he was to execute

[1] *Life of Nelson*, p. 161.

punishment. At the order 'Do you duty' he advanced to the man at the grating, drew the cat tails through his fingers, flung his arm back at the full sweep of his arm. He was generally a powerful seaman, and he knew very well that any sign of favoritism would infallibly cause his disrating, if it did not subject him to the same torture. Some seamen could take a dozen, or as they expressed it, 'get a red checked shirt at the gangway' without crying aloud. But the force of each blow was such that the recipient had the breath knocked clean out of him with an involuntary 'Ugh.' One blow was sufficient to take off the skin, and to draw blood wherever the knots fell. Six blows were enough to make the back positively raw. Twelve blows cut deeply into it, and left it a horrible red slough, sickening to look upon. Yet three dozen was a common punishment. Six dozen lashes were accounted as nothing. Three hundred lashes were very frequently given."

The flogging on board the *Columbus* just referred to is thus noted in Midshipman Luce's journal under date of August 18, 1845: "At 9:30 A.M. called all hands witness punishment, and administered the razors to a number of men for different offenses. At 10 A.M. turned the reefs out of the topsails. Nothing remarkable occurred." Nothing remarkable!

Of the same flogging Nordhoff in the forecastle writes: "Blood! Oh! God I could look no more, but burying my face in my hands turned from the sickening scene."

Of another flogging Luce notes that a Marine was punished with twelve lashes for sleeping on post and resisting arrest. The entry in the log continues: "When Hogan was ordered for punishment he refused and was put in double irons. Afterwards Captain Tyler, by Commodore Biddle's order, showed Hogan the law applicable to his case and said he might submit to punishment or not as he pleased, but if he did not he would be tried by a court martial. He requested the Commodore to punish him."

Bad weather was experienced off the Cape of Good Hope which proved to be the worst gale of the cruise. During the heavy weather which lasted the better part of two days, topsails and courses were split and new ones bent; at different times sails were blown away, yards sprung and running rigging parted. Seas tumbled on board from the crests of enormous waves, and in general the ship was cold, wet, and uncomfortable. When the gale subsided a tremendous sea was left in which the ship almost rolled out her spars. What a school of seamanship! Luce who became one of the best seamen in the Navy here had practical opportunities by which he profited. His journals are filled with notes and neat pen and ink sketches relating to damages to spars and rigging; how to avoid accidents, what to do in cases of emergency, and how to effect repairs, all of which were later embodied in his great work on practical seamanship. To a student and close observer the cruise was full of lessons. It is proverbial that a midshipman learns his seamanship on his first cruise, and Luce was especially fortunate in learning his early lessons of sea life under such seamen as Voorhees, and Wyman, and David D. Porter, the elder Selfridge, Percival Drayton and McIntosh.

It was a hard apprenticeship, under stern grim masters who had learned their profession in a still harder school, but it turned out officers who have had few equals and no superiors in any service. The lieutenants and midshipmen of the 'forties were the leaders in the Civil War on both sides, and afterwards.

Philanthropy, sanitation and hygiene did much to ameliorate the severe conditions of man-of-war life in the next thirty years. The last hanging at the yardarm in the Navy occurred in 1855,[1] flogging was abolished in

[1] This occurred on board the U.S.S. *Levant* in the Mediterranean off Spezzia, January 19, 1855. The entry in the ship's log reads, "From 8 (A.M.) to Meridian. At 9:45 reduced sail to single reef topsails, backed the fore-topsail and at 10 A.M. in obedience to an order from Commodore S. H.

1850, and the rum ration was withdrawn in 1862. In later years shore leave was made compulsory at least every three months, and double irons are now authorized only under exceptional circumstances.

Admiral Luce once said, "if you wish to know how I was brought up read *Sea Life in Nelson's Time*, except for so much flogging; there was flogging in our Navy but not near so much as that, but the rest is exact."

But to return to the *Columbus*.

In due course the ship arrived at her anchorage in Pearl River, that is to say on Christmas Day, 1845. It was there that an accident occurred which made a deep impression upon Luce, and had not the counsel of his brother officers prevailed he would have resigned from the Navy. The story reads like a chapter from *Midshipman Easy*[1]:

"We had been at anchor in Canton River several days, when one evening I was informed it would be my duty on the following morning to go for water.

"Watering ship in those days was a tedious operation. It consisted in bringing the water off in casks by means of the ship's boats, the casks averaging about sixty gallons each.

"The ship lay a little below Boca Tigris, some thirty

Stringham . . . ordinary seaman sentenced to death by a court martial was hung at the fore-yard until dead.

"At 11:10 lowered the prisoner from the yardarm, filled away, shook out the reefs, hauled aboard the courses and made sail to topgallant sails, studding sails and flying jib."

The occasion of an execution was made a matter of solemn ceremony. An officer on board the *Levant* thus described it:

"All hands were called to witness punishment. The officers in full uniform with their swords and pistols; marines drawn up with their muskets loaded and bayonets fixed. The prisoner was then brought up in double irons; he was perfectly composed though very pale. He kissed the Captain and First Lieutenant, and read a few verses of his own composition to his shipmates urging them to repent and profit by what they would soon witness. At 9:30 the gun was fired, the rope placed around his neck, and in an instant his lifeless corpse dangled at the yard-arm." (Lieutenant Robert Stuart to his wife in Florence, Italy. By the courtesy of Mrs. Alexander Mackay-Smith.)

[1] *Youth's Companion*, 1892.

odd miles below the city of Canton. The watering place, on the other hand, was about 20 miles below us.

"The next day broke fair, and a little after sunrise, having partaken of breakfast, we shoved off from the ship the last injunction from the first lieutenant being that I should be back before dark.

"On reaching the watering place, about nine o'clock, the men set to work very cheerfully in getting the casks out of the boat, rolling them up to a rude sort of fountain. Everything went on so pleasantly and so expeditiously, considering that but one cask could be filled at a time, that I looked for a completion of the work far in advance of what had been calculated upon, and enjoyed, in anticipation, the commendations I should receive on my excellent management in getting back to the ship so much sooner than expected.

"Matters had been running on thus smoothly for a couple of hours or so, when the progress of the work began to be retarded by the appearance of a lot of Chinamen from a neighboring village whose presence gave rise to a number of jokes on the part of our men, and seemed to raise their spirits.

"At noon we had more than half completed the filling of the casks.

"After dinner I gave the order to 'turn to' which was received by the men with something that sounded very much like jeers. Nettled at such an evidence of disrespect I strode in among them, and to my consternation found them all quite tipsy. The rascally Chinamen had been supplying them with arrack, a very potent intoxicant distilled from fermented rice.

"Four of the crew were missing and, on asking what had become of them, was informed with a leer 'that they had gone up to buy a pair of shoes.' I knew only too well what that meant; they had gone for more liquor.

"Here was a pretty mess, truly! Twenty miles away from the ship with eighteen drunken sailors!

"Fortunately the coxswain was a tower of moral and physical strength. He was a Marblehead man, and one of the very finest specimens of American seamen it has ever been my lot to see. During dinner he had kept aloof from the rest of the men, so that he was as little aware as myself of what had been going on. He now came to my assistance, and indeed, I stood in good need of it for some of the men were getting quite unruly. Together we managed to get the least tipsy of them to work, and finally, much to my relief, I saw the casks all filled and stowed in the launch.

"The coxswain and I then went to the village in search of the stragglers. A pretty scene awaited us. The four men had complete possession of the place, and not a single native was to be seen. They had demolished one small house of bamboo and thatch almost entirely and were proceeding with another when I called out to them to stop.

"They at once commenced uttering complaints against the natives, declaring they had been insulted and robbed by them, and were only seeking their own in a peaceful way, as became American citizens. This harangue I cut short by a peremptory order to all four to go down to the boat immediately. The order was met by a point blank refusal, however, and one of them went so far as to be exceedingly disrespectful in words and manner, even approaching me in a menacing attitude. But he had scarcely advanced a step toward me when he was met by the coxswain who felled him to the ground with one blow of his fist.

"I had drawn my sword and was prepared to use it, for I was no match in a hand-to-hand conflict with those stalwart seamen, half crazed as they were with liquor. I was but little over sixteen at that time, of slight build and not particularly strong; so that I would have been a mere child in the hands of any one of the crew disposed to do me bodily harm. The summary treatment of their comrade

had a quieting effect upon the other three, who now protested their innocence of any evil intent. Seeing the turn affairs had taken the inhabitants now commenced streaming out of their little cabins. A number of Chinamen at a sign from me seized the four delinquents, bound them securely with grass ropes, and finally secured them to hastily improvised stretchers of bamboo. Four Chinamen allotted themselves to each stretcher and we started for the beach, escorted by the entire population, who were glad to be rid of such terrible fellows.

"On reaching the boat I found the crew had obtained more liquor and were engaged in a free fight among themselves.

"The sight of the procession marching down upon them seemed to have a sobering effect, which was not a little enhanced by the appearance of the stretchers and the helpless burdens which they bore. One or two of the violent, however, had to be lashed down to the thwarts of the boat, and partial order was at length restored.

"To have attempted to sail the boat back to the ship would have been under the circumstances, sheer madness. The only course left was to let the men sleep off the effects of the liquor, and to make a start when there were sober ones enough to manage the boat. As some of them were too much excited to sleep, the coxswain administered copious draughts of salt water. On the heads of others he dashed bucketsful of cold water. Both remedies had good effect.

"We started the next morning and it was high noon before we got alongside the ship.

"As I stepped over the gangway I felt every inch a hero. I experienced much of the sensation that must have been Perry's when, stepping over the side of the *Lawrence*, he saw victory perching on his banners. I had passed successfully through a very trying ordeal and thought that the trial had not been without credit.

"Going aft on the quarter-deck I was met by the cap-

tain. The 'sixteen-year-old smile' was still about his lips, but it had a sort of cast-iron rigidity, and there was a lurid gleam in his steely gray eye that bode no good.

"'Where have you been, sir, all this time? What do you mean, sir, by staying out of my ship all night?'

"'I thought, sir'—the captain caught me up sharply.

"'You thought! You thought! And who gave you a right to think on board my ship?

"'I'll have you to know, sir, that aboard my ship I'll do the thinking; and it is your place to obey orders. You think, indeed!' the last words being uttered in a tone of blended ferocity and contempt.

"At this point his voice seemed choked by passion; for although his lips kept moving he uttered not another word, but pointed to the nearest hatchway as a sign that I should go below and get out of his sight.

"My first sensation on receiving this rude shock was one of utter bewilderment. My second thought was to devise some ready and expeditious method of ridding the world of such a worthless encumbrance as I had proved to be. Lastly—and my resolution was irrevocable—I must resign my position in the navy. I must send my resignation home by the next mail and beg my parents to demand its immediate acceptance for the reason, that I was utterly unfit for the navy. And all through these fleeting thoughts rang the words: 'Why did I think? Why did I think?'

"With these melancholy reflections I reached the steerage messroom, where I was greeted with shouts of merriment and good-natured bantering.

"I was obliged to recount my adventures, and having a generous and sympathetic audience the story lost nothing from my telling.

"At Valparaiso I was sent in charge of the market boat. Before leaving the ship the first lieutenant gave me explicit directions to return as early as possible. 'Remember,' said he 'we are homeward bound, the captain

wants to get under way at early daylight tomorrow and the boats must all be hoisted and secured for sea before nightfall.'

"It was a long pull to the shore; so the afternoon was well advanced before the stewards were fairly landed. Then, as this was the last boat, and no chance of making other purchases till the ship reached Rio de Janeiro, there were many things to get for the habitual procrastinator. In short, it was sunset before we were ready to shove off to return to the ship.

"The boat, a ten-oared cutter, resembled a floating menagerie. There were a couple of sheep, several pigs and turkeys, ducks and chickens in quantities, each complaining in its own tongue. These, with baskets of eggs, hampers of vegetables, boxes, packages of various kinds, and bundles of washed clothes, left scant room for the passengers and greatly interfered with the pulling of the oars; in fact the two bow oars could not be used. Finding a little later that the wind had sprung up, and from such a direction that in two or three stretches we could fetch the ship, I ordered the oars to be laid in and masts stepped. This accomplished, sail was made amid a deafening concert by the menagerie.

"We went along very well for a time, but on drawing out from the land the wind grew fresher and the sea rougher, until finally it became necessary to make everything as snug as possible. The boat now commenced pounding into the sea, which broke over her in such heavy spray that everybody became drenched to the skin. At times the lee gunwale would be under water, so that vigorous baling became necessary to keep the boat free. The night had already grown so pitchy dark that it was difficult to make out the ship's lights.

"Several times I thought of ordering the helm to be put up and running in for the mole again, but my experience in Canton River recurred to me and fortified me to keep on at any cost and obey the orders I had received. We

managed to reach the ship a little before four bells (ten o'clock) very greatly to my own relief, and no doubt to that of all concerned.

"As we got alongside I became aware that the occupants of the boat were unusually quiet. The undertone of chattering among the dago stewards had long ceased, and not a sound escaped from the menagerie. The boat was nearly half full of water, the live stock had all perished and the stewards had been frightened nearly to death.

"I scrambled on board as best I could in my drenched clothes and made my report to the officer of the deck, while the poor stewards crawled up one by one looking like so many drowned rats.

"The captain's steward, an irascible Mahonese, steered a straight wake for the cabin, seemingly indifferent as to the fate of his marketing. Presently, and while still giving the officer of the deck an account of my proceedings, I heard the cabin door slam violently. This was quickly followed by the voice of Captain Blazers, calling out loudly to know the name of the officer of that boat, at the same moment I stepped forward.

"'How dare you, sir, hazard the lives of a boat's crew by coming off in such weather?'

"'I did not think, sir.'

"'You didn't think?' he cried. 'You didn't think? Why what was your head given you for?' 'You didn't think?' he kept repeating derisively. 'Why I might as well put a midshipman's jacket on a squilgee handle and send that in a boat as to send such a—such a'—but while he was seeking a fitting symbol to characterize my turpitude, I shot down the nearest ladder and made my way for the steerage, chilled to the bone and all but famished, for I had had neither dinner nor supper. Added to all this was now the bitter feeling that I had been guilty of an error of judgment—that I ought to have thought, and thought differently. The depression of spirit must be great indeed that is proof against the mirth of a midship-

"Before reaching the anchorage a Japanese officer accompanied by a Dutch interpreter came on board the *Columbus* to inquire as to the object of the ships visiting Japan. He was informed by Commodore Biddle that he came as a friend to ascertain whether Japan had like China opened her ports to foreign trade and, if she had, to arrange by treaty the conditions on which American vessels might trade with Japan. The officer requested that this answer might be put in writing which was done.

"On anchoring, the ships were at once surrounded by a vast number of small boats. The ship was soon thronged with Japanese visitors. They were permitted to come on board in large numbers, that all might be convinced of our friendly disposition.

"Permission to land was denied. We did not land, nor was any attempt made to disregard the wishes of the local authorities. There were but two exceptions to this rule. Objection was made to our boats passing between the *Columbus* and the *Vincennes*. On the impracticability of this restriction being explained the restriction was withdrawn.

"The morning following our arrival a Japanese officer, apparently of higher rank than the one of the preceding day, came on board. He stated that foreign ships upon entering Japanese ports always landed their guns. He was told that it was impossible for us to do so, to which was added the assurance that we were peaceably disposed. He then informed the Commodore that his letter of the previous day had been transmitted to the Emperor who was at some distance from Jeddo and that an answer would be received in five or six days.

"Upon being asked why we were surrounded by so many boats, he replied, 'that they might be ready in case we wanted them to tow the ship!' This was mere subterfuge. The real reason was to prevent us from communicating with the shore.

"When our boats were sent out to take soundings at

some distance from the ships Japanese boats followed, without however attempting to molest them. During our entire stay these boats continued about the ship day and night.

"On the 27th a Japanese official of rank, accompanied by a suite of eight persons, came on board with the Emperor's answer, which as translated by the interpreter ran as follows:

"'According to Japanese laws, the Japanese may not trade except with the Dutch and Chinese. It will not be allowed that America make a treaty with Japan or trade with her, as the same is not allowed to any other nation.

"'Concerning strange lands, all things are fixed at Nagasaki, not here in the bay; therefore you must depart as quickly as possible and not come any more in Japan.'

"The officer was informed that the United States wished to make a treaty of commerce with Japan, but not unless Japan also wished a treaty. Having ascertained that Japan was not ready to open her ports to foreign trades, the officer was further informed that the ships would sail the following day.

"On the 29th July both ships got under way. As the wind was very light the Japanese boats took our lines to tow us out. The number of boats was estimated to be three hundred, twelve men in each boat."

"There can be no doubt but that the interchange of civilities between Commodore Biddle and his officers and the Japanese officials and the total absence, on the part of the American officers, of any hostile intention must have impressed the Japanese officials with our friendly disposition and disposed them to receive with favor the overtures of the American officers who visited Japan a few years later."

Admiral Luce adds, "My interest in the events just recited lies not merely in the fact that I was one of the junior officers of the *Columbus*, and to this day (1905) retain a vivid impression of the dignified bearing of the

Departure of the U. S. S. "Columbus" and "Vincennes" from Jeddo Bay, July the 29th, 1846.

Japanese officials, their affability and polished manners, but in my desire that in any history of modern Japan that may be written due recognition be given to the able and tactful manner in which the negotiations referred to were conducted by the distinguished officer under whom I had the honor to serve."

The visit of Commodore Biddle to Japan has been obscured by that of Commodore Perry six years later. Not much has been written about it, and an unpleasant incident reported by Commodore Biddle has been practically ignored.[1] Admiral Luce, who admired the Commodore, was never critical, and he invariably treated the incident with restraint. Mr. Nordhoff, who was a powder monkey in the gun division of which Luce was the midshipman and Percival Drayton the lieutenant, with rare tact makes no reference to anything reflecting on the Commodore in his charming little book,[2] although the affair must have been gossip on the forecastle and berthdeck.

After leaving Jeddo the squadron proceeded to the Sandwich Islands. Kamehameha III was King, gold had not been discovered in California, and Honolulu was a primitive straggling village. Stores were taken on board

[1] "Biddle gave a Japanese officer who came on board, accompanied by a Dutch interpreter, a written statement of the object of his visit. This letter was sent to Jeddo, and an answer was sent refusing access for trade, and ordering Biddle away. Biddle consented to go on board a Japanese junk to receive the Emperor's reply, which proved to have no address or signature and to be rude in terms. When he first attempted to step on board a Japanese gave him a blow or push which threw him back into his boat. Biddle demanded through the interpreter that the man be seized, and he then returned to his ship. He was followed on board by the interpreter and some Japanese officers, who declared that they were not expecting his visit and therefore were not on deck and that they would have the man severely punished. It has been said that this affair produced a very bad effect, as the Japanese spread the report that they had not only refused to treat, but had inflicted an indignity on an American officer." *International Law Digest*, vol. v., p. 734, J. Bassett Moore. Also report of Commodore Biddle to Hon. George Bancroft, Secretary Navy, 32nd Congress, 1st Sess., 1852. Sen. Ex. Doc., 59.

[2] *Man-of-War Life*, Nordhoff.

and after three weeks rest, the ships again went to sea, bound for Valparaiso, which was reached after a passage of sixty-four days. Here the men were given liberty to go ashore for the first time during the cruise. They had been kept on board ship nearly two years, deprived of all shore recreation.

The ships remained several weeks, and "when," writes Nordhoff, "the crew were once more on board and sober" they ran up the coast to Callao, thence to the California coast where the United States troops were already in possession. Nine "long and tedious months" were spent principally at Monterey, there being only one visit to the village of San Francisco.

The war with Mexico was on, but there was not much work for the Navy, and none for Luce's ship, and on the 22nd July, 1847, the *Columbus* sailed for the United States. A stop was made at Valparaiso; the Horn was rounded in fine weather, it being in December and the height of the summer; another stop at Rio de Janeiro, and finally on the 8th March, 1848, the *Columbus* anchored in Hampton Roads and at noon the following day Commodore Biddle hauled down his broad pennant. The cruise had lasted thirty-four months, of which nineteen and a half months had been actually passed at sea.

CHAPTER III

In Trouble at the Naval Academy—Cruise of the *Vandalia*

IN 1834 the midshipmen who had been at sea for six years were given a finishing course at the new naval school in Philadelphia. They were instructed in mathematics, the languages, and nautical astronomy. Commodore Biddle who was the Governor required a rigorous attendance at chapel of all the midshipmen.

In 1845 the school was abandoned and in its place was established the Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland.

On 6th March, 1848, Midshipman Luce was detached from the *Columbus* and ordered to the Naval Academy where he reported to the Superintendent on the 1st April. He was just twenty-one years old. He had been at sea on foreign stations seven years and had circumnavigated the globe. It was the policy of the Navy Department to send the "young gentlemen" who were appointed midshipmen to serve at sea for a number of years, and then to give them a theoretical course for a few months at the Naval School, before issuing their warrants as Passed Midshipmen.

The midshipmen of the "'41 date" as they were called were the first to be sent to the School for a definite course of instruction, although groups of midshipmen had been sent there before for short periods. It was not, however, until 1853 that a class was graduated with college formalities and given diplomas.

The older officers of the Navy generally opposed the

School. To them the idea of teaching seamanship and gunnery "out of books" was absurd, just as forty years afterwards when Luce was struggling to establish the War College, the proposal to "*teach* the art of war" was as severely condemned by the same midshipmen then become admirals.

Commodore Blake writing of this hostile attitude said:

"It has unhappily been too much the fashion among senior officers to decry the Naval Academy, and 'the LL.D.'s' who graduate from it. But to the day of my death I shall not forget the mortification which the officers of a squadron to which I was attached felt when they learnt that a man high in rank who had constantly indulged in such senseless tirades had 'excepted' an invitation to dinner from a high English official and that his note of '*exceptance*' had been passed around quite extensively as a specimen.

"It is furthermore a well-known fact that one of our oldest flag officers could never comprehend why if the variation of the needle was allowed to the left going out of the Mediterranean why it should be allowed to the right hand coming down. He, moreover, practiced this theory and came within an ace of losing his squadron on the coast of Africa."

The date of '41—the famous "Forty-Oners" as they were known for years afterwards—included many who attained distinction in the Civil War on both sides: Pembroke Jones, William H. Parker, John H. Upshur, Francis A. Roe, J. B. Smith, who was killed in action on board the *Congress*, John M. Brooke, the great ordnance expert of the Confederate Navy, Kell, the executive officer of the *Alabama* in her duel with the *Kearsarge*, and James S. Thornton, the executive of the *Kearsarge*, John Lee Davis of the *Sassacus*, Joseph Fry, who was shot at Santiago by the Spanish authorities when in command of the *Virginius*, Waddell of *Shenandoah* fame, Jefferson Maury, and the famous Hunter Davidson, who was in charge of

the Confederate naval torpedo service, and who himself attempted to blow up the *Minnesota*.

In this distinguished class which was discharged from the Naval School at intervals in '47, '48, '49, and '50 there were a total of one hundred and eighty-three and Luce's rating when he left Annapolis was one hundred and seventy-three. How he fell from the top of the class to the bottom is a story of misadventure and injustice and a cast-iron departmental determination to uphold a Board, right or wrong, worth repeating for what may be learned from it today.

Upon the occasion of the inauguration of General Taylor as President in March, 1849, the Superintendent of the Naval School, Captain George Parker Upshur, was authorized by the Navy Department to allow the midshipmen to attend the ceremonies. For some reason Captain Upshur decided that he would not grant the privilege. The midshipmen resented this, and some of them decided to show their disapproval. One night the School was startled by the ringing of ship's bells, blowing horns, and the discharge of guns.

In the investigation that followed, Luce was implicated in the mischief in a minor degree, but the Superintendent decided that no one who had had any connection with the affair should escape punishment. A report was made to the Secretary of the Navy who arbitrarily decided that all those who were concerned should lose a certain percentage of their figure of merit. Luce was the worst sufferer, and dropped from number five in his class to the tenth from the foot. It was a heart-breaking punishment for a boyish prank. Similar occurrences have taken place at the Academy many times since, but have rarely incurred such harshness.

Luce had many letters from officers with whom he had served in the *Congress* and *Columbus* testifying to his zeal, efficiency, and aptitude for the service, but the Examination Board was obdurate, and under the positive instruc-

tions of the Navy Department Luce was reduced. It was a terrible experience and after the promising start with every prospect of winning the prizes of his profession most discouraging. But neither then nor afterwards in his long career did he ever allow, to use his own expression, Giant Despair to put him in Doubting Castle.

For many years he and his family and his friends worked to have the Department's decision set aside or mitigated, but not until he had won the commendation of his commanding officer in the battle of Port Royal was he finally restored to his original rank. It was Admiral duPont who turned the scales in his favor.

In 1862 Flag Officer duPont, Commander of the South Atlantic Blockading Squadron, took the occasion of the detachment of Luce from the Flagship *Wabash* to send the following letter to Mr. Gideon Welles:

FLAGSHIP *Wabash*
PORT ROYAL HARBOR, S. C.
January 9, 1862.

SIR:

In accordance with an order from the Department temporarily suspended by the Acting Secretary of the Navy, Lieutenant S. B. Luce returns to the north to assume duty at the Naval Academy.

His services in this ship and his gallant conduct in the action of the 7th November and his high character and attainments as an officer impel me to ask the Department to take into consideration certain circumstances connected with his position on the Navy Register which have long been to him a source of annoyance and mortification.

I have ever been a stern advocate for sustaining the discipline of the service as carried out through the action of Courts of Inquiry and Courts Martial, but I am enabled to say from my own knowledge of this case that great but unintentional injustice was done some years ago to Mr. Luce.

I will leave him to give more fully all the points in his case and will merely state such as will explain the grounds of the request I am about to make.

Whilst Mr. Luce was a midshipman at the Academy an investigation was held by a Court of Inquiry into a certain disturbance by the students involving a breach of discipline; the result of the Inquiry implicated four of the young gentlemen. Mr. Luce was one of the four and the least to blame.

The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry led to an order from the Secretary of the Navy to place these gentlemen at the foot of their class, a Board of Examination at the Academy of which I was a member being in session at the time.

This was done, but the punishment an enduring one for life was singularly unequal in its operation inasmuch as the individual the least censurable was by far the most severely punished; for standing high in his class, his loss of position in it was very considerable while the others being much lower down, their reduction in standing was of hardly any moment, two of them being nearly at the foot of their class.

Of the four young men, if I remember, thus implicated at the time two were afterwards cashiered, one joined the rebels, while Mr. Luce has steadily risen in distinction and rendered efficient service in this war.

To illustrate what I have said: Mr. Luce lost seventy-seven numbers in his class;[1] the vicissitudes of service have however removed many of this number, and if restored to his place he would now only have to go up twenty-five numbers.

I respectfully recommend the Department to do this for I believe it would be just in itself and earned by this meritorious officer.

Respectfully
Your obt. svt.

Hon. Gideon Welles
Secretary Navy
Washington, D. C.

S. F. DuPont
Flag Officer Commdg.
South Atlantic Blockg. Squad.

In August, 1849, Luce was ordered to the sloop of war *Vandalia*, and in the following month he was promoted to Passed Midshipman.

[1] This is an error, Luce lost 168 numbers.

The *Vandalia* was seven hundred tons and carried a complement of a hundred and ninety officers and men. She was a handy little ship and a fast sailer "when trimmed by the stern." The report of her inspection says in the language of the sea as it was spoken seventy years ago, "She steers easily, stays quickly, wears slowly; is very weatherly and would be stiff enough without ballast; performs remarkably well under all circumstances but in a seaway pitches and is very wet." She had recently been rebuilt and lengthened several feet. She sailed from Norfolk 6th September, 1849, to join the Squadron in the Pacific Ocean.

In the wardroom were Reed Werden and Thomas H. Patterson, both of them afterwards rear-admirals, the latter a brother-in-law of Admiral D. D. Porter; Herndon who five years later was to win undying fame when he went down in the *Central America;* Dr. Palmer, afterward Surgeon General; Dr. Robert Carter of Virginia; John Van B. Bleecker the purser. The Marine Officer was Second Lieutenant Read. The navigator or master was Lieutenant John P. Bankhead who thirteen years later was in command of the original *Monitor*, when she foundered in a gale a few miles south of Cape Hatteras, 30th December, 1862.

There were ten Passed Midshipmen and two midshipmen in the steerage mess, among them Luce's intimate friends and classmates, Alexander Habersham, John B. Stewart, and Hunter Davidson—"Habs," "Jack," "Davie," and "Tibby"—"cheeryble brothers." "A party of youngsters kept in strict discipline by their elders, worthy representatives of the innocent bravery of the Navy, ready instantly to enter upon grave situations if called upon and disappointed when the call did not come."[1]

Luce's journal in the *Vandalia* does not begin until 26th September, 1851, in the last year of the cruise. In the *Congress* he kept no journal, in the *Columbus* his

[1] *Atlantic Monthly*, 1883.

journal for the most part consists of a transcript of the ship's log. The *Vandalia* diary is personal, in which his opinions and thoughts are jotted down daily, and generally with youthful frankness of self-communion. It is written in his characteristically neat, clear, hand which scarcely altered during his life.

He remained in the steerage throughout the cruise, doing subordinate duty as mate of the deck, and later as "officer of the forecastle," although when the cruise ended he was twenty-five years old and had been at sea constantly ten years.

The cruise of the *Vandalia* was typical of the cruises of the period, short stays in port and long passages at sea, and in the Pacific there was not much to vary the monotony.[1] The *vie intime* of an overcrowded steerage of a sailing ship of war seventy years ago was as happy, lighthearted, and careless as healthy youth invariably is, whether or not the environments are attractive. The midshipmen of those days were content with candlelight, and oil lanterns, tin washbasins and a scant allowance of fresh water. They eked out their hardtack and salt horse rations with occasional contributions from the wardroom mess, and they made life endurable with modest potations of red wine and grog. "Boy, bring me a bottle of sherry," exclaimed a midshipman on one occasion in a gale of wind, when the steerage was wet and foul, "and I'll make a palace of this place in five minutes."

There was ample time for writing, reading and such amusements as might be devised from slender resources. Luce passed most of his hours off watch reading, and writing his journal. Addison was his favorite author. "Reading the first volume of the *Spectator* the other day," he writes, "I fell on a discourse upon a subject which so nearly coincided with a self-conceived or rather original theory of my own, that I was taken by surprise." He is

[1] The U.S.S. *Preble*, during a cruise of 54 months (1846–1851), sailed 100,000 miles.

much affected by Dickens' novels, and records, "My vibrations are frequent and rapid. I am very sensitive to those touching instances of affection as exhibited by little Nell for instance." He reads *Paradise Lost* but decides "that Milton and Salt-horse are as incompatible with each other, as doughy rice cakes and Addison and Steele." He thinks that *Antony and Cleopatra* is inferior to *The World Well Lost, or All for Love,* and finds *Love à la Mode* by Charles Macklin much more amusing than Mrs. Conby's farce, *Who is the Dupe?*

Littell's *Living Age* and *Harper's Weekly* serve to pass many hours.

He plans for the future. There is so much he wants to accomplish. "This morning (September, 1852—At Sea) kept the forenoon watch. Afterwards had a long talk with Dr. Carter about the University of Virginia. I entertain serious ideas of going there for a year. Query: Is it to be college or a private tutor? Shall I go to Europe, or get command of an East India Clipper? Heavens it may be death or another three years in the steerage, excepting the last almost anything will do. I forgot matrimony, but of that there is little fear." On another day he writes, "When I return home I must occupy my mind with useful amusements for which I have a decided fancy, such as experiments in electro-typing, etc. I want to learn to stuff birds, take lessons in music and drawing and to learn the art of self-defense. I will apply for orders to the Washington Observatory, the Navy Yard, or the Coast Survey." He contemplates becoming a Mason.

Sometimes he affects Pepys' style of mixing up his English with questionable French and Spanish, "J'ai pris et quitte cent fois la plume, j'hesite des le premier mot, je ne sais quel ton je dois prendre je ne sais pas ou commencer, politics and state affairs first duty and common sense, and mes la grimas y suspiros des pues . . ."

There is a German youth on board whom the Captain

took on board at Honolulu to train as a midshipman, and Luce appears to be fond of him.

"Talked with the Baron about Paris. He spoke of his uncle the Marquis Von Wagner, Parisian manners, etc."

Let us now turn from the diary to the political situation in the Hawaiian Islands with which the *Vandalia* was in a measure connected.

On February 25, 1843, the captain of the English man-of-war *Carysfort* sailed into Honolulu harbor, hauled down the Hawaiian flag and hoisted the British flag. His act was promptly disavowed by the British Commander-in-Chief when he heard of it and the Hawaiian Government was restored, but the affair left a feeling of irritation and anger against the English. Subsequent to this the French, who had protested against Lord Paulet's seizure of the Islands, got into disfavor with the King and his cabinet by their arbitrary measures,[1] and the Government, being helpless to protect themselves, offered a provisional cession of the Islands to the United States which was declined. However, the Navy Department was instructed to keep the ships of the Pacific Station "in a position requisite for the safety of the Hawaiian Government."

The *Vandalia* was ordered to Acapulco and was kept there a long time waiting despatches from Washington for the Hawaiian Government; on 26th September, 1851, she sailed hence for Honolulu. Luce records that "all swearing and growling in the ship" may be attributed to these despatches, and humorously adds "with our non-acceptance of annexation but assurance of a strict protective policy, an offer which taking into consideration the many volcanic eruptions the Islands have been troubled with, may be justly regarded as a burnt offering."

[1] The French Consul General having quarrelled with the Hawaiian Government, the captain of a French man-of-war sent a landing party on shore, took possession of the Fort, dismounted the guns, and destroyed the ammunition.

As the *Vandalia's* mission was of the most friendly character there was every reason to expect marked attention and hospitality, but the event showed that during her stay in Honolulu "no notice whatever was taken of our officers by the King or Cabinet or those in authority" except the usual visits of ceremony.

To resume the Diary.

September 26th, 1851. (Acapulco.)

At 4.50 P.M. weighed the anchor and left the harbor in tow of the U. S. Mail Steamer *Panama.* At 11.30 sent Mr. and Mrs. Gwin and Mrs. Greenough on board the *Panama;* for their amusement burnt a blue light, sent up a rocket and fired two guns. Cheered the P. as she left us.

September 30th, 1851.

For some time the Captain and Jack S. have been at loggerheads. Yesterday S. did something which didn't quite suit the Captain accordingly he got pitched into and his next watch was taken by the First Lieutenant. S. very much exasperated applied for and relieved me on the berth deck. I have been in charge of that deck, off and on about fourteen months. The weather for the last twenty-four hours has been quite ugly; heavy squalls, also considerable rain.

October 6th, 1851.

A day or two ago I had another one of those delightful little rows which without creating any serious difficulty serve to dispel the monotony of a long passage. While fully occupied with setting studding sails Mr. —— officer of the deck, gave one or two orders in his usual indistinct way, which failed to attract my attention, he then requested me to attend to my duty; this I only learned after I had gone below after my watch. I reported him to the Captain but of course didn't get any satisfaction.

October 24th, 1851.

At 7 o'clock in the morning watch made the Island of Hawaii the most eastly point bearing S by E ½ E. At eight Maui in sight bearing West. During last dog watch saw a great light on the Island of Maui, having the appearance of a volcano. Standing for the passage between Molokaii and Oahu.

November 7th, 1851.

Arrived the French Frigate *Algeria* from the Friendly Islands. Supplied her with water by the launch.

November 9th, 1851.

At 7 A.M. Commander-in-Chief of the French Naval Forces in the Pacific visited the ship; on his leaving fired a salute of thirteen guns with the French flag at the fore, which was returned by the *Algeria*. In afternoon the *A*. sailed.

November 10th, 1851.

Sent a boat with an officer to iron the crew of the American Barque *Arab* at the request of Mr. Allen the U. S. Consul. Sent first cutter with kedge and hawser to an American Brig to heave her off the reef.

December 26th, 1851.

At 2 P.M. His Hawaiian Majesty King Kamehameha 3rd arrived in his yacht; on his passing this ship manned yards, and in company with the *Vincennes* fired a salute of twenty-one guns with the Hawaiian flag at the main.

January 3rd, 1852.

At 2 P.M. Their Excellencies John Young Premier of the Kingdom, J. Paki Chamberlain, and R. Armstrong Minister of Public Instruction visited the ship. On leaving we fired a salute of nineteen guns.

February 2nd, 1852.

Sent assistance to Bremen Barque *Ceres*, ashore on the reef.

February 5th, 1852.

Sent a gang of hands to assist in getting American Clipper Ship *Typhoon* underway, whilst there Adolphus Conner (Captain F. C.) was dangerously wounded by the falling of the F. Topsail Tye Block; he was immediately taken on shore to the hospital, and expired at 8.03 P.M.

February 6th, 1852.

An English Barque (*The Harpooner*—Captain Morice) got on shore on the outer reef. Sent launch, first cutter with stream anchor and hawser to her assistance. At 11 P.M. boats returned not having succeeded in getting her off.

February 24th, 1852.

At 9.15 A.M. H.H.M. Kamehameha III and suite came on board.

March 17th, 1852.

At eight dressed ship and at twelve fired a salute in commemoration of the birth of His Hawaiian Majesty Kamehameha III.

(At the request of the King the Marine Officer, Lieutenant Jacob Read, had been detailed to instruct the Hawaiian troops. He took with him a few privates and the Guard music.)

March 17th was the King's birthday. The officers of the *Vandalia* were presented at the Palace, and Luce notes "a fine large painting placed opposite the throne, representing Louis Phillipe," a portrait which was still in the throne-room at the time of the overthrow of the monarchy forty-one years later.

A review of the troops followed the reception on

Waikiki plain east of the city which had been the scene of the ceremonies attending the Restoration of the Islands by the British Admiral Thomas. Luce describes the festivities:

"Now for the review! We rushed round to Bleeckers where we had left our horses, disencumbered ourselves of our swords, encumbered ourselves with spurs, stuck Laura's lilac in a conspicuous place, and rode madly out of the yard, gracefully saluting Mr. Patterson in passing. Honolulu was perfectly alive, everybody was astir; the taboo was taken off of hard riding and drinking. Everybody was on horseback. I began to feel great anxiety on the Major's[1] account; his reputation was at stake, and I hoped in my heart the review would go off well. Quite a number of us occupied the centre of the Square—myself endeavoring to do the agreeable to the charming Mrs. Bishop.

"But now there's a stir and here's the King! He and his staff and guard really presented a fine appearance. His Majesty was mounted on his magnificent black stallion—the staff were all well mounted and dressed in their handsome uniforms. They rode near the centre of the Square, and dismounting proceeded to inspect the troops —after walking along the lines he again took up a position near us and the whole regiment passed twice in review. The King sent one of the Princes for Mr. Read and complimented him upon the precision with which the troops went through the different evolutions and cordially thanked him for his services.

"The King in the plenitude of his wisdom and power, or the wisdom of his advisers, tendered his thanks to Lieutenant Read by letter and offered two hundred dollars to the private marines who had been engaged as fuglemen, as a slight compensation for their trouble. Mr. Read was also offered a handsome ring with an in-

[1] The marine officer on board ship is called "the Major" regardless of his rank.

scription on it, in the Hawaiian language; this the Major was obliged to decline—but the joke is, that he hinted in plain terms that they might send it home to his mother. The King it is said has requested the President of the U. S. to confer some distinction on the Major as a special favor. Nous verrons ce que nous verrons."

March 27th, 1852.

I have recorded on this day that Mr. Wiley, Minister of Foreign Affairs, visited the ship. It was this gentleman who was the bearer of the King's letter. It appears that the Prince Alexander had been first commissioned to perform this service, but pleading indisposition he delegated Mr. W. in his place. The crew were called to muster and all being assembled the different letters were read. After which Mr. W. asked and obtained leave to make a speech —he stammered so, and repeated, and hemm'd and haw'd so continually that it was with difficulty one could preserve the thread of his discourse—this together with his broad Scotch accent rendered it rather amusing than otherwise. "Upon one memorable occasion in the history of English Naval History, a celebrated Admiral remarked (Lord, Lord, Lord Nelson I refer to) remarked that er that er 'England,' gentlemen, 'England expected every man to do his duty' but er, gentlemen, I may remark that er America *knows* that her sons will do their duty—and er, she is not disappointed."

From our first arrival everybody appeared to be bent on getting quarters on shore. Habersham and myself were soon comfortably established in a new frame house belonging to a Mr. Wood, situated on Beretania Street, in an excellent visiting neighborhood, and near enough to the Commercial Hotel for all practical purposes. Our room was indeed a most delightful one, cool and airy, and commanding a fine view of Nuaanu Valley and then there was the veranda, and better still the bath-house. Long may I remember that pleasant room and its pleasant as-

sociations—but the great difficulty always, with me, is that my pleasant associations are so confoundedly mixed up with disagreeable ones, that whenever I invoke the former, the latter forces itself along too like a black and ugly shadow. As it is, I can only exist in the future when my inordinate vanity is sufficient to bar anything like gloomy forebodings, except, indeed, when experience opens the way.

Nearly sixty years after these events, Admiral Luce writing from Newport to his daughter, Mrs. Macomb, whose husband, Brig.-Gen. Macomb, was in command of the Army Station in Honolulu, says:

"Many thanks for the picture cards. 'The Judiciary Building' is new to me. Not so Diamond Head. That is where the *Devil's Punch Bowl* is. Waikiki plain is where we used to have races. On one occasion a little imp of a Kanaka boy was to ride one horse, and I being the smallest and lightest among the whites, was selected to mount the other. The boy was much the better rider—for all the natives of that day took naturally to horse racing, cards and brandy, but I managed at the start to get on his fore quarter, and so preventing his getting ahead of me came in a little—but very little ahead. Gambling was in vogue, and I have seen native women toss off a glass of raw brandy without winking!! But those were the days of 'one' and 'two fingered' poi, eating raw fish (a particular species) and Lonoa dog—the latter bred for the purpose, was covered with plantain leaves and cooked on hot stones. Poi was served in a calabash and you helped yourself with one or two fingers according to the consistency of the mush. John Young of whom I spoke in my last was Premier of the Kingdom. He and Paki, Grand Chamberlain, and Mr. Armstrong, an American and Minister of Public Instruction, visited our ship on one occasion. Mr. Armstrong was the father of General Armstrong my very good friend of Hampton Institute,

Virginia, who was born in Honolulu, and so was Mrs. Folger for that matter."

The *Vandalia* remained at Honolulu until the last of March. Nearly all the officers had obtained permission to live on shore, and Luce and Habersham had a room in Mr. Wood's cottage, on Beretania Street, where they kept open house. If the officers were ignored by the native officials, they received every kindness and great hospitality from the Judds, Ladds, and Bishops. There were no amusements but riding, swimming and visiting; once the Purser got up amateur theatricals at the Hawaiian theatre. Luce took part but confesses that his histrionic talents are obscured by a poor memory. Finally the day came for sailing, and he writes, "Long may I remember that pleasant room and its pleasant associations," and then he makes an entry which is unusual for the vision it contained of the Rebellion and of the future of the Islands. "Farewell Isles of Beauty! a long and I hope a last farewell! What is thy destiny? From the bowels of the earth you were disgorged. Your hills are high and frowning. Your people children. You must pass into the hands of some great nation. 'Westward the tide of Empire holds its course.' Should fierce civil strife rend the great model nation—which God forfend—who can tell to what country you may belong."

After a pleasant run of twenty days, the *Vandalia* arrived in San Francisco Bay having sailed 44,289 miles since leaving Norfolk, September 6, 1849. She remained there until early in May when she sailed for home by way of Valparaiso and Cape Horn. San Francisco had risen from the great fire of May, 1851, and the journal records his amazement at its improvement and he writes that he felt like a country clown as he stared at the wonderful shops and the beautiful and well dressed women, and the fine horses. It was a gay and careless town and Luce entered into its social life with all the zest natural to his pleasure-loving nature.

The voyage to Valparaiso was accomplished in fifty-two days.

June 21, 1852. Valparaiso.

The passage down has been dull and uninteresting.

At 5 P.M. discovered land ahead and on both bows. Made the usual preparations for going into port. Towards evening the light-house of Valparaiso could be seen quite distinctly and there was every prospect of our getting in that night, but unfortunately we had a Jonah on board in the shape of a mortgaged gentleman one Werden by name, whose lady love Miss —— was doubtless on the very tip-toe of expectancy and as the gentleman himself was wrought up to the very spy glass and quarter boat state of impatience, why of course the wind wouldn't blow; what wind would! so there we stuck.

Talk about confusion and ships being upside down and all that, but a ship skipping lightly over the waters on her three trucks with everything spilling out, wouldn't be anything to the Lady *Vandalia* on this eventful night. In the first place I had the first watch with "Cassius"—the spy glass man, but his is not a nature to betray the working of the spirit; and he had to gulp down his ill humor as one would a nauseous dose. Now at about 9 P.M. when honest men thought of their hammocks, all hands were called to work ship and then the First Lieutenant took the deck and commenced fussing with the yards and sails whilst people about decks expressed various opinions; some thought we'd get in; others on the contrary thought we wouldn't.

While the winds, the light winds dallied with the sails, we were kept amused by getting up the stream anchor and cable. If the object in this was to give unnecessary trouble and lumber up the gangway it was eminently successful. At 11:30 they piped down. Sail was reduced when it came on to blow from five to six[1] from the east-

[1] Fresh to strong breezes. Topgallant sails over first reef in Topsails.

HOFSTRA UNIVERSITY LIBRARY

ward. I was right glad when it was eight bells; and when I went aft I saw a mass of Indian rubber clothes steadily and thoughtfully peering through the gloom at the far off beacon. The quarter boat man was under them, and when I saw him my heart softened and I wondered if I would ever look that way and think, as I doubted not he was thinking.

I went below with the consoling belief in a good sleep, but about four bells in the mid watch the wind coming out light again, all hands were again called to bring the ship to an anchor, but about 3:30 falling calm the watch below were piped down. This time we felt certain that we were below for a full due—but oh flattering delusion! At five in the morning watch I was startled from "Sweet dreams of home and you Mary" by the drummer's call to quarters. This was something so unusual that everybody thought something very dreadful had certainly happened, and it was amusing to hear the various impressions made on different persons when the thing was spoken of afterwards. I rushed up half draped, with smoky and sulphurous visions of swabs (epaulets) and prize-money, for I felt certain that we had been fired into. Arrived on deck I found everything in a perfect whirlwind of confusion—the order had been given to "Cast loose" and then—"load *without* shot!!!!!!!!!!" It appears that the Captain for some reason unknown even to himself had ordered a gun fired and a blue light burnt, but the gunner didn't "get his gun off" to suit the lone chieftain, so the grey headed baby in a fit of insanity ordered the officer of the deck to go to quarters, in spite of the fact that his crew had been up the greater part of the night.

It was daylight when the retreat was beat. At six the Log Book says the ship was "in dangerous proximity to the shore"; the Great Booby thought proper to cry or rather whine "Oh Mr. Bankhead! save my ship, save my ship, Sir! Do anything you like, Sir, but save my ship!" Mr. B. who was the officer of the watch, and old Billy

May the quartermaster at the con, both tried in vain to pacify their Captain and assure him that there was no danger but he insisted that shipwreck was inevitable unless somebody did something. So the starboard anchor was let go in twenty-nine fathoms of water and preparations made for hoisting out the boats. The ship had been standing down the shore to the southward of the light-house, and the wind dying away, left us at the mercy of the ground swell which gradually carried us in toward the shore.

June 22nd, 1852.

At seven got the ship underway again and stood up for the harbor of Valparaiso. At 8.45 A.M. arrived at Valparaiso. At 1 P.M. saluted the Chilian flag with twenty-one guns which was returned by the fort on shore.

July 3rd, 1852.

This morning the Captain ordered me to go on shore and say to Admiral Blanco that he would defer celebrating the "4th" as it came on Sunday until the following day, the 5th. I was also to give the same message to Captain Prevost the senior English officer here. The Admiral was not in his office so I went to his residence; nobody answering my summons at the door I marched in when who should I see but Her Loveliness Teresita. I wish some women would not be so lovely! or those who are should be locked up.

When the ship left Valparaiso the usual preparations were made for a passage around the Horn in anticipation of bad weather; royals and stunsails were sent below, and the gear unrove, struck below two of the 68–pounders with their carriages, unbent and sent below the cables, and got both bow anchors on the forecastle.

On July 23rd they ran into heavy weather, carried it around into the Atlantic, under short canvas, close reefed

main top-sail, and foresail and fore storm staysail. In fourteen hours the barometer dropped nearly one inch to 29/52 while the wind blew in heavy gales from N.W.

On July 27th the diary reads "about 10 P.M. shipped a heavy sea on port quarter; the after hatch not being battened down both steerages were deluged. Served out an extra allowance of grog to both watches. Cold, wet and disagreeable." At 7 P.M. the next day "Cape Horn was sighted, and St. George et ego drank Italia punches to celebrate the occasion of our getting once more into the waters of the Atlantic."

On August 17th the *Vandalia* arrived at Rio, on the 20th sailed for Pernambuco—en route Luce writes "In speaking of truth I am far from limiting myself to words. I extend it to actions, to manners and the expression of the face. Veremos loque veremos." He conscientiously records that because he protested against an action of the Captain's he was "suspended and fiercely threatened with 'charges,'" but a few minutes later was restored to duty.

At Sea, September 11th, 1852.

Making a passage to New York from Pernambuco. Commenced this day by an act of devotion to my country —I kept the mid watch.

At Sea, September 15th, 1852.

Saw a black fish; reminded me of the Great Sea Serpent; wished one would make its appearance. Wasn't gratified! Gave way to fit of passion and swore. Couldn't check myself in time.

September 21st, 1852.

Officers generally packing up curiosities, etc., preparatory to leaving the ship. Every day anxiety about latitude and bets are won and lost on it. Consumed our last box of sardines, but couldn't get anything to drink with it. Hunter and self melancholy.

September 23rd, 1852.

Living on our rations. Yesterday it was proposed to draw our grog. This morning it was drawn from the Tub on deck for the first time. By order of the First Lieutenant could not draw the whole back ration from the Spirit Room. This morning it was discovered that some of the men had thrown nearly all the holy stones overboard.

Kept the mid watch last night. As we are steering close in for land orders had been given to keep a particularly bright lookout on account of the catamarans which are said to be plentiful here about. Tramping the deck trying to imagine myself in Washington, I was suddenly startled by "Boat oh" sharply bawled from the lee cat head. I jumped up in the lee fore rigging just in time to see us dash by a small fishing boat at about a biscuit chuck's distance. I imagined, through the gloom, the poor fellows looking very frightened for we were going large under a vast pile of canvas. The latter part of watch reduced sail, backed main yard, and got a cast of lead in twenty-eight fathoms water—white sand (coarse) and shell. At 7.15 A.M. came to off the town of Pernambuco with the starboard anchor in six fathoms water. Sent a boat in under charge of First Lieutenant Johnson—accompanied by Midshipman Cushman. They were hospitably treated by the few Americans there, met on shore and received every attention. Mr. J. offered to take charge of a letter bag for the U. S. in consideration of which we placed a large launch at his disposal thereby enabling him to send off to the ship a quantity of sand, holy stones, fresh beef, vegetables, fruit, parrots and monkeys.

September 19th, 1852.

I have scarcely a remark to make. Nothing to say. Thought, reflection! I don't know what such things are. I never think, never reflect, it's burdensome. The talents given me by the Lord are and are likely to continue as

little improved as if placed beneath the sod. This morning while trying to write an extravagant love-letter for another person, Mr. Henkle[1] in the midst of a series of Frenchified gesticulations preparatory to asking for a cigar, knocked over my inkstand and as it fell on my knee the contents were dislodged and spread over my white pantaloons. I betrayed no signs of anger happily, for he seemed so sorry for it that I laughed it off to relieve him. I was considerably vexed notwithstanding, as it was my last clean pair and I wished to preserve them for another Sunday.

This afternoon there was a very diverting monkey chase aloft which proved a "wild goose chase" as the saying is, for the little animal was too active and daring to be caught. Kept first dog watch. Mr. Patterson officer of the deck spoke to me in that extremely unpleasant surly way he has, and, though the thing was trifling in its nature, bids fair to keep me in an ill humor for a week. As we draw near home everybody talks how they will indulge in savory dishes and wines, such as are not frequently found in a steerage mess.

September 25th, 1852. At Meridian.

First Lieutenant sent in some lobster dressed—good. Lunch: lobster, bread and butter, salt horse and whisky—good.

September 26th, 1852.

Winds light and ahead. Toute notre petit monde inconsolable. This morn: before the performance of ablutions comes Robert with query, "Do you want a doz. of claret?" "Yes, Sir." So we got it, but it's very sour. Our two breakfast Tots were saved for lunch. Hunter on deck. I mixed a toddy using both, when in comes Purser and drinks half.

[1] The German who was received on board at Honolulu.

In the Lee Gangway of the "Richmond."

September 27th, 1852.

Do such beautiful women exist as I dreamed of last night—after I had eaten fried hard tack saturated in pork fat and ship's molasses.

September 29th, 1852.

An English sailor tatooed some figures on my arm. The inflammation caused thereby prevented me from reading or writing. Feverish. Then comes "Habs" with some peanut paste, a Georgian mixture of his own make, which completely glued my mouth.

September 30th, 1852.

Squilgees and boarding pikes! Great guns and gantlines! How it blows. How it rains. How wet the steerage is, how purgatorial! Evening: It has been blowing heavily all day and still continues without any sign of abating. Ship under close reefed main topsail, main trysail, and fore storm staysail. It has been so disagreeable below that I have not been able to do anything. Read *Henry II* a five act tragedy by Thomas Hall.

All hands were called to wear ship, used a goose winged foresail. For a short time when before the wind she was driven at her utmost speed, darted along like a frightened sea bird. This gale has blasted all hopes of getting into New York on Sunday next (October 3rd).

October 1st, 1852.

Morning watch. Gale still blowing. At eight was glad to get below—relished my grog. After breakfast and pipe turned in to grass hammock. Read *Seduction* rather a poor comedy by Thomas Holcroft. Went to sleep. Roused by smell of Italia. Found Bleecker holding a flask of it under my nose. B, Hunter and self toddied. Sea struck ship forward on port bow, washed away hammock netting as far aft as fore rigging. Dinner at two; bean soup, horse and rice. Crockery fast disap-

pearing. Tureen holds on nobly. Grass hammock again and *Percy* a tragedy by Hannah Moore.

October 3rd, 1852.

Last night crossed the Gulf Stream.

On October the fifth, the day before the ship got in, there occurred what Luce describes "as one of the most important epochs of my professional life." He tacked ship! Anyone who was brought up in the sail period knows what this means. It is the thrill that comes once in a life-time. He writes, "She luffed-to lazily, but she never works quickly. All went right. The main yard was swung when I discovered the weather main reef pennant foul of fore yard arm; this was soon cleared by bracing in the main yard a little and checking the fore brace. As I sang out 'Haul the bowlines,' a weight seemed lifted from my mind. I had not only succeeded in the maneuver but I had won a quantity of pale ale.

"Evidences of our approach to land are numerous. At 11 P.M. sighted Barnegat Light."

The next day, October 6th, the *Vandalia* passed Sandy Hook and proceeded up to the Navy Yard, passing the *Columbus* seventy-four, flying the broad pennant of Commodore Perry, standing out to sea, bound on her eventful voyage to Japan. In the afternoon Luce went ashore and after visiting the Astor House, telegraphing his father, and ordering a suit of clothes, he went to the Metropolitan Concert Room to hear Madame Sontag,[1] but could not get a seat.

The following day the ship was inspected, and then immediately ordered to Philadelphia. The crew promptly refused duty, and only the prompt and decisive action of the officers quelled an incipient mutiny. The *Vandalia* was four days reaching the Philadelphia Navy Yard

[1] The German soprano (1806–1854).

where the crew were paid off, the officers detached and the ship put out of commission. She had been three years and two months in commission; more than two-thirds of the cruise had been passed at sea.

CHAPTER IV

Astronomical Work. Coast Survey. Marriage. Cruise in the *Jamestown*. Ordered to Naval Academy. The Civil War. Ordered to U.S.S. *Wabash*.

IN August, 1848, Congress appropriated five thousand dollars under the recommendation of the American Philosophical Society, and the Academy of Arts and Sciences for astronomical observations in the southern hemisphere of the planet Venus at conjunction, and of the planet Mars at opposition, to determine more accurately the solar parallax.

Shortly after leaving the *Vandalia* Luce was ordered to report to Lieutenant Gillis in Washington to assist in working up the results of the observations and this duty kept him on shore several months. It was his first shore duty, with the exception of the few months at the Naval Academy, and the only time he had been at home for more than a few weeks since he entered the Navy.

In May, 1853, he joined the *Vixen* of the Home Squadron, and it was his first service on board a steamer. While at Pensacola he was stricken with yellow fever one night while on watch. The quartermaster, an old sailor of much experience, hurried below and came back with a tumbler of raw whiskey which he insisted upon the young midshipman drinking straight. Although he was desperately ill, Luce always maintained that it was this glass of grog that saved his life.

From the *Vixen* Luce was ordered to the Coast Survey the following May (1854) and thus realized one of his *Vandalia* dreams. First he went to the schooner *Madison* as Acting-Master, and then he was transferred to the sur-

veying party under Lieutenant John Newell Maffitt,[1] an officer of exceptional ability and a hard taskmaster. For three years Luce was engaged in surveying the coasts of Georgia and South Carolina acquiring a knowledge of the waterways there which were of greatest benefit to him ten years later when as a commanding officer he was engaged in hostile operations in those waters.

Luce's duty in the Coast Survey was not a sinecure. It was work of the hardest kind. The hurricane of 1854 which raged along the coast made so many changes in the channels that a resurvey was necessary, and Maffitt was directed to do the work in Charleston harbor and vicinity. He had the rare gift of getting everything out of his people, and yet carrying them along with him—the highest mark of leadership. Admiral Luce once told how he and his old shipmate, Hunter Davidson, slaved day after day in open boats, angling, sounding and running in coast lines until at times they swore that they would rather be court martialed than serve any longer under such a driver. And then when tired and hungry and worn out they returned to the ship, often after sunset, fully determined to have it out with the "old man," they would find the Captain at the gangway to greet them with a cheerful, "Well you have had a hard day's work today. As soon as you get washed up come up into the cabin and dine with me. My steward has found some ducks and terrapin on shore and we'll have a good dinner." And then they would forget all their troubles and mutinous thoughts, and dine abundantly and copiously, enjoying the captain's

[1] John Newell Maffitt was born at sea, and was a resident of North Carolina. When the Civil War broke out he joined the Confederate Navy and won distinction by running through Farragut's blockade off Mobile. He was in command of the *Oreto* at the time, and although ill with yellow fever, he directed the movements of the ship from his arm chair on the poop. His feat cost the Union Commander of the blockading force his commission. Later he commanded the *Florida* when she was cut out in Bahia by Captain N. B. Collins—this became a *cause célèbre* for which the United States was forced to apologize.

best Madeira; and listening to the stories of his own youthful days in the *Constitution* under old Commodore Elliot, "Old Bruin" as he was called, of whom so many stories have been told.

It was during this tour of duty—a sort of compromise with shore duty—that Luce became engaged to his boyhood sweetheart, Eliza Henley, a great-niece of Mrs. Washington. They were married at St. John's Church in Washington, December 7th, 1854.

Eliza Henley was born August 27th, 1828. She was the youngest daughter of Commodore John Dandridge Henley[1] and Elizabeth Denison.

[1] Commodore Henley was born in Williamsburg, James County, Virginia, February 25, 1781, and entered the Navy as midshipman October 14, 1799, and served with distinction in the war with Tripoli. Later he commanded the *Carolina* at the battle of New Orleans. His appointment was obtained through the influence of General Washington, who wrote the following letter to his sister-in-law, Henley's mother:

MOUNT VERNON, October 20, 1799.

DEAR MADAM:

You will perceive by the enclosed, which is left open for your perusal before it is forwarded, that your son John is appointed a midshipman in the Navy of the United States.

You will press him to take the oath of office, required by the Secretary of the Navy, without delay; and forward it to that Gentleman in the manner he directs. Enclosing it in a letter couched in some such terms as you will find on the other side. From the date of which letter of acceptance his pay will commence, according to the information given therein.

The oath may be taken before any respectable magistrate, who must certify the same at the bottom thereof. And I hope by his punctuality, and diligence in performing the duties which will be required of him,—and his obedience to orders—he will give sufficient evidence of his deserving this first grade in the Naval Service, and thereby entitle himself to promotion.

As I expect your Sister is writing to you, I shall say nothing concerning her or family matters;—only adding that with the greatest truth I remain

Your most obedient, and
Affectionate, Hble. Servant
GO. WASHINGTON.

P.S.—If your son John can write a tolerable hand, the letter to the Sec. of the Navy had better be written by himself than any other; taking care to spell his words well.

MRS. ELIZABETH HENLEY.

In 1855 Luce was promoted simultaneously to Master and Lieutenant, and in the following November, he was ordered to the sloop-of-war *Jamestown* and remained in her as one of the watch officers until February, 1860.

The *Jamestown* was a sailing ship of nine hundred and eighty-five tons mounting twenty guns.

The cruise was uneventful and must have been extremely monotonous for the young husband. The greater part of the cruise was spent on the Mosquito coast varied by short runs to Aspinwall, and once she came north to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on account of her unsanitary condition to refit and clean ship. When overhauled at the Navy Yard her bilges were found to be in a horrible condition, which alone was sufficient to account for the extraordinary number on the sick list. Luce himself was ill for several weeks and it was at first thought he had yellow fever.

Conditions on board were not conducive to happiness or comfort. The Captain was severe although he had church on board every Sunday, one of the lieutenants reading the service; the climate was bad; the daily routine of drill, and repairing and setting up rigging were grinding; mail came only at long intervals; sometimes they shot alligators for a pastime. There were few if any decent amusements on shore; and time was passed chiefly at anchor under housed awnings upon which the rain poured continuously. It was the period of filibustering expeditions, and the ships of the squadron took turns in patrolling off the mouth of the Colorado River and sending armed parties ashore to preserve order. Walker's expedition had collapsed the year before, but numbers of swashbuckler marauders and half pirates kept the political situation in a turmoil which necessitated keeping a number of war vessels on the coast to watch events.

The *Jamestown* arrived at Greytown, 19th January, 1858. January 21st, General M. B. Lamar[1] (Mirabeau

[1] 1798–1859.

Bonaparte), Minister Plenipotentiary to Central America, accompanied by Captain J. R. Sands,[1] visited the ship and was saluted with seventeen guns.

March 31st, 1858.

Halfmasted the colors and fired a salute of thirteen minute guns in respect to the memory of the death of Commodore M. C. Perry.

April 4th, 1858.

Watered ship with launch and cutter from San Juan river about one mile from mouth.

May 30, Sunday.

Mr. Thomas Francis Meagher[2] did us the honor to dine with us. He was quite interesting giving us some descriptions of the interior where he had been travelling. (Gathering material for lectures.)

June 1st, 1858.

Commenced this day by getting sick. Had the midwatch and when called at twelve awoke with a chill. Thought that I had the yellow fever as that malady seems to hang over us like a pall threatening to drop. As yet we have but one case. Happily it was not (my indisposition) of the febril order. I was obliged to go on the Doctor's list.

[1] Afterwards Rear Admiral (1795–1883). Rear Admiral Joshua Ratoon Sands was born in Brooklyn, N. Y., May 13, 1795, and died in Baltimore, Md., October 2, 1883. Appointed midshipman June 18, 1812, and sent immediately to duty in Commodore Chauncey's Squadron on Lake Ontario.

Participated in action with the *Royal George*, November 5, 1812. Attached to the *Madison* and in the action that resulted in the capture of York (Toronto), April 27, 1813, carried the orders of the commander-in-chief, in a small boat from vessel to vessel until the surrender of the enemy.

Commended for his creditable service in the capture of Alvarado, Tobasco, Laguna, Vera Cruz, and Tuxpam, during the Mexican War.

Sands fought a number of duels, one with an English officer at Gibraltar, and another at Praya Grande with Surgeon H. W. Bassett in which the latter was killed.

[2] Irish patriot and Union soldier (1823–1862).

June 9th, 1858.

H. B. M. Steamship *Leopard*, Captain Wainwright came in. The *Leopard* has yellow fever on board. Lost three midshipmen by this disease and one by falling from aloft.

June 18th, 1858.

At eight the Flagship *Colorado* struck the broad pennant of Commodore Jas. McIntosh and hoisted a Flag-Officer's Flag at the mizzen and saluted it with fifteen guns. At meridian fired thirteen minute guns in memory of Captain T. Ap. C. R. Jones.[1]

June 25th, 1858.

At sea off Cape Corrientes sighted a side-wheel man-of-war steamer towing a line-of-battleship which proved to be the Spanish Admiral, in the *Isabella Segunda* frigate.

[1] Captain Thomas ap Catesby R. Jones was born in Virginia in 1789, and died in Georgetown, D. C., May 30, 1858. He was appointed midshipman, November 22, 1805; Captain, March 11, 1829.

1808–1812 on duty in Gulf of Mexico for the suppression of piracy and slave trade. October, 1814, took part in expedition against pirates on islands of Grande Terre, Grand Isle and Cheniere, La., which broke up the establishments.

Commended for his able and gallant conduct in the engagement with the British on Lake Pontchartrain on December 15, 1814.

Commanded the Pacific Squadron in three separate cruises. In 1842 took possession of Monterey, Lower California, having been informed that the United States was at war with Mexico. This not being the case he was temporarily removed from the command of the squadron. 1848–1850 he was again commander-in-chief of the Pacific Station which was his last service afloat.

Commodore Jones was one of the best known officers of the "old" Navy, one of those characters in the Service, who became the subject of many anecdotes. In *Love Afloat*,* a story of the Navy as it was a hundred years ago, one of the characters, an old sailor of the War of 1812, is constantly telling stories of Thomas ap Catesby "*R*" Jones. His son, Captain Catesby ap R. Jones, was executive officer of the *Merrimac* in the action with the *Monitor*, March 8, 1862. He was murdered in Selma, Ala., after the war.

* *Love Afloat*, by Lieutenant Commander F. H. Sheppard, U. S. N., New York, 1875.

June 30th, 1858. Off Havana.

Exchanged numbers with the U. S. S. *Macedonian* Captain Levy.[1]

July 4th, 1858.

Refrained from firing national salute on account of the sick on board.

July 23rd, 1858.

Off Sand Key, Florida. Sighted the *Constellation*, *Plymouth* and *Saratoga* working down the main ship channel for sea. Flag *Colorado* and brig *Dolphin* in port. Moored alongside wharf at Key West.

July 24th, 1858.

Ship surveyed by the Fleet Surgeon and on his recommendation ship ordered to New York for the health of the crew. Took an afternoon walk through town with Dr. Duval and Lieutenant McCawley[2] a pretty flowery town.[3] Got a sprig of jassamine—called on the Geigers

[1] Captain Levy has been called the American Dreyfus. He was a rich Jew who had risen in the Navy from Midshipman to Captain. His story is one full of trouble.

Commodore Levy was a strong advocate for the suppression of corporal punishment in the Navy, and his untiring efforts toward this end had great influence in securing its abolishment by Congress.

He was the owner of Monticello, acquired by purchase from the Jefferson family.

[2] Charles G. McCawley, U.S.M.C., born in Pennsylvania, 1827. Appointed from Louisiana. Commissioned Second Lieutenant, March 3, 1847. Served in War with Mexico. Promoted First Lieutenant, January 2, 1855; Captain, 26 July, 1861; Major, 10 June, 1864; Lt. Col., 5 December, 1867. In May, 1862, he was sent to reoccupy Norfolk navy yard with a force of 200 men, and hoisted the National flag on behalf of the Navy. In the boat attack on Fort Sumter, 8 September, 1863, he led a detachment of 100 men and officers and received a brevet as major for his bravery on that occasion. Was promoted Colonel Commandant U. S. Marine Corps, 1876. Died 1891.

[3] In a letter to Admiral Luce, Admiral Porter writes that as a young midshipman he remembered Key West when there was only one house on the island, that of Mrs. Mallory whose son, Stephen, was a companion of Porter's in daily fishing excursions. Stephen Mallory became the Secretary of the Confederate States Navy.

(the pilot's family) a set of midshipmen girls. Called afterwards on board the *Dolphin* to see Maffitt who asked me to bring him down some English professional books.

The ship was ordered to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, where she was thoroughly cleaned and overhauled. On September 23rd she left the Yard to return to her station in the West Indies. During this time Luce obtained four days' leave but was required to report on board every morning at nine o'clock which angers him with the Captain; one day he was kept on board until late to assist in mooring ship and he thus writes, "How can we wonder at the want of esprit de corps in the Navy when superior officers do all they can to make themselves intolerable." This complaint has a familiar sound!

October 28th, 1859.

Arrived at old station at San Juan.

There were no social opportunities until towards the end of the cruise, when the Commodore allowed the *Jamestown* to make a short visit to Cartagena. Luce writes October, 1859:

"Everyone delighted by the appearance of the place, the land-locked harbor, the scenery, the ancient Moorish-Spanish looking town; the fortifications, etc., all covered (sic) by the charm of association recalling the old buccaneer Morgan and his marauders and Admiral Vernon. I don't remember if Morgan was ever here or not.

". . . Everybody regretted leaving this very pleasant place so soon. The people were very kind to us and seemed to be as anxious for us to stay as we were sorry to go. Our Consul Mr. Mathieu (a Franco-American) was exceedingly hospitable. . . .

"The city is falling to ruin but still retains many evidences of former prosperity; the walls which entirely surround it are wonders of engineering containing vast cisterns which to this day the inhabitants depend upon

for their supply of water, at least those of them who have not their own private wells."

The *Jamestown* sailed from Aspinwall for Greytown on November 1st. On the 3rd Luce notes:

"Weather very ugly, heavy rain squalls and considerble sea. During the last dogwatch took third reef in topsails. Lieutenant Bennett kept first watch during which a heavy squall parted lee main topsail sheet and split main topsail. Unbent the sail."

At midnight Luce relieved the deck. "This was the worst watch I have ever kept. The night was as dark as pitch, the thunder and lightning fearful—rain fell in torents, and the wind blew in heavy squalls first from one point and then from another point of the compass. All the fore and main top men were aloft but did not succeed in getting the new topsails set during the whole watch."

Greytown was made eight days later; our frigate *Sabine* and the British ship *Valorous* were in harbor. A few days later the English screw sloop, *Racer*, anchored near the *Jamestown* at the mouth of the Colorado River supposing they were at Greytown. "Captain Pakenham seemed much annoyed etc.; he got underway again and stood for Greytown under canvas."

December 1st, 1859. Greytown.

Sent gig and third cutter to join funeral procession from H.B.M. screw sloop *Racer*. Her Chief Engineer had fallen out of the gangway striking his head on the deck, fracturing his skull. He was buried in the English cemetery at Greytown.

On the 15th the H.B.M. steamer *Gorgon* anchored near the *Jamestown*. "Spent a very pleasant evening on board *Racer* with Lieutenants Royer, Herbert, etc., during the evening Commander Bedford Pim[1] of *Gorgon* came on

[1] Bedford Clapperton Trevelyan Pim (1826–1886). British Admiral. Took part in search for Sir John Franklin, 1852.

board—was much pleased with him, seems to be an active, energetic sailor."

The *Jamestown* and *St. Louis* alternated in the duty of patrol off the Colorado until the first of the new year. In noting the loss of two anchors Luce says, "I am determined hereafter always to use buoys on the anchors."

December 25th, 1859.

4 P.M. Spliced the main brace. (Christmas moderately dull.)

December 31st, 1859.

Saw the old year out by keeping first watch.

The New Year began with orders to return to the United States. On January 2nd he says, "At dusk great excitement on account of a vessel reported in sight; many supposing it to be the *St. Louis* with interesting intelligence. True enough. At 7:55 the *St. Louis* passed us under easy canvas looking very pretty in the moonlight. As she passed Captain Poor[1] hailed and said, 'I am happy to say I have home orders for you.' Upon this our crew who were on deck gave three hearty cheers. Orders were promptly given to send up topgallant masts and prepare for sea."

The ship proceeded to Aspinwall where she found the Flagship *Roanoke* and the storeship *Relief*. As she entered the harbor, she hove to with the main topsail to the mast and the Flag Officer watching the evolution "threw out" the signal to anchor near the Flagship. When this was done, permission was requested to send down topgallant royal yards, and the reply was "loose sail." Then the Flagship soon afterwards signaled to furl sails and send down light yards and masts, in the meantime the crew of the *Jamestown* had been kept from breakfast. It was this disregard of the comforts of the

[1] Afterwards Rear Admiral, 1809–'84.

men and the lack of the most ordinary consideration that often drove even a good crew into mutiny. Of this "horsing" of the *Jamestown* Luce writes, "What was all this humbug for? There is no fool like an old fool."

On the 10th January the ship got underway for home and while "working out" of the harbor "split main topsail; it tore like brown paper." Saluted the *Roanoke* on passing with fifteen guns and gave her three cheers.

On March 2nd, 1860, Luce was ordered to the Naval Academy as assistant to the Commandant of Midshipmen.

With these orders ended the first phase of his long career. He had been at sea almost continuously eighteen years. His experience under all conditions of wind and weather had been exceptional; he had been around the Horn four times, around Cape of Good Hope once, and eight times across the Equator. About two-thirds of his sea duty had been passed actually at sea, and saving shipwreck he had seen every accident that could happen to masts and sails and rigging. His journals are filled with notes of damages and injuries and illustrated with neat pen and ink sketches of various objects connected with his profession. He was a student, a reader and a zealous active and capable officer. In personal appearance at this time he was slight, weighing only a hundred and thirty-seven pounds, and was five feet seven inches tall. His handsome face was thin and delicate and refined, his eye a steel penetrating blue which always twinkled, his nose straight, the thin nostrils indicating his highly strung sensitive disposition. His hair was dark brown; he always wore side whiskers brushed out from his face, as if they had what sailors call "a permanent set," from head winds. The mouth firm with wavering lines in the corners indicating an easy capability of suddenly becoming grave and stern. He was remarkably alert and full of life, and his sense of humor, unusually keen, made him a favorite in the mess.

He was just thirty-three years old when he became an instructor at Annapolis.

Mrs. Stephen B. Luce.

At the time of her marriage.

Commander Luce.

Commandant Midshipmen, 1866-1869.

Luce's tour of duty at the Naval Academy was brief. The storm of civil war was rapidly approaching and the old town of Annapolis, the birthplace of the Academy, and at that time the home port of the immortal *Constitution*, awoke from a long slumber, and shared the excitement of Baltimore and Washington. The talk was all of war and State's rights, and every Southern midshipman was constantly asked the question, "Are you going to stay with the Flag or go South?"

Luce reported for duty in March and shortly afterwards he was sent to Washington by the Superintendent of the Academy to represent to the Secretary of the Navy the situation at Annapolis, the defenceless position of all Government property which was threatened with destruction by Southern sympathizers in the event of war. He was charged especially with the recommendation that the old *Constitution* should be removed immediately to some northern port.

Luce did not find a willing or sympathetic audience at the Navy Department. Mr. Welles did not consider the conditions sufficiently serious to take immediate action, and sent word to the Superintendent in effect, not to worry, there was no danger as yet.

Luce's duties as assistant to the Commandant were not such as to content him with duty on shore under the circumstances, but his efforts to get to sea were not successful until May, 1861, when he was ordered to the frigate *Wabash* just one month after fire was opened on Fort Sumter and a week before the Academy was moved to Newport, R. I.

The *Wabash* was commanded by Captain Samuel Mercer, and among the watch officers was Luce's intimate friend, classmate, and shipmate, Lieutenant Upshur.

CHAPTER V

In Action at Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal. Returns To Naval Academy. Commands Practice Squadron.

ABOUT the middle of May, the U. S. Steam Frigate *Wabash*, to which, as we have seen, Luce had been ordered as a watch officer, was commissioned at the New York Yard, and shortly afterwards sailed for Hampton Roads on a cruise which was destined to become historic.

The *Wabash* arrived off Charleston early in June and joined the force assembled under Flag Officer Silas H. Stringham who was flying his flag in the *Minnesota*. The monotony of blockading was varied by the capture of several prizes and chasing suspicious-looking vessels. A number of English men-of-war were nosing in and about carefully watching operations, also a Frenchman and a Brazilian. Occasional news from the North was brought by ships on the way to the Gulf, but all in all it was a hot dull summer until the latter part of August when the affair at Hatteras Inlet occurred.

Hatteras Inlet lies only about 18 miles west and south of Cape Hatteras and is the principle sea entrance to Pamlico and Albermarle Sounds. Owing to shoal water and the intricate channels inside, it was a favorite landfall of the blockade runners and a rendezvous for the Confederate light draft vessels. From 25th June to 4 August, 1861, the latter had brought in 16 prizes.[1]

As the interior waterways connected directly with Norfolk the importance of the control of the Inlet is ob-

[1] Maclay's *History United States Navy*, vol. ii., p. 239.

vious. Therefore, it was decided to capture the Confederate forts guarding the entrance. The operations marked an era in naval warfare in this country as it was the first time our wooden ships had been tested, against earthworks, and also it was the first time our forts were attacked by ships while underway, thus compelling the forts to fire at a moving target.

The object of the expedition was quickly accomplished, and on the 29th the forts surrendered.

The affair at Hatteras Inlet was Stringham's fight, and although considered in terms of the holocaust of modern warfare, it was not much more than a skirmish, it reflects great credit upon the Flag Officer, and for the time and conditions and its results, it must be considered one of the Navy's brilliant achievements.

Among the prisoners taken by Stringham was Captain Samuel Barron, a distinguished officer of the "old" Navy, who as late as April, 1861, had been detailed by President Lincoln as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation. He had been in the Navy since 1812, having served about as long as Stringham, who had entered in 1809. He enjoyed a high reputation "but he was a Southerner," says Luce, "and was believed at the time he was ordered by the President to relieve Captain Stringham as Officer of Detail, to hold a commission in the Confederate Navy. . . . The effect of this order if carried out would have been to place a disloyal officer in control of the Navy."[1]

It so happened that among the vessels of Stringham's force was the famous sailing frigate *Cumberland*, which was towed into action by the *Wabash*. In the afternoon when firing ceased she was towed out again, but the next morning when the bombardment was resumed, "the *Cumberland* stood into action under all sail for the line of engaged ships, and luffing ahead of the leading one we executed a simultaneous evolution of shortening and furling sail, dropping anchor, and opening fire. It was a

[1] *Naval Administration*, iii., U. S. Naval Institute.

very smart and inspiring piece of seamanship. Old officers who saw the maneuver have often spoken of the magnificence and beauty of the ship on the last occasion of an American frigate going into battle under sail."[1]

When the *Cumberland* was sunk by the *Merrimac* in the following March, the sail period definitely ended.[2]

Until the attack on Port Royal the 7th November, the Fleet was employed blockading the coast. Flag Officer du Pont relieved Stringham in command of the squadron hoisting his flag in the *Wabash*, and Lieutenant Commander C. R. P. Rodgers temporarily succeeded Captain Mercer in command of the ship.

There is an entry in Luce's journal about this time that a sailor jumped from the stern ladder to get his cap which contained the picture of his sweetheart and was drowned although "every effort was made to save him." He does not mention that he himself swam to the rescue. Years afterwards the story was told by a marine corporal

[1] *Memoirs of Admiral Selfridge*, p. 40.

[2] In the British Navy the passing of the sailing ship in action is told by Admiral Sir W. R. Mends, C. B. The incident is related of the *Arethusa* at Odessa during the Crimean War.*

"We had a delightful working breeze, and the men being on their mettle and working beautifully I was able to handle the ship exactly as I wished; we stood in twice, tacked close off the Mole, and engaged the works on it in reverse; having on the second occasion got the range accurately, we poured in a destructive fire as we went about . . .. One of the officers wrote, 'after standing in and opening fire we tacked and stood out, while the eight middle guns on the port side of the main deck were transported to the stern ports. When we stood in again, two guns opened fire on us from the top of the hill, as well as those from the Mole. A reef was taken in the topsails by the sail trimmers while the rest of the men were firing; this was done to prevent the *Arethusa* from going too fast through the water, and so to allow better aim.' I believe this to be the last occasion when a British frigate fought an independent action under sail.

"A brilliant maneuver. A strong breeze was blowing making it necessary to reef topsails. The frigate had carried sail to baffle the enemy's artillery-men by the rapidity of her movements. When it became necessary to shorten sail, she delivered one broadside, hove in stays, reefed her topsails while tacking, and then delivered the other broadside. No such *tour de force* can ever be performed now."

* *Life of Sir W. R. Mends, G. C. B.*

who was an eye witness of the gallant act. He said, "We were aloft furling sails, when a cap blew off and was carried into the water; down went the blue-jacket who owned it, and running to the starboard gangway he sprang into the sea to recover it; directly we saw him struggling, 'man overboard!' was shouted, and a boat ordered to be lowered; before the boat was lowered from the davits the officer of the deck, who had meanwhile divested himself of his sword and coat, jumped overboard, and swam vigorously towards the drowning sailor, who disappeared before the officer could reach him. Those of us who remained aloft were now alarmed for the safety of the officer as we saw numbers of hideous sharks around him. We warned him of his danger, which caused him to keep moving as lively as possible until the boat reached and rescued him. We shall never forget the heroic attempt which Lieutenant (now Commodore) Stephen B. Luce made to save the life of poor William Emmet, who without doubt, was seized and carried down by sharks."

After his retirement Admiral Luce received a letter from an old sailor then an inmate of Snug Harbor who recalled this incident. The letter is worth quoting:

Dear Admiral Luce:

I say Dear Admiral Luce for the reason that I can only look back to the dark days of '61, and remember you with feelings of admiration and respect akin even to affection. . . . I was in the *Wabash* with you, and well do I remember the day when lying off Charleston you jumped off the poop and attempted to save poor Bill Emmett; what a noble deed for you.

The next move of the Navy Department was to capture Port Royal Sound and establish a base of supplies. This duty was assigned to Flag Officer du Pont who was given a large force to accomplish it. He fought a brilliant and successful action.

In the action Luce commanded a gun-deck division, and his only view of the battle was through the gun-ports.

After the loss of Port Royal the Confederates attempted to cut the fleet's communications with the interior, by obstructing the network of waterways which intersect the country. To prevent this a number of small vessels with howitzer launches were sent in to attack the enemy gunboats on the 30th December, 1861. Luce had command of one of the launches. After several short encounters with the Confederate gunboats and shore defences this service was successfully completed at the beginning of the year (1862). Shortly afterwards Luce was detached at the urgent request of the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, but against his own vigorous protest, and was ordered there as Head of the Department of Seamanship. It was heartbreaking to come ashore and turn away from active operations with the enemy. He wrote the following letter to the Flag Officer, who held up his detachment for a few days but the Department would not cancel the orders:

U. S. S. *Wabash*,
October 13, 1861.

Sir: I learn from various sources that orders detaching me from this ship have already been issued.

As it seems to be the general impression that the squadron under your command is on the eve of engaging in important operations against the enemy, I most earnestly request that orders detailing me for shore duty may be withheld at least until the termination of the expedition now in contemplation.

I have the honor to be

Your obt svt.
S. B. Luce.

Luce in his diary gives scant space to the operations of the *Wabash*, and nothing at all to his experience and impressions, with the exception of a letter he wrote his wife the night before the boat expedition. The letter shows his deep religious conviction, and his readiness for whatever the future might have in store for him; the letter


Port Royal Ferry
Fort
Fort Adams
Port Royal Island
Haywards
Coosaw River
Lucky's Island
Beaufort
Broad River
Paris Island
Beaufort River
Hilton Head
Wabash
Bay Point
Jany 1st 1862
The Ottawa Pembina & armed transport
A.B. proceeded up Beaufort River, thro the
Brick Yard Creek into the Coosaw, thence up to P.R.
Ferry, where a junction was formed with armed Ferry boat
Ellen & Seneca, which had gone up Broad River.
Large Number of Rebs which had been collected
& secreted among the Islands on the banks of the Creeks (marsh
(reeds) and in these the advanced guard was fired on by rebs
under Cover of Earthworks & Lunettes. They then marched up to Adams
& were joined by the main body which landed at that place.
The whole body then advanced towards the Fort, but learning
that the Enemy were strongly posted in a thick wood
(see Plan) Stevens left the main road & turned down to his
left & his force to attack battle in an
open field (see A). The Rebs declined. In the mean
time the G.B. had arrived at the Ferry, ground the Fort
abandoned Point & the Round Heads then crossed Creek
pursuit from Ferry joined by Stevens. Next
morning all returned to the Ferry - Both G.B.s
returned to Embarcge - Loss on our side 1 Killed
7 wounded - Enemys Loss unknown - This is the
whole story.

Sketch of Virginity of Port Royal & St. Helena

closes with these words, "I could not die in a better cause, aiding in the suppression of a rebellion against a wise and good government."

On January 9, 1862, Luce was detached from the *Wabash* and unwillingly went to Newport and reported to Commodore George S. Blake, the Superintendent.

In the summer of 1862 he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander; he commanded the *Marion* on the summer practice cruise, and was directed to overhaul every vessel he met and satisfy himself of her identity. It was exciting work for the youngsters who saw possible glory and advancement in every craft that appeared above the horizon.

He remained attached to the Academy until October, 1863. He did not allow his great disappointment to keep him from doing his full duty. A month after he assumed his new duties he addressed a letter to the Commandant of Midshipmen, Lt. Commander C. R. P. Rodgers, recommending improvement in the methods of instruction in seamanship. As it refers to the transition period from rope to iron and wire, in rigging ship, and was the foundation of his great work on Seamanship it is quoted at length:

"There being no textbook in Seamanship (for to apply that term to the *Kedge Anchor*,[1] would be incorrect), I have been compelled to prepare a course for the class, making selections from such works as seemed most reliable.

"I find by an old manuscript in the Library which Commodore Bainbridge in 1809 presented to the Navy Department, rules for masting and sparring ship, and Commodore Rodgers is quoted as authority for rules for finding the comparative sizes of standing rigging. These rules seem to have been transmitted from generation to generation of Midshipmen and always accepted as infallible. The question in my mind is do the same rules still obtain in these days of long ships, superior quality of rig-

[1] The *Kedge Anchor*, by Sailing Master William Brady. 1841.

ging, increased use of iron and general improvement. If they yet hold good I should like to have some authority for saying so to my class; if not I submit the question, whether or not they shall be replaced by such as are in vogue in our rigging lofts and spar sheds.

"Looking beyond my own particular branch I can find nothing on American Naval Architecture adapted to the use of our students. No doubt the graduate may be able to describe accurately the method of launching a man-of-war in England, and to enumerate the principal parts of a 'cradle' and the 'ways,' but the junior classes often betray a commendable degree of curiosity on these subjects which it seems a pity not to gratify. Why then, should not the walls of some room always accessible to the Acting Midshipmen, be adorned with photographs, drawings, and models descriptive of these subjects as they are practised in the Navy Yards of the United States? A few well developed photographs of a man-of-war steamer in the various stages of construction, would, I take it, impart more real useful knowledge than many pages of written description.

"The actual practice of Seamanship on the decks or in the tops of a man-of-war is by far the best method of instruction, and admitting the fact that a good seaman can never be made by the mere study of books, yet the system necessary in an Institution of this kind will always render a textbook indispensable to both student and instructor, a book which in its comprehensiveness and weight of authority shall compare favorably with the standard works in the other branches, carrying the ship, the student's future home, from her cradle to her grave.

"With all their carefully prepared textbooks in the Army, with their almost exact uniformity throughout the whole body from tactics in the field to the fitting of a dragoon saddle it was still thought worthy of considerable expense to send a Commission to Crimea to obtain what information could be gleaned from the armies of other

nations. The results of the labors of that Commission have been given to the Army in well printed books, in which the cost of plates does not seem to have been considered. Scarcely anything worth knowing appears to have escaped the vigilant eyes of those gentlemen and the straps and buckles of a Prussian knapsack were thought worthy of careful delineation.

"Does it seem creditable then, Sir, to this Institution that it should possess no textbook on the most important branch taught within its halls?"

In a letter to a friend about his *Seamanship*, he says, "while waiting for something better to turn up I cut out from several textbooks that had been used by my predecessors, such parts as had been given to the Midshipmen, put them together, and gave them to a printer here (Newport, R. I.) to be published. The work was done in a hurry; first to save my copying of manuscript, second because I knew I would have to go to sea again. This was the beginning of the textbook now in use."[1]

The *Seamanship* was a success from the beginning "and every youngster grappled with it until its very words were crystallized into the brain structure of the personnel." It went through many editions and was used as a textbook at the Naval Academy for forty years until sails disappeared. It was well known in England, and it is said that at the opening of the new Eddystone Light House in 1882 when Commodore Luce's Training Squadron was in Plymouth, the Duke of Edinburgh told him that he learned his first lessons in Seamanship from his book.

In the preface to the Fourth Edition (1868) Luce states that, "for the present at least, the introduction of steam and iron-clads into the Navy in no degree lessons the necessity that Naval Officers should be practical seamen skillful in the management of ships under canvas and fertile in all the resources known to seamen as well as prompt in the application of them, when meeting the ac-

[1] *The United States Naval Academy*, Park Benjamin.

cidents and disasters incident to men-of-war." With one exception, the reference to ships under canvas, these words are as applicable to the Navy to-day as when they were written.

In the summer of 1863 he commanded the practice squadron which consisted of the *Macedonian*, Flagship the *Marion*, and the yacht *America*, all sailing vessels. They left Newport together, 6 June, 1863, but when well out from land the smaller vessels were sent to cruise in Long Island Sound, while the *Macedonian* alone "stretched away to the eastward with a light southerly breeze and a promising sky"; she had on board 304 midshipmen. The run to Plymouth was made in twenty days.

Before following the *Macedonian* across the Western Ocean on perhaps the most memorable practice cruise ever made by midshipmen, we will turn for a moment to the *America* and *Marion* which were beating down Long Island Sound.

The *Marion* was commanded by Lieutenant Commander E. O. Matthews, a fine officer and very popular, commonly known in the service as "Pat." He reports to Luce that shortly after parting company with him, they ran into foul weather with rain and light baffling winds.

"During the night," he writes, "the wind freshened and we beat through the Race having all hands on deck. Midshipmen Evans[1] (acting Lieutenant) had charge of the deck while beating through and worked ship beautifully, displaying a perfect knowledge of the value of the different sails in steering a ship in a strong tide-way. He also reefed the topsails during his watch with little or no assistance from me. While close to Gull Island Light, the wheel ropes worked off the drum so we had to resort to relieving tackles and sails for steering."

It is pleasant to record this fine tribute written years ago, and all but forgotten, to a young officer who in after

[1] Afterwards Rear Admiral R. D. Evans.

years fulfilled the promise of his youth and became one of the best known American naval officers.

Matthews reports that he has placed Midshipman Douglas Cassel, who in a few months distinguished himself at the battle of Mobile Bay where he was wounded, in command of the *America* "with twelve midshipmen in his wardroom and eight men on deck."

Matthews took his little division into the Gulf Stream to give the midshipmen a real taste of the sea, and as he expected he ran into a gale and the *Marion* was struck three times by lightning. "Having experienced enough Gulf Stream weather in a condemned ship, and with nearly all the midshipmen and acting Lieutenants of the midshipmen first class seasick, I concluded to stand to the westward in hopes of finding better weather." He concludes, "We have neither seen nor heard of anything Piratical."

Let us now return to the *Macedonian*.

Two days before getting into port, Luce called all hands aft and addressed the crew in the presence of the officers. He said in part:

"I am particularly gratified to observe the harmony which has existed between the crew proper and the midshipmen of the ship. These young gentlemen are now learning their profession, a most important part of which is to become familiar with the character, the habits and the peculiarities of seamen, a class of men they will some day be called upon to command, and while for this object we encourage them to mix among you to a great extent I charge you in no instance to forget that they are young officers and gentlemen. . . . I like to see what is called the etiquette of a man-of-war kept up, that is the crew should always be polite, most particularly to foreign officers. Such politeness on your part is the best evidence of your own respectability."

At this period of the Civil War our relations with both England and France were somewhat strained, and doubts were felt of the welcome the ship might receive. At

Plymouth, Lieutenant W. T. Sampson[1] was sent with a letter from Commander Luce to Mr. Charles Francis Adams, our Minister in London, informing him of the arrival of the *Macedonian* and the object of the cruise, and stating that the length of the visit would depend upon the nature of their reception, "which former practice cruises have found marked for its courtesy and cordiality—and it is upon this subject I am particularly desirous of being advised by you." While lying at anchor a merchant vessel in the harbor displayed the Confederate flag, but hauled it down when ordered to do so by Commander Luce.

Happily every courtesy possible was extended by the port Admiral, Sir Houston Stewart, and there was more than the usual interchange of civilities, social and personal. Luce reports, "A party of midshipmen attended the Parish Church of St. Andrews built in the time of Henry VI and still a fashionable church; by a previous arrangement seats were provided, and the midshipmen marched up in regular order. I trust the impression made was not an unfavorable one."

Among the Midshipmen of the First Class was one of the Orleans princes who had been permitted to take a special course at the Naval Academy, Pierre d'Orleans, Duc de Penthièvre, the son of the Prince de Joinville and grandson of Louis Philippe, but known to his classmates as "Pete." One of Sampson's duties in London was to confer with the Minister as to the propriety of taking the Prince to France, as "in the rapid and momentous changes taking place it would be as well to avoid giving offense, or what might be distorted as such to the Emperor of France." It was decided after an interview with the Prince de Joinville to grant leave to the young prince with orders to join the ship at Lisbon. Luce thought favorably of him, and in his report of the cruise, he states that "Mr. d'Orleans navigated the ship from Cadiz to Madeira and made an excellent land-fall."

[1] Afterwards Commander in Chief at the battle off Santiago, 1898.

From time immemorial midshipmen have been required to keep journals, and from time immemorial the journals have as a rule been perfunctory and altogether without value. Luce's order on the subject has a familiar ring, and will find an echo in the heart of every man who has ever been a midshipman.

"The journals sent in for inspection are for the most part very carelessly written, one or two are quite slovenly and scarcely one can be called well kept. They all seem to be hasty copies of the ship's log."

Then he prescribes in detail what they are to write in the journals, which were to include complete sailing directions and a chart of every port visited. He said, "to be useful in after years, and to induce a habit of acquiring useful knowledge it shall contain notes on the pilotage of each place, on the facilities for water, provision, wood and stores; facilities for docking and repairs, on the anchorage and tides, on the military defenses and etiquette peculiar to the place, the name and brief description of every man-of-war in port and such other items as may prove useful for future reference. The journals of Commodores Bainbridge and Porter are still read with interest."

This extract from his report of the practice cruise of 1863 is the germ of the valuable volume now published by the Navy Department containing information of every port in the world. What was first suggested for Midshipmen, now is required of Captains.

The ship was at Spithead on 4th July and the national salute was fired, as was customary at that time, at daylight, noon and sunset. The English men-of-war were notified, but did not fire as Queen Victoria passed about noon in the Royal Yacht to the Isle of Wight and had expressed the wish there would be no demonstration. In reporting this incident to Washington, Luce remarks, "The explanation was considered satisfactory."

At Cherbourg the hospitality and friendliness were no

less profuse and gratifying; which before leaving Luce acknowledged in letters to the Vice Admiral Prefect.

From Commander Luce to the Secretary of the Navy

Cherbourg, August 18, 1863.

I was invited to take part in the funeral ceremonies of the late Duke of Hamilton which by reason of the relationship of the Duchess to the Emperor were to be on an unusual scale. The position assigned to me in the procession was, I think much higher than I was entitled to, being with the Admiral Prefect and two others next highest in rank. I mention this circumstance on account of the compliment paid to the Commander of an American man-of-war, and also to speak of the embarrassment I could not but feel on account of my uniform. In the vast concourse of officers of every rank and degree I was conspicuous as being the only one in undress, that is without the chapeau and dress coat. My *outré* appearance was noticed at once, and I felt it encumbent to apologize to the Admiral explaining that by a recent change in our uniform, the two articles considered by Europeans as indispensable to full dress and state occasions had been discarded.

Later this part of the uniform was restored.

Perhaps in no other profession does life repeat itself so mechanically like an idiot, as the Navy. During the World War and afterwards officers were again deprived of these two articles of uniform, and Commanders-in-Chief and Captains and Naval Attachés were compelled to appear at Court and State functions sans epaulettes, sans chapeau, sans laced-trousers to the embarrassment not so much of the officers as to the goldlaced officials who escorted them. By the sagacity of a Secretary of the Navy, these "bauble accoutrements" have been restored, but for how long? Queried the Emperor of Japan, when an Admiral in recent years was presented at Court wearing a frock coat and plain trousers, "Is *that* the full dress uni-

form of the American Navy?" not realizing that this mock Jeffersonian simplicity was only a foolish symbol of democracy.

Commander Luce must have had his tongue in his cheek, when he wrote to a certain midshipman on board ship at sea:

"You have been reported to me for inviting upon two occasions your superior officer to drink with you; as this is not only a breach of etiquette and the rules of polite society, but a serious violation of the discipline of the Naval School, you will please furnish me with a written statement," etc.

He insisted upon proper bearing of the midshipmen on all occasions; the following order illustrates this:

At Sea, August 14th.

It has been observed that during church service a number of Midshipmen instead of rising at the proper times remain seated. This is not proper in any point of view. Those who belong to the Episcopal Church should conform to the rules of their own Church as a matter of religious duty. Those who belong to other Churches should out of respect for the Christian religion and deference to the Church they attend, follow the customs of that Church for the time being.

Those who are so unfortunate as to belong to no Church whatever should remember that it is but the part of a well bred gentleman to show respect for Religion, and when attending service, evince at least an outward regard for the sacred exercise.

It was a busy cruise full of adventurous possibilities. The experience of being at sea in war times, under war conditions, and on the lookout for enemy ships gave the midshipmen on board in after years a standing in law with the veterans of the blockading squadrons and the heroes of the river fights. It made them eligible for membership in various military organizations, and entitled them and their widows to Civil War pensions.

Day and night exercises and drills were carried on unceasingly, and in every way possible the young officers were trained in the practice of the profession. Luce was always a man of originality; he was never bound by precedent or routine, and he was fond of surprising the midshipmen with unexpected situations and preparing them to meet sudden emergencies. He believed that first of all a seaman should be forehanded—he should be ready. Once he had a memorable fire drill. "An alarm of fire was given late one evening at sea, when without waiting for a drum the people rapidly assembled at their quarters as provided for by the Fire bill. The berth deck was filled with smoke issuing from the fore hatch, and officers on that deck actually felt the fire through the soles of their shoes so intense was the heat in the forehold and so complete the deception."[1]

Before leaving Cherbourg for Lisbon, Commander Luce, acting on the information he had received from Mr. Adams in London that it was possible he might fall in with one of the new Confederate cruisers in the Bay of Biscay, disguised his ship. "For the first time in the history of the Navy," remarks Park Benjamin,[2] "a United States man-of-war copied the appearance of a Spaniard. The lofty poles of the *Macedonian* were cut down to stumps, her spars painted bright yellow and her sides black with no white strip. Then with a huge new Spanish Ensign flying at her peak instead of her own colors she proceeded to patrol the Bay of Biscay." Every soul on board was eager for the glory of a fight, but the enemy did not appear.

The *Macedonian* after leaving Madeira where several blockade runners were at anchor, sailed for Newport and one night late in September, 1863, she arrived during the first watch off Point Judith. Of her dramatic entrance into Narragansett Bay at night beating up against a head

[1] *Report of Summer Practice Cruise, 1863.* Commander Luce.
[2] *History of the U. S. Naval Academy,* Benjamin.

wind under sail, Rear Admiral P. F. Harrington, who was a midshipman on board, draws an impressive and vivid picture. He says:

"The ship was under courses and single-reefed topsails, turning against a gale from northwest, blowing directly out of the narrow passage from Narragansett Bay. Progress to windward was favored by the flood tide. After long and laborious tacking ship to windward, the voice of the First Lieutenant failed. The Commander took the trumpet, and when the pilot, standing at the knight-heads, cried 'Hard a-lee!', the ship's company was startled by a singularly clear, compelling voice, rising above the gale. No one who heard and felt the impulse of his orders could forget the stirring time and the inspiring commander. After midnight, following some hours of intense action, the commander suddenly hauled up the courses, lowered the fore and main topsails, braced aback the mizzen topsail, and dropped an anchor in Narragansett Bay. Only a seaman of high courage would have attempted, and only a seaman of persistent resolution could have accomplished that notable enterprise. It was an illustration of the capability, the energy, and the determined character of the seaman, Stephen B. Luce.

"Luce had a versatile mind and a wide range of professional expedients of instruction and exercise, keeping the midshipmen on tip-toe expectancy. Even in their hammocks, the subconscious minds were half alert, waiting the night alarm. Luce excelled as a drillmaster. A gun Division, which served occasionally under his personal direction, learned at once the force of a leader; the urgency of his command stirred every man to instant action. I was a midshipman of that Division and Luce's method and the spirit of it formed the model which I tried to reach in my later service."

It is appropriate here to record the estimate of Admiral Luce written by Admiral Evans, who as we have seen was a midshipman at this time on board the *Marion*. Refer-

ring to the employment of the sloops of war, *John Adams* and *Marion*, for practical seamanship and gunnery drills afloat, Evans wrote of the year 1862–1863[1]:

"That master of his trade, Stephen B. Luce, had charge of drills afloat, and scarcely a day passed, that we were not under his watchful eyes at some sort of practical seamanship. Every Saturday we went outside (Newport Harbor) in one or both ships, and then the work was most thorough and complete, each midshipman in turn taking charge of the deck for different evolutions. On our way in, we could generally tell when our work had been satisfactory; if it had not been, the ship was sure to fetch up hard and fast before we reached our anchorage, anchors were carried out and the vessel hove off, properly berthed and everything made snug and shipshape, before we could leave her. For all this work we had only midshipmen—no men to help us. Everything must be done with our own hands, and thus we learned thoroughly what a man had to do in every position on board a sailing ship from passing a close reef to sweeping down the quarter deck. We learned how to do it ourselves, and how to make others do it under our instruction. If the weather happened to be such that we could not get underway, we sent down yards, masts, and rigging, and proceeded to refit everything. Before the year was out there were very few in the class who could not, with their own hands, do any job of work required of a petty officer or seaman.[2]

[1] *A Sailor's Log*, R. D. Evans.

[2] Commenting on this Rear Admiral P. F. Harrington says in a letter to the author, September 23, 1924:

"Evans was of my class and his statement is true enough with slight modifications. Luce put the *John Adams* ashore on Goat Island one Saturday, and he did it intentionally, and we spent a part of the afternoon getting the ship afloat. I cannot recall any other occasion when either of the practice sloops was grounded. Again kedge anchors were used in floating the *John Adams*, and the midshipmen learned the effects of sallying in a body from side to side on deck and from the bow to the stern. A stream anchor may have been used on that occasion, but not the bower anchors. The carrying out of a bower anchor and chain was done by the

Writing of this period Rear Admiral C. F. Goodrich says[1]:

"When I was at the Naval Academy, having entered in 1861, Lieutenant S. B. Luce was head of the Department of Seamanship. I did not come into personal contact with him until later, but I saw him from afar, so to speak, and I shared the universal admiration of his outstanding qualities as a sailor. In knowledge of and authority in that now lost art, Seamanship, he was without a rival in our own or possibly, any Navy. I should call him our very *best* seaman had I not, subsequently, served under Alexander A. Semmes who, as a *practical* sailor was, in my judgment, worthy to be regarded as Luce's equal—the highest professional honor of that period.

"Luce's spare, trim figure, side whiskers, clean-cut features, scrupulously neat attire and officer-like bearing are unforgetable, as is his ringing, melodious, tenor voice, both engaging and commanding which, when giving orders, could be heard above the soughing of the wind through the rigging, the shaking of the canvas and the rattling of the running gear in evolutions. To hear it inspired every soul on board with the burning desire to jump to the ropes designated and put every ounce of his strength upon them. Oh yes, a born leader of men.

"On Saturdays when the weather favored, he would take us midshipmen out in the old sloop-of-war *Marion;* each going to his station, we would get under way and cruise around in Narragansett Bay till noon, Luce directing the movements, either in person or vicariously through some lucky first classman. It was useful experience, of course, to carry out an anchor and warp the *Marion* off a shoal where Luce had gently grounded her, but this opera-

---

midshipmen of the *John Adams* in Peconic Bay, Long Island, under direction of Edward Simpson, Commanding, and Joseph N. Miller, First Lieutenant, two expert seamen, of memory honored by all who knew them and generally valued by the Navy. That was in 1862."

[1] Letter to author.

tion generally resulted in a later dinner and the loss of much, in some cases all of our afternoon liberty,—hence neither it nor he was exactly popular when, as it seemed to us youthful critics, this valuable lesson was too often repeated. Some of us who had to learn it may have profited by it in later years. Even if there was only one such, this instruction was well worth while.

"Luce commanded the same vessel during the summer of 1862 when she was used as a practice ship for midshipmen. I was fortunate enough to be among the number for a month and in her to knock about the New England coast under this rare teacher of his trade."

CHAPTER VI

Commands U. S. Ironclad *Nantucket* off Charleston. Returns to Naval Academy as Commandant of Midshipmen

ALTHOUGH his life at the Naval Academy was unusually active and pleasant, Luce was impatient to get to sea, and was ordered October 13, 1863, to command the monitor *Nantucket* (the sailors called her the Nancy Tucker) which was engaged in operations against Charleston. The attacks on the Charleston forts in the preceding April had disappointed the Navy Department and Rear Admiral du Pont, an efficient and skillful officer, was made the sacrifice. His relief was Rear Admiral John A. Dahlgren, an officer of but little sea service but of great reputation as an ordnance man and the inventor of the Dahlgren smooth bore gun. To him Lieutenant Commander Luce reported.

In one of his papers on Naval Administration, Luce writes of the operations of the monitors before Charleston:

"The Admiral (du Pont) felt that he was a victim of a false conception of the situation at Charleston, by the Department, and that his professional reputation was to be sacrificed to a defective system of naval administration. There was no staff attached to the Secretary's office to prevent placing Admiral du Pont and his command in the utterly false position of being called upon to solve an insolvable problem, viz.: the capture of Charleston without adequate coöperation by the army.

"A year had elapsed since the failure of the attack of

the nine ironclads, when on the 10th of May, 1864, Admiral Dahlgren called together the commanding officers of the New Ironsides and the monitors to discuss the question of attacking Fort Sumter. I was one of those summoned, being then in command of the monitor *Nantucket.*

"There were two conferences; in the first, four including Luce voted for attacking. In the second conference the vote stood No—7 including Luce; Yes—2.

"While operations of some sort seemed advisable, the object to be gained by attacking Sumter was not quite clear. To me, individually we were groping in the dark; and the other members of the council impressed me as being pretty much in the same state of mental obscurity. There was no one present who seemed to understand the problem to be solved and able to state it in precise terms. The well known views of the Navy Department, moreover, only served to complicate the question."[1]

To his old friend at the Naval Academy, Commodore George S. Blake, Luce writes:

U.S.S. *Nantucket*
WARSAW SOUND, Nov. 18, 1863.

. . . . I am very agreeably disappointed in the Ironclads so far, and find this vessel not so unpleasant as I was led to expect, but we are in smooth water and enjoying charming weather. The officers warn me not to be premature in my exultation, for they say it is far different with a high thermometer or in rough weather, and I presume they are right. However sufficient for the day is the evil thereof.

With the exception of a little fishing and the advent of an intelligent contraband now and then, there is nothing to break the full monotony of the blockade in these waters.

When in Port Royal I went on board the *Vermont* and like the tailor at Niagara "Heavens what a place to sponge a coat," my first thought was what a noble ship for the Academy. With that I went to planning and soon

[1] *United Service Magazine.*

got messing, sleeping and washing accommodations on a light and well aired deck.

About this time the Army Signal Code was introduced into the Navy, and gave no end of trouble. Nobody wanted it and the officers regarded it "suspiciously," but Luce thinks "Ensigns Pegram and Dickman, being active and intelligent could shortly become reliable operators."[1] Later he devised a system of fog and night signals by the steam whistle which received favorable reports and he was commended by the Department. There is another entry in his personal log: "Introduced new signal system into the Naval School with consent of War Department."

He reports to the Honorable G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, that there is much complaint from the men principally on account of the absence of bounty money, depreciation of currency, the great increase in the price of Purser's stuffs, and the detention of men over their terms of enlistment, "while the crowning sorrows appear to be the stopping of their grog and the scarcity of old school of officers under whom they would gladly serve under many privations." He receives a deputation of sailors who had sailed with him on a former cruise, "When I asked what they intended to do next—they answered that they would ship in the Army. Many of the seamen have gone into the English Navy and they assured me, that we were doing all we can to drive our best seamen out of the Navy."

He writes, "There is as much necessity for seamen on board an ironclad as other vessels, and finding a number of boys and young landsmen on board I have placed them in charge of one of the officers for instruction."

One autumn day in Newport Harbor, Admiral Luce went on board the U.S.S. *North Dakota* to see the new superdreadnought which had recently gone into commission. Standing on the bridge, sixty feet above the water,

[1] Letter to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

and looking at the cage masts and glancing over the tops of the turrets, and into the conning tower, he said in his whimsical way, "Is there any place on board this ship for a sailor?" He himself had answered the question as just related thirty-five years before. *In any craft that floats there is always room for a sailor.* Also one afternoon at a reception on board the *New York* just after the Spanish War as he was going down an infinite number of steel ladders, and through narrow passageways, lighted by electricity, he said with mock seriousness, "Did anyone ever say that coal whips would not outlive tacks and sheets?"—referring to a much quoted statement in his *Seamanship* written in 1862, that "it is by no means certain that coal whips will outlive tacks and sheets."

Even in the midst of exacting war routine, he found time to submit in detail a long statement of his views to the Navy Department in regard to the organization of school-ships for boys; it was a subject apparently never out of his mind.

His pen was "as restless as a veering wind." He addresses a long letter to Senator Grimes protesting against the return of the Naval School to Annapolis, and to the Mayor of Newport urging him to resist all attempts to take the Academy south to its old home.

To Senator Grimes he admits Annapolis possesses many advantages as a school of learning, but not for a school for the education of young Naval Officers, which should be located at one of the great naval centres "where he can come in daily contact with seamen fresh from the ocean." He decries the Infantry drills and regrets that there is so little seamanship. "It is always the battalion, the muskets, a banner and a drum and fife!" In '61 the Academy had been moved to Newport; "Then," he writes, "it was different; there in a seaport town the youngsters inhaled the sea breezes by day, and at night were lulled to rest by the roar of the Atlantic surf. . . . At the annual examination in 1863 there was a regular Naval exercise and

drill for the first time in the school history of 18 years. The Board of Visitors of which Admiral Goldsborough was President and the Honorable Edward Everett, Mr. Sidney Brooks, among the members, "were taken on board a sloop of war officered and manned by midshipmen. The vessel was got underway by them, taken out into Narragansett Bay, maneuvered in almost every possible way and finally brought to an anchor."

In a letter to Admiral Dahlgren, dated May 14, 1864, he reports two engagements in his ship with Fort Sumter at a distance of 1900 yards to 1500 yards in which "the *Nantucket* was struck five times and the deck plating injured requiring replacement."

Luce had been in command of the *Nantucket* about three months, when he was stationed in Warsaw Sound to watch for an ironclad which the Confederates were reported to be building at Savannah. The *Nantucket* was kept cleared for action and ready for battle and a constant lookout was kept for the enemy. One bright Sunday morning about eleven o'clock when all hands were at divine service and Captain Luce was reading such portions of the liturgy of the Protestant Episcopal Church as were appointed for the day, it was reported to him very quietly that the enemy was sighted through the mist which lay on the water. Luce whispered to the Executive Officer to go on deck, and if he made out the Confederate ram to go to quarters at once. In his story of the incident,[1] he says his heart was in his mouth, "and ready to jump out," for if the enemy were really approaching precious moments were being lost. But the Captain's anxiety was not visible to the crew. However, the mirage suddenly dissipated, and the mysterious object that looked like an ironclad with sloping sides and twin turrets proved to be a boat and two refugees. That and nothing more!

The *Nantucket* made several prizes which did not com-

[1] *Youth's Companion*, February 17, 1898.

pensate for the dullness of the blockade, and the duty was in strong contrast to the brilliant and exciting operations then in progress in the Gulf; but it was a service that won the war.

In September, 1864, Luce relieved his classmate Russell in command of the U.S.S. *Pontiac* off Charleston lightship. The *Pontiac* was what was known as a double ender, that is she was built to go astern as readily as ahead, very light and was intended for special service in harbors, narrow channels, etc. She was constantly engaged in close inshore work against the batteries, and scouting up the shallow rivers.

Luce had been in command only a short time when he had the misfortune to sink a barkentine loaded with coal for the squadron. He was trying to turn his ship in a strong tide, and when halfway round she refused to obey the helm, and rammed the collier abreast the fore channels. In his report to the Admiral he assumed all blame and responsibility and expresses his painful regret for the accident "not only in a primary sense, but as it affects the resources of the Squadron."

While getting underway on the morning of the 7th November, Battery Marshall opened fire on him. At first the shots fell short, and Luce continued to get up anchor when a rifle shot struck the hawse-pipe and exploded, killing four and wounding one officer and seven men. Many years afterwards he received a letter from one of the crew of the *Pontiac* who recalls himself to Luce by an account of the engagement:

QUINCY, ILL.,
February 9, 1901.

. . . . . .

I came on deck that morning at the call of "all hands," deposited my hammock in the netting and started to "go below" at once, because, being a fireman I had nothing to do "on deck"; but, as there seemed to be an emergency at that instant, being under fire, you, Sir, from the bridge,

ordered me (and others) to "go back and lend a hand to get the anchor up." I had just taken a position to help—the bo'sn's mate was "slung" over the port bow in a bowline in the endeavor to ease the cable into the hawsepipe, when the shot struck right there, and burst. The bo'sn's mate was never seen after that—the hawser was cut and the chain was lost. With the others I was thrown flat on the deck; the man who stood next to me was instantly killed —a small blue mark on his breast being the only sign left to account for his sudden taking off. You immediately gave the order to "back out" and we took up a position with the fleet, out of range.

You were alone on the bridge all this time and may remember it was a rainy morning and while we were under fire a rainbow appeared stretching from the rebel battery almost directly over the ship making, as some one remarked, a very good "line shot."

At the time of the explosion a piece of the shell, or of the hawsepipe flew by me, so closely, I could feel the "wind" of it; it struck the paddle box to starboard, right under the bridge and close to two marines who were cleaning their "leather goods" there.

The killed were buried on what I think was called Morris Island, close to Ft. Wagner. Being a fireman I was below decks most of the time, and so had few opportunities to note what was going on.

The same day Luce reports to Admiral Dahlgren the arrival at Charleston of a blockade runner. It was during the midwatch when the lookout discovered a strange vessel bound into Charleston. The evening before the *Pontiac* had moved close in shore, but the moon being too bright he anchored on an east and west line with the *Housatonic*, *Pawnee* and *Acacia*.

"About 1.40 A.M. the quartermaster on watch heard a noise like that of a paddle wheel steamer and presently saw a vessel in the moonlight pass between the lightship and the *Housatonic*. The crew were called to quarters, rockets and signal lights burned, and fire opened upon the stranger, but she slipped past."

The *Pontiac* itself gave him more anxiety than the

enemy. One day he discovers that his after rudder has been carried away, and later on the same day when he returned on board from a Court Martial in the *John Adams*, he is informed that the chain of his best bower parted, and that the ship is riding to the second best anchor "which has but half a stock, and liable to capsize and 'come home,' at any time." Surely he is justified in reporting that in the boisterous weather and rough sea he "feels little confidence in our ground tackle and apprehensive lest the forward rudder might fail us too if used in rough weather."

Luce was never idle. There was no likelihood of his ship grounding on her own beef-bones. He made opportunities when opportunites did not come to him. He was constantly in contact with the enemy, and his casualties were considerable, but notwithstanding these activities he never forgot the education of the boys on board his ship. In his private journal is this entry when the ship is patrolling in the Edisto river, "confined four boys (for two days) for neglecting their school duties."

His boats were employed in scouting in the river and neighboring creeks, and they frequently engaged Confederate skirmishers. On December the 14th one of the scouting party was seen in a *tree* trying to signal to the ship. Assistance was sent in, and it was found that the party had been fighting a battle of their own with a detachment of Wheeler's cavalry; the officer in charge, Ensign Stevens, received wounds from which he subsequently died. Parties of bluejackets were occasionally landed to occupy prominent points, or to fire buildings of plantations which were being used as signal stations. It was a busy life.

On the 5th of June he was ordered to report in the *Pontiac* to General Sherman then in Savannah River for duty in connection with the Army. As will be seen later, this order strangely enough brought to him "an illumination" (as Mahan once expressed it), from General Sherman which twenty years later resulted in the movement for

the War College of which Luce was the heart and soul; but the order itself was prosaic enough with nothing in it to suggest anything prophetic. In view of what it led to, however, it is worth presenting together with the General's undated and informal endorsement written in his own hand.

Flag Steamer *Harvest Moon*
Savannah River
January 13th, 1865.

Lieut. Commdr. S. B. Luce
Commdg. U.S.S. *Pontiac*

Sir:

You will proceed to this place, with the *Pontiac* under your command, without delay, after receiving one month's provisions, and a supply of coal.

It is indispensable that you should be here, and report early on Monday to General Sherman for special service with the column of Major General Davis.

But the sooner the better.

Very respectfully,
Your Obdt. Servt.
J. Dahlgren
Rear Admiral Commandg. S.A.B. Squadron.

Endorsement: All right. I will send Gen. Slocum to consult with you and beg you to escort any boats he may have to send up, to Sister's Ferry on the Savannah.
Gen. Eustis will find any pilots you may want.

W. T. Sherman.

U.S.S. *Pontiac*
Sister's Ferry
Savannah River
January 31, 1865.

From Lt. Commandr. Luce to Admiral Dahlgren.

Sir:

In obedience to your order of the 13th inst I reported to General Sherman and was by him referred to General Slocum for special instructions.

Agreeably to such instructions we left Savannah on the afternoon of the 18th in company with the Army transport *Robert E. Lee* and arrived at Purrysburg about 20 miles up the river on the afternoon of the 19th where we found a portion of the 20th Corps under General Williams.

. . . . . .

With a view of ascertaining the position and strength of the rebel pickets and for information generally, small scouting parties were sent out . . . and cautioned particularly against detached bodies of Wheeler's cavalry . . . Notwithstanding this warning . . . a scouting expedition was surprised and captured.

To Admiral Dahlgren.

Off Savannah, Georgia, Feb. 9th

I dropped down to Sister's Ferry . . . and occupied a position to command the heights on the Georgia side with our guns. By 10 P.M. the last of the rear division, the regiment on picket duty was withdrawn without molestation from the enemy and placed on the South Carolina side.

. . . . . .

S. B. Luce.

I arrived here at 8 P.M.

On the 2nd March while lying above Savannah, Luce captured the *Amazon*, a Confederate steamer which was attempting to get to sea. She had a cargo of 81 bales of cotton. Her master and owner claimed to be a Union man, but after prolonged litigation the prize courts declared her a good prize and awarded to the *Pontiac* $5,605.32.

A few days after the capture of the *Amazon* the ship *Lawrence* of New York with a cargo of cotton was injured by striking on Tybee bar. Luce lightened her and towed her up to a safe anchorage off Point Venus. He thought no more of the incident as he was doing what might reasonably be expected of him, and was therefore surprised and

gratified to receive from the Board of Underwriters in New York a handsome acknowledgment of the service; he requested the Admiral to inform him "as to the propriety of accepting the 'manifestation' of the appreciation" of the Board of Underwriters.

When Commander Luce reported to General Sherman he unconsciously passed a milestone in his career, allusion to which has been made above. This is his own story of the incident which played such an important part in his career.

"On reporting to headquarters, General Sherman indicated in a few short pithy sentences and by the aid of a map, his plan of campaign. General Slocum commanding the left wing of the Army was to move up to Sister's Ferry about forty miles above the city, and cross the Savannah River by means of a pontoon bridge into South Carolina. The object in having a gunboat (the *Pontiac*) was that it might go up the River above the ferry in order to protect the pontoon bridge from molestation by the Confederates supposed to be in force somewhere in the direction of Augusta. 'When I get on solid ground,' he said (for much of that part of the country was inundated), 'somebody will have to get out of the way.' And he added in a pleasant style of banter with which he was accustomed to talk to naval officers, 'You navy fellows have been hammering away at Charleston for the past three years. But just wait until I get into South Carolina; I will cut her communications and Charleston will fall into your hands like a ripe pear.' And that is just exactly what actually came to pass.

"After hearing General Sherman's clear exposition of the military situation the scales seem to have fallen from my eyes. 'Here,' I said to myself, 'is a soldier who knows his business!' It dawned upon me that there were certain fundamental principles underlying military operation which it were well to look into; principles of general application whether the operations were conducted on land or at sea.

"Leaving Pocataligo, his army now well in hand, General Sherman marched on Columbia and captured the city with little difficulty. This led to the immediate evacuation of Charleston, February 17, 1865, or a little over three years after the capture of Port Royal.

"A few weeks later I accompanied Admiral Dahlgren, by invitation, in a ramble about the deserted streets of Charleston. On the 14th April I was in Fort Sumter and witnessed the hoisting of the flag by General Anderson and heard the oration delivered on the occasion by the Rev. Henry Ward Beecher. Charleston and the forts were ours at last; but not through the efforts of the monitors.

"Charleston fell into our hands just as General Sherman said it would, by severing her communications.

"There was then, I learned, such a thing as a military problem, and there was a way of solving it; or what was equally important, a way of determining whether or not it was susceptible of solution.

"The lessons to be drawn from this experience are that the Secretary of the Navy should have, if only in justice to himself, a staff of naval experts to lean upon; that this staff should be attached to and made part of his office, and be under his immediate supervision; and that the members of this staff should be prepared for staff duty by a special course of study.

"In other words the Civil War demonstrated conclusively the necessity of a War College and a general staff. We have the one; let us now have the other without more ado."[1]

Thus was conceived the idea of the War College, but it was twenty years before it became a reality; and then only by perseverance that never faltered. A Naval War College was Luce's goal and through years of rebuffs and discouragement, he never desponded. As was said of Lord Fisher, he made his way with extraordinary independ-

[1] *War College Lectures.*

ence of mind and directness of aim through obstacles that lay in his path, from those who had no political backing and no conventional arts. He respected nothing that was old because it was old, and he feared nothing that was powerful because it was powerful.

Luce remained afloat until fall, thus completing a two years' cruise, and on October 6th he relieved Commander Donald Fairfax as Commandant of Midshipmen at Annapolis, the Academy having returned to Annapolis the preceding summer.

At the same time Admiral Porter was ordered as Superintendent. His selection was a happy inspiration. He went to the Academy as the most distinguished officer of the Navy after Farragut, and his laurels which were many were green and fresh. His career in the Civil War had been spectacular to a degree; he had risen in four years from Lieutenant to the high rank of Rear Admiral and his subsequent promotions to three and four stars quickly followed. He had been thanked four times by Congress. What an exemplar for the Midshipmen! He was a man of commanding intellect, and force of character; a severe disciplinarian but not a martinet; he was tactful and *human*, and it was service opinion that he was the man of all others to head the Naval Academy.[1] The midshipmen were fond of him, but his popularity was not purchased at the expense of discipline.

Between himself and Luce existed a friendship which began in the *Congress* when Porter was a watch officer and Luce a youngster learning his profession, and ties formed then between Lieutenant and Midshipman endured throughout the long lives of both men.

The régime of Porter and Luce were the golden years of the Academy. They worked together harmoniously having the same general ideas of discipline and organization. The officers who were sent to the Academy as assistants

[1] The class of 1869 have placed a stained glass window to his memory in the Naval Academy Chapel.

were men above the average, like Kidder Breese, James A. Greer, Ramsey, R. W. Meade, Selfridge, Sicard, Robert Bradford, "Jack" Barnes, Farquhar, Dana Greene, George Dewey and others.

Many changes were made and innovations introduced. The Academy was revived after its near collapse during the war. Athletics were placed on a firm footing. Porter is said to have been in his youth the strongest man in the Navy next to Stringham; he could crush a silver goblet in his hand like Guy Livingstone in the story, and he took great interest in all outdoor sports, and was himself handy with the foils and the gloves. For a Vice Admiral and Superintendent " to box with Midshipmen" made some of the old conservatives wag their heads, but the fact that he did so, gave a great impetus to physical exercises. Captain Luce also heartily approved of this new departure and encouraged the Midshipmen to organize baseball teams and boat crews and to enter collegiate contests.

Light hearted, good looking, always in smart uniform, Luce was a favorite with the midshipmen, although they stood in awe of him. He possessed a commanding and musical voice, he looked every inch a sailor, and he was their High Priest of Seamanship, who not only wrote of the art, but lived and practiced it, and no doubt some of the youngsters thought he invented it.

The summer practice cruises were continued with Luce as Commandant of Midshipmen in command. In 1866 the Squadron consisted of two frigates, two small steamers and the yacht *America* which cruised on the coast. In his report to the Superintendent of the Academy Luce says:

"One noticeable feature of the exercises on board the *Macedonian* was the absence of noise. On the occasion of our first going into Newport we fanned up to our berth under all sail, the ship brought to an anchor, and the sails furled in perfect silence, not a word being spoken save by the Executive Officer whose orders were delivered in a voice not above the ordinary conversational tone. The

occasion is mentioned in particular as all the attending circumstances conspired to make it unusual, and it could hardly have failed of impressing itself upon the minds of the young officers."

Nothing is a more convincing evidence of discipline than a quiet ship. The practice of hailing the deck from aloft, and giving orders in an unnecessarily loud tone and the useless repetition of commands was not tolerated. In his *Seamanship* Luce says:

"'Hark! the boatswain rudely bawling' is no poetical license in some ships, while in others the pipe is used almost exclusively to the great saving of noise."

Divine service was performed regularly on Sundays, and all hands were piped to daily evening prayers occupying a few minutes at hammock formation. As there was only one Chaplain, this exercise of religious influence was necessarily confined to the senior ship, and the Commandant recommended that Chaplains be sent to all ships, and to be especially selected for their "peculiar duties."

The next two years the practice ships went to Europe, and in 1868 on their return they made a memorable visit to West Point, where they were received with every mark of cordiality. A salute of 15 guns was fired from Battery Knox in their honor, and the Academic and Military Staffs assembled at the Superintendent's office to receive Captain Luce and his officers.

It is said and probably it is true that this visit was made by order of the President, General Grant, in order to promote co-operation between the Army and Navy which was often lacking during the Civil War. He wanted friendships formed in youth which would lead to harmony in later years. It was also Admiral Porter's desire to promote a friendly rivalry between the two Academies.

Although to Admiral Porter primarily belongs the credit of the marked success and progress of the Naval Academy in the years 1866–1869, a large share is due to

Captain Luce. Porter who was always generous in his acknowledgments of service rendered by officers serving with him, never failed to give praise to Luce for his co-operation and work.

When Captain Luce returned to sea duty in the fall of 1869 his immediate connection with the Academy ceased, but his interest in the school never flagged. He had identified himself with it by his administration, and when the new naval academy was built on the site of the old, one of the most imposing buildings was named Luce Hall.

CHAPTER VII

A Cruise in Europe. 1868–1872

WHEN his tour of shore duty at Annapolis expired Commander Luce was ordered to the *Mohongo*, a small double ender in the Pacific Squadron. This was a disappointment as he had expected a ship in the Mediterranean. But he accepted the situation. An insignificant ship on an uninteresting coast did not promise advancement to an ambitious officer but the orders had at least one attractive feature. The duty at the Naval Academy had made heavy drains on his slender purse. There was a great deal of entertaining expected of the Commandant, and there was no table money allowance for official functions.

Leaving his family in Annapolis he went to the west coast by way of the Isthmus. He found the *Mohongo* in bad condition, but the cruising was confined to the coast between San Francisco and Acapulco. It was not a bright prospect, and except for occasionally transporting specie to California for which the Captain received his legal compensation, the days were as monotonous as at Greytown in the *Jamestown*. Fortunately the ship was put out of commission in the early summer, and Luce was ordered to the command of the U.S.S. *Juniata* fitting out at Philadelphia for a cruise on the European Station. He joined her at League Island in July, 1869.

Fifty years ago a cruise to Europe was considered the most desirable sea duty in the navy. The United States habitually maintained there a squadron of five or six

vessels which cruised principally in the Mediterranean, but usually in summer the ships went north into the Baltic. The northern cruise was considered the cream of the Station; sometimes the squadron visited the east coast of Africa, occasionally going as far south as Sierra Leone. This was interesting but not so pleasant. European cruising was so much sought after that it was often obtained by political influence. To counteract this there used to be a ruse of the Department when fitting out a ship for the Brazils or South Pacific to encourage the rumor she was going to the Mediterranean; the Coburgers were not often fooled—only those unversed in Washington strategy fell into the net.

As the United States after the Civil War had no foreign entanglements and only a slight disagreement with Spain, we were not interested in the quarrels of the European chancelleries, and the principal duty of our ships was to show the flag abroad and protect when necessary American life and property.

Whenever anything happened or was about to happen our flag was sure to be present, ubiquity which often provoked resentment. "I declare," said a well-known English official to the author on board the *Nipsic* in Constantinople in the early eighties, "you Americans are the most impertinent people in the world. You are everywhere! What possible interest has America in Constantinople, that you should keep a ship of war here?" At the bombardment of Alexandria our ships were present as a "squadron of observation"; this offended the rebel leader, Arabi Pasha. Several years afterwards when he was an exile in Ceylon, the author then in the *Trenton* called on him in his bungalow near Colombo and spoke of having witnessed the fight. Arabi said, "What were your ships doing at Alexandria? That was an affair in which you had no concern."

Our misunderstanding with Spain was regarding Cuba —Spain having declined to negotiate upon a subject which

related to its internal policy and government. "The situation was further complicated,"[1] says Chadwick, "by the detention of several small gun boats which Spain was building in the United States for service in Cuban waters. The Peruvian Minister at Washington protested against their delivery, as his country was at war with Spain, and he claimed that if these gun boats were allowed to go to Cuba, the larger Spanish cruisers there would be relieved for operations against the republic on the Pacific coast in case hostilities should be renewed. At that time the Spanish Ironclad *Saragossa* was in dry-dock at the New York Navy Yard, and while General Sickles in Madrid, and Mr. Fish in Washington were trying to adjust the conditions, a coal barge sank at the entrance of the dock imprisoning the ship, and it was not raised until after the negotiations were concluded.

In the meantime Luce was dispatched to New York in the *Juniata* with orders to "lend all needful assistance to prevent the departure from New York of the gun boats now building by the Spanish Government." He was ordered to assist the double turreted monitor *Dictator* in this duty.

But the *Juniata* was not delayed long at New York and was made ready to sail as soon as released by instructions from Washington. Let us turn now to Luce's private journal of the cruise.

U.S.S. Juniata, New York, August 16th, 1869.

The *Tallapoosa* arrived and Secretary of the Navy Robeson, visited on board with Ex-Secretary Borie, Vice-Admiral Porter and General Sherman.

New York Harbor, August 17th, 1869.

Mrs. Luce and family came on board for passage to Lisbon.[2]

[1] *The Relations of the United States and Spain*, p. 299. Chadwick.

[2] It was permissible at that time for a Commanding Officer to have his family on board ship.

August 18th, 1869.

Got underway and stood out to sea bound for Lisbon.

The passage across the Atlantic was quickly made under sail alone, and Luce reported to the Secretary, "Consider as a sailing vessel the *Juniata* is a success, and falsifies every unfavorable prediction made of her."

September 13th, 1869, Lisbon.

The British iron clad fleet embracing the Mediterranean and Channel Squadrons came in flying the flag of the Lords of the Admiralty, Mr. Childers and Sir Sidney Dacres, Admiral Alexander Milne and Admiral Symonds. Exchanged visits.

September 15th.

The King of Portugal came on board.

The ship next visited Gibraltar, Tangiers, Barcelona and Marseilles.

September 7th, 1869, Gibraltar.

Went with a party of officers to visit St. Michael's Cave having obtained permission from the Governor of the Fortress to have it opened. Took magnesium and colored lights to illuminate. Entered the cave at an opening about one third distant from the summit of the Rock, and proceeded through a low rough and slippery passage to a famous cave, the most beautiful in the rock. Here fired the signal lights which emitted a dense volume of sulphurous smoke that hung low in the damp air and completely obscured the light of the short candles brought by the guides. Attempting to return, the guides became bewildered and could not find the outlet. Groped for a while until outlet was discovered by one of the officers.

Afternoon visited another portion of the cave where the roof was higher and connected with an opening. Here illuminated with magnificent effect. After leaving the

cave, ascended to the summit of the Rock and lunched at the Signal Station. Then visited the galleries.

Marseilles, November 23rd, 1869.

The *Plymouth* sailed for Lisbon to join H.B.M.S. *Monarch*, and escort home the remains of George Peabody.

Marseilles, November 26th, 1869.

Hoisted flag at halfmast in memory of Rear Admiral Charles Stewart, "Old Ironsides," who in the *Constitution* captured the British *Cyane* and *Levant* in a fight off Madeira, February 20, 1815.

Marseilles, January 26th, 1870.

When standing out of harbor in tow of tug, tiller rope parted, rats having gnawed the raw-hide of which it is made. Anchored just in time to avoid ramming a steamer. Pilot with strawberry nose much excited. Master of tug on his knees invoking the skies.

The religious strain in Luce's character is shown in a letter he wrote to a clergyman, Mr. Smithson, regretting that the departure from Marseilles would prevent another church service on board, and thanking him for the Sunday visits. "I know that it is to our Divine Master you look for commendation and to Him alone, but it is only proper that we who desire to benefit from your labors and those of the Society you so efficiently represent should give some expression however feeble of our high appreciation of its value."

At Sea, January 30th.

Approaching Villefranche. Alps capped with snow glistening in early bright sunlight. A long low line of lights shining from the shore at Nice.

March 20th, 1870, Spezzia.

Clear and pleasant. Went in company with a number of officers of *Franklin* and *Juniata* to attend the funeral of General Chioo, late chief of engineer corps at Spezzia. Minute guns fired by *Re Galantuomo*. Divine service held on board at 3 P.M. by Rev. Mr. Clark, English clergyman. "'Tis indeed," "'Twill do. Quite so." Rev. Mr. C. told of a bear (Polar) that had been seen off the Scilly Islands on an ice-berg,—"Very funny, quite so, quite so."

On the way to Tunis from Spezzia the wind dies out and Luce gets up steam. Whenever in those days a ship took a pilot or got up steam an explanation had to be made to the Admiral, and to the Navy Department. If action in taking a pilot was not approved the pilotage was checked against the Captain's account; if getting up steam was not endorsed, he was reprimanded. So it was often a difficult position to face. On this occasion Luce reported that he was "apprehensive that in the strong current which runs around Sardinia the ship might be drifted into dangerous proximity to shoals" and this explanation was apparently accepted.

It was March, 1870, when the *Juniata* reached Tunis. From our Consul, Mr. Harris Heap, Luce heard the details of the riot caused by a murder committed by a fanatical Moor. This was to have been the signal for the indiscriminate massacre of the foreigners. "The summary execution of the wretch by orders of the Bey stopped the trouble, but guards are still posted around Consulates." Luce is so impressed with the inadequate rank of our representative in Tunis that he recommends the Consulate be raised to Consolate General. He writes: "Constantly visiting foreign countries and being thrown among foreign officials of almost all grades it seems to me that we (officers of the Navy) are peculiarly qualified to look upon all such questions with an eye single to the interests of our government, hence it becomes our duty to express our

opinions upon such subjects as concern our foreign relations falling under our observation with freedom and candour, leaving to others to judge of their value." This recommendation was eventually carried out; it had first been recommended by the Secretary of State in 1846.[1]

Tunis, March 18th.

Consul Heap gave a ball to the officers at the Consulate where his family has lived almost continuously since 1824, he having followed his brother David Porter Heap who had followed his father Dr. S. D. Heap. Music by *Juniata's* band, which was the first European band in Tunis for thirty years. Company consisted principally of the Foreign Consuls and their families—considerable beauty and fashion displayed. Among the guests was the famous American beauty Mrs. Ronalds.

Accompanied by a number of the officers of the ship, I was presented by Mr. Heap to the Bey. I presented the Admiral's compliments and good wishes for his health, and at the same time expressed his regrets in not seeing him during his recent visit to Tunis. Count Kaffo acted as interpreter. The Bey was not at his palace at the Bardo, but at a private residence near by, so after the interview, the proper permit having been given, we visited the palace. The throne room is a large and handsome apartment, hung around with life size portraits of various sovereigns of Europe, of the present Bey and his immediate predecessor. Open from the throne room is another apartment not quite so large and more private, the walls of which are covered with pictures of no little merit. I was much gratified to see among them a full length portrait of Washington.

June 6th, 1870.

At anchor in the Bay of Tangier. Immediately after the salute I paid an official visit to the Governor Sidi

[1] Report to Congress, December 12, 1846.

Abbas Amtishet, at whose residence I met the prime minister to the Emperor, Sidi Mohammed Bengash. I expressed the hope that they would visit the *Juniata*, an invitation they readily accepted. The next day, at the appointed hour one of our boats, (being in attendance) brought them off, where they were received with the usual honors. They inspected the ship with much apparent interest, their visit lasting about two and a half hours.

On the morning of the 8th of June off Cape Santa Maria passed and exchanged colors with the Spanish Squadron, consisting of two heavy wooden steam frigates, a large iron clad frigate probably the *Numancia*, and a gun boat. The Squadron was standing to the Southward under easy sail in line ahead.

At Sea, June 14th, 1870.

Ship has refused stays on repeated trials in consequence of the wind being light, and having a swell on weather beam, made experiment with a drag which was put over on the weather quarter, and hauled upon by a line from jib boom end. Successful.

[Mem. An original and clever idea in seamanship.]

Lisbon, June 16th, 1870.

Dressed ship with Portuguese flag at main in honor of the feast of Corpus Christi. There was a long procession in the city. The effigy of St. George was borne on horse back through the streets followed by a number of caparisoned horses. It is the custom to lead the horses as they are never ridden. The King and Queen followed on foot, and after their Majesties came the nobilities, also walking and after them the priests and other prelates. Note: The effigy of St. George receives from the Portuguese Government a perpetual salary of Major General.

Antwerp, July 26th, 1870.

Smallpox has broken out in the U. S. S. *Franklin* at Flushing. Surgeon S. J. Turner promptly volunteers his services.

Antwerp, July 31st, 1870.

Held divine service on board which was attended by Admiral Glisson and staff and a number of ladies from shore. Mrs. Lincoln[1] was expected, but at the last moment hadn't time to dress, and sent "Tad" in her place.

August 8th—Flushing, Holland.

Admirals Radford and Glisson came on board at Antwerp, and this ship proceeded to Flushing where Admiral Glisson relieved Radford in Command of the European Squadron.

War between France and Germany was declared July 19, 1870, and the French had undertaken a blockade of the German coast.

Under date of August 26th, Luce received the following order from Admiral Glisson:

FLAG SHIP *Franklin* 1ST. RATE
U. S. EUROPEAN SQUADRON
OFFICIAL August 26, 1870.

SIR:

So soon as the U. S. Str. *Juniata*, under your command shall be in all respects ready for sea, you will proceed to the Island of Helgoland, communicate with the British Authorities, and obtain all possible information relative to the French blockade of the German Coast.

You will then show your "flag" off the mouths of the Elbe, and Weser, keeping outside the French blockading fleet, and observing strictly the rules of the blockade. You will communicate personally with the Commanding Officer of the French fleet, and you will gather such in-

[1] Widow of President Lincoln.

formation concerning the strength, condition, and performance of the Fleet, as may be in your power.

It is desirable that you should remain in the vicinity of the Elbe, and Weser for a fortnight; one week off the mouth of each river, providing you can find safe anchorage, and without consuming coal; it is not deemed desirable that you should attempt to ascend the rivers, but you will communicate by letter with the U. S. Consuls at Hamburg and Bremen if possible.

After having performed this duty, you will proceed to Cherbourg, France, and await further instructions.

Very respectfully
your obedient servant
O. S. Glisson.

Upon his arrival at Helgoland, Luce addressed letters to the American Consuls at Bremen and Hamburg informing them of his orders.

At Sea, August 29th, 1870. Off German Coast.

Sighted two French ships which gave chase. As they neared us we stopped our engines, and sent an officer on board to explain why we were within their line of blockade (on account of bad weather and consequent mistake in position). The vessels were the *Valeureuse* iron-clad, and *Cosmao* corvette. Proceeded on until near French Squadron at anchor about 5 miles off Helgoland.

(Note.) When the *Valeureuse* approached us during the chase, went to General Quarters and loaded guns with shot.

(Mem. Luce was taking no chances. He would have no repetition of the *Leopard* and *Chesapeake* affair.)

On September 2nd, Luce informs the Admiral from Helgoland that the French Admiral objects to his going inside the line of blockade.

September 5th, 1870.

Two Prussian men of war came out and encountered a French ironclad and an "aviso." The Frenchman fired

several rounds and then stood back for the French squadron, which got underway; the Prussians then retreated.

(Mem. This "encounter," and an "engagement" off the north coast of Cuba between two small vessels, which ended by both combatants being towed into Havana by a tug, were the only naval "battles" of the Franco-German War.)

September 12th.

Luce reports to his Commander-in-Chief:

The French Blockade off the Elbe and Weser is raised. Yesterday (Sunday) forenoon the last of the French supply vessels left their anchorage to the eastward of Helgoland, and under convoy of one ironclad and one corvette steamed to the southward and westward. About one hour afterward three Prussian ironclads were discovered steaming towards Helgoland.

I left Flushing, Holland, in the *Juniata* in obedience to your orders of August 26th on the 27th. On the day following (Sunday the 28th) met with foul weather and lay to under easy steam just keeping the ship's head to the sea. On Monday, the weather having moderated, stood for Helgoland. At 9:20 A.M. fell in, and communicated with the French ironclad *Valeureuse* and the corvette *Cosmao*, two of the French blockading Squadron, from whom I learnt the position of the French Admiral. Soon after we made the island of Helgoland and the French Squadron at anchor in about 14 fathoms water, four miles S. E. of the island.

On passing the French Squadron a salute of 15 guns was fired by this ship which was promptly returned by the *Magnanime*, bearing the flag of Vice Admiral Fournchon. We then stood on for Helgoland and anchored in the northern part of the channel way which runs between the two islands. (H & Sandy Island.)

After saluting the English flag, I repaired on shore to

call on the Governor the salute having been returned from a battery on shore. Governor Maxse received me with great cordiality, and at once evinced every disposition to make our stay as agreeable as possible, but as he maintains an impartial neutrality, he has had scarcely any intercourse with the French Squadron and could give but little information in regard to it.

On the 2nd September I went out to see the French Squadron and called on Vice Admiral Fournchon, by whom I was received with great politeness. I stated plainly the object of our visit to these waters, and that I had been ordered to observe strictly the rules of the blockade. He informed me that his instructions did not admit of his allowing any vessel to visit the German Coast. But that there was no difficulty in communicating with our Consuls by means of the Helgoland dispatch boat which I already knew.

As I could not approach the coast, the next best thing to do was to seek a good anchorage, and be prepared while waiting for replies to my letters, for the boisterous weather common to these seas. Bad weather continued to prevent the recrossing of the mail boat, and on the 8th heavy weather set in and for three days we had quite a gale. We lay for a part of the time with our lower yards and topmasts housed, and three anchors down, and scopes of 160, 60 and 30 fathoms chain, with a fourth anchor ready to let go and steam up, a very ugly reef being about a hundred yards astern, on which might be seen as a gentle reminder, the wreck of a steamer that had gone on shore there in some former gale.

Yesterday morning, the gale had broken, and as at first stated, the last of the French Squadron disappeared. The English Coast Guard schooner *Mermaid* arrived in the afternoon bringing papers up to the 9th, by which we learned the momentous news of the past two weeks and that Vice Admiral Fournchon had been appointed Minister of Marine. Under these circumstances I lost no time in

Brooklyn Shenandoah Wabash Juniata Wachusett Plymouth

European Squadron, "Wabash" Flagship.

Commanded by Admiral Alden.

getting up our spars, and steamed out from Helgoland to this place (Delfzyl).

I shall send to Cuxhaven a pilot, as I am told the entrance to the Elbe is very dangerous, and shall go up there to show the flag, after which I shall proceed down the channel, and should circumstances admit stop at Dover for orders, on my way to Cherbourg.

The French blockading squadron consisted of 8 iron-clads, a corvette and three avisos.

During the daytime this squadron remained at anchor in the position in which we first discovered it, with the exception of two, an iron-clad and corvette, which cruised off the coast. Every evening at sunset the whole squadron got underway and cruised till daylight, anchoring again in its accustomed place in the morning. This blockade was efficient, so far as keeping the Prussian squadron greatly inferior in force shut up is concerned, but compared to our blockade during the late rebellion for the purpose of closing ports to commerce it amounted to little or nothing, as fast steamers could go in and out with impunity.

I was unable to find out the number of guns carried by the iron-clads, but those I saw on the gun deck of the *Magnamime* were breech loading, rifled, guns of about 6 inches bore, and mounted on carriages similar to our pivot carriage and that is I believe the character of all their ballines.

All the iron-clads were stripped for fighting, having their spars down except the fore and main yards and the gaffs.

Although they used coal very economically, the expenditure was about 200 tons a day, and to keep up the supply was one of their chief troubles, coaling from colliers in these stormy seas being tedious, difficult and dangerous.

It is the popular belief that the French iron-clads do not compare favorably with the English—I myself am of that opinion—but what have we in our Navy comparable

to this squadron? Compared to the old style of ship they have splendid fighting qualities, are remarkably steady in a sea way, and as comfortable as a ship can well be.

Whatever else may be said of this squadron, its moral effect is undeniably great.

From Commander Luce to U. S. Minister in Berlin

(Telegram) September 14, 1870.

The French blockade off the Elbe and Weser was raised on the 11th inst. Can I in any way serve the United States interests on the N. W. German Coast?

From Mr. Bancroft to Commander Luce

American Legation, Berlin,
Sept. 15, 1870.

Dear Sir:

Your telegram is received in which you report: "the French blockade of the Elbe and Weser was raised on the 11th." I hope you will by letter give me the particulars of the raising of the blockade, that I may announce it with certainty. I have no instructions to give you respecting the N. German coast, and suppose the Admiral is fully informed of the wishes of our government.

P. S. As you do not give me your address, I forward this through Mr. Robinson.

From Mr. Bancroft to Commander Luce

American Legation, Berlin,
September 17, 1870.

Sir:

I am glad to hear of your arrival in Cuxhaven. Can you give me any information about the blockade of the German ports on the Baltic? I do not know whether you have orders to go into the Baltic, but if you have, I hope that you will do so, and report to me exactly whether the blockade is raised or not in that Sea. I do not feel myself

authorized to give you any directions on the subject, but refer you to your own orders.

From Commander Luce to American Consul

Bremerhaven, September 19, 1870.

Will you be kind enough to inform the Prussian Naval Officer, by whose authority these pilots were sent, of my high appreciation of his kindness and consideration. Taken with the courtesies which have been extended to us by the Naval authorities here it is an additional and gratifying evidence of the good feeling they entertain for our country.

From Same to the Commander-in-Chief, Rear Admiral Glisson

U.S.S. *Juniata*, 3rd Rate
Dover, England
September 22, 1870.

Shortly after our arrival at Delfzyl, Vice Admiral Jachmann of the North German Navy sent me a pilot from Wilhelmshaven, and finding I could accomplish my object as well there, I availed myself of the opportunity thus offered, and went to the Jahde where I fell in with the North German Ironclad Squadron Vice Admiral Jachmann commanding. At this point I received letters from our Consuls and finding I could be of no service to American interests, I left the Jahde yesterday morning at 5:25 A.M. By the copies of letters, herewith enclosed, it will be seen that the visit of this ship to the German Coast on the North Sea, has not been without good effect.

It gives me very great pleasure to say that while in the Jahde the officers of the North German Squadron treated us with marked courtesy. A steamer was placed entirely at our disposal to go wherever we liked, steam launches were always at hand to tow our boats about, the steamer running to Wilhelmshaven (Government steamer in charge of Naval officers) stopped at the ship, going and coming, for mail and passengers; items of news and newspapers were sent on board to us, as soon as received, from

the Flagship; in fact, every little attention which the most thoughtful kindness could suggest was being constantly extended to us. When our officers visited their ironclads or the splendid docks and arsenals at Wilhelmshaven, there were German officers specially detailed to wait upon them, escort them around, and show and explain everything. It has surely been very good fortune to meet with such unaffected, friendly and unremitting kindness.

I arrived here at 6 o'clock this afternoon and intend to-morrow morning leaving for Cherbourg.

From Same to American Consul at Havre

Havre, Sept. 25, 1870.

In view of the unfortunate state of affairs now existing in this country, and the possibility of the investment of Havre by the German forces, I beg you will be kind enough to inform me as to the amount of property, belonging to citizens of the United States liable to the casualties incident to a state of war, now here; also the number and aggregate tonnage of American ships in port and the number of Americans sojourning here.

I should be very glad, moreover, to be favored with your views as to how far American interests would be jeopardized by a siege and possible fall of Havre, and in such unhappy event, in what manner I could best serve the interests of our countrymen falling within your consular district.

From Same to Mr. Washburne, Minister at Paris

Havre, September 27th, 1870.

Having been detailed by Rear Admiral O. S. Glisson commanding U. S. European Squadron for the purpose of looking out for interests of citizens of the U. S. at this port, it is but proper that I should advise you of the fact of my being here in the *Juniata*, and ready and anxious to render any aid in my power to our countrymen during the present distressing condition of affairs in this country, and with that view I shall be most happy to receive any suggestions or advice you may think proper to give.

From Same to Admiral Glisson

Havre, Sept. 28, 1870.

The navigation of the North German coast I found difficult and dangerous by reason of the removal of all buoys and beacons, and this, together with the nature of the mission with which I was charged made it, in my judgment, necessary to keep the ship understeam; for even while at Helgoland the anchorage was so dangerous as to necessitate keeping the fires banked all the time. It was during our stay at Helgoland that I experienced one of the severest gales I have ever known. Indeed during all our time there bad weather prevailed in those stormy seas. I believe that that, and the almost impossibility of coaling, is what led to the abandonment of the blockade by the French.

From Same to Same

Havre, Oct. 4, 1870.

The presence here of an American man of war has had far more moral effect than I could have believed possible. I know that not only from our Consul, but from others both foreigners and natives. The people of Havre at one time talked of setting fire to the shipping and destroying all supplies that could possibly benefit the Germans. Since our arrival, such wild projects have been much less discussed, and that our presence has had a beneficial effect generally there cannot be a doubt.

The promptness in sending a U. S. vessel here where such large interests, belonging to citizens of the United States, are at stake, has been very favorably commented upon—as indeed, it was in the German ports.

The feeling of confidence which our presence has inspired has not been confined to the few Americans here, but has even spread in some instances to the French, singular as it may appear. And I think all classes are gratified by our timely visit. In this view of the case I would respectfully suggest that one ship should not leave before the arrival of the other or that we may defer our departure till the *Shenandoah* is signalled in the offing.

Havre, October 27th, 1870.

Sent assistance to the English iron sailing *Royal George* aground in the "Arant Port."

From British Consul to U. S. Consul

Havre, October 28th, 1870.

My dear Sir:

I shall be much obliged if you will express on behalf of myself and of Captain Hogg of the English Ship *Royal George* to the Captain of the United States Corvette *Juniata* whose name I much regret not to have the pleasure of knowing, our very sincere thanks for the hearty and valuable assistance lent by his ship's crew yesterday when the *Royal George* took the ground.

I am well aware from experience that British sailors can always count on such assistance both from the United States Navy, and from her commercial marine, but because so frequent it is none the less a pleasing duty to acknowledge their services whenever the occasion presents itself.

Havre, November 8th, 1870.

Walked two miles outside the city to visit church of Notre Dame de Bon Secours.

November 18th, 1870.

Issued an order calling upon the officers of the ship to be patient and forbearing with the men with a view to checking desertions lately so frequent.

Lisbon, December 22nd, 1870.

Cloudy with heavy rain showers. Witnessed solar eclipse at station of American eclipse expedition which is in charge of Professor Winlock of Harvard University. At the moment of eclipse the sun was only partially obscured by filmy clouds.

To the Secretary of the Navy, from Commander Luce

Cadiz, Spain, December 31, 1870.

While at Havre, France, I was so forcibly struck with the excellence of the Electric Light on Cape La Heu, and the great advantage to be derived by our commerce from having similar lights on our own coasts, that I directed Lieut. Henry Whelen to report upon the subject. I sent his letter from Havre but neglected to accompany it by a letter of advice, as the report was so full and comprehensive as to leave nothing to be said.

I have now the honor to enclose a report on the electric light as used on board [this] ship, for a "running light" and for signal purposes, which I respectfully submit for the information of the Signal Bureau.

From Gen. Sickles, Minister to Spain, to Commander Luce

Madrid, January 11th, 1871.

In reply to your note of the 5th, received with some delay, I can only state that thus far Madrid remains tranquil and the reports from the interior indicate no immediate disturbance of the public order, unless it may be in the north, where another movement is said to be imminent. It is too soon yet to say whether the present coalition Ministry of Marshal Serrano will hold together for the municipal elections that are expected to begin in the latter part of this month and for those which are set down to follow in the latter part of this month and for those which are in February. Upon these elections a good deal depends and these people have not yet learned to respect the will of majorities. If, however, the present truce between the different factions supporting the new King should be broken, as most people think it will be, what we would call at home "a free fight" is quite likely to follow.

I am glad you are at Cadiz. If you can look in at some of the other ports (agreeably to your orders) and confer with our consuls, it is desirable that you do so.

It will afford me great pleasure to see yourself or any

of your officers in Madrid, and I regret that I did not receive your letter in season to ask you to join a party at my house tomorrow night. I would like very much to give you a glimpse of Spanish affairs from my point of view so far as they may concern the interests confided to the protection of the Navy.

FROM COMMANDER LUCE TO MAJOR GENERAL SICKLES, MINISTER TO SPAIN

CADIZ, January 16, 1871.

I have to thank you for your very polite and interesting letter marked unofficial—of the 11th instant.

At Malaga is the *Saco* Lt. Comdr. Edward Terry. She is, I believe, regularly stationed on the coast of Spain, and likely to remain there for some time or till relieved by another vessel.

Villefranche, February 9th, 1871.

Lieut. General Sheridan and Brigadier General Forsyth visited the Squadron, and on their departure were saluted by 15 guns from the *Franklin; Guerrière,* and *Plymouth* manned rigging and cheered ship. Today our second whale boat raced the Admiral's barge and lost the race, at least it was so decided by the umpires.

At Sea, February 17th, 1871. In the Mediterranean.

The Boatswain has harpooned a large porpoise under the bows. The ship's dog on the forecastle so excited that he backed himself overboard while barking at it and was drowned. Anchored after sundown in Tunis Bay.

Palermo, February 24th, 1871.

Received a visit from Prince Billoni.

Naples, February 25th, 1871.

Moored alongside H.B.M.S. *Royal Oak;* Captain Somerset came on board.

European Squadron at Villefranche.

Vesuvius very active, throwing out a heavy column of smoke from a small cone. Streams of lava flowing down into the valley near Mt. Somma.

After visiting Civita Vecchia and Leghorn the *Juniata* returned to Villefranche but was immediately sent to Marseilles to protect American interests during the riots. Luce found all quiet on his arrival but the Prefecture in which the Insurgents had established themselves had been shelled by the guns of Notre Dame de la Garde and the building stormed and carried by sailors landed from the French ironclads *Magnamime* and *Couronne.*

On May 6, 1871, the *Juniata* again sailed for Northern Europe.

May 10th, 1871. At Sea.

Boatswain harpooned a turtle. Lowered the dingy and brought it on board. Island of Majorca in sight.

May 14th. At Sea.

Fresh gales from Wd. Stood to Sd. and Ed. intending to run into Algiers if necessary. Sprung head of main mast. Fished it immediately. Ship rolling heavily and sea running high, under close reefed topsails and maintry-sail. Squall came up in afternoon. Just as the sun went down the clouds on the west lifted and a most beautiful rainbow formed which lasted several minutes after the sun went below horizon.

June 21st, 1871. Gravesend.

General Schenck, U. S. Minister to England, visited the Ship. Prince Alfred Duke of Edinburgh passed ship in steam yacht on way to Worcester. Fired Royal salute in his honor. Lost 16 men by desertion.

June 29th, 1871.

In company with Flagship *Franklin* entered the Categat. Next day passed Elsinore and anchored off Copenhagen. Sunset at 9:50.

July 6th, 1871. Copenhagen.

John Davis (seaman) while laying aloft to furl sail fell from main rigging to the deck and was instantly killed.

July 13th, 1871. Christiania.

Officers in full dress and swords attended opera—*Les Brigands.* Visited Prince Oscar. Ball on board *Franklin.*

August 1st, 1871.

Returned to England and anchored below city of Southampton. Visited Netly Abbey, Winchester. Off Ryde saluted Queen Victoria when passing Osborn House.

August 21st, 1871. Antwerp.

Took part in the ceremony of removing the remains of the officers killed in the siege of 1831–32.

August 23rd.

The Royal Yacht *Victoria and Albert* with Crown Prince of Prussia and family came up river and anchored.

September 6th, 1871.

Received thanks from Senior Officer Present of the Belgian Navy for rendering assistance in saving lives of ladies and gentlemen whose boat capsized alongside *Victoria and Albert.* Princess Alice of Hesse went on board the *Victoria and Albert* when the Royal Standard was hoisted. Kept our flag flying all night following motions of *Victoria and Albert.*

September 25th, 1871.

Heavy weather in the Bay of Biscay during which two chronometers were ruined, a set of charts destroyed, main mast head cracked across the grain, whale boat lost, main stay and bowsprit shroud carried away, hammock rail stove on port side of quarter deck.

It was a notable storm in which many ships were lost. The sea was strewn with wreckage. Just a year before almost to the day, and in practically the same position the English armored turret-ship *Captain* went down with all hands.

Luce remained on the bridge thirty-six hours. When he went below he found his cabin a wreck and his library, which included a handsome volume of Dante's *Inferno* illustrated by Doré, ruined by salt-water. His steward remarked, "Captain looked so sad I think big book must be Holy Bible."

From Commander Luce to Admiral Glisson

Ferrol, Spain, Sept. 30, 1871.

I have the honor to inform you that I left Cowes, England, in this ship on the 21st instant. We got underway at 1:30 P.M. under sail (the propeller triced up) and beat through the Solent with a windward tide, and I was in hopes of making the great part of, if not the entire, passage to Malaga under sail. On the 26th however, we encountered a gale from the S.W. and have experienced nothing but bad weather ever since.

From Commander Luce to Mr. Bancroft

Antwerp, Aug. 30, 1871.

I have reason to believe that a plan of the new dock yards now in course of construction at Wilhelmshaven will be acceptable to our Navy Department at home, as the design has been conceived on a scale of great magnificence, and will afford, when finished, facilities for accom-

plishing and docking the longest iron-clads, superior to any dock yard in existence. As the plan of a dock cannot be a matter of secret I wrote to Admiral Jachmann of the Imperial German Navy requesting a copy, feeling encouraged to such a liberty by the very courteous treatment I had received at his hands during my visit to the Jahde in this ship on the raising of the French blockade last year. But Admiral Jachmann answers through an aide that "drawings of the docks at Wilhelmshaven are not to be had for sale." This polite refusal to my request is probably due to the Admiral supposing I wished the drawing for my own private use, which is far from the case.

Under these circumstances, I would respectfully solicit your kind offices in procuring the desired plans, providing of course, there be no objection in making such an application to the Minister of Marine. Should there be the slightest question of propriety or policy in preferring such a request, I at once withdraw. If on the other hand the application be complied with it would save time to forward the drawing to Admiral D. D. Porter, U. S. Navy Department, Washington, D. C., for whom it is desired, and who will I know be grateful for the favor.

From Ship's Log, April 25th, 1872. Marseilles.

Weather clear and pleasant. At 12:45 A.M. an explosion occurred on board a sloop loaded with 1800 cases of petroleum. Fire broke out immediately afterwards. Went in 1st cutter to scene of fire in the Nationale Basin alongside of dock not far from where *Juniata* was moored. Called all hands on deck and prepared to unmoor, at same time ordering steam to be raised. Succeeded with assistance of other boats of squadron in locating fire in sloop, and finally, after cutting chain of sloop towed it to position of safety in outer basin, where the fire continued to burn during the night, the oil floating to the surface and drifting some distance, to the mole, where the heat calcined the surface of the stone. Hauled fires. At about 2 P. M. Count deKoraby Prefet Dept. Bouches de Rhone attended by principal officers of the city Government of Marseilles repaired on board Flagship and tendered thanks for

energetic assistance rendered at fire, saying the effort of the officers and men of the American Squadron had saved the port of Marseilles.

A few days after this the *Juniata* sailed for home from Marseilles. She met the usual gale in the Gulf of Lyons, and sprung her main yard which was fished at Port Mahon. After looking in at Cartagena, and a short stop at Gibraltar she steamed to Madeira and left there 25th May. Losing the wind she steamed to Bermuda.

Once when Luce went to sea from Villefranche he took the *Juniata* under sail alone out of the little harbor which was so crowded with the French and American Squadrons there was scarcely room for the ships to swing clear, although each was tied up to a buoy. It was an exhibition of splendid seamanship under sail alone which could be attempted only by a past-master of the art. The *Juniata* ran out a kedge on starboard bow, slipped from the buoy, then hauled out to the kedge and made sail to royals, then braced aback and sent a boat ashore for the mail. She *sailed* out of the harbor to the intense admiration of the people in both squadrons, as well as to the fisher folk and others on the Quai.

It happened that on board one of the French ships was Pierre d'Orleans, who it will be remembered had served with Luce in the *Macedonian*, and when the *Juniata* passed so close to his ship that an officer on board the *Franklin* said there was scarcely room to slip between the ships a chaffing mat, he calmed the excited Frenchmen by telling them there was "nothing to fear, Captain Luce could do the impossible." Once Luce beat out of the Solent against a windward tide under double reefed topsails, and on another occasion astonished the French ironclads at Toulon by coming into the anchorage under sail. He was a man who did things.

FROM COMMANDER LUCE TO SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

NAVY YARD, BOSTON, June 29, 1872.

Left Bermuda on the 18th and made a moderate passage and with almost every variety of weather, till off New York when we ran into a dense fog. On the 23rd, the engine broke down and we were obliged to rely entirely on our sails; and with the engine partly taken to pieces, we were obliged to grope our way past the Nantucket Shoals. Being for days without an observation, we were drifted more out of our course than allowed for, so that we became involved among the shoals of Nantucket. During the night of the 20th the soundings and our reckoning led me to suppose we were on Fishing Rip, and I was proceeding on that supposition under easy sail, and two leads going when the water shoaled so that I deemed it prudent to anchor.

At 2:25 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, the ship was luffed to, to let go the anchor, when she struck. The topsails were instantly braced hard aback when a rapid sternboard took us into deeper water, where we anchored.

In the forenoon the fog was as thick as ever, offering no hope of ascertaining our position. A boat was sent to sound about the ship and a shoal discovered to the Ed. having heavy breakers upon it. There appeared to be every reason for supposing this to be "Old South Shoal," and with that supposition I endeavored to grope my way out. The soundings led me to suppose we had struck one of the "pockets" of deep water, which lie between the ridges of the shoal and I was just congratulating myself upon getting clear, when the water again suddenly shoaled and the ship struck several times though not heavily.

Completely bewildered as to our position I sent a boat out to sound, at the risk of losing her in the fog, but happily she discovered and led us to deep water where I was glad to anchor.

With 35 sick men on board, provisions and coal running short, I was anxious to proceed, but determined not to move again till some idea could be obtained as to our position. We lay at this latter anchorage all day on the 26th, and on the morning of the 27th, finding the density of the fog continued, and as far as I knew might continue indefinitely, I commenced firing guns every half hour, in

hopes of calling any fishermen or others, who might be in the vicinity to give information as to our position. The steam cutter was placed in the water and regularly fitted for surveying the locality, when the steamer *Island Home* of Nantucket, appeared through the fog, and put a pilot on board. Soon after, the fog lifted when we discovered Sankaty Light house bearing N.N.W. distant about 7½ miles.

We had, on the night of the 25th and 26th, struck on the Rose and Crown Shoals.

It was an unpleasant ending of a happy cruise.

CHAPTER VIII

Nautical School Ships. The Naval Training System

WHEN the *Juniata* sailed for home from Europe Luce bore with him a letter of introduction from Captain R. W. Schufeldt, the Captain of the Flagship *Wabash* to Isaac Bell, Esq., Commissioner of Charities of New York City, in which Schufeldt said, "Commander Luce goes home from this station with the very laudable intention of interesting the government and the people of the country in the establishment of a training school for seamen. Your position will enable you to be of great service to him in New York. Your active co-operation in a project of so much benefit to the commercial interests of New York will I have no doubt be most cheerfully rendered. Our citizens are lamenting the loss of American Commerce, but in their efforts to restore it they have seemed to have lost sight of the fact that good sailors are getting quite as scarce as good ships and that for future prosperity one is quite as much needed as the other."

When the *Juniata* was decommissioned after her cruise Luce was ordered immediately to duty at the Boston Yard. At the time the navy yard at Charlestown was moribund. There was but little work going on, and the Yard like some others on the East Coast was kept open only upon the insistence of politicians for the patronage it afforded. The consequence was that duty in the Yard was more of a sinecure than a serious occupation, and while attending strictly to the routine of his functions as

Equipment officer the energetic Commander had ample leisure to devote to the subject which claimed his best endeavors for the next twenty years. His ideas on training and education of our sailors were crystallized and he now had the opportunity to put them into definite shape.

We have seen as early as 1864 he had submitted a plan for the training of enlisted men to the Navy Department but nothing came of it except putting himself on record as interested in the subject. During the years following the Civil War he was a close student of history and world politics with special reference to naval affairs, and when he undertook to champion the cause of naval education he was well equipped for his self-appointed task which he knew would be opposed by the same type of reactionaries as those who had opposed the Naval Academy. In 1866 shortly after he became Commandant of Midshipmen at the Naval Academy he wrote a number of prominent gentlemen in New York and Boston relative to the establishment of a "Nautical College" for the purpose of educating officers for the Merchant Marine with a view to elevating the character of the personnel, thereby decreasing "the enormous losses, now so common, of life and property by marine disaster," and supplying a reserve of a large body of educated men to meet the emergencies of a suddenly expanded Navy. Encouraging replies were received, and Charles Sumner, then in the Senate, wrote to him, February 16, 1867, "I shall be glad at the next Session to consider carefully any Bill as per the suggestions you may make in regard to Nautical schools . . . you may rest assured that I am in favor of all measures which tend to promote the knowledge of the officers and sailors of our Merchant vessels, and so to extend our commerce and secure to us an efficient Navy."

Luce was a keen observer and he knew men. He was aware he would require all his determination, all his alertness and what was as much to the point, his sense of

humor, if he would be successful in turning naval thought out of old grooves. "If a few undertake to build up," he said in the Annual address to the Naval Institute in 1888, "there are never wanting those who are ready to pull down—apparently from a sheer love of pulling down. The personal element moreover is such a strong feature of the work of destruction, that it is sufficient to know that A is endeavoring to achieve something for his profession in order to incite B to oppose him. Both the principle on which A is working and the manifest advantage of his work are lost sight of in the naked fact that A is the active agent. That one fact is enough to arouse the most determined hostility of B. Like blind Samson he will pull down the pillars of his house, though it involves his own destruction. This introduction of the personal element in official relations, whether it has its origin in 'envy, hatred, malice and all uncharitableness' or is born of a conscientious sense of right regarded with strabismic sense of sight, it yet exists."

On another occasion Admiral Porter said practically the same thing—but in his own characteristic fashion—to the Secretary of the Navy. "You know how it is in the Navy when a man is appointed to anything, that another man don't approve of, that other man goes to work to thwart the party of the first part. . . . You have given Commodore Luce a position and you give him no tools to work with, and . . . he is curtly told the Department declines to grant his request."

But rebuffs did not deter Luce. His gift of clear and concise expression, his intelligence, his culture, his personality which would have gained fame for him in the political forum, won for him in the beginning many influential friends outside of the Navy, and drew from the inside a strong, loyal and devoted following.

His idea was first to establish nautical school ships for training boys for both the Navy and the merchant service, for he rightly held that the two services were

dependent upon each other, and that it would be as unwise, as illiberal and shortsighted to work for the advantage of one without the other. He pointed out that Commodore Hull manned the *Constitution* with fishermen of the New England coast, and the merchant sailors of Salem, Newburyport and Boston, and that in his action with the *Guerrière*, only sixty of his crew of 400 had ever served in a man-of-war.

His scheme was based upon the fundamental assumption that the object of the training was to produce sailors—"Foremast hands, hard fisted, staunch, God fearing American sailors," and the first article of his religion was that sailors can only be made at sea and on board sailing ships.

On November 12, 1872, he submitted his views to the Secretary of the Navy. He points out in a long letter that "the seamen who man our ships fight our guns and follow our officers into battle are as a class inferior to those of almost every navy having the slightest pretensions to respectability.

"Our ships go to sea manned by heterogeneous crews representing nearly every country on the face of the globe; men, many of them utterly destitute of any feeling of attachment for or interest in the Navy; whose only care it is to earn a present subsistence till something better can be found.

"The majority are ignorant of the Navy and its traditions, indifferent to honor and reputation; impatient under discipline, and who go through with their military duties under protest as it were."

He draws a picture of the unhappy results arising from the confusion of tongues, and constant changes due to desertions, and to the discouraging effect upon the officers and "the few men-of-war's men who remain to us."

He forwards a tabulated statement of the nationalities of five ships of the Mediterranean Squadron in 1872

showing that 35 countries are represented and only 46.6% of the men are Americans. And of these said to be Americans, one-third are not so.

Of course what Luce attempts to show to the Secretary is the demoralizing effect upon the good men of the ship's company by the presence and unholy influence of the beachcombers who were swamping the Navy, and the urgent necessity of reform. "The professional deserter," he adds, "belongs to the same class. He draws his advance pay and sooner or later deserts deeply in the debt to the Government only to enlist again under another name and to go through the same round."

The deplorable condition of the English Navy prior to 1859 and the remedies taken are described. He shows that that condition was similar in some respect to our own (1872) and recommends the adoption of certain suggestions of the English Commissions as a correction for the evils in our system of manning the Navy. "We are going through precisely the same experience and sooner or later must come to the same conclusion, viz., *that the gradual organization of a permanent Navy must principally depend upon a supply of trained boys!*"

Herein is the germ of our apprentice system of today.

He discusses the two previous attempts to establish a training system in the Navy, and the causes of failure, answers the objections to the scheme, and concludes with a forecast of the results of a properly organized and well-sustained Training System, which in fact has proved to be a prophecy, because from the apprentices today selections are made for seamen gunners, and from the latter are chosen the Warrant Officers; and under new laws, supplementing the old, some of these rise to Commissioned rank, and others pass into the Merchant Service in which they hold master's certificates, and automatically form a Reserve for the Navy to be called upon in time of war, as was shown in the last war when the Navy was largely recruited by officers and men from the mercantile marine.

Having sowed the seed in Washington where it is proverbial new ideas are slow to take root, he turned to a more fallow field for quicker action and got it.

He addressed a circular letter to the Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade and Boards of Education in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore on the subject of nautical instruction in nautical school ships. The replies from all the cities were so encouraging that at their request he drafted a Bill to promote the efficiency of Masters and Mates in the Merchant Service and to encourage the establishment of Public Marine Schools. He also proposed a plan for the organization of the nautical school ship in New York as authorized by the legislature of New York.

In July, 1873, he was ordered to New York City to consult with the Board of Education in reference to the establishment of a nautical school for the training of seamen.

To the Board in New York he wrote, "The boys may be apprenticed for a term of years (4) to some shipping house of respectability. An essential part of the scheme is to provide good sailors' homes where for a reasonable price the sailor when on shore may find a good chamber and a decent table, with library, means of writing letters, and amusing himself.

"This system would it is believed soon work a change in the morale of our Merchant Service—the condition of the seamen would be ameliorated, the officers would be less brutal, discipline would be firmer, more consistent and milder, the ship would be better kept, more systematically ordered, their navigation would be safer and better, and in times of disaster the conduct of all would be heroic and sailor-like, in short the character of our mercantile Marine would go up and the rates of Insurance go down.

"Particularly interested in this question is the Western man who sends his produce beyond the seas, the

Eastern man who imports the produce of other shores. The merchants whose goods are brought from abroad, the shipbuilder whose ships are to win their reputation through good seamanship, the underwriter who is to guard against loss, the State and political economists who are interested on general principles in the growth and spread of American Commerce. The moralist who sees in the well ordered merchant ships the best missionary to spread through distant seas the manifold blessings of Christianity and civilization, the patriot who sees for his country with pride, the increase of tonnage and consequent wealth, and sees the ships of his country crowding into every port and pointed to as models of successful enterprise and good order; the naval officer and soldier who see in an educated merchant service our best bulwark of defence. The thinking American in short who sees in commercial prosperity the wealth and influence of the nation."

His appeals in this field met with almost instant response. On June 20, 1874, Congress passed an act to encourage the establishment of public marine schools and on June 11, 1875, the New York nautical school ship *St. Mary's* was opened at the foot of East 23rd Street. She had been loaned to the State by the Navy Department and was fitted out at the Boston Navy Yard under the inspection of Captain Luce who himself sailed her to New York. She was officered and manned by United States Naval Officers; her first Captain was Robert L. Pythian, and one of the lieutenants was the ill-fated De Long who was afterwards lost in the *Jeannette* Expedition toward the North Pole. Philadelphia and Boston followed the example set by New York. On March 4, 1911, the Act was amended and the additional nautical school ships ports named in the Act as amended are Seattle, San Francisco, Baltimore, Saginaw and Detroit. A brief sketch of the school-ship movement is given in the following letter written many years after

the "first gangplank of the *St. Mary's* was put over her side."

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO ADMIRAL WILDE, CHAIRMAN OF THE MASSACHUSETTS NAUTICAL SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS

MY DEAR ADMIRAL:

As I was more or less identified with the establishment of our State school-ships, and have ever since retained my interest in them, I beg leave to refer you to their origin. Although commonly known as State school-ships, and maintained at the expense of the State, or city, as the case may be, yet the General Government, has, in the clearest and most practical manner, shown its active interest in them. Our nautical schools are a part and a very important part of the enlightened educational policy adopted by Congress. The Act of July 2, 1862, known as the agricultural-college Bill made a munificent provision of public lands for "the endowment, support, and maintenance of at least one college in each state claiming the benefit of the Act.—" . . . "To teach such branches as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts . . . and including military tactics . . . . "*in order to promote the liberal and practical education of the industrial classes in the several pursuits and professions of life.*" This Act was supplemented by the Acts of July 28, 1866, authorizing the detailing of army officers as instructors at those colleges for the purpose of "promoting a knowledge of military science among the young men of the United States."

Following out this liberal and comprehensive policy for the encouragement of industrial education, Congress passed the "Marine Schools" Act of June 20, 1874, "*to promote nautical education.*" This Act authorized the use of a "Suitable vessel in the Navy as a Nautical School," and the "detailing of officers of the Navy as superintendents of, or instructors in, such schools."

The use of a national vessel, and the employment of naval officers gave the state school-ships a quasi-national character which added greatly to their dignity and importance. This was a great advantage in visiting foreign ports where they were regarded as second only to vessels

of war, and materially extended their sphere of influence at home.

In the several Acts quoted, the intention of Congress is too clear to need dwelling upon. But since the passage of those Acts, our former school of seamanship—the sailing ships of our mercantile marine—has practically ceased to exist, so that the marine schools so wisely and liberally provided for by Congress are more needed now than ever.

Under the Marine Schools Act of June 20, 1874, being at the time attached to the Boston Navy Yard, I fitted out agreeably to orders from the Navy Department the old sloop-of-war *St. Mary's*, destined for the nautical school of New York. And, in accordance with orders of December 3rd, 1874, I took her to New York and delivered her over to the Executive Committee on the Nautical School of that city, where she has been ever since.

To give up these nautical schools now, after all these years of successful operation, and at a time when industrial education is exciting such a wide-spread and intelligent interest, seems like a reflection upon the wisdom of Congress. I beg you will inform me of the outcome of this matter.

Luce's suggestion to the Board in New York to provide good sailors' homes was the forerunner of the Sailors' Clubs which afterwards followed automatically, and proved to be of inestimable value during the World War.

In November, 1873, Commander Luce read a paper at the Naval Academy entitled, "The Manning of our Navy and Merchant Marine," which a year later appeared as the leading article in the initial number of the *Naval Institute*. "The object of the paper," wrote Luce, "was to show the necessity of training boys for the naval service to become expert gunners. That paper was the beginning of the Naval Training Service which culminated in the Training Squadron composed at first of the *Constitution*, *Portsmouth*, *Saratoga*, and later of the *Portsmouth*, *Jamestown*, and *Saratoga*."

In the paper referred to he said, "We need for our ships the thorough seaman with his characteristic devotion to the flag of his country, his contempt of danger, his love of adventure, combined with the carefully trained gunner. And, the prejudices of many of our officers to the contrary, we may look to our seamen of the future for yet higher qualities, but such as are sure to come by that very course of education which is to give us the best type of a modern man-of-war's-man."

He quoted from Fox: "Education has reference to the whole man, the body, the mind, and the heart; its object, and when rightly conducted its effect, is to make him a complete creature after his kind. To his frame it gives vigor, activity and beauty; to his sense, correctness and acuteness; to his intellect power and thoughtfulness; to his heart, virtue. If you would mark the perfect man, you must not look for him in the circus, the University or the church exclusively, but you must look for one who has *mens sana in corpore sana*—a healthful mind in a healthful body. To make all men such is the object of education."

This was the corner-stone upon which he built; he applied the principle enunciated by Fox to the education of our sailors, arguing that as the various exhibitions held in London and Paris had demonstrated that the mere mechanical workman stands not the slightest chance with the workman of cultivated taste, education was even more essential for the difficult trade of mariner, especially when to it is added that of the skillful marine artillerist. "*Our uneducated seamen will stand no chance against the trained gunners of England and France.*"

With all his heart he loved sailors; and none knew better than he that in spite of his vagaries the sailor is a tender-hearted creature. That he is "prompt and fearless, fertile in resources, patient, even cheerful under adversity, of wonderful endurance, intelligent, and self-reliant and with all, of unflinching, uncompromising fidel-

ity to his flag." He considered the American seaman unequalled. There is nothing stolid in the make-up of an American bluejacket, and he does his own thinking. Admiral Dewey had reference to these qualities when he once said that our sailors were superior to those of Germany and thereupon called down upon his head the wrath of the German Ambassador, and a mild reprimand from President Roosevelt.

In a tribute to the sailors of his early days, the sailors of the *Congress* and *Columbus*, Luce said, "It is with unfeigned pleasure that I recall the recollection of many worthy representatives of the class, and some I love to remember as my tutors. I recall them with their bronzed faces, their kind hearts beaming through their eyes, with a degree of feeling bordering on affection. The early lessons learned of them I think the most indelible impression on my mind, and whatever fondness I had for the sea I trace to the quaint yarns of adventure, not unmingled with goodly precepts which fell from their honest lips.

"They owned their full share of human weaknesses if you will, but it is not mine to cast the first stone. I respected them then; I honor their memory now."[1]

Luce was not the first to advocate a training system for our sailors. The experiment had been tried as early as 1837 when Congress authorized the enlistments of boys from fourteen to seventeen and we soon had 2000 apprentice boys. But the effort failed. It was renewed in 1863 but failed again. Our national ships continued to be manned largely by foreigners. General B. F. Butler once indignantly declared in Congress that it was a disgrace our ships were flying the national colors made of foreign bunting, but he said nothing of our ships and guns being manned by Europeans! As late as the early nineties, we had a gunboat in China which had only one American in a crew of 135. It was not altogether humorous

[1] *Naval Institute*, vol. i., p. 27, 1874.

when an officer called out one day, "if there is anyone in the gangway who can speak English, lay aft." On board another ship in the Mediterranean was posted in a conspicuous place, "ici on parle Anglais" and on her decks might be heard French, German, Spanish, and Italian; Mahonese, native Irish and occasionally Chinese. The average American man-of-war afforded rare opportunities for practice to a linguist.

These facts were notorious and were the source of derisive illustrations and comparisons in certain quarters of the foreign press. The general impression among certain people who wished us ill in our war with Spain was that our navy was composed of hirelings who would desert at the first crack of a gun, and in 1911 when Admiral Schroeder's fleet made informal visits to French and English ports, London and Paris Journals commented sarcastically upon the appearance of American bluejackets, some of whom wore spectacles, kid gloves and moustaches. An English correspondent wrote that "American man-of-war's men looked like landsmen dressed in sailors' clothes." In the summer of 1917, however, England and France were not so critical.

It seems incredible that Luce's praiseworthy efforts to improve conditions in the Navy encountered apathy and even opposition. Notwithstanding he was indefatigable in efforts to secure legislation that would permanently establish the apprentice system, in order that our petty officers and leading seamen, the connecting links between the forecastle and the quarterdeck might be native born. "If the native American seaman is a valuable person," he said, "and if as all admit the class is rapidly disappearing, is it not our plain duty to set ourselves earnestly to work to save it. So obvious indeed is it, as to remind one of those self-evident propositions, which while difficult to demonstrate from very simplicity, seem in the attempt to do so like an imputation on the understanding."

Luce's efforts to establish the naval apprentice system

were at last successful. On April 8, 1875, Congress authorized the enlistment of 750 boys between the ages of 16 and 18 to serve until they were 21. The wooden ship *Minnesota* was made the training ship at New York. At this time Luce was still at the Boston Navy Yard, but in the following October having been thirty-eight months on shore he was ordered to command the Flagship *Hartford* on the home station. During his tour of shore duty he had seen the Nautical Schoolship at New York established, and the beginning of his pet Training Service; and as we shall see later proposed a Naval School of Architecture at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His years at the Boston Navy Yard when "Equipment Officer" had borne fruit far afield from his official duties.

Afloat he had wider opportunities of expanding and developing his ideas of training which were beginning to attract the attention of the entire service.

Of this period Admiral Harrington, who was his executive officer in the *Hartford*, writes: "The ship's company included eighty apprentices, the objects of Luce's particular interest. His control of those young bluejackets and his system of instruction was intended to develop expert seamen and petty officers for our Navy. The routine occupied every hour, keeping the apprentices, when not asleep, either at work or at play. Their amusements were planned and supervised as carefully as their instruction was regulated. The late Chaplain Tribou taught them the popular hymns; two schoolmasters led them in the rhymes and music of the old sea songs; and in both their voices sounded a rousing chorus. Luce himself inspired their patriotic spirit. He was an impressive and effective public speaker. On one occasion when the *Hartford* was moored in Hampton Roads, overlooking the scene of the battle which changed the type of naval vessels, Luce told to the bluejackets, assembled on the gun deck, the story of the *Monitor*. His apt description of the conflict and of the influence of the *Mon-*

U. S. S. "Hartford," 1876.

itor's victory upon our international relations, given with his peculiar vocal earnestness and his forceful manner all made a strong impression upon his youthful audience. Luce became their leader, and there were few occasions of misconduct requiring severe correction.

"On the other hand, prizes and promotions in ratings were established as incentives to effort and excellence. I quote from a letter to me from Captain Luce, dated at Boston, September 8, 1877, after his detachment from the *Hartford:* 'Today I went to a silversmith and ordered two silver prizes, one for the boy Leary, Captain of No. 7, and one for Brown, Coxswain, Captain of the after pivot gun. The prizes should be in Norfolk by Thursday next, so I hope that you will not sail without them. I do not wish the boys to think that I have forgotten them. Remember I expect to get out of your lot two Boatswains and two Gunners. There will be an order soon that forward officers shall be selected hereafter from the enlisted boys brought up in the Service. Ask Captain Adams for me to have the prizes delivered in due form.'

"Perhaps these are sufficient illustrations of Luce's ways and personal influence in training men for naval service. The official records will show the important part he took in the work of the vessels assigned to training the enlisted force. His activities extended to many other naval projects."

Luce believed that the *sailing ship* was the best school to develop courage and nerve. "This old fashioned seamanship as it is sometimes called," he wrote, "prepares the modern man-of-war's-man in a way no other school can prepare him, for service in a steel cruiser, where for the remainder of his career in the Navy he has an opportunity of acquiring a knowledge of new fashioned seamanship—whatever that may be."

His arguments for sailing ships as practice ships are epics, but nowadays make only interesting reading to

the student who is anxious to know the Navy as it was a half century ago. Luce lived to see the final passing of his beloved tacks and sheets, and the victory of coal whips, but he never lost his own faith, that it is only in sailing ships *at sea*, sailors are made. "In a sailing ship the skill of the officers and the activities of the whole crew are brought into play, and with adverse winds this may continue for hours, calling forth energies and bringing out faculties that in service on board a steam vessel lie dormant." This was his doctrine.

It was characteristic of Luce to insist upon correct use of sea language.[1] In a letter to the Navy Department he turns aside from a plea for a Practice Squadron to comment upon the title of a Manual for Training which was sent to him for revision. He says:

"I return a copy with the expression '*on* the Training Ship' corrected. This smacks so much of the Mississippi navigation *on* a raft, that I am anxious to see it (the word *on*) obliterated from all covers placed in the hands, or likely to reach the new school of seamen. The expression is not to be found, I believe, in Cooper's *Naval History*. This may seem a very small matter but to my mind it betrays the difference between 'deepwater' sailors and 'longshoremen.'"

On one occasion Admiral Luce after his retirement went alongside the Flagship *New York* at Newport in a shore boat, and being in citizen's dress was not recognized by the gangway sentry who repeatedly hailed him: "you can't land here." The Admiral paid no attention and as he stepped on board and passed the sentry he said in his humorous way, "If I wanted to *land*, I would go ashore."

[1] When James Gordon Bennett was proprietor of the *Herald*, he insisted upon the most meticulous selection of sea phrases, and prepared a list of terms which were forbidden to be used, as *on* a ship, instead of "*in*" a ship, or "*on board*" a ship; "boat" for ship, steamer, etc., etc.

CHAPTER IX

The Training Ship *Minnesota*. The Training Squadron

IN December, 1877, Captain Luce was detached from the command of the Flagship *Hartford* and ordered to command the Training Ship *Minnesota* which due to his persistent efforts, had been assigned to this duty two years before.

The *Minnesota* was one of the largest wooden ships and was at the Navy Yard, New York, when Luce joined, but early in the spring he shifted her berth to the North River and began preparations for a cruise with the apprentices along the coast, in order to introduce the lads, so to speak, to the uncomfortable ocean.

"The practice ship," writes Luce in the *United Service Magazine*, "soon gets into troubled waters of the Gulf Stream, and not a few of the youngsters become sea-sick. This soon passes off, when they get their 'sea-legs' aboard, and what is equally important, their sea-stomachs. They are now ready to emulate the example of the reckless Mr. Fid of the song and 'Laugh at the force of the gale.'" They learned the sea habit.

When the boys presented themselves for enlistment they were first examined by the Surgeons, and then by a board of officers to determine their mental fitness. On one occasion one of the candidates replied, when asked where he was born, "in the modern times." He was told that the question was where, not when. He hesitated and then, "I was born in the *Modern Times*, sailing from

Liverpool to New York." Another explained that the difference between a monarchy and a republic was that the President "had the most to say," and as to the source of authority of the rulers, "With the Queen it runs in her blood, and with the President it's the smartness of him."

Luce now had the training system completely under his own control and the education of the lads became a fetish with him.

The education of the lads began at once in seamanship, gunnery and machinery. They were taught how to work fires and operate boilers as well as to "hand, reef and steer"; they were instructed in the elements of practical navigation, how to take sights and to compute "a day's work," and in the pointing and firing of great guns. They were exercised in the use of rifles, revolvers and broad swords, and a routine of drills was established for winter and summer including boats under oars and sails.

Referring to this phase of naval education, Lieut. Ridgely Hunt says[1]:

"To know how to hand, reef and steer—words of archaic significance—did apparently quicken the faculties and stimulate the activities so that, in some unexplainable way, an officer acquired the art or science or power, whatever we may choosen to call it, of managing, controlling and working his ship and crew with ease, assurance and confidence. Was this so because the brotherhood of sailors was closer than that of seamen? Was it because 'to lay aloft in a howling breeze' inculcated in young men that mighty spirit of which we have written, and which remained steadfast with them from youth to old age, and carried them all, Midshipmen, Lieutenants, Captains, Admirals and the crews, triumphantly through the jaws of death? There are men of the old navy who will answer you Yes. There are men of the new navy who will tell you No; notwithstanding the assertion that

[1] Prize Essay 1912—Naval Might—by Lieut. Ridgely Hunt, U.S.N.

'The history of the future will bear out the assertion that, other things being equal, superior seamanship will decide battles.'"

Special attention was given to their food and reform was effected in the regulation Navy ration with efficient cooperation of the then Paymaster T. J. Cowie.[1]

By the system of training thus inaugurated American youths were taught not only the duties incident to man-of-war life, but their moral nature was brought out and developed. Luce regarded the religious training of the boys as the paramount consideration. His desire was to save our young men from drunkenness and vice by physical, mental, and moral training.

From time immemorial music of some description has played an important part in life on board ship, and nothing denotes happiness and contentment more than the songs on the forecastle when the men are gathered together "after hammocks," and before "pipe down" to smoke and "gam" and sing. There were old songs of wrecks, songs of sentiment, and songs of sea fights handed down from the War of 1812. To encourage in the apprentices a fondness for music and to teach them the traditions of the service, Luce compiled a book of songs of our naval fame.[2] These sea ditties may lack poetry, but they are full of inspiration and embody the traditions of the service. Unfortunately these songs are fading out of our man-of-war life, and may soon vanish altogether. In our own memory there are cherished pictures of moonlight nights at sea, and tall masts and white topsails swelling out in the trade wind between the buntlines, like—to use Tom Cringle's picturesque phrase—the bosoms of a maiden, and groups of sailors on the forecastle smoking their pipes, and old John Lane, the captain of the foretop, seated on the forecastle-chest by the fife-rail singing, with little regard for

[1] Afterwards Paymaster General of the Navy.

[2] *Naval Songs, Songs of Sailors and Shanties*, 1902. S. B. Luce.

tempo, an interminable ballad about the Loss of the Peacock.

Luce sang well himself and he loved these songs of the sea and Yankee sailors.

To the suggestion that some of Dibden's songs be included in his book, he replied, "Wouldn't the Songs of Anacreon answer as well? I thought it was the American spirit that was to be fostered in the boys—not the English. Some of the English songs, however, are not to be despised." The later collections of his Naval Songs do contain a number of old English sea ballads. In the preface to the last edition he says of the *Constellation and the Insurgente*, "The first part of the air was remembered by an old Boatswain's Mate of the service; while the second part, only could be recalled by one of the older officers who had heard it sung in his midshipman days when men who had fought in the War of 1812 were still living." The *Constitution and Guerrière* was sung to the tune of *Hearts of Oak*, and the *Chesapeake and Shannon* was sung to the air of an old English tune.[1] Like many popular airs a variety of songs was adapted, the best known in its day was

> A landlady of France she loved an officer so gay
> This officer, he dearly loved her brandy O'.

In Fiske's autobiography he mentions passing Admiral Luce one day in Newport, "walking briskly, wearing a pink flower in his button hole and swinging a little cane. As he passed we heard him singing to himself." Miss Powel in her *Journal* commenting on this, writes, "I dare venture that he was singing to himself his beloved

[1] Professor Laughton says he can remember the singing of the *Chesapeake and Shannon* for close on to sixty years and that he never heard it sung to anything else but a horn pipe which in 1813 was as popular as "I'd rather have a guinea than a pound note." He also wondered if this tune was popular in the United States at that time. Letter from Henry York, Secretary to Admiralty, to Miss M. E. P., February 18, 1900.

U. S. Training Ship "Minnesota."

'High Barbaree.' I have heard him singing it many a time to himself, and once or twice a few lines out loud. I do not remember ever seeing the Admiral carry a cane."

The following letter from Rear Admiral Almy to Admiral Luce on this subject gives an interesting glimpse of life at sea in the old Navy in the forties.

"Speaking and writing about Naval Songs, I will state that on board of the U. S. Flagship *Macedonian* on the coast of Africa during the year 1843, we used to have 'Saturday Nights' in all its glory in the cabin of the *Macedonian*—old Commodore Perry and Captain Mayo at the head of it.

"A person who couldn't sing a song had to write one or pay a bottle of wine. We had been to Madeira, and had a stock of good wine. Out of the officers, four songs were produced; one of them by your humble servant. Would you believe it? But Luce, it may be difficult for you to imagine the *immense amount* of poetical and musical talent in the Navy at that day. And this, of which I am writing, was elicited and inspired on the dark shores of Africa. What would it have been in the bright Southern climes?

"I don't know how it is with the young fellows of the Navy nowadays; it don't seem to extend further than church choirs.

"Tunes were fitted and arranged to these songs which sounded pretty well on the coast of Africa where there was no rivalry or competition."

A library was established on board the *Minnesota*. A vocal music teacher named Houghton was secured, and also a pugilist for a boxing master, and a Belgian fencing master.

A cruise was made up the Hudson River as far as Kingston, farther than any ship of the *Minnesota's* draft had ventured, stopping en route to recruit apprentices. At Poughkeepsie Captain Luce entertained the historian

Lossing, and induced him to write a short popular history of the Navy. "He never lost an opportunity to advance the fortunes of the Navy," writes Professor Rawson, U. S. N., who was the Chaplain on board, and to whom I am indebted for notes of the *Minnesota's* cruise, "and to make it known to his fellow countrymen. If it had been possible he would have taken the ship to Albany, his birthplace, but she drew too much water."

There is an entry in the ship's log worth repeating here which was put in by Luce's order:

Sunday, December 22, 1878.

At 8.30 Commanding Officer inspected ship and crew at quarters. At 10.30 held divine service on board, Chaplain Rawson officiating. By order of Captain S. B. Luce mention is made in the log, that with the exception of the Commanding Officer and the Chaplain who officiated not an officer of the ship attended divine service, and there are twenty-four officers attached to the ship.

During his command of the *Minnesota* he made unflagging efforts to elevate the standard of proficiency and the moral tone of the boys and to cultivate among them ambition and the high ideals of the service, and to this end he instituted the system of medals and prizes. To accomplish this he appealed to his friends, for there were no funds for the purpose provided by the Navy Department. There was a generous response to his appeal, and seven medals and several prizes were donated. Mrs. Tredick, daughter of Admiral Theodorus Bailey, gave a gold medal for general efficiency. The other medals were of silver; the Farragut given by Loyall Farragut; the Dahlgren Medal for Gunnery from the widow of the Admiral; two Barron medals, bearing the motto "Look ahead for danger and aloft for succor"; an anonymous medal with the inscription "Do not touch me with impunity"; the officers' medals, by the Officers of

the *Minnesota;* and the Lawrence medal presented by Lawrence's granddaughter, Mrs. Mary Lawrence Redmond, bearing the engraving of the *Hornet* sinking the *Peacock,* and Lawrence's immortal words "Don't give up the ship."

The annual presentation of the medals on the quarter-deck of the *Minnesota* was made the occasion of impressive ceremonies, and in the presence of high officials of Government and State. After the conventional prayers and speeches the boys sang the old navy songs of which Luce was fond and proud. "Hold up your heads, boys," he would call out in his ringing voice, "and give our guests the '*Constitution and the Guerrière*'"—a song to be handed down to posterity. "The Glee Club of six boys," wrote a spectator at one of these ceremonies, "accompanied by a harmonium led the singing, the music swelled by four hundred voices. They sang how the *Constellation* captured *l'Insurgente,* and Captain Luce said 'Give her some life this time,' and the boys in singing the good old song did 'give her some life,' and made Newport harbor ring with their strong young voices."

All was going well with the *Minnesota* and the Training system when a move was made by some one in Washington to send her to New London and establish a naval station there, with the *Minnesota* as a sort of receiving ship. As the New London idea was based upon political considerations, and would have defeated the basic principles of the Training System—training boys to be sailors on board ship—Luce strongly opposed the proposal, and in doing so precipitated a row that had been brewing for months. It is not our purpose to discuss the New London project. It failed, and Luce gained another point, after a controversy that lasted for more than a year and consumed reams of paper, and alienated more than one old service friend.

The feeling created is reflected in the letters that follow:

From Captain Luce to the Chief of Bureau of Equipment, Navy Department

U. S. Training Ship *Minnesota*,
Navy Yard New York,
Nov. 27, 1879.

My dear English:—

In yours of Nov. 8th you say: "The Hon. Secretary of the Navy is very desirous of getting the apprentice system started on a uniform basis and I wish you would advise and adopt a routine with that end in view."

And again "The *Minnesota* will probably be permanently located at New London, and it is essential that a definite system be put in force as soon as possible."

Nothing would give me greater satisfaction than to see a definite system of training enlisted boys put in force at once; for nothing could be more thoroughly unsatisfactory than the present condition of affairs. From my point of view we are not getting one half of the good out of the Training System that we might and have a right to expect.

The sooner the Training System is consolidated and brought under one management the sooner will the Navy begin to reap the benefit of it.

Captain Luce to the Secretary of the Navy

U. S. Training Ship *Minnesota*,
New York, Nov. 19th, 1880.

I take the liberty of addressing you unofficially, to say that the remarks you did us the honor to make on the quarter-deck of this ship during your recent visit to Hampton Roads, were very encouraging. They convinced us of your full appreciation of the importance of the naval apprentice system and of your intimate knowledge of its present deficiencies.

To save the training system from the failure which now threatens it and to secure its success, it needs two things:—a permanent location and a head. This done there would follow as a natural sequence, the uniting under one superintendent, the several elements which now compose it; and its organization on some fixed plan.

The training "System," in its present state, may be compared to an infant suffering from retarded development. Its capabilities are yet unsuspected by those who have not made the subject a study.

Obviously, the first step and the most important, is the selection of a site for a permanent location. All the rest I apprehend will follow in order.

I trust my excuse for thus venturing a suggestion may be found in the very great interest I have always taken in the matter.

Luce was promoted to the grade of Commodore in the fall of 1881, and in official verbiage was ordered to "take command of all the apprentice ships to be assembled at Washington" on the 25th April, 1881. These ships were organized as the Apprentice Training Squadron, which was composed finally of the *Portsmouth*, *Jamestown* and *Saratoga*, the *Minnesota* being replaced by the *New Hampshire*. "The ships," wrote Luce, "were pronounced by English Naval officers as ideal ships."

From Secretary of Navy to Commodore Luce

Navy Department, Washington,
August 3, 1881.

In view of the large number of desertions from the Training Ships, and the complications that have arisen among the officers of the Fleet, it seems proper that at the earliest practical moment, as large a portion of your command as you can properly detail for that duty, should set sail for other ports. Occupation and a change of scene, will soon obliterate discontent in the minds of the boys. The attractions of Newport, so great to officers, seem to be growing infectious with the boys; and you will as far as you deem expedient, not lead them into such temptation!!

Finding it desirable to have a mother ship for the Training Squadron, the Commodore succeeded in obtaining the old wooden ship *New Hampshire*. She was taken

to Newport and moored in the stream off Coaster's Harbor Island which was designated as her base. For many years Luce had advocated Narragansett Bay as a site for a Naval Station, and it was through his personal influence that the City of Newport executed a deed of gift to the Government of Coaster's Harbor Island for naval purposes. "The object and sole object," writes Luce, "in getting possession of the Island was to have a place where the boys might land occasionally for drills under arms and recreation."

In the summers of 1882 and 1883 Commodore Luce made cruises to the English Channel with the *Portsmouth* and *Saratoga*. At Plymouth there was still living at the time of the visit of the Squadron, Lady Hillyer, the widow of the captain who had defeated Commodore Porter in the battle in Valparaiso Harbor in 1814. Porter's grandson, Carlisle Porter, was the marine officer in Luce's flagship. When Lady Hillyer was told this by Commodore Luce, she insisted upon Lieutenant Porter being brought to her and accorded him a cordial greeting.

Lady Hillyer returned Commodore Luce's visit seated in her barge which came alongside. She made many inquiries for Mrs. Luce, whose aunt, Mrs. Tobias Lear, had been her early friend. They had been young women together at Tunis.

Another incident of the cruise was the opening of the New Eddystone Light House by the Duke of Edinburgh. At the luncheon which followed the ceremonies in the Guild Hall at Plymouth at which the American officers were guests, the Duke expressed his gratification at the presence of Commodore Luce and his officers and said that it was with special pleasure he welcomed the American officers and proposed the Commodore's health. Luce's reply was brief and characteristic. He said, "It is good we should be here to speak in the name of America as Americans. The very name of Plymouth suggests the Pilgrim Fathers and Plymouth Rock of New Eng-

land. The ocean cannot separate Americans from this country, in whose classics they have been nurtured. As England today gives physical light to the physical world, may she continue to give light to the spiritual world."

On Luce's return from the summer's cruises in 1883 to Newport he found "that the *New Hampshire* had been hauled into the wharf. My first thought though was to have her hauled out in the stream again, but the anchor hoy and all her heavy ground tackle used for planting and taking up moorings that had been sent up from the New York Navy Yard for express purpose of shifting her moorings, had been sent back and there were no means here of handling heavy anchors and chains. As it was useless to apply for aid to the Bureaus, I had to submit much against my will, to the inevitable. To me it was a bitter experience. Tied securely to the wharf, the *New Hampshire* made a comfortable bed for herself in the mud, produced a cess-pool, had sickness on board and had to be hauled out in the stream again where she was moored to one of the buoys intended for the practice ships."[1]

About this time the effort was renewed to have the training station moved to New London. This was the beginning of the end of Luce's cherished Training Squadron, although his Training System survives on a greatly enlarged scale in the barracks at Newport, Hampton Roads, the Great Lakes, and San Francisco.

Of the elimination of the Training Squadron, Luce tells the story graphically in an unpublished paper which he called "The Passing of the American Sailor":

"As a preliminary step the *New Hampshire* was sent there (Newport), the apprentices, meanwhile, being put in tents. Thus it came about that the Training System was cast on shore like so much wreckage where it has since remained. The effort to have the training station sent to New London having failed the *New Hampshire* was turned over to the New York Naval Militia where

[1] Memorandum by S. B. Luce.

she now is under the name of the *Granite State*. Here was a good ship for the purpose, doing good service, deliberately thrown away. The rest soon followed. The *Jamestown* was given to the Marine Hospital Service.[1] The *Portsmouth* was turned over to the Naval Militia, New Jersey, where she is now. The *Saratoga* was given to Philadelphia as a State School ship, just as the *St. Mary's* had been given to New York. The last feeble effort to keep the man-of-war sailor from becoming entirely extinct was when the *Monongahela* was assigned to the training service. She also was given up, and was recently destroyed by fire at Guantanamo, Cuba. Thus has the Navy of the United States deliberately, and, it may be added, wantonly abandoned the Industrial system and the school of the sailor. What end has been gained by it, or what end it is proposed to gain by it we are at loss to understand. To us it is a sad story and one that bodes no good for the Navy or for the country.

"We have just stated that this result was brought about by our own officers of the line. Let us look back into that question. Some years ago we were interested in the fitting out of the *Lancaster* as a gunnery ship, and normal school of petty officers. She was intended as part of the training service. Meeting a young officer from the Department in the street one day we asked casually what was done with the *Lancaster*, the officer being attached to the Bureau of Navigation. His reply was 'I have not yet made up my mind.' And quite recently we read among the advertisements of one of the popular magazines the following delicious bit of information. 'A few months at a training school makes the naval recruits familiar with conditions aboard a man-of-war. . . . When he is sent to a sea-going vessel he has become a seasoned bluejacket. . . .' This is not funny. It is too serious a matter. The two examples taken together indicate that an overworked Chief of a Bureau is

[1] She is now the quarantine vessel at Old Point, Va.

U. S. Training Squadron at Newport.

obliged to delegate to the young officers of his Bureau certain responsible duties and these latter with all their zeal and intelligence in many cases lack experience in educational subjects.

"Nor is this all. The American flag has practically disappeared from the ocean. An extensive mercantile marine once all but monopolized the carrying trade of the world and furnished a great naval reserve. That reserve no longer exists. Our navy of today has been built up without the foundations on which certain other navies rest, an extensive mercantile marine. If we are to have sailors at all the navy must produce her own. There is but one thing necessary—the will to do it.

"To show that others are alive to this important question I may refer once more to the splendid full-rigged clipper ship the *Mersey*, the White Star Line training ship for the cadets who are in time to officer the company's ships; the *Newport*, schoolship, of New York, and the schoolship *Ranger* of Boston. Both of these ships may be navigated under sail and the *Newport* has this summer made a record passage to England. I do not, as stated, argue in favor of manning the entire navy with sailors—far from it. The proposition, surely a very reasonable one, is that every ship in the Navy should have as part of her complement a given proportion, say 25 percent, of real up-to-date sailors—sailors competent to do a sailor's work handling ground tackle, knotting and splicing, and marlinspike seamanship generally, good leadsmen and men able to man a life boat in a heavy seaway, handling hawsers, etc., etc., together with all the military training he is capable of taking in.

"In case of disaster at sea, as well as in battle, such men would prove of inestimable value. Everyone who has had experience with sailors knows of their adaptability, knows how readily they accommodate themselves to circumstances, how handy they are under any and all conditions.

"During the Boxer war there was landed from an

English man-of-war a 5-inch gun, which the sailors of the ship managed to place on an eminence where it did great execution. It was said at the time this was a marvelous piece of work and one that could have been done by sailors only. Don't give up the Sailor!"

He sums up the situation in a letter to his son-in-law, Lieutenant Boutelle Noyes on board the flagship of the China Station.

U. S. Naval Training Station
Coaster's Harbor Island,
Newport, R. I.
July 19th, 1883.

My dear "Bottle":—

Passing the apologetic stage we come at once to business. Yours of — I blush to recall the date—duly received and I have waited and waited and waited for some good and encouraging news to give you about the Training System, but it seems like one of them 'ere bloody ignus fashus that the sailors talk about—the more you comes up to it the further it goes off, so I am all but in despair. I knew that we could do nothing much in the way of progress till it—the T. S.—was put in the charge of some bureau having money, and every one said that English and myself should "make up" as the small boy says. Having practiced "eating dirt" since my first steerage mess claimed me as its own, I had no objection to taking one more gulp, and so the thing was done, but beside bringing out General Order No. 33 establishing the school here permanently but little has been accomplished. It was said of the House of Bourbon that its scions never forgot anything and never learnt anything. *Verbum Sap.* The shaking hands over the bloody chasm has not resulted in any substantial good that I can see. One illustration will suffice. We have here now on board this ship *45 boys.* The *Minnesota* has 105! ! So rampant is the spirit of jealousy!

I take the situation very calmly knowing that such a condition of affairs can not last very long; but it is aggravating to see, by repeated illustrations, how very little sympathy the Navy Department has for this school.

It really appears at times as if we were keeping it up in spite of the protests of the authorities! They think nothing of yanking a valuable officer out of the ship at a moment's notice and let us whistle for a substitute. Dick Derby our navigator was detached four months ago and I have not been able by tears and entreaties to get an officer in his place to this day. As to *System* there is none—and so it goes. I do not worry because that does not help. I simply wait. Old Symonds[1] is a tower of strength. He is at present commanding officer—Matthews[2] having gone to Europe with the Foundry Board. But even Symonds every now and then shows signs of weakening under the continued disadvantages from which we labor.

But there is a bright side to the picture. Everyone is charmed with the place as it appears in its vernal vestments (v-v, is good). Just now it is perfectly charming and people wonder and wonder how Newport could ever give such a place away. But I know and the festive taxpayer knows, that we throw—this ship alone throws about $12,000 a month into the town, and when all the ships are here it amounts to about $30,000 put in circulation monthly. No bad thing. And the popular dread that the town would be overrun with drunken sailors has not been realized— . . .

. . . . . .

. . . It is true, I believe, that the refuse matter thrown from the ships has inconsiderately drifted in on the shore, thus spoiling the bathing. I am really sorry for this and have done everything in my power to avert the evil. For I have honestly tried from the first to make ourselves as little objectionable as possible to the good people; I must soon give up; but I predict that the one who succeeds me will have the choice command in the U. S. Navy.

My great hobby now—now that the Training System is fairly established—is to erect a "War School" for officers—the prime object being to teach officers the science of their own profession—the Science of War—including

[1] Lieutenant Frederick Symonds, U.S.N.
[2] Commodore E. A. Matthews, U.S.N.

cognate branches, such as Ordnance, International Law, etc., etc., and modelling it somewhat after the fashion of the Artillery School at Fort Monroe and the Cavalry School of Fort Leavenworth. I have the plan roughly mapped out, and the Alms House on this Island is to be the College. I have presented my plan to the Secretary of the Navy but he has not yet had time to give the matter his attention. But all the officers with whom I have talked give it their hearty approval. Whether it will end in smoke or not I can not say.

Do you ever meet any of the old Japs who remember the visit of the *Columbus* in '47, and the *Vincennes?*

The two next letters close the story of the Training Service afloat:

From Admiral Porter to Hon. Charles A. Boutelle, M.C.

Office of the Admiral,
Washington, D. C.
June 12, 1888.

Great efforts have been made to do away with the training ships of the Navy which for want of repairs are about to be laid up. This is all wrong. These vessels should never be allowed to go out of service as long as they can be kept together. In this letter I will not go into an argument to demonstrate why it should be so, but I send you an article I once wrote on the subject which you can fully appreciate from your long service in the Navy.

I think the article covers the ground. Please read it carefully and submit it to the Naval Committee with my respects.

"The deadliest blow that could be dealt to the apprentice system would be the substitution of steam vessels for the magnificent sailing sloops that have done so much for the system.

"Seventy thousand dollars would put all the ships in thorough condition to last some years, and there ought to be a law passed that the Act of Congress of August 5, 1882, should not apply to the practice ships of the Navy.

"The sailing ship of war has no rival as a school of instruction. It is the school that has made the sailors of years gone by proverbial for strength, activity, readiness of resource, adaptability to circumstances, patience under severe trial, and contempt of danger. These are the qualities absolutely necessary in a true sailor, which will be essential in the future as heretofore in any class of vessel that may be used in the Navy.

"What was it that gave the volunteer officers in our Civil War such great value but the early training they received on sailing vessels? That training produced as fine a body of men as ever went to sea. We could not have done without them any more than we can do without them in future wars where they will prove to be a powerful factor."

But all pleadings were in vain. Sailing ships and steam ships too were abandoned for training purposes, and barracks for the apprentice lads were established on shore. In his midshipman's journal Luce once wrote of an order from the Captain, "The fiat has gone forth, defy it if you will," and now another fiat had been issued from which there was no appeal.

After the Training of Apprentices had been permanently relegated to shore he wrote to Captain G. C. Hanus, U. S. Navy:

15 Francis Street
Newport, R. I.
February 13, 1907

Your kind favor of 11th about a suitable school ship duly received. For some time passed I have been impressed with the idea that the *St. Mary's* had reached the time when she must either be rebuilt, or restricted to harbor service. She will float many years yet in still water.

You say: In training those who are to become officers of our Merchant Marine, 'we can not abandon our training in square rigged vessels.' I agree with you entirely, only I go a little further in saying that we can not abandon our training in *sailing ships*. I do not

believe, nor have I ever believed, in auxiliary steam ships for training purposes. The greatest demand on skill in seamanship, and alacrity in obeying orders on the part of the crew, is in getting under way in port and going to sea; and in entering a harbor and coming to anchor. With steam auxiliary this is done, not under sail, but under steam, in nine cases out of ten. In the offing with a sudden drop in the barometer the first impulse is to get up steam, douse sail and scurry into port. Another test of seamanship is in beating to windward. It is a sheer waste of time, and the vital forces, to try this with an auxiliary steam ship. I know this, for I have tried; first, in the *Juniata* in the Mediterranean, and again in the *Hartford* in the Home squadron. Both ships were fine specimens of their class, and carried, at that time, all the canvas they wanted. Going large they did remarkably well, but in thrashing to windward, while looking well up to the wind, they sagged to leeward like a small boat. The long flat floor designed for steaming, is fatal to sailing qualities.

Misdirected education is the rule in this country, from the university to the primary school. I am an earnest believer in colleges, but, although it seems a harsh thing to say, they have blasted the career of many a young man; not through the fault of the college, but from the mistaken judgment of those who sent them to a college instead of to an industrial school. The first step in training is to have a perfectly clear idea of just what is to be produced, and secondly to make the course progressive. Avoid cramming. Lord Macaulay had to learn the alphabet before he could launch out on his brilliant literary career. If you want to produce a sailor he must be made to master the alphabet of his trade first. In doing that he will develop character, but thereafter follow the bent of his natural aptitude. While learning to be a sailor he is at the same time learning practical navigation in the very best of schools. Having finished his first course, the young sailor will then be prepared to take up marine engineering, or electricity, as his proclivities may lead him. To undertake, in a limited time, to teach seamanship, navigation, steam and electricity would be a mistake. At the Naval Academy it takes four years to do that. You, I take it, have not the time to take

more than the first step in the course. But whatever is done let it be well done as far as it goes.

Such, in brief, are my views on nautical schools. It will be difficult to get the right kind of ship. The *Young America* was designed for quite other purposes. The success she so richly deserved was marred by mismanagement.

Wishing you success in your efforts to keep the N. Y. Nautical School afloat, believe me,

It was inevitable that the sailing ship should share the fate of the galley, and that the original system of training should be modified. The great point gained was the permanent establishment of a service that has given the country a body of seamen who have no superiors.

CHAPTER X

The Naval War College

IN the preceding chapter we have seen that Commodore Luce wrote to Lieutenant Noyes in 1883 that having established the Training System, his great hobby was to erect a war school for officers. We will endeavor to show how he labored to do this for many years against the buffetings of the Navy Department, but never despaired of ultimate success. In his work for the War College, he was assisted and backed up by his faithful disciple Lieutenant William McCarthy Little who was his tower of strength as he called him, as Frederick Symonds had been in the struggles for the Training system. Little was a graduate of the Naval Academy of the class of '66 and was a brilliant and energetic officer who when a young lieutenant by an accident on shore had lost the sight of one eye and had been retired. Many years afterwards through the efforts of Admiral Luce, Little was promoted to the rank of post Captain. He was on duty at the War College until his death in 1915.

From Captain S. B. Luce to the Honorable R. W. Thompson, Secretary of the Navy

U.S.S. *Hartford*, Navy Yard,
Norfolk, Va., August 8, 1877.

I have the honor to propose for the consideraton of the Navy Department the establishment of a school wherein our junior officers shall be carried through a post

graduate course consisting of the higher branches of their profession.

The existence—not to say the complete success of such schools—both in this country and in Europe renders any argument in support of the proposition quite superfluous.

Nor shall I, at this early stage enter into any of the details of the proposed plan, contenting myself, simply, with referring to the pamphlet herewith enclosed, containing the "Programme of Instruction and Code of Regulation of the U. S. Artillery School at Fort Monroe, as giving a general idea of its formation.

I may state here, however, that the leading feature of the post graduate course would be the carrying of the young officers through a course of instruction in the Art of War.

Extraordinary as it may appear the naval officer whose principal business it is to fight is not taught the higher branches of his profession. The U. S. is not singular in this respect. The defect is common to nearly all navies and is an inheritance of a past and less enlightened age. But with the recent revolution in naval warfare comes a demand for a higher order of talent in the conduct of naval operation. Elementary tactics, or the simple handling of a fleet is no longer sufficient for a Commander-in-Chief to know. The introduction of steam and the telegraph enabling military operations both on land and at sea to be conducted with great rapidity, and shortening to months great campaigns which had in times past consumed years, renders it absolutely necessary that to be a successful naval captain of the present day an officer must be a strategist as well as a tactician. Now as the principles of strategy are always the same and apply equally to the army on land and the army afloat—the Navy—it strikes me that our officers should be taught the Art of War very much in the same manner that our army officers are taught that branch in the post graduate course at the Artillery School at Fort Monroe. This difference, however, should undoubtedly obtain—that the rules of the Art should be applied to naval operations, and that the course should be combined with the study of naval history—another branch which has been singularly neglected in our profession.

Should my proposition meet with the favorable consideration of the Department, and I know of no step that would tend so materially to the advancement of the naval profession—I would further suggest as a preliminary step, the sending of a select few of our officers to attend a course of instructions at the Artillery School at Fort Monroe. The knowledge thus attained, combined with a course of reading of naval history would prepare them in a few months to become the instructors of their juniors.

Earnestly hoping that this plan proposed—so very desirable in every respect—so practical, and so full of promise will commend itself to your favorable consideration, and that it will prove not the least substantial benefit confirmed by your administration upon the naval service.

I am, etc., etc.

From Brigadier General Emory Upton[1] to Captain S. B. Luce

Fort Monroe, Oct. 16, 1877.

Pardon my delay in acknowledging the receipt of your article, which was so interesting that I finished it at a single sitting. It gave me quite new ideas as to the similarity between land and naval tactics, and I can now fully comprehend your scheme in relation to a post graduate course as a means of educating the officers of the navy in the strategy and tactics of their profession. Your project is a worthy one, and I am glad to hear now that not only do many naval officers approve of it, but that the Secretary of the Navy received your propositions favorably. Someone must start the scheme, and I sincerely hope that as you have done so, you may be able to inaugurate the course and witness its triumph.

My report drags on slowly. I am now working up our policy during the War with Mexico. In the war of '12 I show that on land we got whipped in almost every battle till Lundy's Lane; that we called out a half million of men, and had our capitol burned in the bargain. In the rebellion we lost on both sides half a million of

[1] Author of *New System of Infantry Tactics*, *Military Policy* d. 1881.

men, and when I make it appear, as I hope to, that these men were the victims of our stupidity, I trust that, abandoning a policy which savors only of dead men's bones, or any other means, we may adopt an organization that will prevent so much blood-shed in the future.

These two letters mark the earliest beginning of the War College, although it was not until several years later, in April, 1883, that the keel of the College, if I may use the expression, was laid. The occasion was a lecture by Commodore Luce before the Naval Institute on the subject of War Schools; in this lecture he suggested the establishment of a "post graduate" course for the study of the science of war, the object of which would be "to prepare officers for the great business of their lives—the practical operation of war," holding that naval officers should possess a knowledge of the science and practice of war "so far as it can be acquired from books." He said that[1] "the naval student should be led into a philosophic study of naval history, that he may be enabled to examine the great naval battles of the world with the cold eye of professional criticism and to recognize where the principles of science have been illustrated, or where a disregard for the accepted rules of the art of war has led to defeat and disaster. Such studies might well occupy the very best thoughts of the naval officer, for they belong to the very highest branch of his profession."

"In addition to the study of war we must add a higher course in ordnance, a course in international law, the higher mathematics, languages, astronomy and hydrography."

For many years he had been a student of naval history, of the great campaigns on land and sea, and he wanted to introduce into the navy a systematic course of study of the art and science of war "as applied to the sea, or such parts of the land as can be reached by ships," which had been practiced in the German army for nearly

[1] *Naval Institute*, April, 1883, vol. ix., No. 5.

100 years, which would teach officers to *think* and to *read* about their profession in its application to war problems at sea. There was a prevailing belief that it was a waste of time to study the history of actions fought under sail as having no bearing upon modern conditions, and in his "crowded hour" instinct or inspiration would be the surest guide of the Commander. He appreciated the fact that although until Rodney's time, the English had won battles by superior seamanship, without previous study, that nevertheless they had been "foiled by the want of correct tactical conceptions on the part of their own chiefs and the superior science of the French acquired mainly by study.[1]

The defeat of the Prussians at the Battle of Jena in 1806 was rightly attributed by them to the fact that they had no system, no doctrine of war, while on the other hand Napoleon's victories were due to a system carefully worked out and studied. It was out of the battle of Jena that the General Staff sprang under the famous von Scharnhorst.

Luce's lecture in 1883 commanded respectful attention but neither enthusiasm nor even much interest. The proposal of a "school" was coldly received. As a matter of fact the lecture went over the heads of the audience. The scoffers remarked that neither Farragut nor Nelson studied the Art of War. But having put his hands to the plough, Luce was not the man to turn back. Now the bolt was fired, obviously the first thing was to win the sympathy and support of the Navy Department. Fortunately he had two strong friends in Washington, Admiral D. D. Porter and Commodore J. G. Walker. Admiral Porter was not in favor at the Department, and the "Office of the Admiral" was in his own residence, but his influence and prestige in the country was enormous. Commodore Walker was Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and politically the most powerful

[1] Mahan, *Naval Institute*, vol. xiv., part 4, 1888.

man in the Service; he was one of the ablest administrators and executives the Department has ever had.

Whether or not Luce's letter of August, 1877, made an impression, it is not possible to say, but at any rate in the following year an officer was ordered abroad by the Secretary of the Navy to study the systems of naval education in foreign countries with a view to establishing a post graduate course, but when he had made his report the matter dropped.

The time was ripe to take up the subject with a determination to push it through. It was the transition period of our navy, when we were passing from wooden ships to iron and steel; from sails to steam; from simple engines to complicated machinery and electricity. The majority of officers on shore duty were engaged with inspection of steel, powder, guns, engines. It seemed as if every one was eager to be identified in some way with the building of the new navy. "Thus mental activity," says Mahan referring to this period, "was not directed toward the management of ships in battle, to the planning of naval campaigns, to the study of strategic and tactical problems nor even to the secondary matters connected with warlike operations at sea." It was therefore natural that the idea of going to school was to most officers absurd.

Shortly after the lecture at Annapolis, Luce addressed another letter on the subject to the Secretary,[1] and upon the recommendation of Porter and Walker, Luce was ordered to Washington on special duty and Mr. Chandler gave him a hearing before the assembled Line Bureau Chiefs. This was the initial step taken by the Department. One of the Commodores openly sneered at the proposition and treated it in a manner bordering on derision. Luce explained that his plan was simply to give officers the opportunity to study the science of war at sea, to prepare themselves for the grave duties

[1] Wm. E. Chandler.

and responsibilities of high command; that it was to be a school, and in no sense was it to be an adjunct of or connected with the Naval Academy. Many years afterwards at the summer opening of the College in June 1903, he explained in detail the real meaning of the college: "The proud position we, as a nation, now occupy was rendered possible by wars. Any future problems in the destiny of man will be worked out through the instrumentality of the sword. There is no escaping it. Tears and tirades are here of no avail. We are no apologists of war. Heaven forbid. We simply regard it from the common sense point of view, as one of the many evils flesh is heir to. War in certain instances may be averted. But mark this well, it may be averted in one way only, and that way is to be fully prepared for it. That is the meaning of this college; it is an instrumentality for the prevention of war by being prepared for it."

The result of the conference in the Secretary's office was that Mr. Chandler on 30 May, 1884, appointed a Board[1] of which Luce was President, to report and consider the whole subject of a "post graduate" course or school of application to be established by the Department for officers of the Navy. It was unfortunate that the phrase "post graduate" course was used; it gave offense at the very beginning. In his lecture in 1883 Luce had inadvertently used the same expression and early in January, 1884, Captain F. M. Ramsey, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, an able officer, failed entirely to get Luce's idea and wrote to him his disapproval. He said, "I cannot see the advantage of cutting down the present course for Cadets in order that a post graduate course may be established for officers. Neither can I find a reason for establishing another Naval Academy. If, however, it should be decided proper to establish another Naval Academy and Newport should be

[1] The other members of the Board were Captain W. T. Sampson and Commander C. F. Goodrich.

considered the best place for it, I think the Torpedo Station offers advantages far superior to Coaster's Harbor Island. My views in regard to this matter differ materially from those expressed in your article published in the *Proceedings of the Naval Institute.*"[1]

The Luce Board met on board the *New Hampshire* at Newport, and on June 13, 1884, submitted an exhaustive report upon the whole subject of a post graduate course, or school of application, its scope and extent of the course of instruction and its location. The Board reported . . . .

"Campaigns that have depended for success upon the co-operation of a fleet; campaigns that have been frustrated through the interposition of a fleet; the transfer, by water, of a numerous army to distant points and their landing on enemy's coast under the guns of a fleet; the various results of engagements between ships and shore batteries; naval expeditions which have ended in disaster that could have been foretold through an intelligent study of the problem beforehand; and the great naval battles of history, even from the earliest times, which illustrate and inforce many of the most important and immutable principles of War, should be carefully examined and rendered familiar to the naval student. For it is upon this professional skill in the large operation of combining and utilizing to the best advantage, the floating force of the country, as well as in the more restricted one of an isolated command, that our people must rely for the protection of their interests and the guarding of their extensive coasts and coasting trade from the depredations of an enemy.

. . . . . .

"Naval officers are often called upon on foreign stations to exercise diplomatic functions, and are, not unfrequently, required to settle or act upon questions, involv-

[1] From Captain F. M. Ramsey, U.S.N., to Commodore Luce, January 10, 1884.

ing nice points of international law. They should therefore, be carefully prepared for this responsibility by an intimate knowledge of the enlightened neutrality policy which this country has had the honor of introducing and maintaining from the foundation, and of the principles of equity that have ever characterized, as well as of the instruments which control the intercourse of the United States with foreign powers.

. . . . . .

"The Board therefore recommends that the War School be established at Newport, and that those officers who take these special courses in science avail themselves of the great institutions of learning at Boston."

In the following October the order was issued establishing the War College on Coaster's Harbor Island. Luce had at last scored a victory, but it was for him a victory without peace of mind.

The text of the Department's order was:

General Order No. 325.

NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,
October 6, 1884.

A College is hereby established for an advanced course of professional study for naval officers, to be known as the Naval War College. It will be under the general supervision of the Bureau of Navigation. The principal building on Coasters' Harbor Island, Newport, R. I., will be assigned to its use, and is hereby transferred, with the surrounding structures and the grounds adjacent, to the custody and control of the Bureau of Navigation for that purpose.

The college will be under the immediate charge of an officer of the Navy, not below the grade of Commander, to be known as the President of the Naval War College. He will be assisted in the performance of his duties by a faculty.

A course of instruction, embracing the higher branches of professional study, will be arranged by a board, consisting of all the members of the faculty, and including the President, who will have regular meetings at least

once a month, and at such other times as the President may direct, for the transaction of business. The proceedings of the board will be recorded in a journal.

The course of instruction will be open to all officers above the grade of naval cadet.

Commodore S. B. Luce has been assigned to duty as President of the College.

WILLIAM E. CHANDLER,
Secretary of the Navy.

It was easy to write the order but quite another thing to put it into operation. The idea had been jeered and pooh-poohed from the start. One distinguished Admiral expressed his opinion when he heard of the order by exclaiming, "*Teach* the art of war! Well, I'll be damned!" A Bureau Chief of scientific reputation and noted for his hard common sense said to Luce, "What is that newfangled thing you've got at Newport?" and then, "You have Cooper's *Naval History* and Parker's *Fleet Tactics*, what more do you want?" and these views were reflected in the service attitude. The Navy at large simply refused to light their candles at Luce's torch.

In July, 1884, after nine years of practically uninterrupted duty on board ship, Commodore Luce was detached from command of the Training Squadron and ordered to command the North Atlantic Fleet with the rank of Acting Rear Admiral—a sort of brevet title which carried rank but not increase of pay. This was a device to make up for the deficiency of Rear Admirals of whom only six were allowed by law. The grade of Commodore[1]

[1] In regard to the rank of Commodore (which was established July 16, 1862) the following letter from Rear Admiral George H. Preble who was the highest authority on flag titles, etc., is of historical value as well as of interest, and for these reasons it is herewith quoted in full:

BROOKLINE, MASS., Jan. 27, 1885.

DEAR LUCE:

I quite agree with you that a Commodore is not a Flag Officer. We recognized the difference in our navy when the grade of *Flag Officer* was created before the war. A broad pennanted ship is not a flagship—

moreover was not Flag grade, and hence when abroad our Commodores were invariably junior to foreign Commanders-in-Chief and of inferior rank. This practice was discontinued when the President at Senator Procter's request sent Dewey to China. The Department, displeased that Dewey had obtained the duty in this way, at once adopted a "new policy" of doing away with the acting rank, and Dewey as a penalty for using political influence, went to China as a Commodore. The world knows how he returned with the rank of Admiral which hitherto had been bestowed only on Farragut and Porter.

When it was decided to establish the War College Commodore Luce was detached from the command of the Fleet 20th September and ordered to assume the duties of "Superintendent of the College at Coaster's Harbor Island." During this short cruise the fleet assembled at Portsmouth, N. H., and received the Greely Relief Expedition when it returned from the Arctic.

At this time the only building on the Island was a small two-story structure of stone, formerly an asylum for the poor of Newport which had been converted into offices for the Commandant of the Training System. By the Secretary's order this building and all the grounds were taken away from the Bureau of Equipment, and turned

---

though sometimes so called improperly. She should be called a Commodore's ship, just as vessels bearing a Senior Officer's pennant are called Senior Officer's ship. Sometimes erroneously "the commodore." I have explained this matter of square flags and pennants, etc., in the introduction of my *History of the Flag* beginning at page 5, also in part VII, pages 667 and 700 on. Falconer in his *Marine Dictionary*, 1769, says the term Flag Officer is synonymous with Admiral and I think you will find that he has been followed by most of the Etymological Dictionaries and Cyclopedias since. *Chambers' Encyclopedia* the only one I have at hand says "a flag officer in the British Navy is an *Admiral, Vice Admiral or Rear Admiral* and defines a Commodore in the R.N. as a rank intermediate between an Admiral and a Captain that is not permanent but bestowed for a time upon a Captain." See also Falconer for his definition of Commodore. I hope the proposition to create Vice Admirals in our Navy to hold relative rank with Major-Generals, and Rear Admirals to rank with Brigadiers will *not* prevail. If those ranks are wanted (6 and 12 each) why let us have them out with their *proper relative rank* and *pay* or else not at all. . . .

The Old Administration Building.

Coaster's Harbor Island.
As it was when turned over to be the War College (1885)

over to the Bureau of Navigation for the use of the War College. This made an enemy of Equipment at once, which resented losing any part of its command.

Luce went through the form of opening the College and assuming its Presidency, but it was a mere form. There were no funds for its maintenance; not a cent of money for light, heat, furniture or books. Never did an unwelcome infant have a more inauspicious entrance into the world, and the cradle of the War College seemed appropriately to be what Luce called it at the opening ceremony, "poor little Poor House, I christen thee the United States Naval War College." Its existence was so precarious from the beginning that it was just as difficult to get it through its first ten years, as it was its first and second summers. A hot-house flower planted on the bleak slopes of the Island would apparently have just as much chance of surviving. It was as if the Navy Department had given Luce a ship stripped to a gantline, and a handful of men, and said, "She is yours, fit her out and take her to sea."

After much maneuvering Luce's staff succeeded in getting together one lamp, a few chairs and desks, and some coal which somehow they stowed in the cellar without the formality of a paymaster's receipt. One of the staff, the energetic McCarthy Little, cut out some pasteboard models of ships, and later another found a plan of the Battle of Trafalgar, which he hung on the wall of the lecture room. Mahan said of this chart that a reporter who had been sent to Newport to write up the College remarked "'Ah, I see you are still talking about Trafalgar,' and I could see that we and Trafalgar were relegated to the fossils."

The hardships of the Pilgrim Fathers in the snow and ice of the Massachusetts Colony must have supplied some humorous parallels in the reflections of Admiral Luce, as he and his band of Pilgrims struggled to preserve the life of the College against the indifference of

the Navy Department, the opposition of certain prominent officers, and the "cold neutrality" of Congress.

While the intangible beginnings of the War College were taking shape, down on the coast of Peru was an American Naval officer whose subsequent career was to be indissolubly associated with the College and by the College was to win much fame and honor. In 1884 Commander Alfred T. Mahan was in command of the U.S.S. *Wachusett* in Callao harbor. His pastime was books and he passed most of his leisure when ashore in the library of the English Club at Lima. It was there in the pages of Mommsen's *History of Rome*, which he found on the shelves, that he got his first ideas of the influence of seapower on History; and there also from the writings of Napier and Jomini he first learned "the living principles of strategy and the close relations in warfare between the Statesman and the General."[1]

Mahan was the first assistant Admiral Luce applied for when he selected his staff, but the Department declined to release him from his ship until the end of his cruise, and he did not arrive at the War College until 1886.

However, no orders were issued to put the College into effect. An officer remarked, "it was a carcass without a soul," and in February, 1885, the Senate passed a Resolution of inquiry, requesting the Department to report the status of the War College, and why it had been established.

It was not until the following September nearly a year after Commodore Luce had pronounced the College opened that a class of eight student officers was assembled, for a course of one month, and the lecturers were announced to be Rear Admiral Ammen, Professor Soley, Commodore Luce, and Commander H. C. Taylor. In addition to these several gentlemen were invited to read papers, General Palfrey on the Peninsular Campaign

[1] *Life of Mahan*, C. T. Taylor.

of 1862, General George H. Gordon, Pope's Campaign in Virginia, and John C. Ropes, the Wilderness and Cold Harbor.

It must be admitted that the program with two or three exceptions gave shallow critics not a little ammunition, and afforded the would-be humorists an opportunity to make fun at a Naval College which was studying land warfare.

An officer of the College writing of the difficulties encountered in the preparations for the course says, "these have been fully described to show the difficulties of the undertaking and the brave way in which these difficulties were met; to show how wisely the foundations were laid; how broadly based the College course was at the very beginning to indicate the sharp differences between this course in warfare and a post graduate course in the ordinary sense of the term, and to record the clear vision of Commodore Luce who purposed that this should be in fact a school of war, and who set for it the perfectly definite task of developing the science of Naval Warfare."

In June, 1886, Admiral Luce was again ordered to sea. He was succeeded by Captain Mahan, who had only just completed his cruise.

Before leaving the College Luce planned the lectures for the second term which began September 4 and ended November 20th. These lectures were on Naval Tactics, Naval Gunnery, Naval History, Military Tactics and Strategy, Naval Hygiene, Sea Coast Defense and Maritime Defense.

The work of the War College really began in the second term, in the fall of 1886, and merits some detailed mention. During the first ten days of the term "the presence of the *Tennessee* allowed some practical exercises in ramming tactics using the steam launches of the Flagship. Admiral Luce opened the term by a lecture explanatory of the necessity for and the objects of the War College. "The hearty readiness of Admiral Luce,"

reports Mahan, "to do anything tending to illustrate by practice the theories of the lecture room has shown that much benefit would accrue to the college if circumstances should allow the fleet to be here during a part of the term."

Luce delivered four lectures on subjects of professional interest. Mahan lectured on Naval History, Commander Goodrich on Coast Defenses, and Lieutenant Meigs on Naval Gunnery. The other lecturers were Commander Hoff, Professor Soley, Lieutenant Bliss of the Army and Captain Bixley of the U. S. Engineers. Medical Director Dean lectured on Naval Hygiene, and Assistant Naval Constructor Gatewood on the preservation and care of iron ships.

Mahan deemed it necessary to explain why an Army officer should lecture on military tactics and strategy. He said, "Two objects are arrived at. First to enlarge the knowledge of sea officers in the matter of conducting such expeditions as may be feasible with the forces landed from a fleet alone, familiarizing them with the best approved methods and expedients of modern armies. . . . The second may be stated thus: the great changes due to steam and modern weapons make navies susceptible of much surer and more complicated use than of old, both in strategy and tactics; but a naval war is yet needed to compel the general adoption of some system of tactics and to test it to the conviction of all. . . . It is reasonably thought that the broad study of land warfare, so copiously illustrated in recent as well as earlier times, will materially aid the sea officers to correct conclusions as to the best use of the yet untried weapons, for whose tactical efficacy in battle he must otherwise depend upon presumptions, resulting so far in very varying opinions."

In 1886, '87, '88, there were classes of about twenty officers each year for courses of from two and a half to three months. In the winter of '88 and '89 Secretary

Whitney who for some reason was inimical to the War College, ordered it to be consolidated with the Torpedo Station on Goat Island in Newport Harbor, placing the whole under Commander C. F. Goodrich who was in charge of the latter, and Mahan was ordered elsewhere. Of this order Mahan wrote, "If by consolidation is meant the merging of two lines of thought radically distinct and in temper of mind opposed, under a single directing intellect, the result will be the one or the other." "The two branches of instruction," says Lieutenant Staunton in plainer phrasing, "are totally different—one strictly mechanical and technical, the other of historical study, strategic investigation and general application; and the attempt to combine them was a predestined failure."

From the cabin of his Flagship Admiral Luce watched eagerly and anxiously every move that was made against the War College, and did what he could to counteract the operations of its enemies. On January 9th, 1888, observing clouds on the horizon, he wrote to General Whitthorne, the Chairman of the House Naval Affairs Committee: "I am very glad indeed to see your name on the Naval Committee and the Navy is to be congratulated on having such a friend there, where friends are so much wanted. I need scarcely tell you that there are a number of questions of vital importance to the Navy which may come before your Committee during the present session. Foremost of these is the reorganization of the Navy Department so earnestly recommended both by the Secretary of the Navy and the President in the first annual message.

"That is the first and greatest need of the Navy to-day—all other—ships, guns, torpedo boats, Naval Reserves,—are of secondary consideration. Of those questions of minor importance I beg to commend to your notice the College recently established on an island in Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island.

"This College has failed so far to win the favorable

opinion of the Chairman of your Committee, not I believe from a lack of merit on the part of the institution itself but from a belief that the College should be engrafted upon the Naval Academy at Annapolis. As this belief has been shown by expert testimony to be ill-founded, and that the site originally selected by a board of naval officers was the proper one, I sincerely trust all opposition to the College may cease and that the very moderate estimate ($14,400) asked for by the Secretary of the Navy may be allowed by your Committee.

"I take leave to inclose herewith my very first article giving some idea of the scope of the College."

He also wrote to Admiral Porter urging him to exert his good offices in favor of the War College; as Luce's enemies were mainly those who opposed Porter, the latter was a good coadjutor.

The following characteristic letter from Admiral Porter has some bearing on the subject:

From Admiral Porter to Admiral Luce

Office of the Admiral
Washington, D. C.
November 29, 1888.

I have received your letter of the 20th instant, enclosing a copy of the petition to the Secretary of the Navy, which I will place on my files. As to any change for the better, or in favor of the War College, I doubt it. I do not think the Secretary would ever consult me on any subject as we are like the two poles of the magnetic needle very repellent.

When I was a midshipman on board the frigate *United States*, somewhere about the year 1832, in Port Mahon on the eve of sailing for home, we had been detained about three weeks by a head wind which would not permit us to get out of the harbor. You may remember old Pons, the Spanish pilot. I went up to him (as he was walking the quarter deck with a great deal of grandeur) in a very respectful manner and touching my hat, said,

"Mr. Pons, do you think we will have a fair wind soon?" I shall never forget the scorn with which he looked down upon me and said in his peculiar broken English, "I never take advice from a d——d Midshipmite."

The Republican administration may take advice if we can get a Secretary who wishes to run the Navy on true principles and does not allow a lot of shysters who have no interest in the service, and who should modestly keep themselves in the background, now that they are retired, to run it for him. In that case we may in the end have the War College, provided we obtain a man who will prevent its rehabilitation in connection with the Torpedo School, as the notoriously imbecile features of the latter would not be conducive towards giving the former any prominent place or one from which the Navy would derive any benefit. I send you my report so that you can see what I have said on the subject.

I am glad to see that you have a flagship in name though she is tied up to the dock. I am under the impression that the *Pensacola* will finally be sent to the South Atlantic Station. There is somebody in the Department that has a head like a bomb-shell—full of wisdom.

To Admiral Porter from Admiral Luce

Newport, R. I.
March 9, 1889.

The enemies of the War College so far succeeded, under the late administration in destroying that institution as to render the task of resuscitation, somewhat difficult. The consolidation of the War College with the Torpedo Station was the act of the enemies of the College, and done with malice prepense. The reasoning which led to it was based on glaring misrepresentation, and the act was consummated in spite of the earnest protest of yourself and others who signed the petition to the Secretary of the Navy begging him to defer action.

If, however, you will lend your powerful influence I trust the triumph of the enemies of the Navy will be but temporary.

I think it can be shown:

1st. That the principal building on Coasters' Harbor Island should be at once restored to the Bureau of Navigation; and,

2ndly. That the placing of a $100,000 building on Goat Island for a Naval War College and Torpedo Station is a rank absurdity and that before any steps are taken the further wishes of Congress should be known. This will give me an opportunity under a Republican administration to get the law so amended as to leave the selection of a site for the College to a Board of Officers.

If you will join the fight I think it will not be difficult to supply such arguments as will induce the new Secretary of the Navy to rescue the College from utter annihilation.

For two years thereafter—'90 and '91—there was no War College course. The friends of the College, however, rallied their forces, "and Mr. Whitney's successor, General B. F. Tracy, foreseeing the disastrous results to the War College, recommended to Congress the transfer of the College back to Coasters' Harbor Island, and an act approved June, 1891, provided for this, and also for $100,000 for a building for the College which was completed in 1892. "In June, 1892, Captain Mahan was again ordered to assume the Presidency of the college, and the classes were renewed, but in 1893 Mahan went to sea, there was no class ordered and again the tireless enemies of the College exerted their adverse influence.

Commodore Ramsey had succeeded Commodore Walker as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, and as his opposition to the War College had never weakened, he exerted his powerful influence to break it up, because he thought it unnecessary, and also at all events he believed Newport was not the proper location. His attitude in the matter is clearly set forth in a letter to Captain H. C. Taylor from which the following extracts are quoted:

"The Secretary has not broached the subject of the War College since my return, but I had several conver-

sations with him on the subject before leaving. All that I know connecting you with the Presidency of the Institution is what I have seen in the newspapers. If the College is to be continued on its present basis and another President is to be ordered to it I shall be very glad to see you go there and will do all that I can to support you in conducting it. I will be perfectly frank, however, and say that I think, looking at matters from a purely Naval standpoint that no greater error has been committed than placing the College where it is and I am therefore not in favor of continuing it on Coaster's Harbor Island. I had this view very strongly before, but since my recent visit to Newport and after spending several whole days at the Training Station and the College and hearing all the objections people have to make, not only there, but at the Torpedo Station and other places, I am strongly in favor of the higher education of officers and am ready to assist in it in every way in my power, but I do think that the present War College System has very much the appearance of a farce. I find that the last series of lectures were not only unfavorably criticized but very much laughed at. Of course, I fully appreciate and realize the value of books written by Captain Mahan, but as these books can be read by any officer in the Navy it seems very absurd to send officers there to have them read to them by Captain Mahan or anyone else. The lectures delivered by other people appear also to have been nothing but extracts from books and from papers written by different officers. Some of the officers who heard the lectures had read everything that they heard at the College. We have the means of furnishing officers with excellent post graduate courses and we can do it in a much better manner than has been done at the War College.

"You will understand that in saying this I am giving my individual opinion. . . ."

Another administration had come but the new Secre-

tary, Mr. Herbert, who concurred with Commodore Ramsey that if we had to have a War College at all it should be located at Annapolis, journeyed to Newport in the *Dolphin* with the avowed purpose of killing it, but as he journeyed, like Paul on the road to Damascus, "there shined around about him a light" and he was converted. An officer hearing of the intended slaughter counselled Captain Buckingham of the *Dolphin* to put in the Secretary's hands Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power*. The Secretary was so impressed that upon his arrival at Newport he announced his determination to stand by the College, and made a fine start in the direction by appointing Captain Harry C. Taylor as president to succeed Mahan, who had gone out to Europe in command of the *Chicago*. Mahan's lectures on Sea Power delivered at the War College had won him international fame and were destined to change the current of naval thought throughout the world. They led to the creation of the modern German Navy, the development of the Japanese Navy, and the rebuilding of the British Navy. It must be confessed, however, that Mahan was "discovered" abroad before he was recognized by his own people. It is related that in 1893 when one of our ships on her way home from China was at Malta, Captain "Ma'an" as the British call him, and his *Influence of Sea Power* were the subject of conversation whenever they met our officers, not one of whom had read the book! A day or two before Sir George Tryon sailed from Malta on his ill-fated cruise to the Levant in the *Victoria*, he was asked by some one if he had read Captain Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power on History* and on the French Revolution. He replied, "they are simply great, the best things ever written. They ought to have been written twenty years ago, and by an Englishman. . . . You Americans ought to be proud of Mahan; we Englishmen are grateful to him, we owe him a large debt." Mahan's biographer says of his visit to England in the *Chicago* in 1893, "the most

eminent and distinguished personages in the land sought to do him honor and to express their recognition of his genius."

During the period 1894–1896 the College seemed to have confirmed its value and importance, and many persons thought it was firmly established as "a factor in naval training for the ultimate and higher duties of the profession, the crucial test of war." But the end was not yet. The rumor that the College was to be removed to Annapolis revived and was so persistent that Admiral Luce addressed the following brief (presumably) to Senator Wetmore:

NEWPORT, R. I.
April 2nd, 1896

It is authoritatively stated that an effort is being made to induce the Naval Committee of the Senate to amend the naval appropriation bill by adding an item of $100,000 for the building of barracks on Coasters' Harbor Island for the use of the naval apprentices.

There, it can readily be understood that it would result in the removal of the War College from the Island; and that it is said, is the real animus of those who so persistently advocate the erection of barracks. *It is to drive the College from the Island and secure its building for the Training Station.* This antagonism to the War College has come down from the days of a former Democratic administration. It will be remembered that the opposition to the College began shortly after its establishment on the Island. Such was the success of its opponents, that the then Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Whitney, by an order dated January 11th, 1889, directed the transfer of the College to the Torpedo Station on Goat Island. It was due to the efforts of Senator Aldrich that an appropriation was made for the present College building, and the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Tracy, directed its erection on the present site, thus bringing the College back to Coasters' Harbor Island. The efforts of the opposition have in no wise relaxed however. Endeavors have been

made to drive the College faculty out of the building authorized by Congress for its use, and with such success that one-quarter of their quarters are now occupied by officers having no connection whatever with the College work.

The peculiar feature of the controversy is that while the enemies of the College are allowed every latitude in prosecuting their designs, its friends are placed under the ban. They dare not speak.

The War College has attained a European reputation and it is to the interest, not of the State of Rhode Island alone, but of the whole country, that it should be allowed to pursue its course unembarrassed by local jealousies.

This appeal laid the ghost for the time being, but it rose again when the new administration came in, as will be seen from Luce's letters to Senator Lodge.

From Admiral Luce to Senator Lodge

Newport, R. I., Sept. 12, 1898

It seems to be accepted here as a fact that the days of the War College are few and short. It must soon cease to exist. The enemies of the College are now all powerful in the Navy Department and are so bent on its destruction, that the end is already in sight unless the Secretary of the Navy himself comes to its relief.

I do not know how the Secretary regards the College, whether favorably or otherwise. Nor do I know the views of the Assistant Secretary. It may be that both are aware of its being swept away. In that case of course we must accept their decision and pray for better days. But if they are unaware of the swift destruction that awaits it the sooner the fact is brought to their attention the better. I would go to Hingham myself to see the Secretary and try to put the matter before him in a plain way but for the fact that I do not know him sufficiently well—and command no votes.

Perhaps it might be in your way to write and ask Mr. Long if he knowingly consented to the breaking up of the War College.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO SENATOR LODGE

NEWPORT, R. I., Sept. 20, 1898

Many thanks for your kind favor of yesterday. I am very glad to know of Governor Long's good intentions in regard to the War College. Captain Taylor is the best man for the Presidency of the College. But recent orders from the Department have *rendered it impossible* for Captain Taylor to come here. Moreover word has come that Captain Crowninshield has declared that the War College must be removed from its present locality. Under these conditions officers are not willing to come to the College and no wonder.

However good the intentions of the Hon. Secretary, his subordinates are gradually but surely undermining the College and the only way to save it is for Governor Long to look into matters for himself.

I know, of my own personal knowledge, that, for good and sufficient reasons, Captain Taylor is averse to coming to the College to be continually badgered by the Bureau of Navigation, as heretofore.

If Governor Long desires to know *why* Captain Taylor objects to take his former duty it is very easy to send for him and thus let the truth come out.

Mr. Long's attitude toward the College at first was Laodicean, although later he became a strong friend. However, both he and the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Allen, believed that the College should be a post graduate course to the Naval Academy, and the acting Chief of Bureau of Navigation, Captain F. W. Dickens, recommended that the staff of the War College be transferred to the Office of Naval Intelligence in Washington, the War College building be transferred to the Training Station, and that the theoretical problems evolved by the staff be worked out afloat by the Fleet. A suggestion vigorously opposed by Captain Stockton the new President. The War with Spain put the War College on trial, and when it was over, the opponents refused to admit that the campaign would have been conducted as

well without its teachings; the believers in the College insisted that the College had more than justified itself, and one enthusiast went so far as to say that the campaign was played so much like the war games that he "sometimes thought he could hear Harry Taylor's bell," as the different moves were made. A remark that greatly pleased Admiral Luce who wrote to an officer at the War College to verify it.

Again in 1899 there was no class assembled at the War College, and again the friends of the College rallied to its support.

"The Business of the War College," remarked the New York *Herald* about this time in an able editorial approving its methods and its location, "is primarily to familiarize officers who may at any time be summoned to assume maritime command, with Naval Strategy, or in other words with paramount aims of Naval Warfare. There too are studied vital questions of naval tactics—the rôle of which begins its part—such as were memorably illustrated at Cavite and Santiago. . . . The teaching imparted at the Newport College demonstrates that the essential principles of strategy and tactics require but slight modifications in detail as the result of change in weapons and in defensive apparatus."

The effort failed. It was the last organized attack on the College but the proposal to move the College to Washington cropped up at intervals for several years.

In 1908 Admiral Luce wrote to Park Benjamin an admirable sketch of the chequered career of the College:

In years gone by when the College was first started only to be jeered at by many in the service; and treated with amused indifference by others, both in and out of the service, it was the policy of the friends of the undertaking to cultivate the favorable notice of the public at large. Great latitude was given to the range of subjects by those who came to lecture, both civilians and officers, and when notables were to speak invitations to the citizens

of Newport to attend were general. The greatest enemies of the enterprise were in the Navy Department. One Secretary of the Navy (Mr. Whitney) knocked it in the head; and another (Mr. Herbert) was about to abolish it altogether, when the happy thought struck him to look into the character of the College himself, and form his own judgment, instead of blindly following the dictum of a Bureau Chief. He came to the conclusion that the College was worth holding onto. Since then he has been its stanch friend. That trying period has happily passed. The College can now sail on its own bottom. The society stunts, once a feature, have been relegated to the limbo of the forgotten; the lines have been tautened up; and those officers who come here soon settle down to serious work, etc.

Pardon this long twister, and believe me,

In December, 1910, Admiral Luce wrote to Senator Wetmore of the revival of the rumor that the College was to be transferred to Washington:

Referring to our recent conversation about War College matters, I beg to say that you were quite right and I was altogether wrong.

When Admiral Rodgers[1] spoke to me on the subject of the removal of the War College to Washington I felt so greatly incensed that I wrote him a hurried, and, as I regarded it, a personal note expressive of my dissent. I kept no copy of the note, and having unburdened my mind, regarded the incident, as far as I was concerned, as closed, and thought no more of it. At the time of our conversation I could not recall having written such a note.

On my return home I procured a copy of my note, which I herewith enclose. I learn further that Admirals Mahan, Chadwick, and Sperry—former Presidents of the College—wrote letters on the subject of the transfer of the College to Washington, a fact I was unaware of till now. These letters, I believe, are on file with the General Board.

The young officers (comparatively young) who started

[1] Rear Admiral R. P. Rodgers, President of War College.

this agitation were members of the General Board. Their views have so far prevailed that they have succeeded in diverting the War College work, as an educational institution, into a part of the organization of the Navy Department. In the report of the Secretary of the Navy recently issued it is stated, page 4, under the head of "Work of the Aids":

"The work of the General Board, War College, and Office of Naval Intelligence has been better co-ordinated, so that our war plans and strategic studies are up to date."

The next step, logically, is to have the War College in Washington inasmuch as it has now become a part of the machinery of the Navy Department and should be close at hand. Such at least is the argument of these young officers.

S. B. L.

From the above, it will be seen that certain of the younger officers of the service disapproved of the War College on the ground that the results of the studies "stopped in the archives"; commenting on this Luce remarked, "None of the results has 'stopped' in the archives of the College; but for many of the officers they might just as well be in the archives for all the influence they exert 'on the service as a whole.' . . . I had hoped the struggles of the War College were over. But . . . they have wrought a change for the worse in the character of the College . . . the next step is the transfer of the College to Washington, and its absorption by the Navy Department. That means the total extinction of the College as an educational institute."

Among the early presidents of the College was Commander C. F. Goodrich (now Rear Admiral). When he first assumed control, he said in substance to the class of officers, "This is not a school—what you will learn and take away with you depends upon yourselves. The banquet is spread before you, partake of it as you may wish."

Goodrich it will be recalled was one of the members of the board with Luce and Sampson which had laid down the lines upon which the War College is conducted. It therefore seems appropriate to quote here his reference to Admiral Luce in connection with the College.

Many a man in Luce's place would have contented himself with keeping abreast of the development of his profession, but not Luce. His eager nature demanded more. His study of history combined with his exceptional gift of forecasting the future to point out the road to the satisfaction of this intellectual demand. When this vision was first vouchsafed him I can not say but I do know that, for several years at least, prior to 1884, his voice and his pen were busy, in season and out of season, urging service and departmental attention to what became his most important life work—indeed one may justly say, his monument. Accompanied by his dry humour and his earnest expression, he once said to me, "We have, besides the Naval Academy, which trains young men to become officers, schools in ordnance, torpedoes, electricity, engineering and what not, but there is absolutely no institution to teach us the thing for which the Navy exists—the Art of Naval Warfare. It is high time that one should be established." Due to him and to him alone is the founding of our Naval War College, the first of its kind to be created in any country. Without it, Mahan would have had no forum in which to expound his views on the influence of *Sea Power in History* as the book of his writing, based on his lectures there, is entitled, a book that revolutionized naval thought the world over. To us, Americans, Luce's labors are even more important than Mahan's *opus magnum*, for they have made our Navy efficient in the widest sense, able to deal successfully with the largest problems of international complications.[1]

After sixteen lean and laborious years the College found itself on a permanent foundation, and recognized as an indispensable unit of the Navy's organization. Other countries followed where we led. England, Germany,

[1] Letter to Author.

Japan, France and Italy have established War Colleges on the lines of ours at Newport. Luce had achieved his greatest triumph.

The War College building which was completed in 1892 is an imposing structure of grey granite now covered with ivy, and stands on the western eminence of Coasters' Harbor Island, a few yards from the "poor little Poor House." It commands a broad view of Narragansett Bay, and on clear days Point Judith may be seen in the distance and the ocean beyond. It serves as a prominent landmark for navigation in those waters, as well as an enduring monument to its sailor founder.

CHAPTER XI

Commander-in-Chief. Canadian Fisheries Question

WE have seen how Admiral Luce's cruise was interrupted by the opening of the War College and that upon the arrival of Captain Mahan in 1886 from South America, he had been ordered to sea. On the 18th of June he was ordered again to command the North Atlantic Station.

During his short time in the Fleet in the summer of 1884, he had made his presence felt; drills of every kind with guns, spars, sails and boats were the order of the day, and night too. In the practical work of the Fleet he was indefatigable; he never rested himself, nor did he permit others to do so, and the morale of the Fleet quickly responded. There was no one in any doubt when he returned to the Fleet of what was coming. It was his high order of leadership that kept his people with him. His motto was to work hard and play hard, and he personally saw to it that the rations were the best. A young officer in the Fleet at the time says "he kept us going all the time; someone dubbed him the great North American drill sergeant."

Now that the War College was *de facto* he could carry out—with the Department's aid—his idea of making the Home Fleet a School of Application, and all his energies were directed to that end.

Admiral Luce hoisted his flag in the *Tennessee* at Portland June 24th, 1886, the Squadron at the time was com-

posed of the *Brooklyn*, *Alliance*, *Swatara*, *Galena* and *Yantic*. In October the Squadron participated in the ceremonies attending the inauguration at New York of the Statue of Liberty. After this the ships returned to Newport and coöperated with the War College in various practical exercises.

Preparations were made for a series of exercises in naval tactics in order to test practically the modifications proposed for the Tactical Signal Book then in use. As soon as possible the ships were based on Narragansett Bay, and says Fiske "officers were compelled to attend the lectures of Mahan and others." Luce believed that the War College was created for the benefit of the Fleet and now that he had the Fleet he saw to it that the officers attended the lectures. Besides the Fleet officers, a good sized Class had been ordered by Commodore Walker,[1] "which," he wrote, " is all I can do." Those were days of trial for the College, for nearly everyone refused to take it seriously, and not much of the seed sown fell upon fallow soil. "We did not see," remarks Fiske, "even the captains of the ships who ought to have seen, did not see what the campaigns of the Archduke Charles had to do with the profession of a naval officer," and in mere levity they named the tall chimney on the Island "The Archduke Charles," a favorite subject for discussion in Mahan's lectures.

In spite of setbacks the summer of '86 was considered a success both for the College and the Fleet.

In November Walker wrote "I think the War College is now on pretty safe ground. The boom given it last summer has modified the Secretary's views very considerably, although I have said nothing or little to him. It came very near being broken up last spring. I was very much afraid it would go, but I stuck to it as well as I could and I think now we shall be able to carry it along without further trouble."

[1] Chief of Navigation, afterwards Rear Admiral.

In the following January the *Tennessee* was put out of commission at New York and Admiral Luce shifted his flag to the *Richmond*.

The winter 1886–87 the Fleet spent in the Gulf. At Pensacola a landing party was thrown ashore and went into regular encampment in a tropical downpour. Over 1000 bluejackets and marines were landed. The exercise was unprecedented in our Navy in peace times. It was Luce!

In July, 1887, it was proposed to take the squadron for a cruise of a week or ten days, and then go to Provincetown or Bar Harbor, but Secretary Whitney decided that the ships should be sent one at a time into the Gulf of St. Lawrence on account of the Canadian Fisheries question which was looming above the horizon and threatening trouble. The *Galena* was sent first, followed by the *Swatara*, while the Flagship, after visiting Portland, proceeded to Halifax.

Trouble with Canada over the Fisheries question had been brewing a very long time, and it came to a head in the summer of '87 when the Fleet was at target practice in Gardner's Bay.

The Administration decided to act in the vexing question. "The Fisheries dispute," says Mr. David Rich Dewey, "was one of the most serious questions affecting the relations of the United States with Great Britain over the harsh treatment of New England fishermen in Canadian waters. The exigencies of party policies were held superior to dignified and stable international intercourse with a friendly power. More than once Congress appeared to be willing to force the Government into hostile relations with Great Britain in order to discredit the Administration (*National Problem*, p. 112)." Mr. Bayard disclosed the position of the Administration when he told the Canadian Commissioners how reciprocity could be obtained. "Let us by common concession," he said to Sir Charles Tupper, one of the Commissioners,

"be able to meet on common ground and remove this irritating cause of difficulty out of the way, and you will find that the policy of this Government, the policy of the President and of the House of Representatives, the policy of the great Democratic party of the United States will at once take an onward march in the direction you propose and will accomplish steadily that which you would desire, in the only way in which it can ever be obtained."

Admiral Luce under date of June 20th (1887) was instructed to send a vessel to the North East coast to "protect and look after the interest of American fishermen." The orders were discreetly worded. The Admiral was informed that "two other vessels should follow at intervals of about a week with similar instructions to those issued by the Commander-in-Chief" the previous year. It was further stated that "the Commanding Officers of these vessels should make frequent reports to you of the condition of affairs among the fishermen for transmittal to the Department," etc.[1]

We will turn now to the Commander-in-Chief. It will be seen that there was nothing in these instructions to commit the Administration.[2] The Admiral had the matter in his own hands—by inference, although even the phrase to "use your discretion" was omitted.

Upon the completion of target practice in Gardiner's Bay, the vessels were sent as directed by the Department on their mission to the St. Lawrence, and Admiral Luce went in the Flagship to Portland where he interviewed the representatives of the Fisheries industries regarding the situation in Canadian waters. He also addressed a questionnaire[3] on the subject to the British

[1] A modus vivendi was agreed to in 1888 which by successive renewals gave to American fishing vessels certain privileges which relieved the situation.

[2] For a notable incident of this kind see Mahan's *Life of Farragut*, pp. 125–126.

[3] Appendix A.

naval officer at Halifax, and having obtained the latter's replies which were not entirely satisfactory however, he caused copies of his questions and the answers to be distributed among the American fishing fleet in the Gulf of St. Lawrence in order that the fishermen operating in Canadian waters might be fully informed as to their privileges and statutory restrictions.

It was this direct communication with a foreign official without going "through official channels" to which the Department took exception, and brought the Admiral into collision with the Secretary of the Navy.

In the meantime the *Galena*, *Yantic*, and *Ossipee* were cruising among the American fishing fleet in the Gulf of St. Lawrence. "Their captains were instructed to talk with the fishermen and caution them to comply strictly with the requirements of the treaty and to inform them that they must not expect any protection from our Navy if they chose to violate Canadian custom law or the requirements as set forth in the treaty."[1]

"It is probable that if the question had not been made one of the partisan politics, the Admiral's action would have been accepted by the Department as a public service entirely consistent with his duty as an officer and his zeal for the honor and welfare of his country."[2]

But unfortunately this was not the case. In the preceding April after the passage of the retaliatory act, the President of the American Fishery Union had suggested to Mr. Cleveland that in case retaliatory measures were adopted, the ends of justice would be satisfied by "prohibiting Canadian caught fish from entry into the ports of the United States." "That is,"[3] said the New York *Herald* editorially, "if Canada wantonly insults the American flag and injures American property we need do nothing more in return than give the Gloucester fishing ves-

[1] Interview New York *Tribune*, 31 July, 1887.
[2] *Portland Press*, August 27, 1887.
[3] April 9, 1887.

sel owners a monopoly of the American fish market." In view of the fact that nearly two-thirds of the men employed by Gloucester fishing vessel owners are Canadians, because they work for lower wages, the suggestion was regarded as a request for a monopoly of the American fishing market and the Knights of Labor and labor unions generally were cautioned to take notice of this employment of aliens for the protection of capitalists. President Cleveland in his reply declared that the interests of all must be considered.

The correspondence with Captain Scott got into the newspapers 31 July "and immediately in consequence, the leading Republicans in the House and Senate, including Senator Frye and Congressman Dingley who assumed to be the sponsors of the New England fishermen made bitter attacks on the Administration. Except for this bitter and sudden attack on the Administration growing out of this matter, you probably never would have heard it."[1]

The Admiral was clear in his own mind what his duty and obligation were. He had posted himself on the Fisheries question, and he desired the fishermen to understand where their privileges began and ended. He said, "Certainly there is no doubt American fishermen must regard the obligations of the treaty of 1818. Fishing within three miles off shore is strictly prohibited and our vessels also are not allowed to enter any of the Canadian harbors unless it be for the purpose of obtaining coal, wood, or water, or in case they are compelled by stress of weather. If American vessels abide by this, no harm can befall them. But as soon as they violate any of those orders they are liable to seizure by the Canadian cruisers, and they must not expect any protection from our people. The moment an American fisherman is compelled for any of the above reasons to enter a Canadian harbor, then it is his duty to repair at once to the nearest

[1] Judge Wm. Lowell Putnam to Admiral Luce, April 8, 1910.

Custom House and report himself there, also whenever he is ready to leave again."

Admiral Luce's questionnaire and the answers appeared in the newspapers at Washington before they were received by mail. On August 5, the Secretary sent the following telegram to Admiral Luce:

I assume that your application to Captain Scott was not for the purpose of obtaining from him an exposition of the law but to enable our fishermen to know the extent of the Canadian Claim and thus avoid difficulties if they should so choose. This is not quite clear from your report and it would be better to issue no more circulars and withdraw such as are within your reach. Captain Scott is not understood to be the agent of his Government for any such purpose as that for which you have employed him, and if he were the application might more properly be made to our own Government in case a correct statement of the Canadian claim is desired.

To which the Commander-in-Chief replied:

Dispatch received. The circular was issued to our fishermen in the hope of keeping them out of trouble. No more to be sent out.

Admiral Luce had reported his action from Halifax in a letter to the Secretary dated August 2nd and doubtless the Department's telegram was based upon the Admiral's official report.

The Department's despatch to Admiral Luce was given to the press in Washington and created a sensation. It was obvious that a public reprimand to one of the ablest and most distinguished officers of the Navy had a deeper significance than the disciplinary feature of a rebuke, and in requiring the Admiral to undo his work, the enemies of the Administration fancied there was an ulterior motive in favor of the claims of the Canadians.

Admiral Luce was mortified by the Department's action

and after some correspondence with the Secretary "in further explanation" in which he maintained the propriety of his action, he requested to be relieved of his command. The many letters from friends in and out of the service he received congratulating him on "the diplomatic and masterly" way in which he had handled a difficult problem went far towards soothing the wound inflicted by the Department.

The question which thus arose with the Navy Department deserves careful study; it involves the principle of initiative on the part of the subordinate, and the duty of the superior authority in making the final decision of approval or disapproval.

In this case so far as the Department was concerned it was the Administration that was on trial, which was of much greater moment than the feelings or rights of an individual, although it happened to be a high officer of the Government.

The Secretary of the Navy admitted the "honorable and praiseworthy motive" by which the Admiral's action was inspired, but he maintained that the information requested of the Canadian authorities should have been obtained through the State Department in view of the fact that the matters touched upon had been the subject of international controversy. He considered that the replies of Captain Scott, as a subordinate not empowered to commit his own Government would naturally make his own claim as broad as possible, and that in fact that they "narrowed very much the former privileges of our fishermen," and that there was no possible justification in Captain Scott's interpretation of our treaty rights. But the gravamen of the Secretary's disapproval was the fact that in circulating Captain Scott's replies without disavowal of responsibility Admiral Luce gave them the implied endorsement of his position, and was issuing them "as a statement of rights of the American fishermen," and the Secretary considered this "compromised

entirely the American position." He said "The effect of this circular under the circumstances was to narrow still further the privileges of our fishermen and deprive them so far as it would be observed by them of some of their rights conceded upon all hands." For instance—he said that by the circular "the fishermen are deprived of the rights of repairs, secured by the treaty of 1818," and that therefore "would have the practical effect of nullifying the treaty."

Luce wrote:

"I am yet at a loss to understand the process of reasoning that could have led to my being publicly censured and my high office brought into disrepute before the whole world."

. . . . . .

"Feeling that I have been not only very unjustly but very harshly treated and the mutual confidence which should exist between the Navy Department and an officer in my position wholly destroyed, I had no other recourse with self respect and the duty I owed to my profession than to ask to be relieved of a command I had been judged unworthy of before the world."

In a private letter Admiral Luce wrote concerning his own disagreement with the Navy Department. "The case is analogous to a blockade. We have, first, the blockading squadron; and second and third the national and mercantile vessels of a neutral power. The medium of communication between the two parties liable to come in contact is undoubtedly the commanding officer of the neutral vessel of war. He ascertains from the commanding officer of the blockading squadron the rules of the blockade and communicates them to the merchantmen of his own nation in the vicinity. It is not within the province of the neutral officer to endorse those rules or to disavow them. He has nothing whatever to do but to accept what is given him and to transmit it to those concerned.

"Should the rules of the blockade be contrary to the accepted rules of international law the Department of State takes cognizance of it, and the matter passes beyond the maritime jurisdiction. When the blockades of our Southern coast was first established at the beginning of the Civil War, English and French vessels of war visited our blockading squadrons and their commanding officers made inquiries, not as to principles of International Law as they affected their respective countries, but as to the rules of the blockade as they affected neutral traders and the desired information was furnished and, presumably transmitted to such merchant vessels as approached the coast bound for the blockaded ports." So in the present case, "The treaty of 1818," he said, "provides that the American fishermen shall be permitted to enter the bays or harbors of Canada for the purpose of shelter, of repairing damages therein, for purchasing wood and obtaining water . . . ! *But they shall be under such restrictions* as shall be necessary to prevent their taking, dredging or curing fish therein, or in any other manner whatever abusing the privileges hereby secured to them."

On 26 August he wrote: "Now it was a frequent question put to our officers by the fishermen as to the nature of those 'restrictions.' This and other questions addressed to our officers last summer could not be answered. This summer they could be answered."

. . . . . .

"If the information furnished by the Fishery Officer reveals the fact that the instructions governing the Fishery Police are less liberal than the Concessions made by the Imperial Government as claimed by the Department, then an important service has been rendered in bringing the fact to light."

. . . . . .

"All of Captain Scott's answers as to the tenor of his instructions have been subsequently endorsed by the

Minister of Marine. Consequently if the former is wrong, the latter is wrong also, and if the latter, the Government of Canada wrong, hence I have brought an important fact to the attention of the Department."

. . . . . .

He claimed that in communicating direct with the Canadian authorities, he confirmed himself strictly to the sphere of action warranted by his office.

In regard to the question of repairs he stated that if the captain of a cruiser was in doubt as to the nature and extent of repairs he was to telegraph to Ottawa for instructions, and that it was better for all concerned to know this rather than for fishermen to be ignorant of what is required of them. He closed his letter with the following paragraph:

"I emphatically deny having given away the American case or that I have done anything that will bear such a construction. On the contrary I claim to have acted wholly within the sphere of my office to the credit of the Navy Department and in the interests of the New England fishermen."

When the Squadron arrived at Bar Harbor Mr. Whitney was there, and the Admiral had a personal interview with him; the request for relief had not been acted upon, but had been acknowledged, the Secretary writing that it would be favorably considered "unless you should think best upon further consideration to withdraw it."

On the 25th August Mr. Whitney wrote a *personal* letter to the Admiral:

Bar Harbor.

Dear Admiral:

I had some conversation on the street yesterday with a member of your staff which he has doubtless reported to you.

I have no personal feeling in this matter. It is entirely

a public matter, but while I am in charge of the Department I feel the necessity of keeping the record clean on all public questions.

Therefore I think the position of the Department, together with such statement as you make should go on the record and be published in case there is further consideration of the matter by the public and end there. Since our meeting *I* understand that you only intended to supply what you considered a want of information upon the one point *viz.* what was being enforced in the Canadian ports.

I understand further that it did not occur to you that your action was capable of the interpretation that you assumed any responsibility for the correctness of the replies—nor especially that you adopted them as the law of the case—and I understand that you had no intention of interfering in the matters under international discussion and especially no intention of giving away our case.

All this information I have since our interview, but a large part of the American public have understood it otherwise.

The almost unanimous outburst of feeling as expressed by the press at the time together with the statements of the position of the Department must convince you I think that it is best to disavow any such intention—but of this you will be the judge.

I have tried to be as considerate as possible under the circumstances—I write this so that you may be under no false impression as to it. I will not send my previous letter to you to the Department until I hear from you and you can send to me from Newport to Lenox, Mass.

To which the Admiral replied:

At Sea, Aug. 27th, 1887

Honorable Wm. C. Whitney:

Sir: In answer to your polite note of 25th I beg to reciprocate the kindly feeling expressed by you and to disclaim any personal feeling in the matter under consideration. My application to be relieved of the command of this Squadron was made under the impression

that the Department desired to change. I am ready to relinquish my command or willing to retain it as may be thought best for the interests of the Service.

I shall mail my official letter explanatory of my position, as soon as I learn of your arrival at Lenox.

On Sept. 23rd the Secretary wrote to Admiral Luce:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of September 9th and am satisfied that you should retain your present command.

Your handling of the Squadron at sea and the practice in tactics and in fleet movements which you have given your officers during the last year, are especially to be commended.

Wm. C. Whitney.

Thus closed the most unpleasant incident of his career. It left a sting which was slow to wear away. He might have said, in the words of Macaulay—"To the end of my life I shall occasionally feel the twinges of a very painful sort of recollection. . . . It was one of the calamities that cut deep. There is still a scar."

Years afterward in his retirement he wrote to Judge William Lowell Putnam who had been one of the Commissioners appointed by Mr. Cleveland to negotiate the treaty after the passage of the retaliatory act of 1887:

March 31, 1910

If Captain Scott's replies "narrowed very much the poor privilege of our fishermen—," as the Secretary states, then I should have been thanked for bringing it to the attention of our Government in order that the Canadian authorities might be requested to set Captain Scott right. In any event it would have made them "show their hand." That would have brought matters to an issue at once.

It was this very misunderstanding, (or playing at cross purposes) that it was my desire to clear up in the

interests of our fishermen. Had the Government backed me up then the instructions to Captain Scott would have been modified and our fishermen relieved from vexatious interference. The "red tape" of diplomacy is indispensable; there is no doubt about that. But a short and decisive cut often serves to disentangle the most complicated question. The present is a case in point.

You must admit the colorless character of the "questions and answers," a copy of which is herewith enclosed.

P. S. I am quite willing to "throw up the sponge" if it can be shown that I was in the wrong—that I allowed my zeal to outrun my judgment. Did I?

Ex-Secretary W. E. Chandler wrote to Admiral Luce, Sept. 28, 1887:

The correspondence between yourself and the Secretary was a very happy conclusion of the whole imbroligio in which you found yourself concerning the fisheries. . . . When the news first came that you had promulgated Captain Scott's replies to your queries . . . I said . . . that I was quite sure you had made no real mistake, that you had not published Captain Scott's letter with any endorsement by you of its soundness but had only given it to the world as the Dominion claim. I felt however that there would be criticism and that you would find yourself in some difficulty, all of which has been ended honorably for yourself.

I think however that censure belongs to the Administration. You should not have gone down east without explicit instructions. Ordinarily it is enough to instruct a naval captain "to protect American interests," but where there is such a notorious public contention as that concerning our fishermen's rights, it was absurd to let you go down there without specific instructions.

Of course all well informed persons, but not the general public, understood that your whole squadron present at the seizure of a fishing vessel by the smallest Canadian government smack could not interfere because the latter would represent the power of Great Britain with which you could not bring on a collision.

It is worth while quoting the comments on the Navy Department's action, which appeared in a Canadian paper:

"We fail to see anything Luce has done which has in the slightest degree compromised the nation he represents. But the instant it is reported what steps he has taken he forthwith receives an official snub from the Secretary which we think unprecedented in official records. If the United States Government felt that Admiral Luce had taken a course which they did not approve of, they might have communicated their disapproval in confidence. But to pen a brutal dispatch to a trusted officer in a foreign port, and hand it over to the press at the same moment, was an outrage, and is impossible of justification. We do not know what course Admiral Luce may take, but we do know that he will have the sympathy of the civilized world. No British Minister would thus venture to humiliate a British Admiral in a foreign port, and it remains for Secretary Whitney, not to Admiral Luce, to justify this extraordinary and uncalled-for exhibition of executive spite. Time will work Admiral Luce's vindication, and time will show Secretary Whitney that his course was unmanly and inexcusable."

This controversy with the Secretary of the Navy clouded to a certain extent the remainder of the cruise. It would not be just to say that Mr. Whitney allowed his displeasure with Admiral Luce to influence his actions, but as will be seen in the course of the next chapter, it so happened that the Commander-in-Chief suffered many unpleasant experiences but at no time did he lose his poise or his self-control even under a storm of abuse from the Administration papers.

At Bar Harbor when the question of Admiral Luce's detachment was still under consideration, the Secretary made an official visit on board the Flagship. Every ceremony and honor of the Navy ritual were accorded to the

finest point of etiquette. The Admiral received his guest at the gangway, grim, calm, and dignified, his right hand at the salute, his left holding his sword—The hand of Douglas was his own!

The Canadian Fisheries Question is well nigh forgotten now, but it was one of the most serious quarrels the United States has ever had with England and there can be no doubt that Admiral Luce's action contributed largely in averting a crisis.

CHAPTER XII

Commander-in-Chief (*Continued*). Affair of the *Haytien Republic*. Hauls Down Flag

IT is pleasant to turn aside from the controversy and resume the narrative of the cruise. Mr. Whitney's displeasure was to give the Admiral much concern in the ensuing months.

When the Squadron returned to Narragansett Bay from down East, the long planned maneuvers with the Army and in connection with the War College took place and were so successful that they were repeated from year to year as ships and troops were available.

From Major General Schofield to Admiral Luce

Headquarters Division of the Atlantic
Governor's Island, N. Y.
Nov. 29, 1887.

. . . I take pleasure in congratulating you upon the success of this effort to give to the Army and Navy jointly such valuable practice instruction.

I do not attach much importance to the proposition of "Autumnal Maneuvers" for the State Militia for the simple reason that the Militia always *go home* about the time their services are most needed.

But the officers and men you have been instructing at Newport will stay with you through the fight. If the Government will organize some Volunteers who are pledged to stay with us in like maneuvers we can well afford to devote our best efforts to their instruction.

From Admiral Luce to General Sheridan

New York, Dec. 23, 1887.

In speaking to the Secretary of the Navy about joint military and naval operations next summer, it would be well to include the Marine Corps. The officers of that Corps are very anxious to go into camp for instruction, and their association with the Army under such conditions could not fail to be of the highest professional value to them. They can scrape together about 500 men with a little effort for temporary service in the field.

From Commodore Walker to Admiral Luce

Navy Department
Washington,
January 1st, 1888.

I had a talk with the Secretary today and he desires me to write you to so arrange the movements of your Squadron, provided of course there is no revolutionary or other troubles to prevent, that you may assemble your ships at New Orleans, and after a reasonable visit, go to Mobile, Pensacola, Savannah and Charleston on your way North. He says he would like to have you spend say six weeks in carrying out this plan, the idea being that it will be a good thing for the Navy to show the ships in the principal Southern ports. Let me know how you arrange it and what orders you give.

I may see you in New York some time next week as I have some idea of running over.

From Commodore Walker to Admiral Luce

Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
Jan. 11, 1888.

. . . . . .

The Department of State has asked that one of the vessels of your Squadron shall go to San Domingo for the purpose of taking our Minister to two or three points and giving him moral support in some demand that he has to

make upon the San Dominican Government. The Secretary wishes you to divert one of your ships so far as it may be necessary for that purpose. Please let me know which one it will be.

From Commodore Walker to Admiral Luce

Navy Department
Washington,
May 2nd, 1888.

My dear Luce:

I have your personal note of the 27th of April and also your letter to the Secretary sketching out a plan for your summer's cruise, renewing your request for the use of two tugs for ramming purposes and a monitor to be used as a target, and also asking permission to use the ships for transporting troops. I will tackle the Secretary on the matter upon the very first opportunity. He is very difficult to get hold of, however, as you know, and it may be some days before I shall be able to talk with him.

I had a talk some time ago with Sheridan about the summer maneuvres and found him very favorably inclined. Mr. Whitney agreed to it and I thought everything was straight. I told Sheridan that I thought when Gen. Schofield came to Washington that we three had better come together and block out the programme in a general way, I knowing your views, then lay it before the Secretary of War and Navy, get their approval and be in a position to go ahead without asking any more questions. Sheridan agreed with me and it was so determined. Gen. Schofield came here and went away without my seeing him, and I found afterwards in talking with Sheridan that there was some hitch about the matter and as near as I can get at it, there was some friction between Sheridan and Schofield growing out of some change of aides, *I think*. Sheridan was very much disgusted and I could not get him to agree to anything. I am now letting the matter mull along and hope bye and bye to be able to bring it up again and fix it. I write you this confidentially. Of course you must not let it get out as that would tend to make both Schofield and Sheridan probably more obstinate and ugly about it.

There is a good deal of doubt about our being able to

obtain an appropriation to carry on the War College. If an appropriation is not obtained of course the War College must be closed and that may put it back for some years to come. I am doing my best, however, to obtain an appropriation, and do not yet despair of getting it.

From Commodore Walker to Admiral Luce

Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
July 11, 1888.

. . . Your Squadron seems to be pretty well depleted just at present, but as the Secretary has ordered the *Richmond* to be sent to China for the Flagship of that Station of course she must be put in order before going, and the time to do the work is through the summer when work can be done to advantage. The same thing applies to the *Pensacola*. The Secretary has given directions that your Squadron must be ready to go South by the 10th of November. To put new boilers in the *Pensacola* and put her in good condition will require four or five months, and of course the work must be taken in hand without delay.

From Commodore Walker to Admiral Luce

Navy Department
Washington, August 14, 1888.

The United States Minister at Porte au Prince has been writing and telegraphing the State Department urging the sending of two vessels of war to that benighted region to look after the picayune interests of Americans there. These have all been forwarded by the Secretary of State to the Secretary of the Navy, and Mr. Whitney feels that he must send at least one vessel down there. Orders will go today to send the *Galena*. This will leave you very short of ships and the Secretary authorizes me to write you personally that about the 5th of September, possibly earlier, he will send the *Despatch* to report to you in order that you may use her for a temporary Flagship. I presume the *Galena* will make the run down to Porte au Prince and back again. I think it very doubtful if she

finds anything to keep her there, but no one can tell what the niggers may be about.

I hope to get away from here in a few days for a month or so North. I shall be glad to go out of the place.

From Commodore Walker to Admiral Luce

Washington, D. C., Aug. 22, 1888.

If you want the *Despatch* to be sent to you, as I wrote you, you had better write a letter to the Secretary saying that you have by personal letter from me been informed he would probably send her to you by the 5th of September and that you will be very glad to have her.

I am as busy as the devil in a gale of wind trying to get off tomorrow to see my people North.

On the 23rd July, 1888, the Department called for suggestions for the summer's cruise. By this time the North Atlantic Squadron had been reduced to two vessels, and the Department's letter brought matters to a crisis, and Luce replied in a long letter reviewing the work of the Squadron since he had been in command. He wrote that from the beginning his idea was to make of the Squadron a school of application for everyone connected with it, and to follow the example of the principal squadrons of England, France, Germany, and Italy. He explained the connection between the Squadron and the War College and that the two working together had raised our Squadron exercises to a higher plane than any other and placed our Navy "insignificant in all else" in advance of the Navies of the world in respect to professional education.

He reminds the Department that in the summers of '86 and '87 the Squadron was assembled in Newport so that officers could attend the lectures and the officers of the College could witness the exercises; and of the war problems worked out by the Army and Navy together, and the enthusiasm of both services, and of the plan that was made and submitted to the Department for the summer in 1888.

"It was my firm impression, up to a comparatively recent date, that the Department was cognizant of, and in sympathy with the projected plan, and that it was acting in perfect accord with the War Department. But the recent orders breaking up the Squadron, and particularly the Department's letter now under consideration, asking for suggestions for the summer cruise, when those suggestions had been before the Department since last January convince me that I have been greatly in error."

Luce's request for two tugs fitted for ramming, an old monitor to be used as a target, and for the *Alarm* had all been ignored. One by one, his ships were detached and sent away. The flagship *Richmond* was assigned to the Asiatic Station and the *Pensacola* unfit for service substituted. The *Yantic* was surveyed and the *Dolphin* was despatched on special duty. The *Atlanta*, his only modern ship, was also taken away. Two ships were left but not despairing, arrangements for transporting General Schofield's troops to Fisher's Island, the point selected for the encampment, were continued in the hope of getting recruits from the steam yacht service, and by this means inaugurating a Naval Reserve. Then came the final bolt. The Department decided that the coal used for the transportation of troops should be charged to the War Department. "The truth was forced upon me," Luce says, "that the views of the Navy Department had undergone a radical change, and were no longer in accord with the policy of making the North Atlantic Squadron a school of practical instruction."

"I shall be very glad," he says, concluding his letter to the Secretary of the Navy, "if this explanation leads to a better understanding on my part of the views of the Department in regard to the general policy governing squadron movements."

Luce's patience was being worn down and in November Walker wrote to him, "I don't want you to commit yourself to giving up your squadron, or [to] any change of

duty until I have given you a pointer or two in conversation when I see you."

The conversation here referred to took place in New York just before Luce sailed for Hayti. Commodore Walker had been in the Navy Department for nearly eight years. His second term as Chief of Bureau of Navigation was drawing to a close, and it was his intention to command the North Atlantic Squadron, with the *Chicago* as flagship, then our biggest and fastest ship, which was then nearing completion. As there was another Richmond in the field who was also an aspirant for the same billet, Rear Admiral Bancroft Gherardi, Walker desired Luce to hold on to the Squadron—now reduced to two ships—until he himself could relieve him. The inducement offered was the *Chicago* as flagship. With this understanding Admiral Luce, forgetting his Virgil, *timeo Danaos et dona ferentes*, consented, but he never got the *Chicago* nor, for that matter, did Walker get the Home Fleet. That went to Gherardi. With subsequent relations between Admiral Walker, who was assigned the Squadron Evolution, and Admiral Gherardi, this story has no concern, but it forms an interesting chapter in the history of the new Navy, worth careful reading.

It will be seen from Commodore Walker's letter of the 11th that when the *Richmond* was ordered to the China Station, Luce was left without a suitable flagship, as the *Pensacola* which was assigned to him for that purpose was unseaworthy.

It is idle to comment on the situation.

Again Luce's strong character is shown in this incident; it lifted him above disappointment and discourtesy. The temptation to return to his family at Newport and run his squadron of two ships from his home in the "Rue François" as he used to call it, or allow them to run themselves, must have been strong, but he decided to take advantage of the enforced stay of the *Galena* and *Yantic* in the Navy Yard for the customary repairs, to investigate

the inland waterways from New York to Norfolk. It was an opportunity he had long sought, to make the trip by going through the canals as far south as Fernandina.

For this purpose he took the ship's barge *Vixen*, a fine Herreshoff boat, and accompanied by his flag lieutenant he started out on his voyage to ascertain the feasibility of using that route for small craft such as torpedo boats, etc., in case of blockade. He reached Annapolis on September 14th and four days later arrived at Norfolk, having been delayed by bad weather, which came near swamping the launch and damaged her so seriously that the voyage was abandoned and the Admiral returned to New York.

The "cruise of the *Vixen*," as brief as it was, attracted considerable attention, and the Admiral was frequently interviewed on the subject of an interior waterway from Cape Cod to Florida.

In one of these talks he said:

"If ours were a military government like England, Russia, Germany, or France, we would have had a system of inland navigation years ago. Foreign nations are more alive to our needs and our defects than we are. The need of an inland system of waterways is undoubted." He believed that the Erie Canal, the Delaware and Raritan, and the Chesapeake and Delaware should all be deepened, and he said because there is no war in sight is no reason why we should not have a thoroughly equipped navy and perfect system of inland navigation which in case of necessity would be an immense saving of time in the transportation of men, stores and ammunition if an enemy were off our coast.

In December, 1888, occurred the affair of the *Haytien Republic*. For several weeks Hayti had been simmering in a cauldron of revolution. The Government had been overthrown and a provisional government set up; the island was the scene of bloody contentions and factional attempts to obtain power. So long as American citizens and property were not involved, our State Department

was not disposed to interfere. However, in October the American steamer *Haytien Republic* which had sailed from the United States October 4th on her lawful occasion was entering the port of St. Marc, when she was fired at by a Haytien man-of-war the *Dessalines*. Upon arrival in port the master of the ship was informed by the pilot that the *Dessalines* was blockading the port. The next morning when the *Haytien Republic* went to sea she was captured—six miles at sea—by the *Dessalines* and taken to Port au Prince, and moored to a buoy behind the fort.

The usual diplomatic correspondence followed, but no steps were taken by the Haytiens to release the ship in accordance with the demand of Mr. Bayard, the Secretary of State. The New York papers treated the affair rather jocosely—the *Herald's* headlines for example in the issue of December 13th were:

"Boom! Bang! Keno! Just Wait Till Those Old Fashioned Pop Guns on Uncle Sam's Toy Navy Are Trained Upon Poor Little Haiti.

"The *Galena* and the *Yantic* crawl out of the Navy Yard Mud, and are now on Their Way to Port au Prince at the Rate of Five Miles an Hour."

The Navy Department took the matter seriously. Luce received orders December 8th to get the *Richmond*, *Galena* and *Yantic* ready for sea as soon as possible, the *Richmond* being again given to him but only temporarily. The *Ossipee* at Norfolk was also to join up. The first ships ready were the *Galena* and *Yantic*, the former flying Luce's flag. Luce was instructed to demand the surrender of the *Haytien Republic*, and if the Provisional Government "refuses, declines, or neglects to surrender the vessel and her belongings within twelve hours" he was to put her owners or their agent in possession, using no more force than possible.

As was to be expected, the Provisional Government after a slight demure, "to save their face" as the Chinese put it, acquiesced in the demands. They did not dare do

otherwise, as both ships when the ultimatum was delivered were at quarters with guns loaded. The *Haytien Republic* was towed to the outer harbor by a Haytien gunboat, salutes were fired from shore and fleet, official visits in full dress uniform were exchanged, and toasts in champagne were drunk in the Palace; in the cabin Admiral Luce said in reply to the President's toast that it had always been the policy of the United States Government to encourage republics, especially those in this hemisphere, and it took especial interest in republics composed of freedmen, as the United States had recently passed through a struggle, the ultimate object of which was the freedom of the colored race. He hoped that the temporary misunderstanding would not effect the usual good feeling between the two countries. Thereupon, says the *Herald*, "the President Legitime and his Cabinet stood up and asserted with much earnestness, 'Never,' 'Never.'"

Secretary of State to Secretary of the Navy

Washington, Jan. 3, 1889.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 31st ultimo, and of a copy of a communication from Admiral Luce, of the 21st ultimo, in which he conveys a clear and conclusive report of his action in executing the duty assigned him of receiving the steamer *Haytien Republic* from her captors at Port au Prince and restoring her to the possession of her owners or their agents. The vigor tempered with high and intelligent discretion which has characterized the action of Admiral Luce in the execution of this National duty to American citizens wrongfully deprived of their property in the turmoil of political disorder in foreign waters, is most satisfactory to this Department, and it is now hoped that the presence of our national vessels in Haytien waters may soon be rendered unnecessary.

Luce had conducted the negotiations with tact, judgment, and discretion which won for him the commenda-

tion of the State Department. This letter was forwarded by the Navy Department to Admiral Luce without comment!

The *Charleston News and Courier* said editorially, "It is admitted on all sides that Admiral Luce acted with admirable good sense in the affair at Port au Prince. The situation was delicate but Admiral Luce succeeded in carrying out his instructions to the letter, and with the requisite promptness and fairness, without wounding unnecessarily the susceptibilities of the Haytien Government." It further suggested that the Admiral should be thanked by Congress, which would automatically extend his service on the active list ten years.

When his duties at Port au Prince were concluded and his ships having escaped yellow fever which was epidemic in Hayti, he cruised a few weeks in the West Indies and then went to Key West. In a letter to Mrs. Luce en route, he tells of the attempt to sink the *Haytien Republic* by one of the small Haytien gunboats:

U.S.S. *Galena*—Jan. 18, 1889.

Bowling up the Bahama. Here we go with a fresh trade wind and smooth sea, bowling along for Key West—the coast of Cuba on our left and the Bahama Banks on the right making the sailing very pleasant.

The Squadron is now reduced to two ships. The *Galena* and *Ossipee* with no flagship and there is no use about my bothering about ships any more. Life's too short. I can hardly imagine that anything will turn up in the meanwhile to change their decision. I will then have done with the Navy for the rest of my natural life.

On the 15th the *Ossipee* caught on to the White Elephant—the steamer *Haytien Republic*—and yanked her over to Jamaica, and I hope that is the last I shall hear of her.

Just before we left Port Royal for Jamaica on the 1st a Haytien vessel of war—a merchant steamer chartered by the Government—on entering the harbor at 6:45 in the evening ran into the *Republic*. The collision had every

appearance of having been done intentionally and with view to inflicting serious injury upon the American steamer, and for a time quite an excitement prevailed. A boat was at once sent to the *Republic* to ascertain the damage sustained and following the stranger into the inner harbor to learn the name of the vessel. The vessel proved that it was the Haytien armed steamer *Nouvelle Valdraque* and that she had been somewhat damaged herself by the encounter.

Upon his arrival at Key West Admiral Luce applied for his detachment, and on the 28th January his request was granted.

A farewell dinner was given him on board the *Galena* and at 10:30 in the evening he left the ship. Every mark of respect and affection was shown him by officers and men. The officers tended the side and escorted him to the Tampa steamer, and the crew of the *Galena* manned the rigging and cheered him. His flag had been hauled down at sunset, and a salute of thirteen guns fired, and he was surprised when leaving the harbor at midnight another gun salute was fired as the *Olivette* left the harbor. Eight years afterwards, Captain W. H. Reeder, who had been Executive Officer of the *Galena* at the time, wrote to him, "I hope you are in as good health as you were the night you received the farewell salute at 11:30 P.M. from the old *Galena*. We tried to show you that night how much we thought of you, and the years have not dimmed in the least the high regard and respect I had for you, Sir, the night we parted on the deck of the steamer *Olivette* at Key West."

During his duty as Commander-in-Chief it so happened that Luce had to do an unusual amount of official entertaining. As there was no appropriation for the purpose the burden of it fell upon his private purse. In the summer of 1887 at Halifax, in New York the following autumn, at the unveiling of the Statue of Liberty when he was present with eight vessels; in Philadelphia at the celebration of

From Portrait by Vinton at War College.

the Constitutional Centennial; at New Orleans at the Mardi Gras festivities, and at Mobile there had been a large number of official guests on board the Flagship. Obviously it was unjust to require an officer to defray the expenses of entertaining, whether foreign or our own people.

The Admiral's vouchers were challenged by the Comptroller of the Treasury who quoted "for his information" the following memorandum of the Treasury Department.

In the absence of any fund appropriating for such purposes by Congress, I am of the opinion that in but one event can such an expenditure be allowed, and that from but one appropriation: Contingencies of the Navy. If an occasion arises when our relations to a foreign government might be strained, or the rules of diplomatic courtesy, or the laws of international comity be infringed by the failure on the part of a Naval officer to entertain the representatives of a foreign government, the Secretary of the Navy may authorize the expenditure of a reasonable amount of money to pay for such entertainment; no money, however, to be paid for wines, liquors, or cigars.

SIGOURNEY BUTLER.

The correspondence with the Treasury officials extended over six months, and was not concluded, until the Admiral paid into the United States Treasury $700.34 for his share of taking care of the guests of the Government.

On the 25th March, 1889, having reached the statutory age limit of service on the active list, Admiral Luce was retired. He had served for forty-seven years, thirty-three of which was credited to sea service, a greater percentage of time on board ship than attained before or since by an officer of our Navy.

In May, 1893, President Harrison appointed Admiral Luce as Commissioner General to represent the United States at the Columbian Historical Exposition held in Madrid in commemoration of the four hundredth anniversary of the discovery of America.

"The Historic American Exposition," writes Admiral Luce in his report, "was intended to illustrate the state of civilization of the New World in the pre-Columbian, Columbian and post-Columbian periods. There was also the Historic European Exposition. There were other functions also as the commemoration of the sailing of the Caravels from Palos, and the unveiling of the monument near the ancient monastery of La Rabida. The exposition formally inaugurated on the 16th November by Queen Maria Christina, assisted by the King and Queen of Portugal. The exposition closed on the 31st of December. There were seventy-seven awards to the United States, the Grand Premium of Honor naturally going to the United States Government."

For his services as delegate to the Exposition the Queen Regent conferred upon him a medal, and the Grand Cross of Naval Merit with white distinctive mark. The decoration consisted of the red and yellow ribbon, the national colors of Spain, and the great star of the Order.

After his retirement Admiral Luce served on several important Boards in Washington, made a brief holiday tour in Europe for three months and upon his return to the United States in 1901 he was attached to the War College, where he remained an interested and active member of the Faculty for a period of nine years.

CHAPTER XIII

Naval Administration

AS early as 1878 when in command of the *Minnesota* Luce began his agitation to reform the organization and administration of the Navy Department. Ever since the Navy's failure to capture Charleston he had studied the problem, and had convinced himself that as long as the Navy Department continued an unbalanced machine it would remain inefficient. It would muddle through peace time, but could not stand the strain of war.

Mr. Whitthorne of the House Naval Committee in 1875–1876 made a strong effort to reorganize the Navy Department to fit it to meet the demands of a state of war, but he failed to accomplish his purpose.

Captain Luce wrote to the Chairman of the Naval Committee under date of July 10th, 1878:

U.S.S. *Minnesota*, New York.

My dear General Whitthorne:

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your favor of 23rd ult. Your remark that I "can hardly appreciate the difficulties under which the legislator, who feels his inexpertness in Naval matters, labors, when endeavoring to reconcile conflicting views," strikes me with much force. It is because I have had some idea of this difficulty that I have proposed from time to time that those interested in naval matters should be brought together for the purpose of discussing and endeavoring to harmonize these conflicting views or effect such a compromise as will be generally acceptable. Such a course is as you are fully aware, that commonly pursued by Con-

gress on all difficult points requiring careful study and mature deliberation. It was this course that was recently adopted with regard to the transfer of the Indian Bureau, the army reorganization, and many other important subjects literally too numerous to mention. Why the same course should not be adopted in regard to naval matters, I am at a loss to understand. It is well known that in our early history there were not wanting wise and good men—notably Franklin, who declared that the interests of the several states were too diverse ever to be blended in one harmonious whole. And in the Convention on the Constitution there were but few members whose opinions did not undergo modification if not radical change in the discussions which ensued—and the instrument itself was, as we know, but a series of compromises. If such a great work could be accomplished by discussion and deliberation, surely the comparatively insignificant question of the reorganization of one of the least (?) important of the Executive departments could be settled by a similar method. The isolated opinions of officers are of comparatively little value compared to what they would be if expressed and combatted in the arena of free and exhausted discussion. From these general views I am led to but one conclusion, and that is, that if your Naval Committee desire to reach any definite result in regard to Naval matters they must procure the passage of an act authorizing a mixed Commission such as provided for by H. R. 2208 of February 21, 1876, as reported by you. The question of reorganization of the Navy Department which I regard as one of the first and most important questions to be settled could then be fully discussed and settled on proper principles. Without such a Commission I despair of seeing any satisfactory legislation on naval matters.

A friend of Luce, a prominent lawyer of New York, once wrote to him, "If you had not been born a sailor I should have said that you were born to be a lawyer and had missed your real vocation. But one can not be invidious."

Luce wrote a number of papers on Naval Administration and Naval Efficiency, the first delivered as a lecture in 1888, others in the years from 1902 to 1910 were con-

tributed mainly to the *Naval Institute* and the *North American Review*, while many were addressed to the Secretary of the Navy. In a lecture at Annapolis in 1888, he reviewed the history of the naval administration of England and France, and that of the United States from the act of February 7, 1815, which added to the office of the Secretary of the Navy and its few clerks "a Board of Navy Commissioners consisting of three officers of the Navy not below the rank of Post Captain, the highest grade in the Navy."

He said, "The objectionable feature of the so-called Bureau System, as it exists today in our Navy Department is that it permits each of the eight officials who constitute the Bureau System to manage his own share of the Navy independently of the others, leaving those parts which do not fall within the limits of that system not managed at all." The effort to obtain a Gunnery ship showed the effect of this lack of co-operation: "the Navy needed a Gunnery ship and the Chief of Ordnance recommended it to the Secretary, but he knew it was impossible for his Bureau to keep up an establishment that depended on other Bureaus for its maintenance. The Secretary forwarded the recommendations to the President, the latter to Congress, thence to a Committee, and so to a sub-committee, and it was finally interred in a pigeon-hole, and the Navy got no Gunnery ship." "The most curious part of it," says the Admiral, "is that the melancholy farce, if the expression may be allowed, has been going on for so many years and is still allowed to go on." Another illustration was the apprentice system which "belonged exclusively to one Bureau—not to the Navy Department be it remembered, but to one-eighth part of the Department" with the result that "it has never been expanded to its full capacity, and never can be until there is some directive force in the Department that will dominate all the bureaus and make them work in harmony for one end common to all."

"To say that this concession of independent authority to subordinate officers is a violation of the plainest military principles is nothing. But that a national legislature whose watchword for one century has been 'economy' and 'retrenchment' should have complacently submitted during forty years to a system which insures the greatest extravagance in the expenditure of public funds with the least amount of return, exhibits one of those extraordinary instances of inconsistency which, while it excites our astonishment, defies any reasonable explanation."

He condemned the Bureau System as it then was on account of "its utter incapacity for dealing with the problems of war, or with military questions in general," and advocated the division of the Navy Department into two principal parts, the Military and the Civil, and outlined a plan for this. "It matters little," he says, "whether the office we have indicated be called a Board of Naval Commissioners, a Board of Admiralty, a Strategy Board, a General Board or a General Staff. The essential point is to have attached to and made part of the Secretariate—the office of the Secretary of the Navy—officers charged with the duty of preparing plans for naval campaigns and of directing under the Secretary of the Navy the military operations of our fleets and squadrons. Such a Board, by whatever name it may be known, would represent the Military Branch of the Navy Department, now lacking as distinguished from the Civil as already explained. It would constitute the brains of Naval operations."

He showed how the want of a Military Branch has on several notable occasions thrown the Navy Department into a state of panic. He showed that since 1812 when Captain Stewart and Captain Bainbridge successfully protested against the administration's policy of laying up the entire navy, down to the year of grace 1902, the military functions of the Navy Department have been prepared by officers outside of the Navy Department and not connected with it. After the Civil War it apparently was

assumed that the millennium was at hand and that wars on earth had ceased; then came the *Virginius* excitement in 1873, then the *Baltimore* affair in Valparaiso in 1892, followed by the war with Spain in 1898, and finally the World War in 1917 and in every case the lessons of preparedness had to be learned over again, and in each case were speedily forgotten when the trouble passed.

But the Navy Department did not change its organization in spite of the fact that during 17 years following 1868 there was wasted on the Navy about 70 millions of dollars, the cost of a fleet of fighting ships, not to mention the inevitable tendency to disorganization and the injury to the tone and discipline of the personnel.

"However good the intentions of the Act of February, 1815, the very language of it tended to confusion, they (the Commissioners) were to represent the military character of the profession, and should have borne to the Secretary relations analogous to those of the three Sea Lords to the First Lord of the English Admiralty, or the General Staff to the Minister of the French Marine. But the act declared their duties were to be the procurement of stores, etc., etc. Thus the military and civil duties instead of being separated, were both imposed upon the Commissioners, and as the work of the Department increased they found themselves swamped.

"Defective as the system was, however, there yet existed in the office of the Secretary," he continued, "a wise directive force and a judicious management of the Navy as a whole, and it is generally conceded that under that management the Navy grew in strength and efficiency and that the discipline of the service was of a high order."

But as the Navy grew, the defects of the organization became emphasized and a change became necessary. The obvious remedy was "to place the civil functions in the hands of another set of persons," leaving the Commissioners to deal only with military matters, and it was the opinion of Luce that had this been done "the Navy would

have been a vastly different affair from what we find it today" (1888). The proposition was to have one commissioner for military affairs instead of three, and several bureaus for the administration of civil affairs. But this was not done.

"The Act of August 31, 1842, abolished the Navy Commissioners and with them the military branch outright; provided for the civil branch alone and gave it to five bureaus (increased to eight by the Act of July 5, 1862) thus leaving the civilian Secretary, as far as the law was concerned, absolutely destitute of professional aid in management of the Navy as a unit, and of the Military branch of the Department. There was no recognition of the military branch, the personnel and the management, and discipline of the fleet. The Act declared that orders from a Chief of Bureau were to be considered as emanating from the Secretary, and as orders from the Secretary are regarded as orders from the President, the orders of a Chief of Bureau must also be regarded as orders of the President. This practically makes nine Secretaries with powers in that department equal to those of the Constitutional Commander-in-Chief."

Luce points out that in spite of this defect the Secretary had ample authority to organize the Department "in accordance with the principles which obtain in other naval governments." But as he provided in the distribution of duties for the civil branch alone, "as the law seemed to suggest he should do," each bureau was left to itself and "there was no one to co-ordinate the labors of the five chiefs, and their labors were not so co-ordinated."

"The results were such as might have been expected . . . With the single exception of the Civil War, the Navy has been for forty years without an administrator of the principal branch of business—WAR."

Luce quoted from President Cleveland's first annual message: "The conviction is forced upon us with the certainty of mathematical demonstration that before we

proceed further in the restoration of a Navy we need a thoroughly reorganized Navy Department."

The evils of the organization of the Navy Department and the consequent decadence of the Navy were shown in 1861 when "under the pressure of a great national crisis, the Department changed its organization in the direction suggested by theory, only to relapse when the pressure was removed." Two failures to obtain gunnery-ships, the history of the apprentice system, extravagance amounting to wastefulness, and the experience at the beginning of the war with Spain, furnish other illustrations of defective organization.

The Chairman of the House Naval Committee is quoted by Luce as reported to have said, "It is difficult to determine what is desired by naval officers or needed by the navy. All want something different, and to ascertain what is most desirable of all the schemes submitted is akin to impossible."

This point of view is not wide of the truth. The difficulty complained of is due not only to lack of coordination in the Department but to lack of coordination in the officers. For example the *North Dakota* and *Delaware*[1] were built with officers' quarters forward; in reporting on the relative advantages and disadvantages of this radical departure from the age-old custom of quarters aft, the Captain of one of the Dreadnoughts advocated one system, the other was equally strong in arguments for the other. Naturally the Chief Constructor exclaimed, "It is hopeless."

Having pointed out the errors and shortcomings of the organization of the Navy Department with the Bureau System, Luce who had a hammer for building as well as a torch for burning, to use Carlyle's phrase, deduced that "The Secretary of the Navy should be a statesman of good business capacity, he should have an assistant in the capacity of a Chief of General Staff to consult on all mat-

[1] These ships were commissioned in 1911.

ters of a professional nature, an assistant to keep him advised of the civil affairs, and another to advise on all questions of civil law. The business of the Department to be divided into two principal parts, Military and Civil."

At the beginning of the Civil War, "Our Naval Administration," writes Luce, "was regarded with such scant respect as to border, at one critical period, on contempt." The expedition for instance for the relief of Fort Pickens was arranged by President Lincoln, the Secretary of State, General Scott, Captain Meigs and Lieut. D. D. Porter, without a word being said to the Secretary of the Navy. Fort Sumter was not relieved when it could have been, and du Pont's failure to capture Charleston was directly due to the lack of any persons or Boards in the Department to plan a naval campaign—"in other words the Civil War demonstrated the necessity of a War College and a General Staff."

A few weeks after the battle of Manila Bay, Luce wrote to Senator Lodge:

Our Navy Department is not organized for a state of war. You will search in vain for any office, or officer in it especially charged with duties connected with the operations of war.

Consider for a moment its make-up. At the head are two civilians—the Secretary and his Assistant—the current business being divided among eight civil bureaus. Not one Military bureau!

Attention has been called to this glaring defect: but, in Congress and out, mostly in—there has been that blind confidence in the exemption of this country from the universal law of strife, that almost every proposition for the adoption of measures looking to an actual condition of war has been all but contemptuously waved aside. It required just such a state of affairs as the present to bring us to a realizing sense of our defective organization.

The Secretary of the Navy needs two assistants—one to aid him in the civil branch of the Department; the other in the military. He has the former, now let Congress give him the latter. In other words give him a General Staff

with the best officer of rank that can be found for the Chief of Staff.

Free from the engrossing duties of a Chief of Bureau, the Chief of General Staff would give his whole time and attention to the operations of war. Firmly established in office, by law, he would bring to his work all the powers a sense of great and undivided responsibility demanded.

What do we find in place of a General Staff? An irresponsible board of hastily caught up officers, each one excellent in his own particular sphere but each varying from the others in previous mental training and habits of thought, a mere make-shift called into temporary being by the emergencies of war.

"Boards," it has been well said, "screen responsibility," and failure is the invariable rule of War Boards so called.

Let Congress now give what the navy has been waiting for during the past fifty-six years, a Navy Department organized for War.

For Chief of General Staff probably Rear Admiral Walker would inspire more confidence among the officers of the fleet than any one else of his rank.

From Senator Lodge to Admiral Luce

May 27, 1898.

I quite agree with you that there ought to be a chief of staff in the Navy Department and I have thought so for many years. I do think however that in justice to the Board it ought to be said they are giving the Admirals in command no inconvenience now and are not hampering them at all. The delay in regard to supporting Dewey was caused I think by the difficulty of getting well equipped troops to send. We were of course entirely unprepared when the war began, which we ought not to have been, but that is the way with this country and whether we can ever succeed in curing it I do not know. I think however that things are moving very much better now in all Departments.

As the machinery of the Department failed for war purposes in 1861 so it failed again in 1898 and to remedy the difficulty the so-called Strategy Board was appointed.

In August following the practical ending of the war, Secretary Long wrote a letter addressed to the Chairman of the War Board (Admiral Sicard) expressing his appreciation of the services the Board had rendered. Referring to this letter, Luce wrote to Captain Mahan, one of the members of the Board:

August 25, 1898.

My dear Captain:

The letter furnishes such strong testimony in favor of the permanency of a similar Board that I venture to suggest that the occasion offers an opportunity of conferring upon the service a great and lasting benefit by taking the initiative step to remedy the defects of our Naval Administration.

The Secretary writes:—"In view of the practical ending of the war, and well earned relief from further duty to which the Naval War Board is now entitled etc." The Naval War Board has, therefore, been "on duty" in the Navy Department, in connection with the operations of the war. Of course the Secretary knew that the Board, as a Board, had no legal status, that its functions were, if I may borrow an international law term extra-territorial. It had no lawful standing in the Department. The Act establishing the Navy Department declares that "The business of the Department of the Navy shall be distributed in such a manner as the Secretary of the Navy shall judge to be expedient and proper" among eight Bureaus. This "business" lies principally in the direction of the furnishing of supplies; or as the act of incorporation has it, "the procurement of naval supplies and materials and the construction of armament, equipment and employment of vessels of war." (Section 417–419 R.S.)

All the "business" of the Department is therefore to be confined to the Secretary and eight Bureaus, and no provision whatever is made for the transaction of business, whether civil or military, by persons unconnected with the Bureaus. In other words, a state of war, when the military, as distinct from the civil character of the organization, could be prominently brought forward, does not seem to have been contemplated by the framers of the law.

True, one member of the Board is a Chief of Bureau, but

the majority of the members give the Board its true character and the Board, as thus characterized, has no part whatever in our system of naval administration.

I am not questioning the right of the Secretary to appoint such a Board. Please understand that. My contention is, simply, that the Secretary of the Navy having experienced the great benefits of an advisory Board forced into existence by the exigencies of war should be furnished with arguments in favor of making that Board or its equivalent a permanent part of our Naval Organization.

The arguments in favor of a permanent Naval War Board under what name so-ever one may please to call it, whether General Staff, or any other title, are too familiar to you to need recapitulation. Suffice to say that "Naval Strategy," the peculiar function of such a Board, is, according to high authority "as necessary in peace as it is in war."

Should you concur in these views, I do not know of anyone so well qualified as you are to present them in their most favorable light for the consideration of the Secretary, or from whom they would be received with greater deference. Should the Board, also, concur, and add the weight of its authority, I doubt not that a recommendation made by the Executive to amend the organic law so as to recognize Strategy as a part of the "business" of the Department of the Navy and providing for it a special office, connected with, and made part of, the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, would be favorably received by Congress.

It must be gratifying to you that the net results of this war have so fully illustrated your theory of Sea Power. The war practically ended with the elimination from the war problem of Spain's navy.

The necessity of a Naval Board had again been demonstrated by the exigencies of the Service, and as a substitute for the Strategy Board, a Naval General Staff was proposed, but it met with such bitter opposition, principally from Senator Hale and the Staff Bureau Chiefs, that it became apparent that any board under that title was impossible. The General Board therefore, an outcome of the War College, the creation of a sagacious Secretary of

Navy, Mr. John D. Long, March 13, 1900, and not Congress, came into existence and Admiral Dewey was made its President. It was designed originally to perform all the functions of a Naval General Staff, and to have nothing to do with material.

The General Board ordered by the Secretary was a long step forward, but it did not solve the problem and Admiral Luce continued to urge the Department not to give up the fight. In his annual message to Congress of December, 1903, the President recommended the establishment of a Naval General Staff. "We need," he said to Congress, "the establishment by law of a body of trained officers who shall exercise a systematic control of the military affairs of the Navy, and be authorized advisors of the Secretary concerning it." This was advocated by the Secretary of the Navy, the Admiral of the Navy and the Chiefs of the three line Bureaus and two ex-Secretaries of the Navy.

The General Board had been established by order of a Secretary and by the same token, it could be wiped out by any Secretary of the Navy who did not approve. The Administration made a strong effort to induce the Naval Committee of the House of Representatives to recognize it, but without success.

The Naval Committee refused.

The opposition of the Staff Bureaus seemed to be all powerful.

From Rear Admiral Luce to Rear Admiral H. C. Taylor, U.S.N.,

Chief of Bureau of Navigation, and a former president of the War College.

June 25th, 1904.

Dear Taylor:

The solution of the General Staff question lies in a nut shell. But the solving is a part of the "unfinished business," and properly belongs to the outgoing Secretary,

who is perfectly familiar with the subject and appreciates its importance; rather than by the incoming Secretary who is a fresh hand and would have to study up the whole question.

The Act of Aug. 31, 1842, organizing the Bureaus declares that the duties of the Department shall be distributed among the several Bureaus. Up to the present time no Secretary has recognized the fact that naval operations should be included among those duties. Let this grave oversight be repaired at once by an Executive order creating under the Bureau of Navigation the Office of "Naval Operations."

By such an order Mr. Moody will accomplish his purpose in a simple and perfectly legitimate manner, and you will gain the end you have labored for.

The Office of Naval Intelligence was created by General Order No. 292, March 23rd, 1882, by Secretary Hunt. Let the Office of Naval Operation be created in the same way.

The office should be placed in charge of an officer of rank and one of recognized qualifications for its duties. His relations with the Secretary will be close and confidential. He will be the Secretary's adviser on all naval questions of a military nature.

Rear-Admiral H. C. Taylor is the officer for the place.

As he will come under the Chief of Bureau of Navigation the latter must be the ranking officer. As the office should go into operation at once—before Mr. Moody goes out, Higginson and Evans are the only available ones who do not retire this year.

The duties of the office will be such as would have gone to the General Staff had one been created. Thus will the Secretary obtain, under the law, the substance of a General Staff without the empty shadow of the name.

There is no such thing as spontaneous generation. Plant the seed now and let it grow.

Should this order be given at once, as I hope and pray it may be, you will simply turn the Bureau over to your successor and take your new desk in the General Board rooms where your office is already in working order. Let the move be made quickly and without undue publicity.

I beg you will carefully consider this very simple way of converting what is now, practically, a pretty bad defeat, into a victory.

From Admiral Taylor to Admiral Luce

Washington, D. C., June 29th, 1904.

Dear Admiral,

Thank you for your suggestion of June 25th. I think we might get a great deal out of what you suggest, but having gone so far and so long towards General Board methods, I believe the relief you speak of would be only temporary. You say plant the seed now and let it grow; that is what I think we are doing. If we plant this other seed that you suggest I am afraid the two plants would not grow together well.

As to being defeated, we certainly have not gained what we want, but I should not consider it a defeat until Congress passed some law which would prevent our trying to improve things. We have been afraid of that, and with reason. That is why the Secretary has moved slowly, as he has seen quite plainly that it was possible for Congress, if pressed too hard, to pass a law which would prevent our efforts, at least for a long time. This was avoided, and so far we are simply standing still and marking time. We have not had to fall back any yet and do not doubt that by continuing as we are going now we shall, in a few years, obtain what we want and obtain it in the right way. Nevertheless, I will bring the matter to the Secretary's attention, if he comes back in time, before going to the Attorney General's office.

It is time to face the chances without blinking. I hold that if we build many more ships than we have authorized at present, without some sort of a General Staff, we shall be building those fine ships for an enemy to capture and use. I do not question that we would fight and die bravely, and that our history would be full of heroic defeats; but they would be defeats still, and the country would be humiliated thereby.

I hope you will keep this confidential, for it would not be understood by others. However, I believe that this plan and forcible way of considering the situation will be the only method by which we will force a discussion of the subject.

With much respect, Sir,

Sincerely yours,

Harry Taylor.

According to Fiske it was Admiral Luce's papers on Naval Administration, especially his lecture at Annapolis in 1888, "that marked his downfall materially speaking"[1] as Commander-in-Chief of the Home Squadron, by which is probably meant that the Navy Department, goaded by his ruthless and persistent criticism of the Bureau system, retaliated by taking away his ships and so forced him to ask to be relieved. This may be so, at all events the exercises he had planned for the summer of 1889 in cooperation with the Army necessarily fell through, due to lack of support and sympathy on the part of the Secretary of the Navy.

But his pen was not stopped, and during the long years that were vouchsafed to him, he wrote a number of vigorous papers of which "The Department of the Navy" and "The Fleet" are accounted his best and strongest. Both were published in the *North American Review*.

[1] *Autobiography*, p. 109.

CHAPTER XIV

The General Board

IN 1905 Admiral Luce wrote to the General Board:

"I have the honor to present herewith for your consideration a proposition, in the form of a 'Memorandum of Naval Administration,' looking to the appointment, by the Secretary of the Navy, of an officer of rank to act in the capacity of Acting Second Assistant Secretary of the Navy, to hold the office until such time as Congress shall sanction the appointment by legal enactment.

"It is scarcely necessary to call the attention of the General Board to the fact that such action on the part of the Secretary would be simply following out the rule which has obtained in the Navy for many years past of the Executive taking the lead in nearly all steps looking to the betterment of the Naval profession. The step once taken by the Executive, and its wisdom demonstrated, Congress has readily followed by giving it the sanction of law. The Naval School started in a very modest way, under Executive orders, at the Naval Asylum in Philadelphia. It is now the Naval Academy in Annapolis, with $10,000,000 buildings.

"The Torpedo Station was started by a Chief of a Bureau. Look at it now!

"The Training Service was started in the same way. At first no apprentices were allowed.

"The War College struggled into existence by Executive order and it was some time before Congress would grant a meagre appropriation for necessary repairs to an old building—the Asylum for the poor of Newport—that had been presented to the Navy. But recognition by Congress came in time and the College is here to stay.

"These cases, so familiar to the Board, are cited simply to show that the Executive has only to take the steps necessary for the completion of the organization of the Navy Department, in order that Congress may follow with its approval.

"Should this proposal meet with a favorable consideration of the General Board there seems to be no reason why it should not be carried out at once. In any event, do not wait for Congress!"

In the summer of 1906 it became generally known that Mr. Bonaparte would resign the naval portfolio. Admiral Luce and some others in the service, as well as out of it, deemed it most important to have a man at the head of the Department, who would not only take an interest personally, but who would appreciate the military side of it, and General Horace Porter was chosen as the logical man. He appeared to be the ideal man for the position. Dr. Hollingsworth of Philadelphia, the originator of the idea of the Navy League, in a letter to Herbert L. Satterlee, Esq., of New York said, "We know Porter's love for the Navy, we are convinced of his ability, courage, patriotism, and the respect accorded to him by the Nation. We also recognize that he understood the absolute necessity for the reorganization of the Navy Department."

Great pressure was brought to bear upon the President to secure General Porter's endorsement. Mr. Roosevelt listened to the eulogies and it is said that wearied of the importunities of General Porter's friends he finally observed that he reserved the right to select his own cabinet.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO DR. W. WHARTON HOLLINGSWORTH, PHILADELPHIA

15 FRANCIS STREET,
NEWPORT, R.I.,
April 18th, 1906.

Your favor of the 16th received. Permit me to offer a suggestion.

You may write to any number of naval officers asking for suggestions in the line of your inquiries and you may hear from half of them. Half of those, let us say, will naturally, give you their ideas from their own point of view; and you will find it a labor to "boil down" the various plans and reconcile differences of opinion. Why not have all this work done for you by experts? If you could get those same officers together to discuss the question, compare notes, and reconcile divergent views, they would, each one, go through a course of education—so to speak—and produce, through their joint efforts, a plan for a naval organization that would possess some value. We have now all the elements at hand. It needs only the work of experts to assemble them and put them in good working order.

Therefore; Let the Secretary of the Navy convene a board for the express purpose of looking into the workings of our present system of naval administration, and suggesting such changes as may be found necessary. Should the recommendations of the board meet with the approval of the President, and of the Secretary of the Navy, then the Navy League would have solid ground to work upon and be able to enter, with confidence, on a campaign of educating the public to the point that Congress might be induced to enact the necessary legislation. This seems to me to be the most direct and, in the end, the most satisfactory mode of procedure.

The question for the Secretary to decide, supposing for one moment he favorably considered the proposition, would be as to the wisdom of putting on such a board any member of the present administration.

The trouble has been heretofore to get a Secretary of the Navy to take action in the matter. They have gone into the Department from civil life, accepting the office as they found it.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO DR. HOLLINGSWORTH

15 FRANCIS STREET,
NEWPORT, R. I.
April 27th, 1906.

You have my thanks for your favor of Sunday 22nd.

Experience taught the English, many years ago, that it was not desirable to have a naval officer as First Lord of the Admiralty. . . . A good business man, who would take an active interest in the navy—one who would accept the office for the sake of making his mark by bringing up the administration of the affairs of the navy to a high point of efficiency—a man who has controlled large corporations and accustomed to the disbursing of large sums of money, and had no friends in the Navy to serve or enemies to punish,—such a man, I say, would be desirable. Mr. George von L. Meyer, a successful business man of Boston, now our Ambassador to St. Petersburg, has been mentioned as a possible successor to Mr. Bonaparte, who it has been known is soon to succeed Mr. Moody as Attorney General.

Unfortunately, appointments to the Navy Department are not made in the interests of the Navy. There are not now, and never have been. The Navy Department has always been made a convenience of. Men have been put at the head of that Department solely for political reasons. It is idle to hope for any change in this respect.

Another unfortunate phase of the question is that our most powerful enemies are *in the Department itself*. The *Bureau officers do not want a change*. In proof of this I invite your attention to my article "The Department of the Navy," page 87, beginning 12th line from bottom, as follows:

"The President recognizing those several considerations," etc., etc., and on bottom line:

"And while it cannot be said that the President's object was actually defeated by those upon whose support he had every right to count," etc., etc., it may be affirmed that such opposition . . . was not an example to improve the *morale* of the service, etc., etc.

The President's plan was defeated by bureaucracy.

Mr. Bonaparte you say will not act in this matter because he is just going out, and Mr. Meyer, or Mr. Somebody-

else, will not act because he has just come in! So there you are!

But suppose, for a moment, that the new Secretary should appoint a board of officers to examine the present system of naval administration and recommend such changes as might be deemed necessary. Let us assume, further, that such a board should draw up and present the Secretary a thoroughly sound and business-like plan of naval government, what would become of it? It would be pigeon-holed! The Bureaus would not have it; and they have influence enough to kill any such measure. They have done it before and they will do it again. I can see but one way out of this slough, and that is to get the President so thoroughly interested in the question that he would be ready to dismiss anyone in office found opposing him. The public utterances of the President, in regard to the Navy, are admirable. He admonishes everyone in the navy to be up to the mark. Very good! Now if anyone has the ear of the President let him be told that it is "up to him," as they say, to set the example and put the administration of the navy on a sound basis. And let the new Secretary come into office with the distinct understanding that that is to be first business, and that he is not to be diverted from that end by any side issues or personal influence. And let it be understood, moreover, that the President "means business" and will brook no interference on the part of his subordinates, either directly or indirectly.

The reason of the opposition of the Bureaus is easily explained. No man willingly surrenders power. It was a fault of the organic law establishing our Bureaus that they were given undue authority. I have tried to explain this in *Naval Administration* I (June 6, 1888), page 578, 12 lines from bottom. It will be seen from that that within certain lines the authority of a Chief of a Bureau is equal to that of the Secretary himself. When it is considered that about $100,000,000 (one hundred millions of dollars) are annually distributed by Congress among eight Bureaus, and that a Chief of Bureau is accountable to no one for the expenditure of funds, as long as he conforms to the law, it will be seen what large powers and patronage he enjoys. Naturally they are unwilling to have these vast powers curtailed. Please understand that I do not

mean to hint, even remotely, at anything like corruption. I mean simply that there is ample room for the introduction of business methods into our system of naval administration. I mention these things that you may know of some of the difficulties which lie in your way. I trust the League will be able to accomplish the great work it has undertaken. It is a great national undertaking. The starting point is with the President. The case is in his hands. Please regard this as strictly confidential.

From Admiral Luce to Dr. Hollingsworth

15 Francis Street,
Newport, R. I.
May 21st, 1906.

On returning home Saturday evening I was very much pleased to receive your very encouraging favor of the 18th.

Judging from newspaper report Mr. Geo. von L. Meyer, a Boston man, now Minister to Russia has been selected as the successor to Mr. Bonaparte. As will be seen from the enclosed paper, Boston has had two Secretaries of the Navy already. Let the Navy have a chance now. Please make such use of the enclosed paper as you think proper. I am delighted to learn that Mr. Satterlee will take an interest in the question. His intimacy with Naval matters together with his large acquaintance with men in political life give him a commanding position.

I presume (though do not know) that Senator Lodge is committed to Mr. Meyer. But he is a broadminded man and very much interested in Naval affairs; hence would be among the first to see a claim of the Navy to recognition in the appointment of a Secretary of the Navy.

Next to Senator Lodge I think Mr. Root (Sec'y. of State) would exercise a controlling influence in such an appointment.

From Admiral Luce to President Roosevelt

Newport, R. I., July 14, 1908.

The General Board and the War College Staff are now busily engaged on questions relating to the design of the *North Dakota*. From all I can gather I am more than

ever convinced that our methods of doing business are radically wrong. A Bureau Chief with all the engrossing details of his office; together with the responsibility of the expenditure of several million dollars a year, is expected to give his attention to the designing of a 20,000-ton battleship, which alone demands the most careful thought undisturbed by administrative duties. This double duty is imposing far too much on any one man, or on any set of men, and is just neither to the Government nor to the individual.

Our methods, which were bad enough in the old days of a few wooden ships and smooth bore guns, have now become intolerable. The severest condemnation of our archaic system of naval administration comes from former Secretary of the Navy Bonaparte in his annual report to Congress of November 28, 1906, in which he declared that "*a very radical and thoroughgoing change should be made in the organization of the Department.*" Here we have the head of the Navy, himself, the highest and most responsible authority, condemning outright his own Department! What more in that direction does Congress require?

Having pointed out the defects Mr. Bonaparte suggests the remedy in the appointment of a "suitable commission" to consider and report upon the question of the reorganization of the Navy Department.

Inclosed herewith is a copy of Mr. Bonaparte's report for reference. I venture to suggest that Mr. Bonaparte's proposition for a "suitable commission" be adopted, or at any rate that it be submitted to the General Board and War College Staff, now in joint-conference, for consideration and report on the make-up of the commission.

From President Roosevelt to Admiral Luce

Oyster Bay, N. Y., July 16, 1908.

My dear Admiral:

That is a very interesting suggestion of yours and I shall carefully consider it. I am not at all contented with the organization of the Navy (Department?).

For two years and a half bickerings between the Bureaus continued, the General Board and the three line bureaus

on one side, the staff bureaus on the other. On January 27, 1909, the President appointed a commission "to consider certain needs of the Navy. The organization of the Department is now not such as to bring the best results, and there is a failure to coördinate the work of the Bureaus and to make the Department serve the one end for which it was created, that is the development and handling of a first class fighting fleet, etc., etc."

The Commission was composed of Hon. W. H. Moody, Hon. A. G. Dayton, Hon. Paul Morton, Rear Admiral S. B. Luce, Rear Admiral A. T. Mahan, Rear Admiral R. D. Evans, Rear Admiral W. M. Folger, Rear Adm. W. S. Cowles. All the Naval members were on the retired list.

The Commission met on February 5, 1909, and on February 26th it submitted its report. It was brief, clear and concise. In general terms the Secretary was to have a General Council and a Military Council. The Department was to be divided into five grand divisions which would form the General Council; the Chiefs of the Military Council (Operations, Personnel and Inspection) were to be appointed by the President. The other two chiefs were to be (Assistant Secretary and Chief of Material).

This report which included the General Board as one of its principal factors of its proposed reorganization, received no attention at the hands of the Congress but it formed the basis of the reorganization of the Navy, which was later put into effect by Secretary Meyer.

As Navy Yards are adjuncts of the Navy Department the reorganization of the latter necessarily brought about drastic changes in the administration of the former, which was notoriously ineffective, illogical and wasteful, due to the Bureau system which had prevailed since 1842 unchanged in principle, notwithstanding revolutionary changes in the Navy business and in factory methods.

In 1883 a commission of which Commodore Luce was President visited the various yards and investigated on the ground the methods and conditions of each yard. The

Commission's report was transmitted to Congress and may be found in Executive Document 55 of the first Session of the 48th Congress. It recommended many changes that would make for accuracy and efficiency, but as these changes collided with the vested rights of the bureaus, nothing came of it.

Twenty years later Admiral P. F. Harrington who was a disciple and follower of Luce, and himself a capable, learned and progressive officer, submitted a project to the Secretary of the Navy, for the reorganization of the Navy Yard at Norfolk, of which he was at that time Commandant. In a letter to the author he says, "I believe that it (the work of the Luce Commission) was of value to Secretary Meyer's decision in favor of the Project in December, 1909.

"Admiral Luce's influence was of value in the gradual formation of opinion, which brought about the reorganization of the Navy Yards, when there arrived in the Navy Department, a Secretary having a clear perception of the evils of multiple control of the Navy Yards and the courage to destroy that costly system, against the efforts to maintain it by class interests which had the support of Senators and Representatives in Congress. Of the truth of the last clause of the preceding sentence, I had personal knowl edge, and in several of Luce's letters to me, it is clear that conditions of opposition to a unified business system in the Navy had long been known by him."

In 1907 the Navy Department invited officers to submit suggestions which would tend to promote the efficiency of the service:

Admiral Luce to the Secretary of the Navy

Newport, R. I., July 30, 1907.

The Act of Aug. 31, 1842, entitled "An Act to reorganize the Navy Department of the United States," provided for five Bureaus (subsequently increased to eight), adding: "That the Secretary of the Navy shall assign and dis-

tribute among said Bureaus such of the duties of the Navy Department as he shall judge to be expedient and proper."

Up to the present time only the civil "duties of the Department have been assigned and distributed among the said Bureaus." The military duties of the Department have never received the consideration their great importance demands. This grave defect in the distribution of the duties of the Department should be corrected at once. This can be done under the Act of '42 above quoted. In this Act Congress has given the Secretary of the Navy ample power to apply the remedy.

The Secretary of the Navy has only to issue an order that there shall be attached to and made part of, the Bureau of Navigation an office under the title of "The Fleet," and to place that office in charge of an officer of the General Board, with instructions that he shall organize said office in such a manner that it shall be able to deal efficiently with the military operations of the Fleet.

At the same time Admiral Luce submitted a lengthy memorandum to the Secretary, on Naval Efficiency which he summed up as follows:

Naval reform must begin with the Navy Department.

The opponents of reform are the five staff bureaus of the department, supported by Senator Hale and Hon. George E. Foss, M.C.

This powerful combination has, on two separate occasions in recent years, defeated the Administration's efforts to increase naval efficiency.

The question of the house is: Whether or not the Navy is to continue under this domination?

On November 19, 1907, Admiral Luce wrote:

The reason why the five Staff Bureaus of the Navy Department have power to defeat the President in his laudable efforts to promote naval efficiency is that they have the sympathy and support of the chairmen of the two Congressional Committees on Naval Affairs.

Those two Chairmen practically control their respective Committees and the Committees in turn control legisla-

tion on Naval Affairs. Hence those seven gentlemen—the five Chiefs of Staff Bureaus and the two Chairmen—control absolutely all naval legislation that effects in any way the interests of those Bureaus. Senator Hale hates the military class; and loses no opportunity for showing his scant regard for line officers of the Navy. His sympathies are all with the civil branches of the Navy.

Mr. Foss, chairman of the Naval Committee of the House, means well but he fails to understand that the navy is a military organization. Moreover, he is largely influenced by Senator Hale.

From this it will be seen how easy it is for the Staff Bureaus to block all efforts of the administration which have for their object a change in the methods now in force in the Navy Department, of carrying on the business of the Navy. The turning down of the General Board by Mr. Foss in 1904 is a case in point.

President Roosevelt in his message to Congress of December, 1903, recommended, in effect, the establishment by law, of the General Board. The measure was ably advocated in person before the House Naval Committee by Secretary of the Navy Moody, April 11, 1904; by Admiral Dewey, and by the Chiefs of the three line Bureaus. But it was opposed by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Darling, and by the Chiefs of the five Staff Bureaus. The bill never got beyond the Naval Committee. Here is documentary evidence that the Navy Department is divided against itself. Does this conduce to naval efficiency or not? Is not the whole system rotten to the core?

The Navy Bureaus have the expenditure, annually, of millions of dollars without accountability. Patronage and influence are the accompaniments of the control of such vast sums.

It is only natural that the Staff Bureaus should strive to the utmost to guard against any interference with the large powers with which Congress has endowed them.

It is far from probable that Congress ever intended to introduce such a disintegrating force into an Executive Department of the government.

It is due to the country that the law creating the Bureaus of the Navy Department should be examined with a view to calling its defects to the attention of Con-

gress and suggesting amending it in the line recommended by Secretary of the Navy Bonaparte in his annual report of November 28, 1906.

It will be seen from the foregoing how thoroughly the ground had been broken for a new Secretary in 1909 if he had the interest and the courage, to take advantage of it. Admiral Luce had conducted a clever campaign, but beyond enlisting the sympathy of the President, the Secretary of the Navy and a few Senators and Representatives there were no tangible and visible results. We are reminded of the conditions in Honolulu preceding the fall of the monarchy, as described by Mr. Stevens in his famous note to Mr. Blaine: "The pear is ripe and ready to fall. We are only waiting for someone to pluck it." Captain Wiltse came into port with the *Boston* and plucked the Hawaiian pear. Mr. George von L. Meyer came into the Navy Department and had the courage and ability to pluck the Naval pear and plucked it!

It would not be appropriate here to even summarize what Mr. Meyer accomplished for the Navy, and although unfortunately some of his ideas were subsequently ignored, suffice it that he did great and permanent good. Admiral Wainwright wrote, "Under Mr. Meyer for the first time since the establishment of the Bureau System in the Navy Department the fleet was placed under the military control of the Navy."

CHAPTER XV

Correspondence Relating to the Merchant Marine

EVER since the adoption of the Constitution, the coastwise trade of the United States has been protected from foreign monopoly by wise laws.

Our deep sea trade, however, has had many vicissitudes. In 1789 the first law passed by the Federal Congress provided protection for our shipping industry and at the end of the 18th century 90% of our ocean borne commerce was carried in American built ships manned by Americans, and our Merchant Marine flourished like the bay tree until just before the breaking out of the Civil War. Afterwards foreign competition, ill-advised diplomacy, sorry statecraft, and the southern commerce destroyers killed it. It is a fact not pleasant to dwell upon, that during the half century preceding the World War our flag was almost unknown on the great trade routes, and our merchants were under the humiliating handicap of having our freight rates fixed in Hamburg and London. In 1907 although the United States tonnage registered for foreign trade was near 879,595, all but 8.2% was carried in foreign bottoms.

Admiral Luce was a strong champion of the Merchant Marine. No one more clearly realized the importance to the Navy of having a developed and properly organized merchant service, and his fight for its interests was one of the important endeavors of his life. His views, full of interest and history are clearly set forth in the following letters—a few out of a great number.

From Admiral Luce to Winthrop L. Marvin Secy., Merchant Marine Commission

15 Francis Street
Newport, R. I.
May 20th, 1904.

In common with many others I have been, for years past, deploring the loss of our carrying trade and inveighing against navigation laws which have drained the country of so much wealth and power. The operation of our laws has been to throw our foreign commerce into the hands of England, thus indirectly contributing to the support of her navy, and forming for her a great naval reserve. In doing this we have sacrificed that source of wealth, and deprived our own Navy of that reserve force. From the standpoint of a naval officer, I have never been able to comprehend this blind partiality for England.

In your admirable and exhaustive work, *The American Merchant Marine*, you have given such a clear account of the rise and fall of our mercantile marine as to leave little if anything to be said in that connection. Let us hope that we have now reached the turning point. Congress has, of late years, dealt so generously with the Navy that there are good grounds for believing that it will now take up the question of the rehabilitation of our mercantile marine in the same liberal spirit. And, indeed, the high character and recognized ability of the several members, composing the Commission, their wide experience in public affairs and the responsibility resting upon them of settling this important question as broad-minded statesmen, with a Secretary so familiar with the whole subject, leaves nothing to be desired in this respect. To their wisdom may be safely left the equitable adjustment of all the varied interests involved.

To you personally, my dear sir, I may say that the placing of ships on the free list would not have the slightest effect in bringing about the desired end.

Subsidies constitute an important factor but do not offer a complete solution.

Discriminating duties on the other hand favor our shipping interests at the expense of our rivals. And with these crude views I must take leave of the subject.

Speaking from the naval standpoint, I would say that the sailing ship, from, say 500 tons upwards, engaged in foreign trade should receive full consideration at the hands of the Commission. It is that class of vessel that produces the greatest number and the best sailors. For as the pioneers in foreign trade they are the most enterprising and active.

The navy is not producing sailors in these days to any great extent, and sailors will be needed in time of war.

From Admiral Luce to Winthrop L. Marvin

15 Francis Street,
Newport, R. I.
May 24, 1904.

I cannot believe that my opinion on the questions under consideration would be of the slightest value to the Commission.

It is a purely business proposition as to where shippers can find cheapest freight rates regardless of the flag. There is no patriotism in business! If a cargo of coal can be sent from Philadelphia to Manila in an English ship for one cent per ton less than in an American ship, other things being equal, the English ship will get the freight every time. The same may be said of a cargo of wheat from San Francisco to Liverpool. *It costs more to run American ships than it does ships of any other nationality.*

It is useless to say that American ships are better built and better managed than foreign ships. Take, for example, the *E. M. Phelps*, Captain Graham. It would be difficult to find her equal under any flag. But any old hooker or the water-bruiser under a foreign flag would outbid her for freight. This is an extreme case, it is true, but it illustrates the fact that the shippers' money is going to the cheapest freighter.

How to "even up" expenses, whether by subsidies, preferential duties, or other means, is a question for business men to settle—subsidies will be made a political issue, and discriminating duties will invite retaliatory measures, so there you are. I am not qualified to give an opinion on this subject that is worth considering. I can only say that if Congress can frame laws that will make it pay to build a fleet of ships of, or about the type of, the

Phelps [1] it would be of inestimable benefit to the nation at large and to the navy in particular.

Passing to another branch of the subject, I have always maintained that our sailing ships should be required, by law, to take out apprentices in numbers proportioned to their tonnage.

To stimulate these boys, it should be understood that they would have to pass an examination before they could obtain a "certificate of competency" in order to become a mate; and mates should be obliged to hold a "certificate of competency" in order to qualify for master. Thus there would be created a demand for nautical schools.

My efforts in this direction, started about thirty years ago, have resulted in the Apprentice Training Service for the Navy, and the State schoolships *Enterprise* of Boston, *St. Mary*'s of New York, and the *Saratoga* of Philadelphia for the merchant service.

(See Revised Statues, Marine Schools, June 20, 1894.)

The bill, as I drafted it originally, included provisions for "certificates of competency"; but as this move seemed at the time unpopular I dropped it and contented myself with the provisions for schoolships alone. The bill itself I cannot at this moment find, but an analysis of it will be found in the paper herewith enclosed. If the commission wish to take up that branch of this subject I will try to find the bill—otherwise, I would be glad to have my paper on the "Manning of our Navy and Mercantile Marine" returned to me at your convenience.

From Admiral Luce to Hon. J. H. Gallinger, Chairman of the Mercantile Marine Commission

Newport, R. I.
November 17, 1904.

Referring to the polite invitation of Mr. Winthrop L. Marvin, Secretary of your Commission, to state what, in my judgment, could and should be done, by national legislation, to increase the number of ships and seamen of our Mercantile Marine, I beg leave to say that the questions at issue are so momentous and the interests involved

[1] See New York *Herald*, May 22, 1904.

so conflicting, that I hesitate to discuss them at present as business propositions.

But as the restoration of our carrying trade is a matter which deeply concerns the navy, I venture to submit a few remarks designed to show how it may be regarded from a naval standpoint.

To the country at large as well as to the navy in particular, the rehabilitation of our mercantile marine is a question of the highest military importance. The reciprocal relations which exist between the military and the mercantile marine has long been recognized. The former ensures immunity from molestation of ocean borne commerce, and, in time of war, finds there its best reserves. A navy may be said to be the offspring of foreign trade. In all history the peoples who have been most enterprising navigators, have, as a consequence, become the foremost of naval powers.

Our history furnishes a conspicuous example of an extensive ocean commerce giving birth to a navy. We were, first of all, a commercial people. In our early days, as a nation, our merchant ships were to be seen in numbers on every sea. They were noted for their superior build, fine qualities, and the skill with which they were navigated. They were at once the source of our national wealth and pride, and made the flag of the newly-born nation familiar to every clime.

Peaceful, as our people were, the country found itself forced, against much and bitter partizan opposition, to build a navy for the protection of its foreign trade. And when, gradually, the navy came into existence, it was from the merchant service it was called upon to protect, that it found its best recruits. Some of our most celebrated officers of the Revolutionary War and of the War of 1812—officers who achieved distinction in battle, and assisted so materially in laying the foundations of our Naval renown, received their early training in the mercantile marine.

When the Civil War demanded a sudden and great expansion of the Navy, it was to the mercantile navy that we turned for making up the personnel. In 1860 the number of seamen allowed the navy by law was 7600. In 1864 that number had been increased to 51,500. The number of seamen enlisted in the Navy from 4th March, 1861, to 1st May, 1863, was 118,044.

In respect to additional officers there were admitted into the Navy during the war about 7500 of all grades, by far the greater part coming from the merchant service. Many were excellent seamen and service on board vessels of war soon made up for lack of previous naval training.

The records of the volunteer officers are creditable in the highest degree, showing that the merchant service of that day was not inferior, as a school of seamen, to what it was in 1812. Many promotions were made for gallantry in battle and for faithful services. At the close of the war 4,500 officers were honorably discharged with the thanks of the Navy Department. After a rigid examination 64 passed into the regular service as part of the permanent naval establishment. Many of those equally well qualified for admission to the regular navy preferred to return to civil life. They had entered the volunteer navy from motives of patriotism; and when the country no longer needed their services they willingly returned to their accustomed vocations.

It must be borne in mind, however, that in 1860, or just preceding the Civil War, with a population of 31,443,322, our foreign going tonnage ran up to 2,496,894 tons, a close second to that of England's, while to-day, with a population in round numbers of 80,000,000, it is only about 1,706,294 tons.

According to recent statistics there are only three "billion dollar countries," considered from the standpoint of exportation of domestic products; and America heads the list, the others being the United Kingdom and Germany. But while America leads the world in trade it must not be forgotten that of the exportation of domestic products a very small percentage is carried in American bottoms, the great bulk going to foreign ships. The money paid the carriers goes to enrich countries with which we may, some day, be at war. Thus we are indirectly aiding the navies of those countries, and their naval reserves at the expense of our own.

"The war with Spain," says Mr. Winthrop L. Marvin, in *The American Merchant Marine*, "proved that the merchant marine of the United States in 1898 was not sufficient to provide the indispensable naval reserve for even a brief conflict with a third-rate (fourth-rate) power."

This is quite true. What then may we depend upon for naval reserves in the event of another war, when our

opponent on the ocean may be something more than a fourth-rate or third-rate power? Indeed, may be one of these very naval powers whose reserves we have, for years past, been aiding to build up?

Although the great mass of the carrying trade is done by steamers, yet the sailing ship is by no means extinct. It has been shown that there are certain classes of cargo that can be carried better, and with more profit, by sailing vessels than by steamers, and statistics show that there is a gradual revival in the sailing ship building. It is desirable from the naval point of view that this species of industry should be encouraged by our navigation laws. For it is unquestionably true that it is that class of vessel that we must look to for sailors. Steamers produce seamen, it is true, men who acquire the sea habit, but not sailors in the strict sense of the word, men who do not only have the sea habit, but the well known characteristics of the sailor; his skill in meeting all the vicissitudes of life at sea, his contempt for danger, his self-reliance under difficulties, his adaptability to all sorts and conditions of circumstances. Men seasoned in that school soon adapt themselves to man-of-war life.

Not only should such an industry be encouraged, but our navigation laws should require that all sailing ships engaged in foreign trade, should carry a certain number of boys proportioned to their tonnage.

Our Bank and other deep water fisheries produce hardy seamen and should be encouraged by every possible means. In this connection attention is invited to an extract from a letter to the N. Y. *Evening Post* of August 20, 1904, from Dr. Hugh M. Smith, deputy Fish Commissioner to Japan.

Says Dr. Smith:

"In view of recent developments in Manchuria, Korea, and along the seas, it is proper to mention that the prowess of Japan is due in no small degree to the skill, bravery, and loyalty of her fishermen. When volunteers were called for to take vessels into Port Arthur for the purpose of blocking the channel, those who insisted most strongly on being allowed to go to almost certain death, were the hardy fishermen, and in every naval achievement of the present war the fishermen in the navy have played a prominent part."

Speaking of the Russian Baltic fleet, on the other hand, a foreign correspondent very justly remarks that:

"The units of the ships' companies are brave, but as a rule are wanting in the high sea experience and the elasticity that enable the seamen of the American and British navies to adapt themselves to new and different responsibilities as they arise. Nor do the temperaments and traditions of the composite races that man the ships serve to correct these deficiencies. The service is compulsory, not voluntary, and a good portion of the crews is drawn from the interior. The merchant marine is relatively too unimportant to provide a proper nucleus of seamen, and the consequence is that many of the men serving on board ship have no sea aptitude, and are found afloat only because they have drawn an unlucky number in the conscription."

The latest statistics at hand show that "all American vessels on salt water which go out of sight of land for any time during the year would be fully manned by 50,000 men including masters." It is shown also that the crews of square rigged vessels, the class that produce sailors, amount to only 5,287 men.

The Board of Trade (England) returns for 1902, show a total of 253,540 persons employed in the Home and Foreign trade.

In the event of war, it may be asked, what reserves can be furnished our navy by the mercantile marine, as the latter exists today under the operation of our navigation laws? The supply must surely prove totally inadequate.

Intimately connected with the subject is that of higher education.

In the interests of the personnel of our mercantile marine in the first instance, but ultimately for the benefit of the whole country, I beg leave to call attention to the good work now being accomplished by the State schoolships *Enterprise* at Boston, the *St. Mary's* at New York, and the *Saratoga* at Philadelphia. These Nautical Schools were established under the wise provision made by Congress "for the instruction of American youths in Navigation, Seamanship, Marine Engineering, and all matters pertaining to the construction, Equipment and Sailing of vessels" (See Marine School Act, June 20, 1874). The reports from each schoolship have been very encouraging. Would it not be well on the part of Government, looking to future possibilities, to encourage still further this form of technical education?

At the first note of war there would be a great demand for ships, as well as for men. In addition to the established line of battle, the conditions of naval warfare of today call for a comparatively large auxiliary fleet, such as scouts, transports, storeships, supply vessels, cable-cutting vessels, repair ships, hospital ships, &c., &c. These may be drawn from the merchant service. During the Civil War some 418 vessels of various sorts were purchased for the navy. It has been tersely said by one very good authority, in reference to the blockade of the Southern ports, that more than one half of the ships, four-fifths of the officers, and five-sixths of the men who performed this vital work came directly from the merchant marine (Marvin, page 331).

The valuable services rendered by the vessels drawn from the same source during the Spanish War and hastily converted into men-of-war is of too recent a date to need more than a passing notice.

Ninety-seven (97) merchantmen were purchased and converted into auxiliary cruisers, scouts, gunboats, colliers, &c. &c. The *St. Paul*, *St. Louis*, the *New York* and *Paris* (the latter renamed *Harvard* and *Yale*) made capital scouts.

During the Civil War the number of vessels of all descriptions bought or chartered by the Government for the use of the army, as reported at the end of the war, amounted to 783, with an aggregate tonnage of 240,499 tons. If to this be added the 418 bought for the navy, we should have a total of 1,201 vessels of all descriptions drawn from the merchant service for government use. During the Spanish War the Government bought for the use of the army 16 vessels and chartered 77. These with the 97 for the navy, made a total of 190 vessels, great and small, furnished by the mercantile marine, for a war lasting but four months!

The Mercantile Marine may, not unaptly, be called the militia of the sea. It enjoys this notable distinction, however, when called to the colors, as the military phrase has it, the sailor joins the national forces trained in a great measure for this work. He comes to the front a seasoned campaigner; whereas the militia man has to be broken in. It has been well said that while volunteers are learning the wisdom of prudence, by hard experience, the regulars are practicing it. War finds the personnel of the mer-

cantile marine with an acquired sea-habit and already inured to the confinement and privations of life on board ship. In the War of 1812 large bodies of troops went into battle ignorant of the most elementary rules of military tactics. The first draft of militia in the Civil War was practically worthless. The same story was repeated in the War with Spain; whereas in each case the naval volunteer, trained to sea life, readily fell into his new duties. This statement is fully borne out by the history of our private armed vessels during the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. Our Privateersmen, made up entirely from the merchant service, by preying upon the enemy's commerce, his source of wealth, and almost his sole means of subsistence, contributed very materially to bring about a cessation of hostilities. Their career was marked by many a hard fought action. They captured many more prizes than were made by the entire navy, and of far more money value. Privateering may be out of date; but American enterprise, and American aptitude for foreign trade are not. It needs only a healthy stimulant to quicken their latent powers, not for militant ends, surely, but to pursue the peaceful paths of commerce. Will Congress supply the stimulant?

The astute Japanese were not slow in recognizing the great military value of the mercantile marine. A shrewd observer of events in the Far East has told us that the secret of Japan's success lies, very largely, in the extreme care which was taken in adapting the national defensive machinery to the end in view, while a *considerable sum was devoted to subsidies to encourage the mercantile marine which has furnished transports for the army.*

It seems to be generally conceded that the revival of our shipping interests is wholly impracticable without Government aid to give it a start. Unfortunately whatever form this aid may take—whether by means of subsidies, discriminating duties, or bounties, the mere proposition of Government protection would receive little favor at the hands of those who would regard it as a party measure—"The People," it would be objected, "should not be taxed to support any one industry." But if the question be raised above the plane of party politics, and outside the geographical lines, and be considered as one of great national importance, affecting the whole country, it would surely appeal to the patriotism of all. Viewed from the

naval standpoint the question becomes at once one of national policy.

In brief, I venture to submit for consideration the military aspect of the questions now to be determined by your honorable Commission.

From Same to Same

U. S. Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island,
March 13, 1908.

I have read with the greatest interest your admirable speech of 24th ult. in support of Senate Bill No. 28, to provide for "Ocean Mail Service."

It is difficult, indeed, to understand how any one can read the arguments, and the abundant evidence adduced, and not be convinced of the vast importance of the proposed measure and the urgent demand for its adoption by Congress. The question of the restoration of our Mercantile Marine is neither local nor sectional, neither partisan nor political. In its broadest aspect it is a great national question in which all America is concerned—one that does not admit of mere party considerations when all parties can meet on the common ground of patriotism.

I cannot hope to add anything of value to the already voluminous literature on the subject. I venture however to offer to you, personally, some observations on the subject from the point of view of one who has had personal experience with our mercantile marine, in the days of its glory; and who has watched with painful solicitude its premature decay. The deep interest of the Navy in the merchant service is easily explained; they are interdependent. That is one reason, among others, why naval powers assiduously foster their ocean commerce. England, Germany, and Japan furnish notable examples of this policy while Russia and America form the exceptions.

Navies are the offspring of foreign trade. When the United States was confined to a narrow strip along the Atlantic border we, with inherited aptitude, engaged largely in commerce, carried mostly in American shipping. The American Flag was a familiar sight on every sea. It was the Mercantile Marine of those early days that gave birth to the Navy of the United States.

The United States Naval War College.

During the first six years of my experience at sea, or say from 1842 to 1848, whether in the Mediterranean, or on the Brazil Station in the East Indies or the Pacific, at whatever port visited American merchant ships predominated. A notable feature of the anchorage in Canton River in 1846, was the number, and fine appearance, of the American merchant ships engaged in the China Tea Trade. They were the fore-runners of the famous Clipper Ships of a somewhat later day. On exchanging colors at sea it was an exception when a foreign flag was displayed. In that school of sailors many of the ablest seamen we had in the Navy received their early training. This immense fleet of American shipping spread over all parts of the globe, which contributed largely to the wealth and influence of the country, and of which we were so proud, has now passed away like a dream in the night. During my last few years at sea, up to 1889, it was a rare exception to fall in with an American merchant ship at sea, or to find one in port. Such are the great changes that have taken place since my early sea-going days.

From an extensive foreign trade carried in American bottoms, and an all but insignificant navy, we have happily passed to a powerful fleet of vessels of war and sad to say practically no mercantile marine. The natural and immemorial order of development has been reversed. Your bill is a long step towards restoring the just proportions which should exist between the two services.

The Navy owes a debt to the origin of its birth. That debt is not difficult to discharge. Let a due measure of economy govern our Naval expenditures and means would be forthcoming that would go far towards defraying the expenses of the Ocean Mail Service you have so ably advocated. Nor would such a measure of economy embarrass, in the least, any building programme for the Navy Congress may decide upon.

From Hon. J. H. Gallinger to Admiral S. B. Luce

United States Senate,
March 31, 1908.

I want to thank you most cordially for your exceedingly kind letter of the 13th instant, in which you wrote so entertainingly about the American Merchant Marine.

The influence of men like you has done much to hasten along our efforts in the direction of getting legislation, and it is especially gratifying to me to tell you that the ocean mail bill that I have been advocating passed the Senate yesterday without a roll call. It is the first time in the history of the Government when the Democratic party did not make an open fight against a measure of that kind.

In the year 1917 we commandeered about 400 foreign vessels building in our ship yards and ordered a total of 2,000 to be rushed to completion. It was the rebirth of our Merchant Marine on a tremendous and undreamed of scale. Some three billion dollars had been appropriated for the purpose. It was not thought then that we would allow again our overseas trade to be carried in foreign bottoms, any more than that our Navy would be permitted to decline. Since then the history of the Navy and the merchant service has followed parallel lines of decadence, and we may say with Cassius, "The fault is not in our stars but in ourselves."

CHAPTER XVI

Letters (First Part)

IT will now be appropriate to present a few letters selected from Admiral Luce's voluminous correspondence. Unfortunately, he kept copies of only a few of his own letters; of his intimate letters practically none exist.

When Captain Mahan was having some trouble in getting his first book on *Sea Power* published he suggested that Admiral Luce take up the matter with Captain J. S. Barnes, a retired banker. Captain Barnes it may be recalled was one of the "Forty One-ers." He and Luce were warm friends, and had been shipmates in the old *Vandalia*. Barnes had resigned from the Navy shortly after that cruise, but returned during the Civil War, and after distinguished service, left the Navy again when the war was over, to return to a successful business in New York City.

From Admiral Luce to Captain J. S. Barnes, New York City

Sunset House, Sugar Hill, N. H.
August 5, 1889

Captain Mahan writes me that he has made a certain proposition to you in relation to the publication of his lectures on *Naval History*, and suggests I should tell you something of the character of his work.

The War College was started with a view to "raising Naval Warfare from the empirical stage to the dignity of

a science." Mahan was the principal and leading lecturer. In his lectures he discussed the philosophy of navies, their origin, development and decay; their value as a factor in international disputes, and their influence on the destiny of the State.

His faculty for generalization and his readiness in drawing conclusions from the lessons of history, gave to these lectures great value to the naval student, while his clearness of statement, and a certain elegance of diction, has not failed to interest, I might almost say charm, old and young who have attended the College courses during the last four years.

Commencing with the old Dutch Wars, he has brought his history up to about the latter part of the last century—somewhere about 1782, enough to make two volumes, say about the size of Bryce's *American Commonwealth*.

It is desirable he should unload, as it were, this large amount of MS. to enable him to relieve his mind of its care etc. etc., that he may continue his very valuable work and bring his history down to the present time. For you must understand that this is but a part of his work. He and his collaborators are yet to develop from the lessons of the past the Science of Modern Naval Warfare. In short I am justified in saying that Mahan is doing for Naval Science what Jomini did for Military science.

No one has urged, more than I have, Mahan to have this first series of lectures published. First because they might have the fate of Carlyle's *History of the French Revolution;* secondly, that something might happen to Mahan to prevent him correcting the proofs of his own work; and thirdly, the belief that this publication will assist the College which has hitherto been obliged to fight for bare existence.

Greatly interested in this work I went to the —— publishing house, explained its nature, and that as it would certainly command a sale in England and France, it must be copyrighted in both those countries, which he said he could do, but they required a guarantee against loss to the amount of about $2,000.

We cast about then to see if the requisite number of copies would be ordered in advance, but the Navy Department would make no promise, and the War Department declined, so with every effort the subscription was so small as to be of no use. The next step was to get some

one to assume the responsibility of publication and take the profits. Mahan has not the money, or of course he would have had the book out by this time.

. . . . . .

I told him then and I now tell you that the one who puts his money in it—the publication—will certainly get it back if nothing more.

. . . . . .

That is to say the book will pay for itself, but that it will be a mine of wealth like *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, or *Grant's Memoirs* is of course not to be thought of; it may not pay the interest on the money. All I dare affirm is that the money will not be lost.

. . . . . .

The marked success of these lectures which were finally brought out by Messrs. Little Brown and Co. of Boston under the title of *The Influence of Sea Power on History*, and their unprecedented effect on the development of the navies of England, France and Japan are matters of history. Captain Mahan wrote to Admiral Luce when the MS. was accepted: "Now that a step forward has been taken, I wish to thank you very much for the warm interest you have taken and the encouragement given to me." *The Influence of Sea Power* was followed by *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire*, and then *Life of Nelson the Embodiment of Sea Power*, the last his *magnum opus*.

"Citizen" Luce to Admiral Folger

Newport, R. I., Jan. 28, 1890

Learning that your nomination as Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance will be sent to the senate this week, I write to congratulate you on your prospective elevation, and to bespeak your good offices for the War College. The late administration, you know, left it in a dreadful snarl.

I ask this, simply and solely, in my capacity of a citizen of the U. S.

For his success Mahan made grateful acknowledgment to Admiral Luce in the following letter:—

HAVERFORD COLLEGE POST OFFICE, PENN.
May 7th, 1890

Before this can reach you, you will, I hope, have received a copy of my book, which I have asked the publishers to send you.

It is not necessary to bespeak your indulgent criticism of either the aims or execution of the work.

You will remember that my principal aim has been to write a critical military history of the naval past, not a chronicle of naval events. If on calmer and more leisurely perusal, the work shall be found in any degree to deserve the favorable opinion expressed by some who heard the lectures, I hope you will consider what can be done to further the circulation, for the sake of the publishers and for the further continuance of the undertaking, as well as for my own benefit. It is not necessarily, nor on the face, an attractive subject to the public; they must be led to water ere they will drink.

Whatever usefulness the book may be found to have, the merit is ultimately due to yourself, but for whose initiative it would never have been undertaken. But for the impulse you gave, I should still have been contented to drift on, smitten with the indifference to the higher military considerations, which is too common in the service. It is, therefore, in every way fitting that you should receive this acknowledgment at my hands, and I wish at the same time to thank you for the start you gave me.

I am in this part of the country for a few days, but my address continues to be Elizabeth.

FROM REAR ADMIRAL THORNTON A. JENKINS TO ADMIRAL LUCE

WASHINGTON, D. C., April 18, 1891

In reply to your inquiry as to the presence of Garibaldi at Montevideo, in 1844, when the Argentine Squadron was captured by the *Congress* Frigate, I can only say that if he was there I never heard of it. Years after (when

Garibaldi's name became newspaper property) I saw it mentioned that he had been in either the Uraguayan, or Buenos Ayres Service but, before that I had never heard his name mentioned. If, with Faitoo afloat, or Oribe ashore, —he must have occupied an unimportant place. I had charge of the Buenos Ayrian vessel (a Brig) several hours. Garibaldi was not one of the officers, as I took down all their names in my note book, and would have remembered him, had his been among them. I recollect my impression of them was, that they were a ferocious (looking) set of cutthroats! Lopez (at the Bueco) I knew well. He was very communicative and friendly always when I met him. He told me of the names of Oribe's officers, etc., etc. but the name of Garibaldi was not among them.

The newspapers had it (years after) that Garibaldi was a mate, or something of the sort, with Lt. D. D. Porter on board of one of George Low's vessels.

In June, 1897, Mr. Roosevelt then Assistant Secretary of the Navy went to Newport and delivered the opening address at the War College. He also addressed the apprentices and in a stirring speech he stated that the *Constellation* lying at the Training Station Wharf "was called *after the celebrated frigate* of that name—the one that captured the French frigate *l'Insurgente* and whipped the *Vengeance.*"

The following day Admiral Luce wrote to him:

"My understanding is that the *Constellation* is practically the same one that was so gallantly fought under the brave Truxtun, or as much so as the *Constitution* is the same 'Old Ironsides' that, in the words of an old song, 'led the way to glory.' Both ships have during a century of existence been repaired from time to time, but their chief characteristics have been retained just as the human *corpus* is said to be renewed every seven years and to remain practically the same old *corpus.* So with these ships.

"Commodore Tingey, Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, reported in 1814: 'The frigate *Constellation* in February, 1812, was brought to the wharf, stripped

down to the lower futtocks, many of which and some of her floor timbers were replaced with new; from thence rebuilt up entirely new, being much improved by an extension of fourteen inches more beam at the main breadth. She had 'new masts, spars, etc. etc. and left the Yard a better ship in every respect, and still continues to be.'[1] In November, 1812, just after the repairs she was in Boston under the command of the celebrated Charles Stewart.

"Hence the *Constellation* you saw yesterday is to all intents and purposes the same *Constellation* that 'Shone so bright, the Frenchmen could not bear the sight'—in whose main-top 'Little Jarvis' (Midshipman James Jarvis) won imperishable renown.

"In historic value she is second only to the *Constitution.*

"It is greatly regretted that the *Constellation* is not utilized as a school ship for apprentices, that they might become imbued from the start with something of the true naval spirit, or be put on board some ship especially fitted up for the purpose. None better could be found than the *Lancaster*, and I trust you will lend your influence to that end."

A frequent subject of inquiry addressed to Luce was duelling in the old navy. It may be remembered that when Luce was a midshipman in the *Congress* on his first cruise a duel was fought at Genoa between two midshipmen of the *Columbus*, and with the details of this affair Luce was doubtless familiar.

One of the interesting facts brought out by this particular correspondence was in regard to the ownership of

[1] Augustus C. Buell, the author of the *Life of Paul Jones*, wrote to Admiral Luce that when the question of "repairing ships" was under investigation by the Whitthorne Commission, Senator Beck asked Lieut. Lucian Young of the Navy to explain the system to him. Young replied, "Take the *Nipsic* for example, in her case they took the hawse-hole of the old *Nipsic* and built a new ship around it." The *Constellation* had a more substantial basis of reconstruction than a hawse-hole, but exactly how much it is impossible to say.

the pistols used by Barron and Decatur, which were borrowed from Mr. Myer Myers, the British Vice Consul at Norfolk, and are now in the possession of Mr. Myers' grandson, Barton Myers, Esq., the present British Consul at Norfolk.

Another correspondent writes, that the Princess Victoria, wife of Prince Louis of Battenberg is compiling a book of the names of men-of-war, and wishes to know the Indian meaning of *Kearsarge*, and also for which town or county the *Essex* was named and why.

Luce replied that it has been said on good authority that the name is not of Indian origin, but derived from Mr. Hezekiah Sargent, corrupted by long usage to Ki Sarge, the Indian name of the mountain being Cowissewaschook. On the other hand it is said that the name is derived from Keesuck which in the Narragansett dialect means "Heaven."

The *Essex*, he says, was named for Essex County in Massachusetts and so called for political reasons.

A gentleman in Philadelphia asks, "Can you tell me when tacking was first introduced."

From Admiral Luce to Mr. C. W. Macfarland

Newport, R. I., Jan. 22, 1897.

Tacking is the changing of the Course of a sailing vessel, so as to bring the wind around from one side, by the head, to the other side; and is probably coeval with the earliest use of sails.

We know from monuments and inscriptions on stone, long antedating authentic history, that the ancients were great navigators, and that their trading ships made voyages under sail; and that the sails were of the style known as *latine* sails, or leg-of-mutton shape. This particular cut, which may be seen in the Mediterranean and on the Nile at the present day, not only permitted the vessel to sail with side wind; but to sail close to the wind. It is inconceivable, therefore, that the mariners of ancient days, when the variable winds headed their vessels off beyond a certain point, from the desired course, should not resort to

such a simple expedient as to bring the wind around on the other side, by the process we call *tacking*, so as to head nearer the objective point. The corn ships of the Euxine and of Egypt—and the "ships of Tarshish which returned every three years bringing gold, silver, ivory" and the rest of it, must have made their voyages under sail. St. Paul was in three different ships going from Palestine to Rome. His admirable description (Acts xxvii–xxviii) of the voyage is evidence of good seamanship as understood to-day. When the ship in which he was finally wrecked was caught in a North Easter, she was hove to on the starboard tack.

It is not to be supposed, I repeat, that vessels navigating under sail, did not turn to "windward," as seamen express it; that is, did not work to windward, against a head wind by tacking.

With the war galley it was different. They navigated under oars, using their sails only with a fair wind; and in preparing for battle often landed their sails and spars.

In the middle ages it was pretty much the same. Froissart (1337–1400?) mentions a vessel called the *Lin*, "which sails with all winds and which keeps nearer the wind than any other," etc.

In the history of Naval Architecture we read that "though the general adoption of the Galley in Western Europe *checked navigation under sails;* still it was never lost. The galley continued for a time to be used for purposes of war; but as ocean commerce increased, sails gradually superseded oars." Hence navigating under sail was common in ancient times and during the middle ages, and tacking, as a consequence, generally practiced during those periods. In short, *Tacking* cuts no figure in history.

The introduction into Europe of the Mariner's Compass early in 1300, on the other hand, marks a distinct era in history. It gave a great impetus to navigation, ocean commerce, naval architecture, colonization, etc. In the study of Economic History there are few events which have had as great an influence on the progress of human affairs.

To an ex-midshipman who inquires concerning his eligibility for admission to the Military Order of the Loyal Legion, he writes:

NEWPORT, March 10, 1897

In reply to your esteemed favor of 5th, which has but just reached me, concerning your eligibility for admission to the M.O. L.L. I beg to say I am not competent to give an opinion.

I may offer the following remarks, however, for your consideration.

In the strict sense of the term a midshipman is not a commissioned officer.

The *Macedonian* in 1863 was attached to an educational institution, the Naval Academy, and her summer cruise abroad was for educational purposes.

On the other hand since the beginning of our history as a nation midshipmen have been sent to sea for educational purposes. Farragut when on board the *Essex* in 1814 in her action with the *Phœbe* and *Cherub* was in the very best school possible to learn his profession.

And so, still earlier was Midshipman James Jarvis in the *Constellation* in 1799 in her fight with the French frigate *La Vengeance*, "who" in the language of the Act of Congress "preferred certain death to an abandonment of post." The midshipmen of the old navy were brought up in the school of the quarter deck and many instances of their gallantry in battle could be cited. The midshipmen of the *Macedonian*, in 1863, differed in no essential respect from those of former days, save that more ample provision was made for their education.

Though intended primarily for educational purposes the *Macedonian* was in every respect "a public armed vessel," cruising in time of war; and had she fallen in with a Confederate cruiser an action would undoubtedly have ensued. The statement on 3rd page in the Special report of Committee of Investigation, is, in the main correct—though I do not now recall that we "cruised in the offing waiting the time when a Confederate vessel should put to sea for the purpose of attacking her."

On the whole the conclusion of the report of the Committee that you have "Fulfilled all the prerequisites of election," seems to me, if I may be permitted to say so, a liberal interpretation of the law, and eminently just and proper.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO SENATOR HENRY CABOT LODGE

NEWPORT, R. I., April 6, 1897.

I beg leave to offer a suggestion (if not too late) by which the Secretary of the Navy will be enabled, in the selection of his principal naval advisor, the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, to secure the best talent available.

No officer in the Navy, of his rank, enjoys the confidence of the entire service to the extent possessed by Commodore Sampson. If he were appointed to the Bureau of Navigation with the tacit understanding that, at the end of two years he should be succeeded by Captain H. C. Taylor, it would satisfy all the conditions of the problem. That is to say; The Secretary would have all the advantages of Commodore Sampson's clear head and good judgment for two years. At the end of that time the Commodore would have two years for sea service, in which to fly his flag as a Rear Admiral. Captain Taylor, in the meantime, would have seen his two years of sea service, as a Captain, and would be available as the successor of Commodore Sampson, as Chief of the Bureau of Navigation.

. . .

After Mr. Herbert retired from office and was practicing law in Washington, he wrote to Admiral Luce that the Japanese Naval Attaché had inquired for an officer who was fitted to instruct the Japanese navy in tactics and strategy and he suggested Admiral Luce.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO HILARY HERBERT, ESQ.

NEWPORT, R. I., Oct. 14, 1897

Your very kind letter of the 12th reached me in due course of mail and I beg to return my sincere thanks for the compliment conveyed.

A visit to Japan would be particularly agreeable to me. When I was there in 1846 in the *Columbus*, 74, Commodore Biddle—we were not allowed to land; but I was so much struck with the courtesy and affability of the natives who visited the ship in great numbers, that I have always desired to see more of the people and of their country.

The failure of Commodore Biddle to negotiate a treaty with the Japanese, I may say in passing, owing to the want of a good interpreter and proper preparation, led to the Perry Expedition seven years later—1853,—To note the change brought about by that wonderful people in fifty years would indeed be worth the journey. But much as I would like to go to Japan, the bare idea of remaining abroad those years would act as a deterrent. I will wait, however, until I have a talk with Commander Havaton before giving a definite answer.

Eventually he declined.

In 1898 a resolution was introduced in the House of Representatives regarding the use by both Army and Navy, of the same shoulder rifle, and Admiral Luce was requested to give his views on the subject:

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO THE HON. SAMUEL G. HILBORN, M. C.

NEWPORT, R. I., March 17, 1898

Question: "Are the conditions of the Service in the Army and Navy, so dissimilar, that it is impracticable, or inconvenient, to use the shoulder rifles of the same caliber in both branches of the Service?"

Answer: No, it is neither impracticable, nor inconvenient. When it was decided that an improved arm was called for, a joint Commission of Army and Navy officers might have agreed upon a weapon suitable for both Services, but each Service was represented by its own independent board. The Army Small-arms board, after exhaustive trials, adopted the Krag-Jorgenson magazine rifle, caliber, 300. This piece with its bayonet is the infantry man's only weapon, and his sole dependence in battle.

The Navy Small-arms board, after an equally exhaustive series of trials, but reasoning on different lines, adopted the Lee rifle, caliber .2362.

A man-of-war's man must be first of all, a seaman and a marine-artillerist. His sphere of action is on board ship. His principal weapon is heavy artillery, or, as it is

called in the Navy, great guns. His rôle as a sharp-shooter, in a sea fight, or as an infantry-man, when thrown on shore temporarily, are mere incidents of the service. Hence the actual use in battle, by man-of-war's men, of the "Shoulder rifle" is exceptional. Moreover the Navy Small-arms board was convinced of the superiority of Lee rifle over all others offered for trial.

Such, in brief, are the considerations which led to the adoption of different patterns of Small-arms and of different calibers for the two services.

"Would the use of shoulder rifles of different calibers and requiring different ammunition, become an element of weakness in case of hostilities?"—I think not.

"And if so, would such inconvenience be serious enough to warrant the trouble and expense of adopting a rifle for both arms of the service and enforcing its use?"

In my opinion the use, by the land and sea forces, of small-arms of different calibers, would not, in the case of hostilities "become an element of weakness."

Admitting for the moment, that a difference of caliber is a source of weakness, it is certainly not great enough to justify the expense, at this stage, when each service is well supplied with the weapon of its choice, "of adopting a rifle for both arms of the service."

If there ever was a time, in our history, when interchangeable small-arms ammunition might have proved convenient, it was during the late Civil War, when our naval forces were engaged on the inland waters; and, at times, cooperating with the land forces. But the occasions were rare in which such interchange was called for. The conditions of such a war are not likely to be repeated.

In future Wars the rôle of the Navy will, in all probability, be restricted to the open sea thus reducing, to the zero point, the chances of a demand for an interchange of small-arms or ammunition with the Army.

While I do not apprehend any "inconvenience" the present difference in calibers of the arms of the two services, I should say that, on general principles, it were certainly better that the "shoulder rifles" of the two services should be of the same caliber.

The *Krag-Jorgenson* and the *Lee* must, inevitably, in this age of rapid progress and mechanical ingenuity, become, in no very great while, obsolete. When that day arrives, it would be the part of wisdom, it seems to me, to

assemble a mixed Commission of Army and Navy officers to agree upon a suitable weapon ("shoulder rifle") for the Army, the Navy, National Guard, Naval Militia, &c. &c.

Owing to the delay in receiving your letter, I have expressed myself rather hastily, but, I trust, to the point.

From Admiral Luce to Senator Lodge

Newport, R. I.,
May 10, 1898

You may remember that the Caroline Islands were the subject of dispute between Spain and Germany, and that in 1885, the question was submitted to arbitration and decided in favor of Spain.

If that decision was rendered on the ground that the Carolines formed part of the Philippine group, they will pass, with the latter, to the sovereignty of the U. S. without dispute—perhaps.

If rendered on any other grounds—such as original discovery they are yet to be taken possession of by the U. S. The same may be said of the Ladrone Islands. They too should be taken possession of. But this is more than Admiral Dewey, with his small force, can accomplish within a short time. Spain, meanwhile, seeing her Pacific Colonies passing away might very readily listen to a proposition for their transfer to another and stronger European power—to Germany, for example, who has long shown an earnest desire to plant colonies and secure coaling stations in that quarter of the world. Such a transfer at this time might easily lead to the unpleasant complications.

Would it not be well, therefore, to send a small force from the Pacific Station—(Admiral Miller's Command) at once, and take possession of both groups?

We may not wish to retain them permanently; but, in the balancing of accounts, after the war, they would be of much value.

I mention this to you, as it is a politico-military question, which you are in a position to bring to the attention of the administration if you think proper.

From Senator H. C. Lodge to Admiral Luce

Personal

U. S. Senate,
Washington, D. C.
May 12, 1898.

The Caroline Islands are recognized as part of the government of the Philippine Islands, and will pass with them. I agree with you that a vessel ought to be sent to take possession both of these and the Ladrone Islands, but I do not think there is the slightest danger of Spain attempting to transfer her islands to any body, for if any European power were to undertake to take the Philippines now it would mean an act of war against the United States, and there is not one of them that dares to interfere. The *Charleston*, as you know, has left San Francisco for Manila and other ships are to follow. I will try to get instructions to Dewey to look after the Carolines as soon as he can spare a vessel.

From Commander C. H. Stockton to Rear Admiral Luce

No. 30 Kay Street,
Newport, June 5, 1898.

The more I think of the Ladrone Islands the more I think of their value as stepping stones in the Pacific. The island of Guam for a long time used as a rendezvous by American whaling vessels is in direct line between the Hawaiian front and the Philippines and is itself so placed as to be about five days easy steaming from all ports of Japan, Korea, Shanghai and Hong Kong in China, and the Philippines. If we secure or retain a coaling station in the Philippines we would have San Francisco or the trans-isthmian canal to Honolulu, Honolulu to Guam, and Guam to the Philippines, the entire stretch across the Pacific with American stepping stones in the way of Coaling stations. The north Pacific is our sphere of influence by divine right.

As to the Carolines, they owe what civilization they possess to American missionaries who were expelled from

ports a few years since by the Spanish at the instigation of the religious orders of monks. The Carolines and Ladrones are geographically and ethnologically closer to each other rather than to the Philippines. All of the other islands in the vicinity and in the Western Pacific belong to Germany, Great Britain or the Dutch, except the Spanish groups.

The *Yorktown* attended by a collier could take possession of the Carolines and Ladrones, which are technically in the Pacific rather than in the Asiatic Station.

If you like I can draw you up a fuller memorandum of the Ladrones,—Guam and the Carolines. Prof. Alexander Agassiz was very anxious to go to the latter with me in the *Yorktown* research.

From Admiral Luce to Senator Lodge

Newport, R. I., June 7, 1898.

Pardon me for referring once more to our affairs in the Pacific.

The Sandwich Islands must soon come into the Union as a territory. As soon as Congress passes the necessary act a naval officer of rank—a Commodore on the active list—should be sent there to organize a Naval Station. But that group is but one of the stepping stones, or way stations, across the Pacific. The next way station is Guam, one of the Ladrone Islands.

Guam has been used for a long time past as a rendezvous for American Whalers. It is in the direct line between the Hawaiian Group and the Philippines, and about five days easy steaming from the ports of Japan, Korea, Shanghai, Hong Kong and the Philippines. We will have then the following stations, or "stepping stones," across the Pacific. From the Pacific Terminus of the isthmean canal to Honolulu, from Honolulu to Guam, Guam to Manila, and from Manila to the ports of Japan and China. Those way stations should be well stocked with coal and other supplies for the ships of our national and mercantile marine.

It is desirable then to dispatch a vessel at once to take possession of Guam and hoist the flag there. I say "at

once" because the end of the war seems already in sight. Peace once assured we will do nothing in the way of establishing outlying Coaling Stations.

Commander C. H. Stockton, now here, is the best man I know of to send to the Ladrones. He is but recently from that part of the world, takes a deep interest in the matter, and his old ship the *Yorktown*, now at Mare Island will soon be ready for sea.

If you care to hear Stockton's very interesting views on this question it would be a very simple matter to have him ordered on to Washington. It might lead to his assignment to the *Yorktown*.

Admiral Luce to Admiral Folger

Washington, D. C., Apr. 7, 1899.

. . . . . .

I have been continually harping on the necessity of having the strictly *military* element of the profession properly represented in the Department.

Just to think of it for one moment! The Navy Department is made up of ten civil offices—the Secretary, Assistant Secretary and eight civil bureaus; and not a single military office!!

The effort, during years past to combine the Civil and Military in the office of Chief of Bureau of Navigation has resulted in conspicuous failure.

Give the Secretary a General Staff to lean upon and your Board of Target practice would not be needed—a General Staff whose duties should be strictly military with nothing whatever to do with supplies or material. That in brief is my panacea for many of the ills the navy suffers from to-day.

One or two of the War College friends are still hopeful there may be a course this coming summer in which the N.A. Fleet will take part. But the indifference of one and the active opposition of another are difficult obstacles to overcome.

P.S. I have sent your typewritten letter to Stockton enjoining upon him the necessity of regarding it as confidential.

From Admiral Luce to Admiral Folger

Washington, D. C., Apr. 1899

Yours of the 4th with inclosure only received.

You have covered most thoroughly, it seems to me, the whole ground of a plan by which the N. A. Fleet could be utilized as a great naval school: or as it might properly be called our great school of application.

Unfortunately, there is no one in authority at Headquarters in sympathy with you! There is the great trouble; and until we get a live progressive man at the helm, the most valuable suggestions find their way to the pigeon hole! There is no one in the department to whom you can appeal, with the slightest hope of favorable consideration of any question outside of regular Bureau work.

. . . . . .

From Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Station to Admiral Luce

U. S. Flagship *Philadelphia*
Apia, Samoa, April 18, 1899.

. . . . . .

I feel I ought to write you and tell you of the distressing occurrence, on the 1st inst, near this place in which your nephew (Lieutenant) Philip V. Lansdale, lost his life. This is a terrible place, bad luck seems to have attended all foreigners here from the beginning. I arrived here on the 6th of March and found considerable excitement, as the so called Provisional Government was threatening to do all sorts of things. I was ordered to make an investigation and act with a majority of the Consular representatives, which of course meant our Consul General and the English Consul. The English Consul is a comparatively young man, with good training in the Foreign Office in London—a fortunate thing, where we are acting in perfect accord. I investigated as rapidly as possible, and then called a meeting of consular representatives and the senior naval officers on

board this ship on March 11th. Much to my surprise the Germans came with the others. Of course they had no idea of acting with us and the English—I presume they thought they could intimidate us, I cannot imagine any other reason for their coming than that—and yet they should have known they could not do that. The result of the meeting as agreed to by the English and American Consuls and naval representatives was that the decree of the Court, as made by the Chief Justice under the Berlin Treaty, must be carried out, and that Tanu must be installed as King—the Provisional Government must dissolve, as there was no place for it, under the Berlin Treaty. I issued a proclamation the same day, and Mataapa and his chiefs promptly left Mulinum (the Government House and adjoining lands), and there would have been no fighting had not the German Consul General issued a proclamation denying the truth of mine and assuring the Chiefs that he would uphold their Government. Naturally the natives who had started the Revolution, believed that the German Government was behind the Consul, and took fresh courage. You know zeal always outdistances discretion with officers and men, especially if they have never been in a war. I did all I could to caution them against taking chances with savages, and they promised to heed my advice, but it was apparent that they would not or could not realize the situation. Then too we had the English, who were full of fight, and our fellows did not want to be outdone by them. The engagement of April 1st in which we lost our brave officers and men, was a surprise to us all. The senior officer Lieut. Freeman of H. B. M. *Tauranga* was killed and so we will never know who was to blame for the disaster. We only know that the instructions given by Commander Sturdee, of the *Porpoise*, who was in charge of operations on shore, were not carried out, but it may be that it was not feasible to do so. Doubtless Freeman and Lansdale did what they thought best and as they staked their judgment and lost, it is idle and uncharitable to find fault with their discretion. It is certainly very sad to think that brave officers and men should lose their lives in this miserable country, when they had so little interest in it. I feel Lansdale's death more than all the others not only because he was such a good and pure man, but on account of his wife. . .

In the latter part of the nineties, Admiral Luce endorsed the proposition to obtain from the British Government the return of the frigate *President*, which was captured by an English Squadron, January 15, 1815, off the New Jersey Coast. It was generally supposed that she was at the West India Docks, London. Ambassador Bayard had been successful in securing the restoration of the *Mayflower's* log, and Admiral Luce thought that the time was opportune for the President to make it the subject of diplomatic negotiations to the same end. Admiral Luce submitted the proposition to Assistant Secretary Navy Roosevelt who made a vigorous reply. He wrote:

"I confess I don't like the idea. There is nothing glorious in the history of the *President*. She is a fair trophy for the British and she ought to be kept by them. If I were an Englishman I would not want to have the *Macedonian*, *Guerrière*, or *Java* in my Navy; and as I am an American I don't want the *President*."

As a matter of fact the existing *President* was built at Portsmouth, England, in June, 1829. Our *President* was broken up at Portsmouth in June, 1818. Sir W. Laird Clowes writing to Admiral Luce of the *President* said:

"I know that many of your countrymen believe her (the ship at the West Indian Docks) to be the craft captured in 1815 . . . but there is no truth in this idea, and I am glad that we do not retain any prize made in that war, which I think is best forgotten."

From Admiral Luce to Mr. Hackett, Assistant Secretary of the Navy

Newport, R. I., July 8, 1901

I have quite recently expressed to Captain Chadwick my willingness to accept orders assigning me to duty in

connection with the War College, and he in turn has communicated with the Bureau of Navigation on the subject. I mean, of course, on the termination of my present duties, which have, in every way been exceedingly agreeable to me.

My associations on the Board of Awards have been exceptionally pleasant, and when the time comes, I shall sever them with regret. But I know that the day is not far distant when the duties of that Board will cease. When they do, I should like very much to be enabled to carry out a plan agreed upon between Admiral Taylor and myself by which we would practically increase the College Staff—now totally inadequate to the work—and accomplish some good work already lined out.

I gave you a hint of this once during a very pleasant drive in the country last May.

I hear of a great deal of dissatisfaction expressed by reason of the failure to assign medals for the bombardment of San Juan, Puerto Rico, May 12th, 1898. My recollection is that the Board was unanimous in the opinion that no medals should be given for an affair that was regarded as a military blunder.

The Secretary of the Navy asked Admiral Luce if there was any reason why he should not be available to serve as a member of the Schley court of inquiry:

Telegram from Mr. Hackett to Admiral Luce

Washington, D. C., Aug. 2, 1901.

Write me fully whether in the event the Department should select you as third member of Schley Court you know of any reason why you should not be available, specify particularly whether any public utterances of yours would indicate a bias. Consider this confidential and unofficial. I have perfect confidence in your sense of justice and believe you would be strictly impartial. I would like to take you if you yourself feel perfectly free in the premises. Mail your letter tonight.

From Admiral Luce to Mr. Hackett

Newport, R. I., August 2, 1901.

In answer to your telegram of this date I beg to say that I am not qualified to act as a member of the Court of Inquiry to which you refer: First because I have already formed a judgment based on official documents on the principal points to be inquired into; and secondly because a public utterance of mine most decidedly indicated a bias. At the last alumni dinner given in New York and very largely attended in responding to a toast I expressed the hope that Admiral Sampson would be our next Vice Admiral.

Captain James Parker who was present and who, I understand, is to act as counsel for Admiral Schley, some days later sent me his pamphlet and justification of the course of Admiral Schley.

From Albert Bushnell Hart, Esq., Harvard University, to Admiral Luce

Cambridge, Massachusetts,
15 Appian Way,
November 18, 1902.

The special copy of *The Story of the Monitor* which you sent me, has been submerged in a heap of mail which accumulated during some months' absence abroad, but for some days it has been standing at my elbow, waiting for the opportunity to acknowledge it. I remember hearing you read this paper at the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts, and I have reread it with great interest and care.

As a student of diplomatic history, I am inclined to differ from your fundamental inference that the government of Great Britain at the beginning of the Civil War was hostile. The North felt that the war in all its phases was immoral, and at the beginning declined to recognize the fact that some millions of our fellow countrymen were actually organized in a civilized government, and that to deny them the status of belligerents would simply mean barbarism on both sides. The blockade Proclamations were an admission of the existence of war between belligerents; the treatment of captured officers, and eventual

acceptance of the fact that the captured crews of privateers and cruisers were only prisoners of war, were an admission of the unwelcome but patent fact, namely, that there was war. I cannot see that the British proclamation of May 13 was anything more than another statement of the fact, and when we consider that according to the statement of the son of our minister, Charles Francis Adams delayed going to England five weeks because he wanted to see his son married, it hardly seems fair to hold England responsible for not waiting longer. With regard to the Declaration of Paris, the continued refusal of the United States government for five years to accept the Declaration would seem in equity to put it out of position to claim either for itself or from its enemies an adhesion to the first article. From my point of view, what made trouble, and caused the destruction of American commerce, was not the attitude of the Confederacy or of England; but the practice of mankind for centuries, and precedents nowhere so common as by Americans during the colonial wars, the Revolution and the War of 1812.

It does not seem to me that the attitude of Great Britain in Mexico is to be connected with the Trent affair or the Civil War. The Mexican trouble had long been brewing, a student of mine who had access to the manuscript archives in Washington, tells me that the United States was seriously compromised in Mexico in 1859 and 1860; and we know that England was among the first to retire from the joint intervention which the United States had been invited to join.

Throughout your paper, I take it, by "breaking the blockade" you mean a declaration of war; for mere ups and downs of naval superiority are in international law and practice no reason for forcible entry into ports. Great Britain could hardly, while remaining neutral, claim her vessels were not subject to capture while entering rebel ports; that would have meant a diplomatic controversy in which the United States would have found a quiverful of precedents from the practice of Great Britain during the Napoleonic wars. My point is that the success of the *Merrimac* could not have meant the sweeping away of our blockading squadrons, and though it might have given cause for the recognition of the Confederacy, that is a different thing from breaking the blockade; and surely the destruction of the *Monitor* would hardly have been as

conclusive evidence of the probable success of the South as the actual defeat of McClellan, Pope, practically McClellan again, and Grant during the summer and fall of 1862. The *Monitor-Merrimac* struggle was undoubtedly a great turning point in naval warfare, and in the Civil War, and I hesitate to differ from the opinion of a renowned officer and authority. Is it a civilian's lack of humanity which makes me feel that when a nation goes to war, no matter how righteous its cause, it must accept the effects of war? I am not in favor of abolishing privateering or the capture of private property at sea, because I think those are two methods of bringing about peace; and the attitude of the United States towards captures of merchant vessels during the Civil War, is one which we may find turned against us in time of need.

Your personal good will to me is such that I dislike to disagree even on theories of international law, and I am very much indebted to you for this opportunity to crystallize some ideas, which have long been floating in my mind.

From Admiral Luce to Captain Mahan

Newport, R. I., Dec. 31, 1902.

It is my hope that in your next book you will dispose of the popular delusion that "we whipped England" in the war of 1812.

In a book just out and written by an author of a *Naval History of the United States* occurs the following: "The War of 1812 was won, so far as it was won at all, on the ocean." It is time the people of this country should be told the truth about that war whether it is palatable or not. At the same time one should not go to the other extreme. I am led to these remarks by a passage in your book *The Interest of America in Sea Power*, pages 149–150. In speaking of the War of 1812 you say, "except for the prestige . . . never was blood spilled more uselessly than in the frigate and sloop actions of that day."[1]

I have heard that passage criticised very severely by careful students of naval history. I myself know perfectly well what you mean, and in that sense agree with you. But I do not think you make your meaning sufficiently

[1] See page 325, Chapter XVIII.

clear in making a distinction between the military aspect of the question and the moral aspect.

The moral effect in England and in other countries of the capture of the *Guerrière*, and only two months later of the *Macedonian*, can scarcely be exaggerated, whereas the military value of these actions was absolutely nil. In this sense it is an error to say that there was a useless effusion of blood. Those frigate actions laid the foundations broad and deep of the . . .

(Remainder of this letter not found.)

In September, 1903, the Swiss Government called a conference at Geneva to consider certain changes proposed to be made in the Red Cross Convention of August 22, 1864, and delegates from the United States were invited. Admiral Taylor who was at the time Chief of Bureau of Navigation offered the duty to Admiral Luce.

From Admiral Luce to Admiral Taylor

Newport, R. I.
April 21, 1903.

A thousand thanks for your very kind note of the 18th in regard to my accepting orders to attend the Red Cross Conference at Geneva September 14th next.

The offer is a very tempting one indeed and my first impulse was to accept at once. But on further reflection, I feel obliged to decline with my regrets the very flattering offer.

CHAPTER XVII

Letters (*Continued*)

Admiral Dewey to Admiral Luce

Washington, D. C.,
September 16, 1904.

Your letter of the 14th instant is at hand, and I assure you it is very gratifying to all of us here to know how great an interest you continue to take in the fleet. The General Board has been for some time considering the very matters of signalling and battle tactics, of which you speak, and if poor Taylor had lived and succeeded Barker in command, as he expected to do, it is believed that much good would have resulted in both these directions.

Some time ago the Secretary of the Navy asked me who would be a good man to succeed Barker, and I unhesitatingly mentioned Evans, as I had heard from Captain Barnette that he desired the duty. It is generally conceded that Evans made a great success as commander of the Asiatic fleet; and for this home station, which contains the most effective part of our whole Navy and needs the best possible commander, his experience in the East would make him a very valuable man. You will see, therefore, that this is a subject on which I am already committed and cannot do what you suggest.

As the ships of the Navy increased in dimensions the question of docks became urgent; the General Board made an exhaustive report on the subject and it was sent unofficially to Admiral Luce for comments and suggestions. His reply is thoroughly characteristic.

ADMIRAL LUCE TO CAPTAIN BARNETTE

15 FRANCIS STREET,
NEWPORT, R. I.,
November 13, 1906.

MY DEAR BARNETTE:

Many thanks for your favor of 6th, and for the copy of letter of General Board of October 2nd, 1906, on the subject of dry docks. Both letters will be regarded as confidential. The letter of the Board is herewith returned. As the Board has made a careful study of the whole subject of dry docks, and has reached definite conclusions, there is nothing more to be said in that connection.

Between ourselves, however, I venture to offer a few remarks on the Board's letter.

Paragraph 1. It is recommended that the subject of the Board's letter "be referred to the Bureau of Yards and Docks for investigation and report—" and for "estimates." The "estimates" are all right, but the Board knows a great deal more of the subject, outside the "estimates," than the Bureau of Yards and Docks does.

Paragraph 2. The "Board believes the whole subject should be carefully considered." "Considered" by whom? It has just been recommended that the subject be referred to Yards and Docks "for investigation and report." In my humble judgment the question is too large, too comprehensive, and far too important for that Bureau to handle. It involves the judicious expenditure of millions of dollars, and is, otherwise, of vital concern to the Navy of the near future.

3 & 4. Good. Cuba is bound, soon or late, to be ours whether we wish it or not. Could this be omitted?

5. Again that "Bureau of Yards and Docks!" The Board states positively that the New York yard will have a 40-foot channel; but further on Par. 12 c it implies a doubt.

6. Good. Spend no more money on the Portsmouth, N. H., Yard.

7. This paragraph needs revision. The Board says: "No other points than . . . New York and Portsmouth, N. H., on the Atlantic Coast . . . can be utilized for deep water docks without extensive dredging." Not so. Forty-five feet (45 ft.) can be carried up Narragansett Bay from the sea to above Prudence Island Light,

Sand Point, or say, at least, two miles above Bradford Coaling Station; and this, too, *without dredging*.

Para. 12 c. New York Navy Yard. "This Navy Yard," the Board says, "is so important that the General Board is of opinion that it should, *if space and depth of water obtainable permit*, be constantly and symmetrically developed . . ." But if space and depth of water do *not* "permit," what then? Has the General Board no alternative? This is, to my mind, the crucial point of the whole question, and one which the Bureau of Yards and Docks is not competent to pass judgment upon.

That "40-feet channel" is still "in the air," so to speak. The silting up of channels due to the debouching of a great river, like the Hudson, into the harbor of New York and its approaches from the sea, is continual. Within my recollection the channels by the Hook and of the Bay have changed a number of times and will go on changing, and silting up to the end of time. The enormous increase of our commerce, of late years, is still going on. New York harbor is already crowded, and complaints are heard that the presence there of a number of battleships constitutes a menace to navigation. In a very few years the approaches to the Navy Yard will become so congested as to constitute a serious objection to it, as our main dependence for docking and repairing. Moreover the soil there is not suitable for a deep dry-dock. For the foundations for "Skyscrapers" in New York City, they have had to go down 40 and 50 feet to get solid ground. It is a well known fact that the first dry-dock built at the New York Yard was founded on a bed of quicksand!

In Narragansett Bay, on the other hand, none of these objections obtain. On the contrary, all the conditions necessary to a good site for "a deep dry-dock" are to be found there. These advantages are too well known to need repeating here. It is a big question—the relative advantages of the two places for the great dock yard of the future, and cannot be answered offhand by anyone. We cannot afford to make a mistake on this question.

13. The General Board recommends a "special board of officers" to report on the "*more important* Naval Stations," etc., etc., I am glad to see this, especially as it drops the Bureau of Yards and Docks out of sight, almost.

I venture to suggest that, should such a board be convened by order of the Department to report on the *more*

important stations, the letter of instructions should be broad enough to take in the *whole subject.* This would enable the board to recommend the discontinuing of expenditures on useless stations should any such, in the opinion of the Board, exist. The instructions should also be broad enough to authorize the board to consider the entire Atlantic Coast and recommend a site for a dockyard capable of docking, with perfect ease, and in all seasons, six battleships at one and the same time, each battleship drawing 30 feet of water.

I am not "stuck on" Narragansett Bay. But I believe such a board would select these waters for such a purpose. At any rate let such a board have the utmost latitude in making its investigations. It is a big subject and is worthy of a big board—"big" in respect to brains and broad professional knowledge, not necessarily "big" in point of numbers.

In your letter of November 6, you speak of the possibilities of the Coaling Station Bradford as a dockyard. I should say, offhand, that that would be a very poor place for one. There are other sites in these waters besides Bradford. I have none in my mind's eye. All I would suggest is that the subject—the *whole subject*—be gone into by a competent board. My own idea is to select some suitable site easily accessible at all seasons for a great dry dock and repair station, and allow New York and Boston yards to subside into secondary importance. We have made a fair start, now for a great Navy. Let all parts grow together. No more pottering over little things. Excuse this long "twister." But it is an interesting subject.

We must begin at an early day, work on docks for ships of 20,000 tons and over (dry-docks—not floating steel docks). The usual method of proceeding in such cases is for the Secretary of the Navy to appoint a board of officers to select the sites for the proposed docks. Should such a board after examining Narragansett Bay decide upon some other locality it would settle the question; for the dock is for the best interest of the Navy and not for the benefit of Rhode Island. You will readily accede to that I know. All you ask for I presume, is that in determining the suggestion of locality by a competent Board the advantages offered by Narragansett Bay may receive due consideration.

From Admiral Luce to Midshipman C. E. Hovey

Newport, R. I., April 12, 1907.

It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your polite letter of the 7th. It should have been acknowledged by return mail. Pardon the delay.

You are quite right in assuming that I am interested in "knowing of the strength and influence of the Naval Academy Christian Association." That Association marks a distinct era in the history of the Academy and is a long step in the right direction. It cannot fail of exercising a great and beneficent influence—not only on the undergraduates in general but eventually on the entire Navy.

I have read the "statement—" you were good enough to send me and am deeply interested with the broad and comprehensive plan of your association. It is said on page 7 that an "honest effort has been made to select only those books of recent publication that were worth reading." This is a hopeful sign of the value of your work. Dime novels and cigarettes have weakened many a fine mind. Under dime novels I class all trashy and sensational books of fiction. There is abundant literature in biography and history that has all the charm of fiction with the added merit of being models of good English. There are also standard novels of the highest order by English and American authors which form part of a liberal education. Hence you are wise in excluding from your library all but the standard works. As a slight evidence of my appreciation of your work I beg to inclose herewith a small subscription to your library fund.

From Admiral Luce to Captain Mahan

Newport, R. I., July 15, 1907.

Referring once more to your favor of July—and enclosure—pages 300–304, I beg to add a few words to my letter of last week. In giving what you understand to be the origin of the War College you seem to labor under a total misapprehension, and do yourself great injustice. In effect you depreciate the true character of your own work. The contents of pages 300–304 is a revelation to

me and explains what has hitherto been inexplicable. It is clear to me, now, that you never read the report submitted to Secretary Chandler on the necessity of an advanced course of study for naval officers or you have forgotten its import. It was the crass ignorance of their profession on the part of naval officers that I "agitated" in Secretary Chandler's time and the imbecility of our Navy Department as a director of naval operations during war.

In the introductory paper read at the War College, September 6th, 1886 (since published in Naval Institute Proceedings), I laid great stress on the necessity of bringing to the investigation of the various problems of naval warfare the "Scientific methods adopted in other professions"—the comparative method.

Later on, I said: "*It is by this means alone that we can raise naval warfare from the empirical stage to the dignity of a science.*" Lastly, I say we must look for one who will do for naval science what Jomini did for Military Science. After your lectures on Naval Strategy I added to the above, "He is here; his name is Mahan."

You will see from this that the original conception of the War College course contemplated the study of war in its broadest and most comprehensive sense. That you have contributed so largely to that end is due in a very great measure the success of the College. This places your work at the College on a higher and broader plane and gives a motive—a purpose to your writings on Sea Power that otherwise would be wanting.

Before undertaking to treat of Naval Strategy you found yourself obliged to study Military Strategy, and to apply the general principles of the latter to naval operations. In short you unconsciously adopted the "Comparative Method." This was the scientific method of proceeding I tried to explain in my paper of 1886. You will see from this why I want you to revise your lectures on strategy and bring them up to date. The work will contribute more to your reputation than many "pot boilers" however desirable the latter may be. They (the strategy lectures) are the culmination of your exhaustive studies in naval history. As you have already published certain criticisms on the conduct of the war with Spain, and on the Russo-Japanese war, you have, no doubt, material on hand wherewith to round out those lectures so as to bring them up to date.

From Chief of Bureau of Navigation to Admiral Luce

Washington, D. C., Oct. 29, 1908.

The Bureau transmits herewith a Civil War Campaign Badge (No. 50) conferred upon you in accordance with the provisions of an Act of Congress approved May 13, 1908, directing the preparation and distribution of badges to the officers and men of the Navy and Marine Corps of the United States who participated in engagements and campaigns deemed worthy of such commemoration.

The badge issued to you is in recognition of your services during the Civil War.

From Admiral Luce to Admiral Pillsbury, Navy Department

Newport, R. I., June 12, 1909.

Would it be asking too much to delay the departure from here of the *Cumberland* until after the visit to this station of the Secretary of the Navy?

I understand that Mr. Meyer will probably visit Newport the latter part of the month, and I am very anxious that he should see the *Cumberland*, which he cannot do if she leaves here for New York on Wednesday next, as I am told she will do, under present orders. If there is no pressing need of her going just now, I trust you will see your way clear to letting her remain here until after Mr. Meyer has had a chance of inspecting her. Pardon my shoving in my oar, but we are at the parting of the ways and the question whether or not the Navy is to give up seamen for good and all is one that should be settled now. I may add, *privately*, that I have already written to the Secretary on this subject. This will account for my earnest desire that he should see the *Cumberland* here and have a chance to inspect her.

In response to a request for his autograph and a sentiment from the Los Angeles Public Library, Admiral Luce replied:

"War is the heritage of man. Its well-spring is in the

human heart. When the heart of man shall have become regenerate wars will cease. Pride, vainglory and hypocrisy, envy, hatred, and malice and all uncharitableness will then give place to the fruits of the spirit: love, joy, peace, faith, and temperance.

"While prayerfully awaiting the coming of the millennium it is the part of wisdom to lessen the chances of war by being fully prepared for it. There is no other way, under Heaven, to avert war, save by national degradation. Be ready for war and it will not come. Arbitration, that blessed alternative fails, unfortunately, when most sorely needed. The armed forces of the State and the Universal Peace Association form one body—one hand holding out the Olive-branch, the other the Sword."

From General E. P. Alexander to Admiral Luce

1437 Calhoun Street,
New Orleans, May 22nd, '08.

I am much complimented by the kind terms in which you refer to my book,[1] in your favor of 14th just forwarded to me from South Island.

The quotation from General Lee on page 425 to which you refer "It was my fault this time" had reference to the discussion which had taken place between himself and Longstreet as to the size of the assaulting column. Lee had said it would be about 15,000 men. To this Longstreet had replied that "no 15,000 men ever mustered could carry that position." Longstreet wished to halt Pickett *after his Division had started* in the charge, but I would not take his suggestions to me as we stood looking on. But it was with a heavy heart that he saw them go. The mistake referred to on page 620 in the lines "knowing how clearly he must have recognized mistakes after making them," was his mistake in refusing to credit Beauregard's persistent assertion that he was fighting Grant's whole army (practically) in the defence of Petersburg after the 15th. For about 3 days Lee was practically

[1] *Memoirs of Military Service* by E. P. Alexander.

lost in the woods below Richmond. He thought [word missing] was opposite to him and did not *know* where he was. It was the greatest blunder in strategy, I am tempted to say—*ever made*, between these two opposing armies. And oh! how often and deeply, Lee must have reproached himself for it but never once did *any one* to my knowedge ever hear him refer to it, even remotely.

I take the liberty of enclosing you a copy of an address I made at West Point in 1902 on the occasion of a centennial celebration, which was afterward given a free circulation as you will see.

I am only here on a visit. My residence is "South Island" South Carolina, near Georgetown.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO THE EDITOR OF *Harper's Weekly*

NEWPORT, R. I., June 5th, 1908.

In answer to your esteemed favor of the 3rd I beg to say that I have not the time to write anything for publication on the subject of the raising of the *Maine*, much as I deplore the long delay in the performance of an imperative duty.

I can cite no authorities nor offer any evidence that would be accepted in a court of law. But I am morally certain that the prevailing opinion abroad, and one largely shared in this country, is that we are *afraid* to raise the ship lest by doing so we prove to the world that we were wrong in our theory of an external explosion. If we were mistaken as to the cause of the disaster, we were mistaken in charging the Spaniards with treachery and precipitating the war. The very fact of our seeming reluctance to discharge a duty so obviously plain lends color to that supposition, *viz.*, that we are afraid of possible disclosures. In other words, we are laying ourselves open to the charge of moral cowardice. And the longer we put off raising the ship and learning the truth, the deeper becomes the conviction that we fear to seek the truth. If we are willing to rest under this imputation, then I am greatly mistaken in my estimate of the character of our people. This I am not willing to admit.

Please regard this as personal, and believe me.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO HON. WILLIAM SULZER, MEMBER OF CONGRESS

U. S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND
April 30, 1908.

Pardon me if I venture to refer to your Bill authorizing the raising of the *Maine*. There have appeared quite recently in the press, in different parts of the country, so many strong appeals in favor of the project, that I take the liberty, not only as a naval officer but as a citizen, to add my plea for an early and a favorable consideration of the proposition.

I have long been an earnest advocate of this measure, but can add nothing to the strong arguments already advanced by the papers.

The prevailing opinion abroad seems to be that the sinking of the ship was due to an internal explosion. And that belief is shared by many in this country, including some naval officers. Now I hold that it is a duty we owe to ourselves, as a nation—a duty we owe to the Navy, and to the nautical world in general, that the true cause of the disaster should be ascertained beyond a doubt. This can be done only by raising the ship as provided for in your Bill. As a people, we certainly have the moral courage to seek the truth and accept the verdict, even though it be against us, assuming for the moment that we have been mistaken in our theory of an external cause.

The wreck is not only a ghastly memorial of a great disaster, but an obstruction to navigation which we are in duty bound to remove. The prompt action of the Japanese in a somewhat similar case should not be lost sight of.

Immediately after the sinking of Admiral Togo's flagship, the *Mikasa*, the Japanese engineers began making plans for raising her. The *Mikasa* blew up and sank at her moorings September 11, 1905. She has already been restored to the Navy List of Japan.

Why do we wait to perform so plain a duty?

Kindly regard this as personal and believe me.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Personal.

15 FRANCIS STREET,
NEWPORT, R. I., May 2nd, 1910.

Pardon the liberty.

Newspaper men so often draw on their fancy for facts that I trust the statement attributed to you in the inclosed clipping from Saturday's Boston *Transcript* is incorrect.

Remember the words of Paul Jones at the most desperate moment of the battle—"I have not yet begun to fight!"

The war now on is the continuation of the campaign of 1904, when the Staff Bureaus under the leadership of Pay Director —— defeated the President in his endeavors to have Congress recognize the General Board.

The real issue now, as then, is the effete Bureau System. The Staff Bureaus are fighting for their lives, and they seem to have the sympathy, if not the support, of the majority of the Naval Committee of the House.

You have the President with you and a staff of very able advisers, so I have no fear of the ultimate outcome. But never, never, give up!

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

Personal.

15 FRANCIS STREET,
NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND,
July 29th, 1910.

The Naval War College is in need of your help, and I trust you will not be unmindful of the call.

The College has a President and Staff (or faculty) but no students!

This college is said to be the best school of Marine International Law in the world. That is because the chair of International Law is occupied by a very able Harvard professor of law—Prof. G. G. Wilson. But the chair of Naval History (which includes naval operations in general) has been vacant for 17 years, or since the detachment of Rear-Admiral Mahan in 1893. As a consequence the principal department of the College—the Art and Science of War—the study for which the College was

founded, has practically ceased to exist. There will be no trouble about getting an officer to fill the chair of Naval History if we can get the students—there's the rub! It would suffice if we could get five junior officers (officers wishing to specialize in the higher branches of the profession) to take a year's course. That would open a new era in the life of the College.

The annual conferences here are exceedingly valuable; but as they last only four months and include a variety of subjects, comparatively few officers derive any material benefit from them. The great need is (to repeat it) a class of comparatively young officers to take a year's course to fit them for duty on the Naval General Staff which, some day soon, let us hope, under some designation will form the basis of our Naval Administration.

On September 6th, 7th, and 8th, Rear-Admiral Mahan is to lecture on "Naval Strategy." If you could make it convenient to hear those lectures I feel confident you would become interested in the War College work. This letter is written without the knowledge of, or suggestion from, any officer of the College.

With this I am sending a short history of the College.

From Captain Beehler to Admiral Luce

Key West, Fla., Aug. 5, 1910.

I am delighted to have a letter from you in reply to your question as to the truth of the statement in the July *Scribner's*. "The Emperor (German) had read and been impressed by Captain Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power* and that book had as much to do with the building of the German Navy as any other single influence," that statement is absolutely true. In June, 1892, at the launching of the German Battleship *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, I heard the Emperor deliver his famous speech "Our (Germany's) future is on the Sea." I heard him refer to Mahan's work, and in one conversation I said "I was impressed by a statement he had made," and the Emperor said "that is true but I am not the author of that statement, your Mahan said so," meaning that he didn't wish to take credit for the idea that originated with Mahan.

I am confident that Mahan's work had more weight than any single influence in building up the German Navy. I believe the Emperor's speech referred to above, made in June, 1899, was translated and published all over the world, and his quotation from Mahan's work will be found therein, if my memory serves me right, as I have no copy of that speech here.

Admiral Goodrich justly observes that Mahan's work helped all maritime countries to a better comprehension of the value of sea power, possibly not always to *our own* particular advantage, while Luce strove to make our fleet the most wisely directed of any. Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon this point in estimating the work of Admiral Luce. It should be kept in mind.

FROM THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY TO ADMIRAL LUCE

WASHINGTON, September 29, 1910.

It has become necessary, as you are probably aware, to reduce to a minimum the number of retired officers on active duty.

In rigorously carrying out this policy I find that I should direct your detachment from active duty, and I wish to say I will do so with extreme reluctance.

Your long and honorable service on the active list is a matter of history, and your no less valuable service since your retirement in fathering the War College, and studying and urging real Naval Administration, are well known.

With my best wishes, and with the hope that you will give me the benefit of your suggestions at any time, I am etc., etc.

P.S. Sometime I shall take pleasure in expressing in person my full appreciation of your services to the Navy.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

WOODSTOCK, VT., September 30, 1910.

I hasten to return my sincere thanks for your kind and very considerate letter of 25th advising me of my detachment from active duty.

I beg to assure you of my appreciation of your words of commendation, and of my cheerful acceptance of whatever may best promote the interests of the Naval Service.

FROM ELMER ROBERTS, ESQ., TO ADMIRAL LUCE[1]

BERLIN, October 18th, 1910.

Pardon my delay in replying to your kind note regarding the article in *Scribner's*. The officer who told me what the Emperor had said about Captain Mahan's book on sea power is somewhere in South African waters, and I should not like to mention his name without his permission. I have heard several times of the Emperor's references to Captain Mahan's doctrines. The Emperor is familiar with all that Mahan has written, and his ready mind has woven the material supplied by Mahan with other studies, prepared chiefly in the general staff of the army, on the correlation of land and sea power.

I suppose that the German navy would have been begun by this time had the Krüger telegram never been sent, because so many other influences were pushing Germany in that direction, the immense investments abroad, the growth of the commercial marine, the desire to extend political influence effectively beyond the territories of adjoining nations.

The late Fritz von Holstein, who was for sixteen years the directing mind of the foreign office, from the time of Bismarck to 1907, gave me a curious explanation of the Emperor's personal pleasure in having a navy. Holstein said that, since the Emperor's helpless left arm made it impossible for him to guide a horse with that hand, he was obliged to ride horses trained to obey the pressure of the knees, that on horseback the Emperor was rarely unconscious of his deformity, and that the consciousness of power on horseback while reviewing troops or leading cavalry charges was always limited by the disagreeable consciousness of being maimed. Holstein said that the Emperor did not have this feeling of limited physical manhood on shipboard, that as admiral he could hold the glass with his right hand, and that on the bridge, when commanding or reviewing a fleet, he had the full conscious-

[1] By the courtesy of The Associated Press.

ness of his might as monarch and war-lord. I have been in Kiel five or six times at the June regattas. The Emperor makes of this event a naval display rather than a sporting competition. He sails into the harbor on the royal yacht at full speed on the second day, after all the ships are aligned, the thirty-three guns of the imperial salute sounding, all together quite a thousand guns. His majesty appears to have an exaltation of spirit, his mood being lifted to a kind of ecstasy. Imagination, intelligence, and emotion run so strongly in him that on these occasions he appears to reach the very heights of personal joyousness in the potentialities and glory of his position. I would not, however, stress too much the influence of imperial love of splendor and power on the formation of the navy, because the national considerations previously mentioned and the fact that probably three quarters of the German people approve of a large navy would have created it had not the Emperor's convictions and moods ran parallel with what is conceived by German statesmen to be the national interest.

From the Secretary of the Navy to Rear Admiral Luce

Washington, D. C., Nov. 15, 1910.

On November 20, 1910, you will regard yourself detached from special duty at the Naval War College, Newport, R. I., and from such other duty as may have been assigned you; will proceed to your home.

Immediately upon your arrival home report your local address in full and the date of your arrival to the Bureau of Navigation. See Article 234, U. S. Navy Regulations, 1909.

From Admiral R. P. Rodgers to Admiral Luce

War College, Newport, R. I.,
November 16, 1910.

In forwarding to you the order of the Navy Department which detaches you from duty at the War College, I de-

sire to express to you my deep regret that your connection with it should thus be now broken. You have been so closely related to the War College, which you founded and for which you have been the steadfast advocate and chief supporter through all the years of its vicissitudes and struggles, that your separation from it becomes an event of unusual importance and regret.

Permit me to thank you for the valuable counsel you have given me at various times when I have consulted you concerning the welfare of the War College, and I beg you, Admiral, to believe me.

From Admiral Swinburne to Admiral Luce

Florence, Italy, Dec. 5, 1910.

The enclosed partial tribute to the life work you have given to the service is the text for this letter—it is from the *Army and Navy Journal* of November 19th which has just reached me and is my first news I have that you have been detached (officially only I hope) from the War College. I *did* hope *you* would serve on active duty until the law expired in 1912. It seemed to me that sentiment in our service was beyond economy at times.

It has been given to few men in my time to have been the instigator and very spirit of so many advances for the good of the service as to you—from the first American book on seamanship through the Training Service and the War College. I can remember when the *Seamanship* first came out when I was a Plebe thinking you were the author of the art. I remember on my first cruise in the service overhearing an old sailor in a heated argument with another, end up with "well I am right and I don't care if *old* Luce says I ain't, and he wrote *the book!*"

This is just a tribute from a man who has gone from Midshipman to Rear Admiral under your pilotage. I think that expresses better what I mean, and to wish you a Merry Christmas and a happy New Year and many of them!

Of course no laws but those of nature will prevent your going on working for us and may those laws not go in force for many a year.

Commodore E. B. Underwood tells the story that when he was a midshipman, an old sailor who deprecated the passing of sails said to him, "There are only three sailors left in the Navy, there's me, and John Lee Davis (a classmate of Luce) and Stephen B. *Lewis*." Perhaps it was the same ancient of the sea who said, "The Navy ain't what it used to be, and never was."

The next letter from Admiral Luce written four years before the World War is inserted (obviously with some diffidence) on account of its bearing on subsequent events in the Near East.

From Admiral Luce to Captain Gleaves

Newport, R. I., July 9th, 1912.

Many thanks for your kind attention in sending me a copy of your excellent article on the Bagdad Railroad and the extension of the German influence over the buried cities of the long forgotten East. You have struck a new field and one well worth pursuing. My attention however has been called to the extension of the German influence nearer home and the time not far distant, when we will be called upon to settle once for all the Monroe Doctrine. Briefly Germany needs a naval base on this side; and little by little she has been making great strides towards attaining that end. German writers have of late exposed the fallacy of our Monroe Doctrine, regard it only as a great American bluff which calls for only a firm hand to expose and Mahan in a recent letter has announced pretty much the same idea, saying in effect that it, the Doctrine, has "not a leg to stand on." Save the Navy—See Admiral Mahan's letter to the New York *Times*.

Since the inclosed letters were published the Danish Parliament has passed the Act granting the syndicate the concession asked for. The next step is for the Syndicate to sublet to Germany; and the latter to take in hand the improvement to establish a naval base close alongside of Guantanamo and snap her fingers at the Monroe Doctrine.

All this I apprehend is in the near future.

From Admiral Luce to Senator Lodge

Woodstock, Vt., Aug. 5th, 1912.

I was very glad to see by the papers that your resolution extending the application of the Monroe Doctrine, passed the Senate by a practically unanimous vote.

This is a notice, I presume, to Germany to keep out of the Danish West Indies, rather than to Japan to keep out of Magdalena Bay. According to press reports, from abroad, the parliament of Denmark has already granted to a syndicate in Denmark concessions that would convert the harbor of St. Thomas into a formidable naval base. This concession covers a period of ninety-nine years with the privilege of subletting presumably to Germany, where the Monroe Doctrine is regarded with scant respect.

To let Europe see that we mean business, it is to be hoped that this resolution will be enforced by four additional battleships; unless, indeed, we mean to depend on the strained relations between England and Germany to keep the latter in check.

No doubt you are fully informed as to St. Thomas.

Pardon the liberty and believe me.

From Senator Lodge to Admiral Luce

August 7, 1912.

It was a great pleasure to get your letter of the 5th and to know that you approve of the resolution, which I reported and which the Senate passed, in regard to the possession of military and strategic points by foreign governments through the agency of corporations. The immediate cause of the resolution was Magdalena Bay, the attempt of the Japanese, through private individuals and the medium of corporations or syndicates, to get control of it. However, I had St. Thomas in mind also, but I thought it not wise to bring it forward as it was not necessary to do so. I know about the concession that was granted there and it so happens that very recently I had a long talk with Mr. Maurice Francis Egan, our Minister to Denmark, upon this very subject. For months he has been following the matter very closely and he has succeeded in excluding foreign interests from the concession.

That is, he has prevented foreign interests, especially German, from becoming part owners of the concession made. He feels that the Danish Government and the Danish people are now very anxious to develop St. Thomas and their steamship lines with a view to the Eastern trade for their own profit and that they are now opposed to sharing these benefits with anybody else. At the same time I quite recognize that the improvement of St. Thomas by Denmark, which is entirely unobjectionable so long as it remains in Danish hands, creates a condition which might become very undesirable if Germany should annex Denmark or should compel that little country to make over to Germany her control of the concessionary company. It is at this very point that our resolution meets them and you may have noticed that the German press snarled about the resolution and evidently disliked it while the London *Times* gave it cordial approval.

I trust that you and Mrs. Luce are both very well and I wish that you would give our kindest regards both to Mrs. Luce and Mrs. Noyes.

From Senator Lodge to Admiral Luce

August 17, 1912.

Thank you for your note and for the further information which I am extremely glad to have. The dispatch from the Boston *Transcript* and Sir Edward Durand's statement were evidently written while the plans for this concession were pending and while Mr. Egan was at work to make it wholly Danish. I think there can be no doubt, from what he says, that the Company which is to receive the concession is entirely Danish. At the same time it is evident that turning St. Thomas into a port of this character makes it a very tempting prize. I think this government would interfere in any event if Germany were to take it, but my resolution strengthens its position.

The session is now so nearly at an end that we shall succeed in getting only one battle ship, but the contest over it has had a very good effect and I do not believe that a second attempt will be made to limit the Navy by the action of a party caucus. The feeling in the country in favor of the Navy is very strong, and it has been brought

out by the fight over the battleships. In the senate there is a large majority of both parties for a strong navy and I think that we shall get two battleships, and perhaps three, next winter. The Panama Canal has aroused the feeling on that point very much.

From Phineas A. Rice to Admiral Luce

435 W. 57th Street,
New York City, March 29, 1914.

I notice in the N. Y. *Times* that you have celebrated your eighty-seventh birthday. You will therefore excuse me if I take the liberty to congratulate you and while we may not personally meet here, we *will meet* before the Grand Commander in a haven of rest where we will never grow old. I had the honor of serving on the *Wabash* during the War and you will always be in my mind as a hero springing overboard as you did off Charleston endeavoring to save the life of Able Seaman "Emmett." I was promoted as Pay Master Steward's clerk and detailed to the *Philadelphia* Admiral Dahlgren, leaving the service an Assistant Paymaster, returning home I engaged in the ice business and have succeeded very nicely. I was a frequent caller on Admiral Erben, both at the Navy Yard and at his residence. We enjoyed many pleasant hours together. And now, dear Sir, it gives me great pleasure to express to you my regard and that you will enjoy good health.

Live many years and when done here fall gently asleep in the arms of Him who doeth all things well. May God bless you Sir!

From Hon. F. W. Hackett to Admiral Luce

Washington, D. C., March 20, 1917.

Let me be a little forehanded, and send you my sincere good wishes for the coming anniversary—the 25th, when you will be ninety years old. May you keep right on in this good work of living a useful life, and get to the century line, with the conditions that shall make the journey a happy one.

You do not need my testimony to the fact that you

have been a faithful worker, and an up-builder of what is worth maintaining in the service. The Navy has had no better, or more efficient, helper than yourself and for one I thank you for what you have done—and done so thoroughly.

It must be a real comfort to you to look back, and see how constant has been your devotion to the best interests of the officers and the men of the United States Navy. You have written your name large; and your friends rejoice with you that your life has been spared to enable you to make the record a very long one.

Wishing you serene enjoyment of the days to come, and recalling with how much pleasure I served with you, when at the Department, I remain, etc.

CHAPTER XVIII

Letters from Admiral Mahan to Admiral Luce

New York, Jan. 6, 1886.

. . . . . .

I will keep the analogy between land and naval warfare before my eyes—the proper development of the theory which I believe fundamentally correct will require a good deal of pains. I incline to think that the difference between formal essays and familiar talks is somewhat like that between written and extempore sermons. The latter are sometimes better than anything in the world, but in the hands of most people lose in precision what they gain, if they do gain, in interest.

New York, Jan. 22, 1886.

Yours of the 20th reached me last night just after I had mailed one to you.

With regard to my own course of lectures my ideas have not yet attained the prevision which I would like to throw into my reply to you. In a general way they are these: I think to begin with a general consideration of the sea, its uses to mankind and to nations, the effect which the control of it or the reverse has upon their peaceful development and upon their military strength. This will naturally lead to and probably embrace in the same lecture, a consideration of the sources of Sea Power, whether commercial or military; depending upon the position of the particular country—the character of its coast, its harbors, the character and pursuits of its people, its possessions of military ports in various parts of the world, its colonies, etc.—its resources, in the length and breadth of the world.

After such a general statement of the various elements of the problem, illustrated of course by specific examples—the path would be cleared for naval history. There are a good many phases of naval history. I have been led, and I think upon the whole happily led to take up that period succeeding the peace of Westphalia, 1648, when the nations of Europe began clearly to enter on and occupy their modern positions, struggling for existence and preponderance. I have carefully followed up this period both in respect of naval history and the general struggles of Europe; for it has seemed to me, with reference to my subject, that the attempt to virtually separate the naval history from that context will be something like, to capsize a proverb, Hamlet with all but the part of Hamlet left out.

I have nearly finished, within a week's work, this general consideration down to 1783. With the purely naval history of the great wars of the Republic and the Empire I believe myself already sufficiently familiar—with the general history less so; but I think I can "get it up" in comparatively short time. *Now* I believe myself to have a good working knowledge of most, of all the important, naval campaigns of the years 1660–1815—and the tactics of the various battles.

Of course the question thrusts itself forward: under all the changed conditions of naval warfare of what use is the knowledge of these bygone days. Here I am frankly still a little at sea how to point my moral. I have stuff enough to work up several popular lectures, but how turn this into instructive material for the future. I have not really had the time to settle this and I have steadily refused to consider more than the one thing at a time. There are here and there however glimmers of light.

For instance strategy, as distinguished from tactics, will have plenty of illustration; the advantages and disadvantages of the possession of sea power and its effect upon specific campaigns must always possess useful lessons. Ships will no longer tack nor wear; but they must turn round sometimes; and I fancy that some thought expended upon the difficulties and confusion that may be thrown into an enemy's line or other order by forcing them to a change of order in action will have some part in the consideration of naval tactics in action; and I believe that knowledge of the great battles between sailing fleets will

help in the solution of the problem. There will too always remain the great moral lessons, the most important lesson to my mind and amply illustrated, of the preponderance gained by activity, promptness, watchfulness, care, foresight—and attention to details. More and more it has forced itself upon my mind that the reason our fleet is better than another has been, and probably always will be, because in component, ship for ship, captain for captain, crew for crew, we are better. Without pressing this view unguardedly or to extremes, I think it is most true relatively to an army land force. The admiral will not, nearly so far, make or mar as the general.

By February 1st, I expect to begin with Jomini, etc., and having naval conditions constantly before my mind, I shall hope to detect analogies—and with an admirable system of our kind of war before me to contribute something to the development of a systematic study of war in another field.

Whether I can accomplish anything more, in the matter of naval history of other epochs, this year, I cannot say—it is scarcely worth considering at present. I am working to my full capacity and have to feel that that is less than it was. So I don't work far ahead. . . .

New Jersey, April 24, 1886.

I have a first draft of some seventy odd pages of foolscap—eight of which will about make two lectures, which I think of sending to you about May 1st to see whether it is at all the sort of thing you will want. As is often the case I have put the cart before the horse beginning with what I mean to have last, namely; the consideration of modern vessels, weapons, etc., and endeavoring to deduce from the necessary orders and plans of battle. I have taken this up first as being the most difficult, and at the same time that which will be most demanded and the absence of which will provoke much criticism. If I fail—the failure will be mine, but if I confine myself to history the College would be blamed for not keeping me to things that were useful.

I think I have today had a first glimmering of how to hitch on the history of the past to the theory of the present. It has been my hope from the first as I wrote to a friend

of mine who asked what I was to do "that I should succeed in evolving from the history of wooden ships and 24-pounders, lessons that would be useful for ironclads and modern implements."

The question of the unscientific character of the English admirals has not wholly escaped me. It is to be regretted in the interests of naval science that either Hawke or Boscawen did not command in place of Byng—but with the exception of that action when did the English and French fleet meet on equal terms up to 1778 (after 1770)? I own too that after reading the French accounts of Hughes and Suffren I am not so sure of the stupidity of the former. Possibly some points have escaped me and doubtless Suffren was a very superior man but in the first action he allowed his convoy to be cut off—in the first two he was decidedly superior in force and carried off no trophies. When he stood down to attack Hughes' rear the latter ought to have won but I am not sure that he had the wind. I have not read Laughton on him. The impression left on my mind was that after Byng—Byron's was the most dunderheaded performance; but when you consider Howe at New York and Rhode Island—Barrington at St. Lucia (as neat a job as I ever read of for dispatch and care)—Hood at St. Kitt's—and (perhaps) Rodney at Marie Galante—there is a great deal to be said on the credit side of the English to which should be added Howe's relief of Gibraltar. On the other hand what is the credit of the French (except Suffren); that they got up a clever system for avoiding action. Had Nelson stood in D'Estaing's shoes at New York in 1779, Howe would have been wiped out despite his care and ability and the Revolution ended then. After Byron's action D'Estaing let everything slip through his fingers, and after all allowances DeGrasse did not deserve success when he got his licking. What I mean is that many perhaps most of the English Admirals were incapable as such, but their readiness to fight brought out their incapacity which was less conspicuous in the French mainly because they would not come to the scratch. If a man runs his ship ashore every one knows it—but who except a few of the profession knows about it if you can't get him in sight of land.

As the postage on my manuscript would be a good deal could you send me a penalty stamp. I see they send them on letters to be returned from Washington to Office of

Naval Intelligence. If you can't I will have to wait till I go to New York.

I think I shall be ready to forward about May 1st. Next month I must give to the Astor Library, where I have found files of the Revue Maritime and United Service Institute. I am doing quite well but have had spells for working at times.

NEW JERSEY, May 1, 1886.

I am mailing to you today my own manuscript, in three envelopes—which I have numbered in their order of paging—and also a fourth envelope returning your own lecture for the perusal of which I thank you.

As regards the former I would apologize for the condition in which I send it, were it not desirable that you should judge as soon as possible whether the matter and manner of my treatment of the subject is likely to meet your views. There is as yet but a small fragment of the whole that must be produced; but enough to show whether the lines on which I work—the method with which I approach the problem—gives hope of a probably satisfactory solution. . . .

After reading what I send you will see that there will remain the consideration of the proper place for small torpedo vessels or boats in the primary formation—the entire question of order for close action considered *absolutely* or with reference to their intrinsic advantages or defects; next the same question of order of attack considered *relatively* to various dispositions of the enemy; then the merits and defects of various defensive, or offensive—defensive order—and I suppose how to avoid and how to force an action—but in all such my method I think would be that which I have so far followed to state as clearly and fully as I can what conditions are required to meet certain cases—and then to examine different possible means to find out which best fulfills the conditions.

I shall not worry myself to bring this course to a conclusion for this session. The first part of my course relating to naval history etc. is yet untouched, though prepared for. I shall not ask for any more time, if my health continues good, excepting so far as this: that if I find I am being belated I will ask you to consider how far you may

so arrange the course as to give me a little more time. I believe I can say I have wasted none that I could use.

I read your lecture twice and am quite in accord with the tenor of it, though you will see from some pages written before I saw it that I draw a different moral from the use of the word *armée* for fleet. I did not either notice any omission. Your argument seemed to me sound and sufficient to willing ears. I may say in the matter of coppering ships that the French Naval History I read this winter complained of their olden lack of speed from foulness—attributing to it loss of advantages over the English, etc. As to construction I have never heard of anything but the inferiority of the English to the French models. . . .

San Francisco, Cal., Feb. 6, 1889.

Your letter of January 23rd was forwarded and reached me here a few days ago. I have always thought that the proper place for the College was on Coaster's Harbor, at least for some years to come; and I have also held, always, that consolidation in any shape was dangerous. In the shape it has assumed it is ruin. I can therefore wish you success in your effort to secure the old site, but you have a difficult task before you. The appropriation bill has been carefully worded to secure the old building to Schley, and also to *fix* the College on Goat Island. I doubt if the new Secretary will venture to change anything without act of Congress. I have never swerved from my opinion that in the present condition of naval interests in the Art of War, the close association of the College with other professional interests will tend to edge the Art out of the course. I doubt whether you fully agree with me on this point. I think the only thing that would decide me to refuse my co-operation with any effort to keep the College idea alive would be the association with it of questions of naval construction, engineering, etc.—in a word naval material. I should think such an attempt hopeless.

There is a bare possibility that the Art of War may be made to dominate over everything else on the island; that gunnery may be confined to the gunnery ship—and the torpedo business made to take a back seat. I don't expect it but think it among the possibilities. . . .

As you say it is the triumph of Whitney and Schley.

New Jersey, Dec. 3, 1889.

I cordially join in your felicitations on the subject of the Secretary's report touching the War College. It was the more gratifying, because wholly unexpected; for I had come to the conclusion that he had referred the matter to the Board, because unable to devote the time necessary to reach an independent conclusion. As it is, he has reached an independent conviction, which is emphasized by his utter disregard of the Board's report; and has expressed that conviction with a clearness and decision which characterize his other utterances. His report, so far as reported in our paper, the New York *Times*, is gratifying not merely by the solidity of his opinions, but by the decisive manner in which they are expressed. I hope much from him.

My book is going slowly through the press—this being of course a very busy time for the trade. . . .

New York, May 25th.

Many thanks for your hint about the article. I will try and look it up. In many cases strategy is little more than guessing— If possible the true strategy is to be off the enemy's port, but Nelson's ships were in too bad order for that, and he had Egypt on the brain. Collingwood on the other hand had Ireland rather, and in this case came near right.

Has the Redwood Drinkwater's account of the battle of Cape St. Vincent? The Astor has not. It may be under his later name of Bethune. He was an army officer (siege of Gibraltar man) and was on his way to England in a frigate which was stationed I think near the Victory. At any rate he saw the affair quite at his leisure.

It is needless to say how very proud I am of your compliments to me in your memorandum for Senator Aldrich. I beg, however, to thank you for them and to admit fully that it is to my association with the War College I owe whatever of the acquirements may with any justice be attributed to me. . . .

New York, Dec. 26, 1891.

. . . This difficulty being removed there remains no difficulty to *me* in accepting the position if the Department

offers it to me. But, whosoever takes it will have an immense difficulty to encounter in—— It is really painful to see a high-toned, honorable, industrious man of considerable ability whose greatest faculty is that of getting himself and every one else into irons; whose chief contribution to any movement not originating with himself, is to tie its legs and add weight after weight till the back is broken.

I shall doubtless have opportunities of seeing the Secretary, and I shall seek the chance of speaking to him very plainly as to the unrecognized ability of the College. There has been a disposition grown up to consider my opinion of importance (a kind of special knowledge) due to the reputation the book gained me. I remark frequently to those who make such allusion that, if any aptitude exist, it is due wholly to my association with the College; that I recognize constantly the influence, upon my perceptions and upon the strength of my convictions, of my historical and strategic reading. I add that I also recognize the denseness of my ignorance prior to my joining the College; and that now, in studying problems of a certain character (notably the attack of a fortified port), chiefly *tactical*, I have to admit disadvantages owing to no opportunity for studying such questions. I bring to them no special knowledge of details, only a few general principles, and I have laboriously to apply these, and under pressure of time seek to solve difficulties, whose solution to a man who had studied before would be rapid. This amounts to saying that a single expert (if such exist) cannot now meet the wants of the government. Had ignorant stupidity not stopped us three years ago, we should by this time have had some one who would take up a fortified harbor, disarm the strong and weak points at a glance, and out of many methods of attack have in his mind the relative advantages and disadvantages of each—in short a man capable of sound and rapid decision, which in the particular case I am not. In a general way I purpose saying these things to the Secretary, for if I don't see him otherwise I shall make a point of getting this before him. I intend to insist upon two things—first the immediate appointment of a president and next a positive order that a class of at least *fifteen* for two months *must* be forthcoming for next September.

Quoting instances of people not going to sea, did you

know that Farragut did not go to sea from 1848 to 1858; and that the cruise ending in the former year was only a twelve-month? Consequently from 1843 to 1858 he spent but one year at sea. His is still a name to conjure with. It is true he had a genius for war and was also an improving man.

NEW YORK, Jan. 5, 1892.

I came home last night, having asked the Secretary's permission because my expenses were far outrunning my mileage. It is probable I may soon be called back—but yesterday I spoke to him about the College, saying I had refrained from doing so before, knowing how much he must be occupied with the various aspects of the Chilian affair. He was in a very happy humor at the moment. I said the two absolutely essential things were the immediate ordering of a president, and the assurance to him that a class of no more than ten, should be ordered this year. If this administration goes out, I added, without putting the College on its legs there was no telling if it ever would get on them. He said, the two things *shall be done*. . . .

The Secretary is the only reliance, and if I were Aldrich I should go straight to him, ignoring the others. I said to the Secretary I shall take the liberty of reminding you of this as soon as the Chilian business takes certain shape. . . .

NEW YORK, Jan. 10, 1892.

. . . I shall very gladly take a hand in the conference you propose. Folger[1] is a man who fully appreciates the value of the College aims, although he himself has taken up as a specialty one part of the material development of the service.

I wait impatiently and somewhat anxiously the outcome of the Chilian trouble. They themselves are aware of the impolicy of forcing us to war, I am sure; but I doubt they may too much fear their mob. It is astounding that our government should allow matters to drag so, when there is a question of so formidable a vessel as the *Prat*[2]

[1] Rear Admiral Wm. Folger, Chief of Naval Ordnance.

[2] The *Prat* was nearing completion in England. She was 6,900 tons and carried a main battery of four 24 cm. and eight 12 cm. guns.

thus getting to escape. We are so confident in our business and so little realize the great extra load entailed by the distance of Chili, in case of war. The ultimate result, I suppose can be little doubted, but we may first get some eye openers. . . .

WASHINGTON, Jan. 28, 1892.

I have just returned from a visit to the Capitol to see Mr. Aldrich, the first time I have felt at liberty to leave the Department for a long period; and found that he had started for home yesterday noon. He will not probably return before Monday, if then. It is less important as I could only say to him what I have already said to the Secretary, and mean to say again—that it is vitally important to order at once a president to the College and engage to him that a class shall present itself next summer or fall. As regards myself I cannot say more than that I will be willing to take the position if desired by the Department. As I wrote you before, the Secretary said to me positively that the president should be ordered when the Chilian business was off, and that a class should be forthcoming. What will be wanted will be for Aldrich to support this decision by his own personal agency. This is Mr. Tracy's last opportunity; and if it goes unimproved there can be no telling which we will get from another administration. The prevalent opinion here seems to be that the war is now wholly off and I intend to ask Mr. Tracy to let me go home, having been here now a fortnight.

4 P.M. I have just come from the Secretary. He asked me what I wanted to do—I replied I had my work on the continuation of my former work to finish. He then said "Why don't you finish it?" and added "Do you want to go as President of the War College?" I said I did, for as far as I could see there was no one else to do it, at present. He said he would have me ordered; and when I explained the impossibility of my leaving New York at present, he said: "We will give you orders to go to Newport as necessary." To this nothing can be added, except to see that, if it slips his mind, he is reminded.

He said also that the War is over; and I think will be at leisure, as much as a Secretary ever is, to hear any propositions you wish to make. He feels, and I think

justly, that the energy with which he has pushed naval preparations has had much to do with the final pacific outcome. I believe myself that Chile simply temporized to see how much we would stand, and had our naval effort been less vigorous and sustained there would have been collision.

I shall leave for home tomorrow. . . .

U.S.S. *Chicago*, NEW YORK
May 22, 1893.

Your letter inclosing Col. Snowden's to yourself was received yesterday. The flattering opinions expressed by Mr. Gladstone and Mr. Balfour are among the most gratifying I have had—coming as they do from men so conspicuous not only in political standing but as men of intellectual force.

The lack of recognition in our own country—either official or journalistic—has been painful; not to my vanity for that has been more than filled by the superabundant tributes from all quarters in England, but as showing the indifference to service matters among our people.

I am not very sanguine about my possible resumption of work. I propose it indeed—but the failure of momentum, the fading of prestige in this age of rapidly changing impressions are all against it. Our own navy —by its representatives,—has rejected both me and my work, for I cannot but think that an adequate professional opinion would have changed the issue.

U.S.S. *Chicago*, SOUTHAMPTON,
Aug. 24, 1893.

Your interest in the College entitles you to hear as soon as may be that a letter from Chadwick, received today but written Aug. 10 ends thus: "The War College is safe. The Secretary read your last book (on Sea Power) and that convinced him. He told me some time since he was opposed to it. He now tells me he has informed Ramsay that he has changed his mind. "In quietness and in confidence shall be your strength."

I have received many very flattering expressions. Earl Spencer and Mr. Henry White both told me that Mr. John Morley was very desirous to meet me. He would

have attended the reception of the First Lord so the latter told me had he been strong enough. Mr. Bryce (the *American Commonwealth*) and Sir George Trevelyan—both distinguished authors and members of the government spoke very flatteringly. At Osborne Erben[1] and myself were invited to one of the Queen's dinners—fifty-four guests, mainly naval and military, so nothing particular to us—but I was presented to her Majesty afterwards and she said she had heard of my books, and the Duke of York the *nouveau mari* apparently made a special point of complimenting me on them. There is I believe no discount upon their success, but the best of all will be if the College really triumphs over its difficulties. . . .

I see in the Paris *Herald* of the 25th that Taylor will be ordered as President. This agrees with a letter received yesterday from Stockton, who said he had proposed it to Taylor and the latter would accept if left independent. But to think that Hilary A. Herbert should be the saviour of the College, against Ramsay, Bunce, and the other enemies.

LONG ISLAND, Sept. 20, 1897.

. . . . . .

No man, however, can expect to improve himself greatly who will not be content to do as I did; read Jomini,

[1] Rear Admiral Henry Erben, Commander-in-Chief in Europe. Erben was the author of the phrase, "The Man behind the Gun." In response to the toast, "The United States Navy," Admiral Erben said that "a bond of affection existed between the navies of England and America, and they were always glad to reciprocate the good feeling exhibited towards them by the British Navy. Nobody has said a word in behalf of Jack, the man behind the gun; but he was as good as he ever was, and blood was the thing that told." The speech was widely quoted and *Punch* paid its compliments to Admiral Erben in a poem of which one verse is quoted (*Army and Navy Journal*):

"Thanks, Admiral E., for teaching P.
That neat and telling phrase!
He joins full heart, for his poor part,
In all that mutual praise
Poured freely out 'twixt sailors stout,
But that which 'cops the bun'
Is your sound crack about brave Jack,
'The Man behind the Gun!'"

Hamersley, the Archkuke Charles, etc., etc., atlas in hand, and with painstaking care.

. . . . . .

During my whole time on the Board, historical parables to our positions were continually occurring to me. How many men in the navy do you suppose know naval history or think of naval operations, in that way? or how many, if they read this, would fail to vote me an egotistic, superannuated ass? Yet unless there can be found in the navy a reasonable body of opinion to recognize that war should be regarded that way, I don't see how any demand for a General Staff is to arise, beyond a mere desire to get the better of the Staff by a sidewind. But such a motive will effect nothing.

I believe that a series of articles for a magazine I am just beginning will afford a better lever to move public opinion than a letter to the Secretary. The instant a man leaves the room or a letter is pigeon-holed it is forgotten. The last thing the Board did—I wrote the letter—was to implore the Department to get the battle-ships at once in first class order, and to have no parades and celebrations and traveling from port to port. When we left the dispositions seemed excellent, but today I see the *Massachusetts* is going to Boston, and I suppose some to Newport, etc.

The navy—in my opinion—wants to stop grubbing in machine shops and to get up somewhere where it can take a bird's eye view of military truths, and see them in their relations and proportions. I don't believe this can be done by letters to a Secretary; certainly not to one who sees in the President of the War Board a grand war horse. If I believed it would do good, I would feel bound to write; but I have written and talked and stormed for three months before the Board, the Secretary, and the President and I feel now very much like the teacher who after laborious explanations, receives from one of his boys one of those answers we see in the funny columns of a newspaper.

LONG ISLAND, September 3, 1901.

There was no constituted Board at the time of the Chilian imbroglio in 1891–2. I was ordered to Washington, and directed to study the military side of the question, to be ready to prepare plans, or to express opinions, as a re-

sult of my reflections; but Mr. Tracy kept matters in his own hands, consulted when he wished to consult, and acted without consultation as he chose. Nor do I remember that I was ever directed to consult anyone else in the Department; certainly, very rarely if ever. At times I saw War Department officials by the Secretary's directions, for a specific purpose.

Mr. Tracy consulted others as he did me—Ramsay, Folger, I know, and doubtless others; but there was no Board known to me. . . .

NEW YORK, Jan. 13, 1903.

Thank you for your letter. The main thesis of my War of 1812 must necessarily be the sufferings of the country through the inadequacy of the Navy as compared with the actual power of the country to have made better preparations.

I will endeavor however so to word my comment as not to give offense such as you mention. I own to thinking that the paragraph as a whole is good for our public; and that the Navy can only complain of the expression you quote by severing it from the context, which enlarges—perhaps not sufficiently—upon the merits of the navy and the demerits of the nation towards the service.

NOTE: by Admiral Luce. In answer to letter of mine calling attention to "Interest of America—Sea Power pages 149–50 stating that "never was blood spilled more uselessly than in the frigate fights of war of 1812."

S. B. L.

NEW YORK, May 12, 1903.

Your early days must have been contemporary with some who had the traditional reports of 1812. Have you ever heard any comment on the fact that the *United States* and the *President* both arrived in the United States in December, 1812, and did not go to sea again till the spring, thus throwing away the winter months for getting out. The *United States* particularly returning from the capture of the *Macedonian* was by Decatur—after the action—pronounced fit to continue her cruise. Yet she acted as above, and so never again got to sea during the war.

I have now worked through the three first frigate actions. I am somewhat surprised to find each having its own distinct individuality, though I cannot yet but grudge the time I have to spend on them. More interesting and important is the individuality of the captains, betrayed more by continual impression than by particular expression.

LONG ISLAND, June 17, 1903.

I have intended all along to answer your last letter, not because it absolutely required a reply, but because I think you misapprehended the drift of my query. It was not the failure of our frigates to get away after the spring —say April—1813; but that, with a difficulty so plainly to be foreseen, why they—notably the *President* and *United States*—should have remained, apparently supinely, during the preceding three months. After April the difficulty, except for light draft vessels, was almost insuperable.

After his action with the *Macedonian* Decatur wrote that his damages would not prevent his continuing his cruise; that he came back only to see the prize into port. He arrived Dec. 4, 1812, and the *United States*, losing the next four months, never again got to sea. The *President* arrived Boston Dec. 31st, she did not sail again till late in April. Since writing you I have come across a misplaced letter of Decatur's March 10, 1813, "the new mainmast of my ship will be finished today, and the principal cause of my detention in port so long be thus removed."

. . . . . .

As regards the surrender of the *President*, I knew Roosevelt's general ground, but have purposely refrained from studying his reasons till I shall have formed my independent conclusions. Decatur has always been a hero to me; all my prepossessions are in his favor. The question of when to give in is always difficult. Hull's surrender at Detroit and Porter's defence of the *Essex* mark extremes; granting for argument's sake, what is very disputable, that Hull needed to surrender at all. His excuse was "to save life." Porter unquestionably would have been justified in surrendering sooner than he did for the same reason. Whatever specific justification exists in a par-

ticular case, I suppose we would all agree in the general rule that it is better to hold out too long than too short.

LONG ISLAND, July 29, 1903.

I read your pamphlet on Naval Administration, which you kindly sent me, with much interest; and I need scarcely add with entire concurrence. Should the views you advocate find legislative adoption, which now seems possible, no one will have done so much as yourself in putting the administration of the navy on an efficient basis. The present scheme, to my mind, derives directly from the War College, through Taylor's experience there; and the institution of the College, due entirely to yourself, was, when taken in connection with the state of the service at that time, a singular instance of prescience. If the History of the Navy as a whole, from beginning to end, ever finds a philosophic historian, one capable of freeing himself from trivialities and seeing things in their true proportion, he will give a very large place to that incident, even if it be necessary to sacrifice a few skirmishes to give it the room due.

I want to ask you if you can make time to read critically my discussion of the *Chesapeake-Shannon* action. I have taken a somewhat different point of view—a different ground—from the other narratives known to me; basing myself upon my analysis of times and incidents. Before myself accepting it as a finality—to myself—I should be glad to have the judgment of a person upon whose professional ability I can rely as upon yours. When I tell you that I wrote it three times, and was a week over it, you will see I found the task not light; but the truth is explaining defeats is a nuisance—at least to me.

LONG ISLAND, August 10, 1903.

I am much indebted for your letter and comments, and have made some changes in consequence of them. As regards the squaring the main yard, your judgment would be decisive, did not my own agree as to its impropriety; but I fear the evidence too strong that Lawrence came up with such way on that only so could he prevent shooting by. I did not know that James' first edition did not mention it. The one I have is explicit, and also mentions that

Broke waited with way on, but maintopsail shaking. Budd, second Lieutenant of the *Chesapeake*, had the forward main deck division, and was doubtless watching the approach from the bridle port. He testified before the Cox court that the *Shannon* was lying with her yards aback, (evidently the condition noted by James), and that the *Chesapeake* came up "with considerable way." The backing of the *Chesapeake's* main topsail he would not know, of his own knowledge; but he swears that his guns fired three rounds, after which they no longer bore, the ship having ranged too far ahead. A man on the main deck at such a time could only know relative positions, and I fancy that this being ahead was compounded of a forward and a luffing movement. However that be, it seems to me probable, independent of James' statement, that Lawrence *had* to back something or else go so far ahead that his guns could not bear, and also give the chance of raking.

Your criticism seems to me so just that I have recast my treatment, bringing out the evidence more fully, that it may appear that Lawrence probably did as alleged, because of his first error of coming up with too great way. I shall not make this comment, I only arrange the evidence. James lived till 1827, and I have no doubt, from his painstaking ways, he got his account from Broke who died about 1840, subsequent to the first edition of the history. My account is not yet final, for I have learned that the record of the Court of Inquiry, Bainbridge senior member, is at the Department, and I shall see it or a copy. I don't expect much from it, because no spar deck officer of rank survived. I may also send for the S's log, though my experience of logs of that time is that they differ little from the Captain's report.

Long Island, April 8, 1904.

By one of those vagaries to which members of families seem liable, the packet containing the chase of the *Constitution* was placed in a corner where it escaped my knowledge till last evening. I opened it this morning. It is a splendid picture,—using the adjective not loosely, but advisedly; instinct with life and movement. I never saw the original that I know, but I imagine it loses little in photograph. If I could venture a criticism, it would

be that the conspicuous figure of the *Constitution*, the first center of interest, would not have been diminished in effect, while the urgency of her situation would have been more impressive, had the artist permitted the leading British ship to emerge a little more clearly from the haze. This is a detail, however, the work as it stands is noble.

I shall forward very shortly to Messrs. Little and Brown with strong terms of appreciation.

I don't know whether I have before mentioned that we expect to go to Europe May 10, returning at the end of September.

LONG ISLAND, January 27, 1908

. . . . . .

With you I have watched interestedly the course of naval affairs since the beginning of the Brownson imbroglio. In my judgment the President, confident in his knowledge of naval matters and of his profound interest in the service, has made the grave mistake, . . . (of) expecting to run the machine himself. Necessary result, hasty and mistaken decisions, for the navy is now so big a thing as to demand the whole attention of a first class man for a full official term. No man can run it and the Presidency together. The letters to Brownson, or about him, should never have been written by any one but the Secretary, though the President might have seen them with reference to the merchant skipper for the hospital ship; has anyone recalled the behavior of the transport captains off Santiago, as stated by Chadwick?[1]

[1] See *Encyclopedia Americana.*

CHAPTER XIX

Signals. The School of Naval Architecture at Boston. The Line and Staff Controversy

IN reviewing the work of a man so versatile as Admiral Luce, it is difficult and unnecessary to attempt to discuss his activities chronologically, so frequently do they overlap or interlock. We have seen that as early as 1864 the seed of the high education of Naval Officers was planted in his mind by a chance remark of General Sherman. Even then he was formulating a scheme for the education of the enlisted men, and was working on a code of signals.

He was constantly occupied in professional work. He was never idle and he was impatient with those who were. His profession absorbed every moment of his time.

When a young officer he interested himself in signals and devised a code of his own which he submitted to the Navy Department and for which he was commended. He proposed the use of the steam whistle, bugle, magnesium lights or electric lights as occasion required and facilities offered.

He wrote frequently for the magazines on naval topics, and he suggested the idea of a chair of Naval Architecture in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He studied the science of Naval Administration and boldly pointed out with disconcerting pen the defects of our own.

His articles on these subjects and naval history make a large volume to which the student of the War College turns for inspiration as well as information.

The decade from 1874 were fruitful years—during which the slow but steady tide of routine promotion carried him through the grades of Commander, Captain and Commodore to the grade of Rear Admiral (acting) in July, 1884, and two months later to the door of the new War College as its first President.

He wrote an article on signals and signalling[1] which merits notice from its research and its quaint humor. Signals he defines as arbitrary signs made for the purpose of conveying intelligence, "not only in connection with military and naval affairs, but by all classes and conditions of people from the gay Parisienne who signals her lover by a camelia in her hair to the dusky Indian whose bundle of arrows is the ominous signal for war." He traces the history of signals from Biblical times when Moses used trumpets for sounding the assembly and for marching as described in Numbers 10—down through the ages to the present, and points out that the last of all signals will be the trumpet call to raise the dead.

In 1875 after the nautical school had been established at New York he conceived the idea of a school of Naval Architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Boston and wrote the following letter to the President of the Institute:

To Prof. Wm. B. Rogers from Captain Luce

Navy Yard, Boston, Mass.
July 8th, 1875.

I beg leave to call your attention to certain of the provisions of the act entitled "an act to encourage the establishment of public Marine Schools" appd June 20th, 1874,

[1] *Potter's American Monthly*, April, 1897.

as follows: "The President of the United States is authorized . . . to detail proper officers of the Navy to act as instructors in any school or college having a nautical branch . . . for instruction in . . . Marine Engineery *and all matters pertaining to the construction . . . of vessels.*" This act was intended to supplement the 26th sec. of the act appd July 28th, 1866, which authorizes the President to detail officers of the army as instructors in military science at any regularly established College "for the purpose of promoting a knowledge of military science among the young men of the United States," and thereby afford equal advantages to those young men of the United States who desire to acquire a knowledge of nautical science or any particular branch thereof. Now from the high character of the Institute of Technology, and its proximity to this Navy Yard there is no school in the country so well qualified as it is, to take advantage of the provisions of the act quoted by establishing a "Nautical branch" for instructions in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering.

That we are about the only maritime country of any importance without a school of naval architecture is well known; and that a theoretical and practical course in that branch is greatly to be desired will I think be readily admitted. On the other hand it is undeniable that the history of ship-building in this country is, up to a recent date, highly creditable to our people.

Free from trammels of tradition and with characteristic independence of thought, American ship-builders were the first to abandon some of the most cherished features of European models. It is an historical fact that our frigates proved in 1812 superior to all foreign vessels of their class afloat, and the famous Baltimore Clipper won a world wide fame for speed.

But the history of Marine Architecture shows that we are indebted to the mathematicians of France and Spain for the elucidation of the principles on which our ships were built. English writers admit that for many years their ship-builders received no aid from science further than the copying of French models. Their absurd tonnage laws and other causes clearly traced in the history of Marine Architecture operated to keep their merchant ships particularly of bad models and inferior quality.

One reason assigned for the backwardness in naval architecture in England is that the "speculative ideas of men undoubtedly of sense and judgment but uninformed as to principles, were taken as the rules for guidance." In France, on the contrary, the aid of science was called in, and some of the greatest mathematicians of the time turned their attention to the improvement of the shipping of that country. "It is an astonishing fact," observes one English writer, "that the experience of more than a century of acknowledged inferiority to France, also with the admission that her superiority was caused by the researches of her mathematicians, should have still left it a question with England, whether our ships should be designed on speculative opinions, or from scientific deductions." So early as 1688 Renan was employed by the enlightened Minister of Marine Colbert and was the first French author to write upon the theory of ships. He was followed by Bernoullis, Pere La Hoste, Bouguer, Euler, Don Jorje Juan, Romme and others, the "effects of whose writings," the author above quoted continues, "we have traced in the progress of the improvements they introduced in the navies of France and Spain, and forced the Navy of England to imitate."

Efforts were made in England from time to time to change this state of things. In 1791 a Society was instituted for the "Improvement of Naval Architecture."

In 1811 a school of Naval Architecture was established in the Dock Yard at Portsmouth, England—but in each instance the attempt ended in failure. The present Institute of Naval Architects in England was established in 1860, followed by the Royal School of Naval Architecture at South Kensington in 1864. From this it will be seen that England was content for a long series of years to copy models and avail herself in various ways of the labors of scientists of other countries; but has at last found herself forced by the great changes in naval science to exert herself to promote and encourage technical education in that department of industry. And with what success the names of Dr. Woolley, Sir Wm. Fairbairn, John Scott Russell, E. J. Reed, Rankine, Froude, Grantham, Murray, Fincham, Barnaby and others fully attest; names which, in their special departments find no comparates in this country. The experience of the United States is similar to that of England in some respects.

As long as we had wooden sailing vessels to build we were pre-eminently successful. But the introduction of steam and iron having wrought great and rapid changes, we must follow the examples of England and other great maritime countries and train our young Architects and Engineers in the new school.

This Navy Yard with its vast resources offers an incomparable field for training in the practical parts of naval architecture and marine engineering, which must henceforth go hand in hand. The Institute of Technology affords every facility for the successful prosecution of the theoretical branches. While from among the Naval Constructors and Engineer Officers of the Navy, no doubt there could be found competent instructors.

The several letters herewith enclosed will show how the project is regarded in the Navy.

Add this one department to the curriculum of the Institute which owes its very existence to you, my dear sir, and you will contribute one more adornment to the noble monument you have erected to yourself, and confer another solid benefit on your country.

P. S. That our Eastern frigates were built after French models is very clearly established by the evidence of Naval Constructor Mr. Joshua Humphries (designer of the *Constitution*), as the following extract from an official letter written by him under date of Dec. 23, 1794, will show:

"As soon as Congress has agreed to build frigates it was contemplated to make them the most powerful, and, at the same time, the most useful ships. After the most extensive researches, and mature deliberations, their dimensions were fixed; and I was directed to prepare the draught; which was accordingly done and approved. Those plans appear to be similar with those adopted by France, in their great experience in Naval Architecture; they having cut down several of their seventy-fours to make heavy frigates; making them nearly of the dimensions of those for the United States. From the construction of those ships, it is expected the Commanders of them will have it in their power to engage, or not, any ship as they think proper; and no ship under sixty-four, now afloat, but what must submit to them; these reasons are paramount to all objections, and annihilated opposition."

From Professor W. B. Rogers to Captain Luce

Gibbs Avenue, Newport, Aug. 5, 1875.

I have already expressed to you in conversation my interest in your plan, and the desire I feel to have a department of nautical science, including naval architecture, established in the Institute, and I shall do what I can to secure this result; meanwhile it will be important to have the subject brought to the attention of leading members of the Corporation, that they may share in our interest, and be ready, whenever the finances of the Institute permit, to make provision for the new department.

On my return to Boston in the autumn I shall aid you, as far as my health allows, in forwarding this object. Meanwhile accept my best thanks for the clear and persuasive exposition of the subject with which you have favoured me, and believe me, my dear Captain, etc., etc.

Francis T. Bowles, later Chief Naval Constructor of the Navy, strongly endorsed the idea of instructing the assistant Naval Constructors at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, rather than at the Naval Academy; in a letter to Admiral Luce he said:

Navy Yard, New York, Dec. 2nd, 1898.

My reasons for wishing the instruction of the Assistant Naval Constructors to be given at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, rather than at the Naval Academy, were briefly as follows:

1. The profession of a Naval Constructor involves the technical knowledge necessary to a skillful naval Architect, as well as the ability to control and administer a large industrial establishment, involving all the trades employed upon a ship; it is therefore essentially a civil and not a military profession. The necessary military knowledge is acquired at the Naval Academy in the Cadet course, and therefore the special course for the technical duties should be carried out under the best conditions suited to a civil profession.

2. The Institute has already a skilled body of educators and professors, with all the classes, laboratories

and appliances for the co-ordinate branches of instruction, such as pure mathematics, applied mechanics, electricity, and sciences, necessary to follow the strictly technical and professional studies. All this is in working order and only requires a selection of branches to adopt a proper and complete course. These courses and professors are subject to intelligent and skillful educational control, such as would not be probable nor possible under the control and direction of naval officers at the Naval Academy.

3. It would be more economical for the Government to pay the Institute from five to ten thousand dollars per annum to maintain such a course than to have a course of its own at Annapolis.

4. If the Government patronized the course at the Institute, it would be open to private students and would tend to raise the general standard of the professions throughout the country by the emulation of private persons to take the course approved by the Government.

The course in Naval Architecture at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology was established in 1893.

During his long service on board ship Admiral Luce saw the quarrel between the Line Officers of the Navy and the Staff Officers grow from petty grievances in the Wardroom to a factional dispute which was finally settled by Congress. Luce was always "a strong Line man," but above other considerations he was just and fair, as will be seen in his presentment of the case as published in the New York *Herald*. Writing of Admiral Luce in connection with this controversy, Admiral Harrington says:

The quarrel between the Staff and Line was then at its crisis (1877), bitter in assault and obstinate in determined resistance. Very early in my service on board the *Hartford*, I was in sharp conflict with a Staff Officer who was of higher rank than mine. I may say that in all such discussions I took care to be in accord with the letter and spirit of the Navy regulations. The way in which Luce

decided the issue was gratifying to me, while his courteous but firm manner disarmed the opposition and stilled resentment. I retain written evidences of Luce's satisfaction with my service as Executive Officer.

For years the contention and jealousy of the Line and Staff officers sapped the life blood of the Navy. In the old days of sails, the line officers, the Doctors and Pursers and Marine Officers lived in harmony on board ship, but with steam came the engineers and their presence in the ward room was resented by the conservative line officers—the sailor officers of the Navy. It would serve no useful purpose to go into the details of the quarrel which, especially on board ship, created dissension of all kinds. Discipline suffered and consequently discipline was lowered. In a nutshell, the Engineers felt that the Line looked down on them and ignored them and whenever possible humiliated them. The Line on the other hand regarded the Staff—for in the quarrel the Paymasters and Doctors lined up with the Engineers—as obstructionists who were combined together to weaken their authority; they resented and combated the efforts of the staff to obtain actual instead of relative rank. The thorn in the flesh that hurt most was the fact that the Staff rank for rank received higher pay, and by law the benefits of a "constructive" term of service of six years, in computing this rank and pay. That is a staff officer took rank from six years prior to his entry in the service, and his longevity pay was computed on the same basis. The result was that a graduate of the Naval Academy invariably found himself in later years junior to people who had not entered the service even two years after he had left the Academy. It was an intolerable situation. In 1886 Admiral Luce commenting on this situation said,[1] "It is high time this unseemly contest should end. It has gone into politics, and between the two the navy has been made a football. As the matter stands today the

[1] New York *Herald*, October 24, 1886.

line goes before Congress and blocks the movement of the Staff; the latter on the other hand blocks the plans of the line. As to the causes which gave rise to the contention I do not hesitate to say both sides have substantial grievances. Perhaps the line was the aggressor. Some of our old school quarterdeck martinets of the sailing ship epoch could not understand or sympathize with the presence of the Engineers. They were tryannical and insolent and the Engineers resented it. Being better versed than the old sea dogs in the way of land, they coming directly from the people got satisfaction as best they might through political influence. I am opposed to all of it. I believe in going halfway to compromise and adjust the difficulty. Every branch of the service has a legitimate and recognized place. An engineer ought to be supreme in his department, a paymaster in his, the surgeon in his own sphere. The watch officer has his place, the first lieutenant has his position. There must be some supreme authority on board ship just as in a cotton mill. In the former case it is the captain; in the latter the general manager is usually given the position. If an officer doesn't do his duty the captain must make him.

" In each and every bill that is proposed to increase the efficiency of the navy it should be clearly shown by the representative of the line and staff that there is no attempt apparent or concealed, to injure the status of the other. I, speaking as a line officer, say that no bill should be proposed that is not clearly free from antagonism to the interests of the staff. No reasonable staff officer wishes to assume any of the duties or functions of the fighting branch of the service.

" Tyrannical or unnecessarily arbitrary line officers who 'go' for the staff on principle should be repressed by the sentiment of the service, and if necessary by the Secretary of the Navy. On the other hand staff officers should keep within the limits of their duties. I am ex-

tremely earnest in this matter. I wish to look upon this question as a patriotic officer who holds the service and its welfare above all."

The quarrel went on, the staff gaining inch by inch until 1899 when a Board of Officers was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to thoroughly investigate the subject. The President of the Board was Rear Admiral R. D. Evans who was believed a "strong line man"; it was therefore something of a shock to the conservatives when the Board recommended, and the recommendations became law, the amalgamation of the Engineer Corps with the Line. The Engineers had asked only for the titles of the line, and an increase in the numbers of the various grades. The Evans Board gave them line titles, and rank, line uniforms and as far as it could be adjusted line duties. In other words the old Engineer Corps as such ceased to exist.

The strongest man the Engineers had was the Engineer-in-Chief, George W. Melville, an officer of marked ability and great distinction. He had been DeLong's right hand man in the disastrous voyage of the *Jeannette* to the Arctic regions and had been promoted by Congress for conspicuous and meritorious conduct in that ill-fated voyage. Proud of his profession as a mechanical engineer, he did not envy either the line titles or the uniform. The correspondence between Luce and Melville on this subject is full of interest and merits careful reading.

To Rear Admiral Melville, U.S.N., from Admiral Luce

15 Francis Street,
Newport, R. I.,
April 24, 1905.

I have read with great interest the parts of your address before the American Academy of Sciences April 7th and 8th, as reported in the *Army and Navy Journal* of the 15th.

You refer to an "Engineering Navy," but do not give your views on the question, whether or not, the amalgamation clause of the Personnel Act has proved a success.

The experiment has been on trial, now, about six years. How much longer are we to wait for an authoritative opinion as to its value in providing the navy with the very best engineering ability the country can produce? And that is what the country and the times demand: That the navy shall have the most thoroughly efficient body of Engineers that can be produced. Such a corps is a military necessity to our navy. The production of such a corps is, from a naval standpoint, one of the most important questions of the hour—a question which, at no distant day, must be answered without evasion.

I do not ask of you a lengthy reply to this hasty note, but I would esteem it a great favor if you would state briefly whether or not, in your opinion, the "Engineering Navy," of which you speak, is now producing the most efficient type of Engineers?

This is a subject in which I have, for years past, taken a deep interest—purely as a military question. We have reached a point now where we must accept the amalgamation plan in its entirety; or reject it absolutely. Which shall it be?

Melville, who was fond of Luce and admired him, replied in a long letter in which he stated his opinion that amalgamation had failed, from the start, and would ever be a failure "if carried on as at present." He contended for a corps of engineers of some three hundred men graduates of the Naval Academy, to be graded from ensigns to captain with rank and title of the line, to wear red shoulder straps like the artillery, and red and gold on the sleeve and to have absolute command of their men on board ship after the manner of the marine officer and the lieutenants of the gun division.

But the Evans Board absorbed all the engineers. "He gave us all we asked for," said Melville, "and more, too."

He writes to Luce in the most cordial manner, "as one

Luce Hall.

Seamanship Building at United States Naval Academy, Annapolis.

who has always been known as having the best interests of the Navy at heart," and "I am pleased to say I have always tried to emulate you, in your patriotism and love for the service."

In the following September Luce has occasion to write again to Melville, and asks him if we have the *best* engineer force:

To Rear Admiral Geo. W. Melville from Admiral Luce

15 Francis Street,
Newport, R. I.,
September 12, 1905.

Please accept my thanks for your pamphlet, "The Important Elements in Naval Conflicts." It is a notable paper and a very valuable contribution to our professional literature.

The prime factor in naval warfare is the battleship. The efficiency of the battleship is mainly dependent on her motive power; and the engines and their dependencies, which furnish the motive power, are wholly dependent, for their efficiency, upon those who have the care and management of them.

In other words the military value of the battleship is largely dependent on the efficiency of its engineer's force. Such a simple proposition needs no argument to support it—no illustrations drawn from the lessons of recent naval conflicts. It is a self-evident proposition.

The question then is: Have we in our Navy the best engineers' force that the country can produce? For, if we have the best ships and the best guns, then nothing but the best personnel of the engineers' department will satisfy the demands of our people. I, myself, am not competent to answer the question; but from all the information I can get on the subject, I should say that we have *not* the best that can be produced. Indeed, the last annual report of the Engineer-in-Chief indicates, very clearly, that the present condition of our engineers force is far from satisfactory.

What is commonly known as the "amalgamation clause" of the Personnel Act of 1899, by which the Engineer Corps of the Navy was transferred to the line of

the Navy, has been in force now, for six years—long enough, it would seem, for our experts to decide how far the experiment has proved successful and what modification of the Act, if any, is desirable.

Should you publish anything more on naval topics I trust you will give the world the benefit of your views on this—to the Navy—vital question.

Melville replies at length and with frankness, regretting that we had not a Board of "Luces and Melvilles" to adjust the new engineering force of the Navy.

He reviews the engineering situation, and states that the Amalgamation Board killed the Engineer Corps, as the Line always carried their own motions and defeated the Engineers. After "amalgamation" was legalized it was only half heartedly put into effect so far as requiring line officers and the engineers alternating on deck and in the engine room, with the result that there was nothing to take the place of the old engineer corps.

He discusses the combined efforts of all officers to increase their pay which were made part of the work of the Board, and Melville, who was opposed, found it was impossible to stem the current in favor of the bill; at the same time the Marine Corps got an increase of 1,500 more men and officers. But believing that the majority of the navy approved the bill, and that the younger officers of the engineer corps wanted it, Melville acquiesced. As he said to an officer shortly afterwards, "the younger men of my Corps have stood loyally by me, it was impossible for me to do anything else."

He wrote to Luce, "No navy can be an efficient navy, without an efficient engineer corps. We have no engineer corps, therefore we have no navy." And then he adds what is as true today as it was twenty years ago when there were no air ships: "I agree with you that the battleship is and must be the great unit for offense and defense. All other classes of vessels are merely auxiliary to the battleships, each and all being useful."

A few months prior to this correspondence Admiral Luce submitted to the Secretary of the Navy a memorandum on the subject of Line titles for Staff Officers, in which he stated that "the ill-advised decision permitting the use of military titles by members of the civil branch of the naval service grew out of confusion between the terms rank and titles," and that the difference was sharply defined by statute, and that the Personnel Act of March 3, 1889, "stated explicitly: Neither shall this Act be construed as changing the titles of officers in the Staff Corps of the Navy. . . .

"As Congress has ever since the foundation of our Government and in accordance with universal practice, recognized the distinction between the military and civil branches of the naval service it is inconceivable that it should now at this late date, reverse its well established policy and derange the existing order among the several corps of the navy by granting inappropriate and misleading titles."

The law relating to titles and rank has never been repealed, but during the World War (September, 1918) the Secretary of the Navy issued an order "off his own bat," to use Lord Palmerston's expression, giving line titles to staff officers, and embodied it in the Navy Regulations, and at the same time abolished all distinctions in uniforms except for the necessary distinguishing corps devices. He could change the Regulations and did, but he could not change the statutes of the United States so the strange anomaly exists that commissions of staff officers signed by the President of the United States still bear their ancient and honorable titles distinctive of their respective professions, while the new Regulations require that "every officer shall be designated and addressed by the *title of his rank* without any discrimination whatever."

Admiral Chadwick was right when in a letter to Admiral Luce he said: "We are not a serious people and will

not take such things seriously. . . . I have preached for years on this subject to no effect, except that I have got so far that, as Chief of Bureau, I am not called 'Commodore.' I have always taken the ground that should I as a commander permit it, I should necessarily give the same title to the (other) Chiefs . . . John Stevenson[1] took the right view and said if the Paymaster General was 'general,' that John Stevenson as General Storekeeper was 'general,' and I have no doubt there were many who took him seriously. Accurate people do not do these things, and the French and most continental nations (all so far as I know) even only allow the appellation of 'naval officer' to the officer of the line.

"There is simply no logic in us."

The bootless agitation to prevent the Marine Corps from serving on board ship found no favor with this clear-headed far-seeing veteran. The Marine Corps was created exactly four weeks after the first Congressional legislation on the subject of the Navy, that is to say November 10, 1775. The Marine Corps and the Navy were practically twin products of Congress. Their history and their traditions are so interwoven as to be inseparable. At various times beginning in 1839 down to 1913 efforts have been made to take the Marines out of the ships, and transfer the Corps to the Army. These efforts were vigorously resisted by the Corps, supported by Admiral Porter and many other leading officers of the Navy.

In 1908 however the following Executive order was issued which restricted the duties of the Marines to shore, and there is no doubt it was the intention to ultimately transfer the Corps to the Army which would have been practical extinction.

In accordance with the power vested in me by Section 1619, Revised Statutes of the United States, the following duties are assigned to the United States Marine Corps:

[1] A Pay Director in the Navy

(1) To garrison the different navy yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States.

(2) To furnish the first line of the mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.

(3) To man such naval defenses, and to aid in manning, if necessary, such other defenses as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.

(4) To garrison the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama.

(5) To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace.

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

THE WHITE HOUSE,
NOV. 12, 1908.

It is deemed pertinent in this regard to write what has more recently been revived in the public letters of "Archie" Butt, an Aide to President Roosevelt at the time. He says that President Roosevelt (November 19, 1908), after the Order was signed, having for its purpose the retention of the Marine Corps by the naval service, had stated as follows:

"I do not hesitate to say that their downfall, as the German Emperor's, is largely due to themselves. They have augmented to themselves such importance, and their influence, which they have gained by pandering to every political influence, has given them such an abnormal position for the size of their Corps that they have simply invited their own destruction. I do not hesitate to say that they should be absorbed into the Army and no vestige of their organization should be allowed to remain. They cannot get along with the Navy and as a separate command with the Army the conditions would be intolerable."

This was frustrated by a proviso in the appropriation bill forbidding any money to be spent unless the Marines

were restored to sea service. In 1913 the General Board expressed the opinion that it was in the interests of the naval service that Marines should serve at sea.

During the controversy which was argued with much heat by both sides leading Marine Officers appealed to Admiral Luce to support their efforts to maintain the naval status of the Corps.

FROM ADMIRAL LUCE TO COL. CHARLES HEYWOOD, COMMANDANT MARINE CORPS

NICE, FRANCE, February 15, 1894.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of January 22, requesting "An expression of my views as to whether or not I consider Marines essential on board ship," etc., etc.

In reply I beg to refer you to my letter of Dec. 29, 1874 addressed to your distinguished predecessor Brig. Gen. J. Zeilin wherein I expressed views decidedly favorable to the maintenance of the Marine Corps, as part of the personnel of the Navy. Subsequent experience has fully confirmed me in those opinions. The Corps has always been so distinguished for its discipline and efficiency that I should regard the withdrawal of the Guards from our ships and Navy Yards as a positive misfortune to the Navy. The proposition to supply these places with blue jackets is not worthy of serious consideration.

When a system has worked well for over one hundred years it seems unwise, to say the least, to change it save through pressure of some marked and obvious necessity for improvement and it does not appear that any such necessity exists in regard to the Marine Corps.

He who rarely failed to see clearly and beyond the events of the present day, wrote[1]:

"I believe in keeping the marine guard on board ship. The idea that marines are placed on board ship in these days to keep sailors in order I dismiss as utterly unworthy

[1] *Naval Institute*, vol. xxii., 1896.

of a moment's consideration. I yield to no one in my high opinion of our seamen. It is my pride that I was brought up among them. I gladly concede all that is claimed for them. As infantrymen on shore, as serving on shore in any capacity, in peace and in war, I can testify of my own personal knowledge that our sailors have always done well. It is no compliment to say that in many respects they are far superior to marines.

"In the several encampments of the naval brigade of the North Atlantic Station I have often seen blue-jackets posted as sentries and I know that they were faithful in the performance of their duties. They took to the duty naturally, and it seemed quite in accordance with the fitness of things. But in his own element it is quite another matter. To see blue-jackets posted as sentries on board ship would be enough to shock one's sense of military propriety. The idea of a sentry and a soldier cannot be dissociated. It is the sincere regard I have for the sailor that prompts me to enter my protest against the attempt to make him a hybrid soldier. It is not that he would fail in his duty; it is not that he is 'not to be trusted.' Officers who say so show their training as sea officers to be defective. Let us have no false issues. It is because soldiering is not his vocation. That he can perform at need the duty of an infantryman is so creditable because it is not his vocation.

"The marine guard on board ship is the outward and visible sign of the military character of the environment. It serves to keep alive and foster the military spirit. To take the marine guard from the ship is to deprive it in a great measure of its military aspect. If it is said that it is only for show, the reply is that show, appearances, the 'pride, pomp and circumstance of war' go for a great deal in military life. But it is for much more; the marine guard belongs to the fighting force of the ship just as much as the seamen do, and although an infantryman, he can be made a good marine artilleryman. Mar-

ine officers are just as much line officers as sea officers are, and have the same adaptability. One of the best signal officers I have ever seen on board ship was a captain of Marines. But they preserve withal their distinctively military character. And it is that distinctively military character that gives them their value in the economy of a ship of war.

"Take for a single example the case of a call in a foreign port to protect the American consulate. The presence of marines there is a visible sign all foreigners would understand—that the place was under military protection. The distinctive character of the soldier is recognized the world over, and the all but sacred character of a soldier on post is universally respected. Sorry, indeed, would I be to see soldiering made a part of the regular duties of a man-of-war's-man. Sorry would I be, speaking in my character as an American citizen not unacquainted with naval affairs, to see the backward movement of withdrawing the marine guards from our ships. Had I ten thousand votes they should all be cast in favor of preserving their present status and increasing their numbers."

The fight continued many years, but ended in a complete victory for the Marine Corps. Under date of March 29, 1909, Admiral Luce wrote to a friend in New York, "The Marines have won out. It is now the duty of all friends of the Navy to accept the situation cheerfully and in good faith and do everything possible to allay the ill feeling caused by the attempt to obliterate a fine Corps; for that would have been the inevitable result—obliteration—of taking the Marines out of the ships. The Commandant of the Corps is partially responsible for this attempt. He wants a little army of his own and to occupy the front seat."

With the subsequent action of the Navy Department in making the Major General Commandant of the Corps a member of the General Board, friction between the Marines and the Navy ceased.

CHAPTER XX

Last Years

AFTER he relinquished his active duties Admiral Luce continued his residence in Newport where he lived with his wife and daughters. Here he found sanctuary in his library, and continued his literary work. He became an associate editor of Johnson's *Universal Cyclopædia*, editor of the *Standard Dictionary*, and he revised his *Naval Song Book*. He contributed articles on naval matters to magazines and reviews, and his opinions on all naval questions were sought by publishers and editors. In 1905 his essay, *The Department of the Navy*, won first honorable mention in the Prize Essay Contest of the Naval Institute, and a Life Membership in the Institute.

As a resident of Newport he was active in civic affairs. He served six years in the city council and twice declined to allow his name to be used for the Mayoralty. For twelve years he was a director of the Redwood Library. He was senior warden of All Saints Memorial Church, and when that organization was abandoned he became a member of Trinity Church.

The War College was two miles from his home and to the time of his detachment in 1910 he regularly attended the Sessions. For several years he rode his bicycle but afterwards he drove the distance, and he attributed his remarkable health to this daily exercise. The slight figure of the Admiral, almost youthful in vigor and energy, was for a long time familiar to the people on the roads

leading to Coasters' Harbor Island. Just as the children who played in certain London squares used to tell how they remembered the gaunt figure of another aged sailor —Lord Dundonald—"the great Dundonald"—so Newport children now grown tell of Admiral Luce who always had a kind word and pleasant smile for them.

In 1911 he delivered his last address at the War College, remarkable for its insistence upon the necessity of the study of war. "Your profession," he said, speaking to an audience largely composed of naval officers, "is the art of war, and nature will be avenged if you violate one of its laws in undertaking to make a part greater than the whole. You give two years (post-graduate) to marine engineering, and but seventy-eight days to the study of the art you pretend to profess! This is not astigmatism. It is a total eclipse of the mental vision. You cannot even see the grim humor of it."

In the same year were published in the *North American Review* his last articles. One was a review of Admiral Chadwick's *History of Our Relations with Spain*. The other, "The Navy and Its Needs," ranks with his great paper, "The Fleet," first prepared, in 1908, confidentially for the War College, but later published by permission of President Roosevelt, and by competent critics considered his most important contribution to the naval literature of the day. These papers written in his eighty-fifth year show no diminution in vigor and clearness of presentation.

To use his own expression, he now "foreswore his inkhorn and threw away his stylus."

It was inevitable that his days of labor must end, and he accepted the situation with "the genial grace of a nature, sloping toward the sunny side." He might have said with a latter day essayist, "I belong to an earlier period. *Cedo junoribus*. I stand aside with no regret. To be outmoded is to be classic, if one has played his part well."[1]

[1] Max Beerbohm.

Mrs. Stephen B. Luce.

When it was suggested that he might enjoy a trip abroad, he replied in a semi-serious way and with a quizzical smile, "Too late, too late; evening shades prevail, and all that." And yet, had he only known it, a half decade was to pass before he was to hear "the one clear call."

Admiral Luce had one son, John Dandridge Henley, and two daughters, all of whom survived him. His son, bright, active, and intelligent, suffered a serious accident in his youth which resulted in permanent lameness. He entered the Boston banking house of Kidder and Peabody and after the Spanish War was appointed United States Fiscal Agent at Porto Rico. Subsequently he became President of the Central Aquirre Sugar Company. He married Louisa Davis, daughter of Rear Admiral Charles Henry Davis, an officer distinguished in the Civil War. The Luces spent many winters in San Juan where they kept open house.

Henley Luce's son, Stephen Bleecker Luce, Second, was graduated from Harvard College with honors and became an archæologist. Owing to defective vision he was unable to get to the front during the World War, but was appointed a junior lieutenant in the Naval Reserve Force, and served in the office of Naval Intelligence as an expert linguist.

Four years after Admiral Luce's death, Henley Luce was fatally injured in an automobile accident near Fall River, Mass.

The elder daughter of Admiral Luce, Caroline, married Howard Walter, who died in 1891. In 1908 she married her second cousin, Brigadier General Montgomery Meigs Macomb, U. S. A., an officer very well known throughout the army. He was especially distinguished for his work in the Field Artillery Corps to which he belonged. He commanded the Army Station in Hawaii in 1910, where he and Mrs. Macomb lived three years, and was President of the Army War College at the time of his retirement. He died in 1924.

Admiral Luce's second daughter, Charlotte Bleecker, married in 1879 Lieutenant Boutelle Noyes of the Navy, who was killed on board the U. S. S. *Richmond* in Yokohama Harbor by the falling of the main topgallant mast during spar drill. When the mast rope parted, he paused to warn his men, and in doing so was himself killed.

There were two sons by this marriage, Robert Boutelle and Stephen Henley; both went through Harvard College.

Robert followed his uncle to Porto Rico where he became interested in the Island and its people, and where he manages his large coffee plantation.

He served in the Navy during the World War and after passing through the Reserve Officers' Training Class at Annapolis was assigned to sea duty, holding the commission of Lieutenant.

Stephen Henley, after graduating from Harvard, became a civil engineer. In 1917 he entered the Air Service and was sent to France as a pilot in the 1st Air Squadron. He was soon ordered to command the 12th Air Squadron and saw continuous service at the front. At the time of the Armistice he commanded the 5th Corps Observation group, of the 1st Army. He was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross and the Croix de Guerre. He was mustered out as a Major in the Air Service.

When Admiral Luce finally relinquished active work he was eighty-three years old, but "he defied the labors and sorrows" which are scripturally due after threescore and ten. With the exception of increasing deafness, there was but little sign of physical impairment. To the last day of his life his mind was clear, and his eyesight scarcely dimmed.

He never lost interest in the stirring events of that memorable summer when we entered the War. He had an unfaltering faith in the success of the Allies, but he was anxious for the fate of Russia.

His cottage in Francis Street was one of generous hos-

pitality—where he loved to see his friends and to greet the officers who came to make their respects; few officers visited Newport without calling upon the veteran. It became the custom in his declining years for his friends and neighbors to gather at his home on his birthday to offer their congratulations, and this always gave him keen pleasure. On his ninetieth and last anniversary of his birthday the battalion of seamen apprentices from the Training Station marched past the house, from which two large American flags were flying. The Admiral was standing on the veranda with Mrs. Luce and his daughters when the salutes were rendered; then the column resumed its march singing *Nancy Lee*, which the Admiral loved. Inside the house friends gathered around the huge cake upon which burned ninety candles, and for the last time the birthday reception was celebrated.

CHAPTER XXI

The End

Our life is closed, our life begins,
The long, long anchorage we leave,
The ship is clear, at last she leaps!
Joy, Shipmate, joy!

Unarm Eros! the long day's task is done,
And we must sleep.

ADMIRAL LUCE was dying.

It was in the forenoon of July 28, 1917, while his daughter was reading to him the latest dispatches from the Eastern front, that the change which presages the end came suddenly and unexpectedly. He died peacefully; before sunset his sailor spirit had gone back

. . . to the great sweet mother,
Mother and lover of men, the Sea.

The funeral took place in old Trinity and in accordance with his wishes there was no military display. After the simple rites of the Episcopal Church the casket was borne between the long lines of fourteen hundred sailor youths. There was a silence more eloquent and impressive than dirge or volley or muffled drum. He was buried in St. Mary's Churchyard at Portsmouth, Rhode Island.

Gone at last,
That brave old hero of the Past!
His spirit has a second birth,
An unknown, grander life;
All of him that was earth
Lies mute and cold;
Like a wrinkled sheath and old
Thrown off forever from the shimmering blade
That has good entrance made
Upon some distant, glorious strife.[1]

Mrs. Luce survived her husband four years and died eleven months after the tragic death of her son. A worthy tribute to this quiet and unassuming woman who had been the helpmeet and closest adviser of her husband, was from the merchants in Newport. "We feel," they wrote, "that this community has suffered in her loss because she was the type of woman whose value and influence can never be estimated to the town in which she spent so many years of her life."

The work of Admiral Luce will live; his influence cannot become extinct. He did not have the opportunity of achieving distinction in battle or winning the naval crown of glory on his quarterdeck, but in constructive work he had no superior, and few naval careers have been as useful or brilliant.

He once wrote that he always had pulled against wind and tide, but surely the struggle never "dimmed the sincerity of his spirit, or weakened the stoutness of his heart." His wit and gift of repartee and mimicry and sense of humor as well as fun, tided him over the shoals of oppositions and disappointment and often turned aside bitter shafts that were aimed at him. He was a man of ideals, but not an idealist. He was eminently practical but "steeped to the lips" in the traditions of the sea. He was familiar not only with the history of our own

[1] *The Old Admiral* by E. C. Stedman, written in Memory of Rear Admiral Charles Stewart.

navy, but also with that of England and France. James Lawrence of the *Chesapeake*—Don't-give-up-the-ship Lawrence—was his idol of the sea kings. He loved to talk about him and to sing about him.

In her Journal of July 18, 1901, Miss Powel writes:

"Admiral Luce's name was brought up, and I descended as soon as possible. It was a question of Lawrence and the Admiral stayed until long after six looking over scraps and prints, and how he did quote *Sea Songs of 1812*, and his fine face lighted up as his voice rang out about 'Brave Lawrence' in the old song. Admiral Luce said Mrs. Lawrence never called him Mr. Luce, she said Luce, and he used to walk up from church with her a great deal. He had at one time a sword of Captain Lawrence[1] given to him by the family, but he felt he should not keep it. He said, 'I never could ask Mrs. Lawrence for anything or even think of anything she would not have given to me.' The Admiral kept repeating, 'He was beloved everywhere, they named a ship for him three months after his death!' etc., etc. Then he looked at Mrs. Lawrence's two books of devotion that I rescued at the auction out of a basket of old books. 'Well!' he said, 'my eyes are old and hard but I declare they feel moist and are willing to shed tears over these.' He read them for some time and said many tender things over them. Said that Mrs. Lawrence had given him a small oil painting of Captain Lawrence which he has! I wish Admiral Luce could himself have been painted sitting there in the big rocking chair bending over those old leather books and murmuring half to himself. . . .

"I shocked Admiral Luce by saying perhaps Lawrence's sword had not been returned, as he had died and his ship was captured and carried into Halifax. The old gentleman stood up. He assumed a tragic attitude, drew himself up, bowed, waved his hand, 'Keep your sword, Sir,

[1] Admiral Luce presented the sword to the State of New Jersey, and it is now in the capitol at Trenton.

U. S. Destroyer "Luce."

1918.

you have gallantly defended your ship,' another bow. I know just how Admiral Luce would have behaved, and I confess I suppose Broke would, had Lawrence been able to speak, which I think he was not as they fought sometime after he was carried below and he became unconscious."

The most accurate critics of men are their own contemporaries. Officers who were with him as midshipmen at the Naval Academy, and drew in their first breath of sea air under his training on board ship, accepted him as their standard and model, and talked about him the remainder of their lives, until there has almost grown up in the service a Luce tradition. Some of them still remain on the western slopes, "Admirals All" now, and they write of him in words of admiration which amount to veneration.

Admiral Harrington who has been several times quoted in this sketch says[1]:

. . . . . .

"A complete review of Luce's naval services and of his public activities, never interrupted during a prolonged life and continued even in his declining years, would exhibit labors and devotion which have never been surpassed by any other officer in the splendid history of accomplishments of officers of our navy.

"My official intercourse with Captain Luce on board the *Hartford*, necessarily intimate and often confidential, disclosed to me his character and personal traits. He was quick in comprehension of the various problems, prompt in decision, and perfectly open in expression of his thought . . . It may be that my estimate of the qualities of Luce is biased by the confidence he gave to me, which naturally increased my esteem for him.

"My duties on board the *Hartford* permitted little social enjoyment, but on some occasions I was with Luce and

[1] Letter to Author.

his friends, when he was free from the restraints of official circumstances. He carried into such company the zest and aptness of enjoyment which marked him for welcome as 'good company.' He had wit and a quaint humor which I observed at its best when he was engaged once in controversy with a man of many words who was really a *tête de mouton*. I think that he never lost his temper or control. I never saw him excited; even when he was much interested or indignant, he was calm in manner and measured in expression. He must have been a careful student of history and of men, for he exhibited much of knowledge, of expediency, of firmness, of moderation, and, in general, of wisdom. I judge that Luce would have been successful, a leader, in any career in which he may have been cast. He was one of the men of our navy whose services and accomplishments are worthy of commemoration for the instruction and inspiration of those who shall work hereafter in the Service which he adorned."

. . . . . .

Admiral Folger who was also a midshipman at the Naval Academy at Newport when Luce was an instructor, and who in later life when Chief of Bureau of Ordnance saw much of Admiral Luce at the time in Washington, writes in the same calm and restrained manner avoiding eulogy, but as one who regards it a high privilege that he knew him for half a century. Admiral Luce might well be content to leave to posterity without further comment, the exhaustive summing up of his character and work as drawn by these two officers, but there are hosts of others who followed in his train, and when he died their testimonials of affection and respect came to the widow and daughters from all over the country as well as from abroad.

From Admiral Folger to the Author

He (Admiral Luce) produced a distinct impression at the start upon the members of my class. It suggested the

real military navy of our ideals; the type of the lieutenants Decatur, Preston, Cushing, young, ardent, absolutely self-confident; an attractive figure among the somewhat faded old gentlemen who composed what was known as the Academic Board.

He was of the refined type, sublimated even, the boiled down product of New England and its heritage of the sea spaces;—a suggestion of the men who commanded the tall clippers, who in their '20's drove these swift ships around the Horn as if it were a simple thing. But even in the minor details he was refined; his small hands;—the fit of his long frock coat. I remember, with quite undue vanity, the mark, not the highest, which he gave me at my graduation. The most striking characteristic, after his devotion to the naval idea in its broad sense, was his almost vaticanic infallibility in professional things. No one ever contested his opinion, and his knowledge of the profession and the sea and its conditions appeared marvelous to us small people from the small towns. I do not recall a critical word from his junior contemporaries; from his seniors, yes, a little perhaps later, when his circle at Newport had grown, but it was mostly the envy and jealousy of a non-productive class. I can speak of this quite freely as I never served a day after graduation in that neighborhood.

I never changed my early impressions of his personality, and, as the years passed, I acquired a more serious admiration for his character, his ideals, and devotion to the service, as these developed with his own experience.

He is remembered, among a hundred things for his published works on seamanship, his collection of the Naval Songs, for his creation of the War College, his persistent advocacy of reform in our target practice, but more than all for his character, ever easily first in the human values.

I do not think he ever had any really intimate or familiar associates. There was always a temperamental reserve, a dignity which no one ever failed to appreciate. He liked refined men, as illustrated in his life-long affection for McCarty Little. But he ever remained Captain or Admiral Luce and no officer ever forgot it.

In his last years I saw him occasionally at his daughter's farm in Vermont about twenty miles from my own home in New Hampshire.

He still retained all his interest in the service, but appeared more reserved and thoughtful. He would listen to all one said to him but the old fire was dying out, as if things were perhaps vain after all.

Chaplain George Williamson Smith, for many years Chaplain at the Naval Academy, in a letter to Mrs. Macomb written forty years after his service with Admiral Luce in the *Hartford* says in reference to his part in the revival of the Navy in 1884–86:

. . . . . .

"Now the point is that this new Navy originated in the brain of your father who is not known as being connected with it so far as I know, and if the old Roman maxim is true, 'Qui facit per alium facit per se' he deserves the credit of originating the new Navy which has already given such a brilliant account of itself.

"From his originating and establishing the Naval War College, and starting the new Navy in existence and from his intense interest in all navy matters, numberless improvements small and great which he introduced into the service, I think he deserves a memorial, although he was not in a position to rival Dewey or Sampson, but such services should not be forgotten and I never hear or think of our Navy excepting as Admiral Luce's navy."

The following letter from an officer of a much younger generation in the Navy reflects the same high estimate of Admiral Luce, and because it is the opinion of a representative officer it is quoted in full:

To Mrs. Noyes from Captain Dilworth Puleston

April 11, 1921.

I enclose herewith letter from Admiral Scales which gives the rules governing memorials at the Naval Academy. Unfortunately I am not sufficiently acquainted

with Admiral Luce's Civil War record to judge whether his memorial should go in the Chapel. Personally, I would not urge his claim, for his great glory will always be that he alone in the midst of peace and in the utter decline of the Navy, kept constantly in mind that the Navy only existed for war and was vigorous enough to force this view on a generation of Naval officers who were engrossed, some in idleness, some in administrative work, some in outside scientific studies but none concerned with war.

The War College will always be his monument, and like Wren he will need no other, but I believe it would be meet and proper to place a suitable memorial in Luce Hall. Next to the War College Admiral Luce did more perhaps for the Naval Academy than any other graduate, and I think it would be well to remind the Midshipmen of his career, as they enter the Service he adorned.

Should you desire to go further into the matter and to urge the claim of Admiral Luce to the Chapel, I shall be pleased to assist in any way, but as a long time admirer of Admiral Luce I would hesitate to compare his services in the Civil War to his incomparably greater services afterwards. No professional sailor can so control his destiny that he will arrive at supreme command afloat in war time; that is on the lap of the Gods. Admiral Luce prepared himself for such a call and better still forced a reluctant service to prepare, and that is infinitely greater than any service he could perform as a young officer in the Civil War. To place his memorial among those killed in battle would not be fair to him, and to have the memorial emphasize his Civil War record would deny him his real glory. Such is my opinion but, again, if Mrs. Luce or you believe differently, I shall be happy to assist you in any way.

There remains little more to be said. To honor his memory the Nation has named for him a destroyer, and at the Naval Academy a massive granite building, assigned to the department of Seamanship and Naval Construction, bears his name.

In the War College, his greatest memorial, hangs a portrait of the Admiral by Vinton presented by citizen

friends and officers of the Navy "in recognition of his services for the advancement and progress of the Naval Service in its various departments."

And here the biographer ends his task. Admiral Luce's long life was one of extraordinary love and enthusiasm for his profession of which he was *magister magistorum*. He loved books, but he loved better, ships and sailors. He lived through three generations of naval thought and left his mark upon each one, but he belonged essentially to the last years of the last century, and his greatest work was done during the transition period of the Navy when wooden ships were giving place to steel armored vessels, when cherished ideas of sails were relegated to the past, when our Navy and Navy Department were stagnant and demoralized. In those vexing times of unpreparedness and inefficiency his was the far horizon, the clear vision, the wise judgment.

He will be accorded a high place among those who have rendered distinguished service. As was said of another, "His old age was a growth rather than a declension. The slope was upward to the end."[1]

To such as he there is no successor.

[1] *Life and Letters of George Bancroft*, by M. A. DeWolfe Howe.

CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF SERVICES OF REAR ADMIRAL STEPHEN B. LUCE, U. S. N.

From Official Records

1841	Oct. 19	Appointed Midshipman from the State of New York.
1841	Nov. 4	To Receiving Ship at New York.
1842	Apr. 2	To the *Congress*.
1843	May 3	Warranted.
1845	Mar. 14	Det. and leave 3 months.
1845	May 26	To the *Columbus*.
1848	Mar. 6	Det. from *Columbus* and to Naval School, 20th instant.
1848	Mar. 24	Delay reporting at School till 1st of April.
1848	June 22	Det. leave till 10th October and then return.
1849	Aug. 20	Det. and to the *Vandalia*.
1849	Sept. 29	Warranted as Passed Midshipman from 10th of August, 1847. (No. 126.)
1852	Oct. 12	Det. and 3 months' leave.
1852	Dec. 31	To duty connected with Lieutenant Gillis, Astrom. Expedition.
1853	May 9	Det. and to the *Vixen*.
1854	Feb. 4	Det. and leave 3 months.
1854	May 18	To Coast Survey Schooner *Madison*.
1854	June 8	Appointed acting Master Survey Schooner *Madison*.
1855	June 19	Transferred to Lieutenant Maffitt's party as Acting Master Tender.

1855	Nov. 9	Warranted as Master from 15th September, 1855.
1855	Sept. 16	Promoted to Lieutenant. (Sloop *Jamestown.*)
1860	Feb. 11	Det. and 3 months' leave.
1860	Mar. 2	To the Naval Academy.
1861	May 2	Det. and to the *Wabash.*
1862	Mar. 14	Re-commissioned from 15th September, 1855, to rank next after Lieutenant Thomas C. Harris,
1862	Jan. 9	Det. from *Wabash* (went to Naval Academy).
1862	Aug. 5	Promoted to Lieutenant Commander.
1863	Apr. 18	Commissioned from 16th July, 1862.
1863	Sept. 24	Be ready for sea service.
1863	Oct. 13	Det. from Academy and to command the *Nantucket.*
1864	Sept. 2	Assumed command U. S. S. *Pontiac.*
1865	June 9	Det. from the *Pontiac* and wait orders. (No record of reporting on this vessel.)
1865	Sept. 26	To the Naval Academy.
1865	Oct. 6	Commandant of Midshipmen.
1866	July 25	Promoted to Commander.
1866	Aug. 7	Commissioned.
1868	Aug. 29	Det. from the Naval Academy 30th Sept. and to command the *Mohongo* per str. 16th October. (Took command 10th Nov., 1868.)
1869	Apr. 1	Det. return and report.
1869	June 10	Det. 26th ult. and wait orders from 7th instant.
1869	June 18	To command the *Juniata* 1st July.
1872	July 1	Det. and wait orders.
1872	Aug. 16	To equipment duty Navy Yard, Boston, 14th Sept.
1872	Dec. 10	To examination.

1872	Dec. 28	Promoted to Captain.
1873	Apr. 1	Member of Board of Examiners Naval Academy.
1873	May 15	Commissioned.
1873	July 11	Ordered to consult with Board of Education, New York City, in reference to the establishment of a Nautical School for the Training of Seamen.
1873	Nov. 19	Det. as Member of Board and resume duties at Boston Navy Yard.
1873	Nov. 29	Be ready to command the *Minnesota*.
1873	Dec. 12	Det. and to command the *Minnesota* 22d instant.
1873	Dec. 22	Det. and resume duties at Boston Navy Yard.
1874	Sept. 29	Captain of Navy Yard, Boston.
1875	Sept. 4	Det. 15th October and wait orders.
1875	Oct. 27	To command the *Hartford* 1st Nov.
1877	Aug. 10	Det. 21st instant, and leave 1 month.
1877	Aug. 25	To special duty inspecting training ships.
1877	Sept. 17	Inspect *Supply* and then wait orders.
1877	Sept. 24	To tempo., duty in connection with Training Ships.
1877	Dec. 1	Det. 31st instant and to command the Training Ship *Minnesota* 1st Jan.
1881	Jan. 28	Det. 15th Feb. and wait orders.
1881	Apr. 11	Take command of all the apprentice ships to be assembled at Washington 25th instant.
1881	Nov. 17	To physical examination.
1881	Nov. 17	To examination.
1881	Nov. 25	Promoted to Commodore.
1882	Jan. 14	Commissioned.
1884	June 21	Det. 30th instant.
1884	July 16	Det. from special duty 26th instant and

		to command North Atlantic Station 27th inst.
1884	July 22	Det. 25th inst. and take command on the 26th inst.
1884	July 23	Appointed Acting Rear Admiral.
1884	Sept. 13	Det. 20th inst. and assume duties of superintendent of Naval War College at Coasters' Harbor Island, R. I.
1885	Sept. 28	To examination.
1885	Oct. 5	Promoted to Rear Admiral.
1886	Jan. 30	Commissioned.
1886	June 18	Det. and to command the North Atlantic Station.
1889	Jan. 28	Det. upon receipt of this order, return home and wait orders. (Relieved 16th Feb. 1899.)
1889	Mar. 20	Will be transferred to the Retired List on the 25th instant.
1893	May 27	Leave one year with permission to leave the U. S.
1901	Jan. 3	Appointed member of Board of Visitors, Naval Academy.
1901	Feb. 14	Member Board of Awards. Office Asst. Secy. 18th inst.
1901	Mar. 7	Leave from March 16th, to May 15th, or abroad.
1901	May 6	To Office Secretary May 8th, Washington.
1901	Aug. 13	Additional duty Naval War College, Newport, R. I.
1910	Nov. 15	Det. Nov. 20th home and report. (Home 20th Nov.) (Detached Naval War College, Nov. 20th.)
1917	July 28	Died at Newport, R. I., July 28th, 1917, of arterio sclerosis myocarditis and buried at Portsmouth, R. I.

APPENDIX A

QUERIES

Submitted by Rear Admiral S. B. Luce, U.S.N., to Commander of the Canadian Fishery Service, and the Latter's Answers Thereto

1. Are there any Canadian ports where American vessels engaged in fishing may replenish their stock of provisions; and if so, name them?

Ans. Not any; but in the Autumn when American fishermen are out of provisions and leaving for home they are permitted to take such as they may require for that purpose only.

2. Will it be insisted upon that every American fisherman, anchoring in port, or other places on the coast, for shelter only, must enter and clear at the nearest Custom House?

Ans. At all times when practicable to do so; but if at an inconvenient distance from the Custom House, and a cruiser is present, her captain will enter and clear those that apply.

3. What construction is placed by Canadian officials on the word *repairs* as expressed in the treaty of 1818; that is, may a fisherman who needs repairs to his rigging enter port to buy rope? Does the word *repairs* include everything on board such vessels necessary to a complete fishing vessel?

Ans. This must be left to the discretion of the Collector of Customs or the Captain of a cruiser as it is liable to create abuse.

4. Are Canadian officials instructed to restrict Americans to certain ports in the Bays of Chaleur and Gaspé for wood, water, and repairs; and if so, what ports are they?

Ans. The Bay of Chaleur is closed to American fishermen with the exception of Port Daniel and Miscou harbors which are open to them for the purpose of obtaining wood, water, shelter or repairs; but when medical aid is required they may go to Paspebiac for that purpose only. Gaspé is not closed, but American fishermen can only enter for either of the four things mentioned in the Treaty.

5. The Magdalen islands being excepted by treaty stipulation from the restrictions applied to other parts of the coast, is it to be understood that American Fishermen may, at those islands, ship fish in bond to the United States, receive salt and barrels from the United States in bond, ship men and purchase provisions there.

Ans. Under the Convention, American fishermen can only take, cure and dry fish at the Magdalens under the restrictions specified in the Treaty, therefore cannot ship fish in bond, ship men, nor purchase supplies.

6. Are the Dominion cruisers authorized to enter and clear vessels in the same manner as Collectors of Customs?

Ans. They are where no Collector of Customs is present. See the answer to No. 2.

HALIFAX, N. S., July 29, 1887.

F. Q. 6

APPENDIX B

Rear Admiral Luce to the Minister of Marine and Fisheries at Halifax

Sir:

I beg leave to enclose herewith a copy of questions addressed by me to Captain P. N. Scott of the Dominion Fisheries Service, and the answers of that officer.

The object of these interrogations was to obtain definite and authoritative information for the guidance of American fishermen operating in Canadian waters.

It is believed that a few plain rules of action distributed among our fishermen will go far towards obviating some, if not all, the difficulties which now prove to be a source of irritation between the United States and the Dominion of Canada.

But, while Captain Scott courteously, and very promptly, replied to my queries there are still one or two points, on which I am left in doubt. The answer to the third interrogatory, for example, leaves it to be inferred that the Collectors of Customs and Captains of cruisers are the sole judges of what constitutes "repairs," as the word is used in the Treaty of 1818. But in the absence of all knowledge, on the part of fishermen, as to what that embraces, Masters, in the conscientious endeavor to have damages to their vessels and outfittings made good, for the prosecution of their work, may unwittingly subject their vessels to seizure and fine.

Again, the fifth query scarcely covers the entire ground on which information is sought. The question, stated

in a more concise form, is: Can American fishermen at the Magdalen Islands receive salt and barrels in bond from the United States? Those Islands, in common with other geographical limits, being especially excepted from the general exclusion of American fishermen from the shores of the Dominion, has led to the belief that such a privilege might be enjoyed.

In the earnest hope of being able to assist our fishermen in avoiding infractions of Law and Treaty obligations the foregoing information is solicited, and any additional points you may think proper to call my attention to as pertinent to the question under consideration will be thankfully received.

INDEX

A

Academy of Arts and Sciences, 60
Acapulco, the *Vandalia* at, 43
Adams, Charles Francis, Minister to London, 82, 86
Agassiz, Prof. Alexander, 281
Alexander, E. P., General, *Memoirs of Military Service*, by, letter to Luce on, 298–9
Alexandria, bombardment of, 108
Almy, Rear Admiral, quoted on naval songs, 153
Amazon, Confederate steamer, capture of, 101
America, yacht, in practice squadron in 1863, 80, 81; in practice squadron in 1866, 104
American Philosophical Society, 60
Ammen, Rear Admiral, 180
Anderson, General, hoists the flag on Fort Sumter again in April, 1865, 102
Annapolis, Naval Academy at, establishment of, 35; *see also* Naval Academy
Appomattox, surrender of Lee at, made possible by the Navy, 4
Apprentice Training Squadron, the, 157 ff.
Arabi Pasha, 108
Argentine squadron captured by Captain Voorhees, 16–17
Army, joint maneuvers with the Navy, 213

B

Bagdad Railroad, 307
Bainbridge, William, Commodore, 18 n., 77
Bainbridge, the, fired into by Argentine squadron, 17
Ballard, Commodore, 7
Baltimore, the, affair of, in Valparaiso in 1892, 231
Bankhead, John P., 40
Barnes, J. S., Captain, 267; letter of Luce to, on publication of Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power*, 267–9
Barron-Decatur duel, pistols used in, 272–3
Barron, Samuel, Captain, 73
Bayard, Charles C., 17
Bayard, Hon. Thomas F., 199, 221, 285
Beale, Edward, Midshipman, 16 and n.
Beecher, Rev. Henry Ward, 102
Beehler, Captain, letter to Luce on the German navy, 302–3
Bell, Isaac, 134
Benjamin, Park, *The United States Naval Academy*, by, cited, 16 n., 79 n., 86
Bennett, James Gordon, 148 n.
Biddle, Commodore James, 18 and n., 34; unsuccessful negotiations of, with Japan, for commerce treaty in 1846, 30–3; Governor of naval school at Philadelphia, 35
Bier, George H., Midshipman, 16 and n.
Blaine, James G., 253
Blake, Commodore, quoted on opposition of older naval officers to the Naval Academy, 36; Superintendent of Naval Academy, 77
Bleecker, Charlotte, 6
Bleecker, John Van B., 40
Blockade of Southern ports in Civil War, 4, 72 ff., 91 ff.
Bonaparte, Charles J., Secretary of the Navy, 243, 245, 247, 248, 253
Bowles, Francis T., Chief Naval Constructor of the Navy, letter of, to Luce, on School of Naval Architecture, 335–6
Brooke, John M., 36
Brooks, Sidney, 95
Brownson imbroglio, the, 329
Buell, Augustus C., 272 n.

Bureau system, condemnation of, by Luce, 229–30
Butler, Benjamin F., General, 144
Butt, Archibald, 345

C

Canadian fisheries dispute of 1887, 199 ff.; text of questionnaire by Luce to Captain Scott and answers thereto, 367–8; letter of Luce to Minister of Marine and Fisheries at Halifax, 369–70
Captain, English turret ship, loss of, 129
Captains, naval, power of, in the forties, 18
Caroline Islands, 279, 280, 281
Cartagena in 1859, 67–8
Carter, Dr. Robert, 40, 42
Cassel, Douglas, Midshipman, 81
Central America, filibustering expeditions and turmoil in, in the fifties, 63
Chadwick, Admiral, letter to Luce on line and staff controversy, 343–4
Chandler, William E., Secretary of the Navy, 173, 174; letter to Luce on the Canadian fisheries imbroglio, 210
Charleston, S. C., operations of the monitors at, in the Civil War, 91 ff.; evacuation of, by Confederates, 102
Chesapeake-Shannon action, the, 327–8
Chicago, the, 219
Chilean trouble of 1891–2, 320–2, 324–5
Civil War, operations of Army in, overshadowed those of the Navy, 3–4; blockade of Southern ports, 72 ff., 91 ff.; actions at Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal, 72–5; operations of the monitors at Charleston, 91 ff.; loss of ocean-borne commerce by American merchant marine caused by, 254; vessels bought by government during, 262
Cleveland, Grover, 201, 202, 232
Clowes, Sir W. Laird, 285
Coast Survey, Luce's work in, on coasts of Georgia and South Carolina, 60–1
Coaster's Harbor Island at Newport, presented to government by the city for naval purposes, 158; order establishing Naval War College at, 176–7
Collins, N. B., Captain, 61 n.
Columbian Historical Exposition in Madrid in 1893, 225–6
Columbus, the, cruise of, 1845–8, 18–34
Commodore, the rank of, 177 and n., 178
Compass, introduction of, 274
Congress, the, cruise of, 1842–5, 14–17
Constellation, the, identity of, with original ship, 271–2
Constitution, the, 62, 71, 111, 137, 142, 328, 329, 334
Cowie, T. J., Paymaster, 151
Cuba, misunderstanding between the United States and Spain about, in 1869, 108–9
Cumberland, the, last American frigate to go into action under sail, 73–4

D

Dahlgren, John A., Rear Admiral, in command of naval forces before Charleston, 91 ff.
Danish West Indies, Germany's efforts to obtain a naval base in, 307 ff.
Davidson, Hunter, 10, 36, 40, 61
Davis, Charles Henry, Rear Admiral, 351
Davis, John Lee, 36, 307
Decatur, Stephen, duel with Barron, 272–3; and the detention of the *United States* in port after capture of the *Macedonian*, 325, 326
Delaware, the, 233
Dewey, David Rich, quoted on Canadian fisheries dispute, 199
Dewey, George, Admiral, 144, 178, 238, 252; letter to Luce on signalling and battle tactics, 291
Dickens, F. W., Captain, 191
Dingley, Nelson A., Congressman, 202
Docks, increase in dimensions of, Luce's views on, 291–4
Drayton, Percival, Captain, 33
Dundonald, Lord, 350
DuPont, Flag Officer S. F., letter of, recommending restoration of rank to Luce, 38–9; in command of blockading squadron off Charleston, 74; capture of Port Royal by his fleet, 75; relieved by Dahlgren, 91
Durand, Sir Edward, 309

E

Eclipse, solar, at Lisbon in 1870, 124
Eddystone Light House, opening of, 79, 158
Egan, Maurice Francis, 308, 309
Elliot, Commodore, 62
England, naval architecture in, 333
English admirals, question of unscientific character of, 315
Erben, Henry, Rear Admiral, author of the phrase "The Man behind the Gun," 323 n.
Essex, the, battle of, with the *Phœbe* and *Cherub* in Valparaiso harbor, 12 n., 326
Evans, Robley D., Rear Admiral, 80; estimate of Luce, 87–8; president of Naval Personnel Board, in 1899, 339
Everett, Hon. Edward, 95
Everett, H. A., 19, 20

F

Fairfax, Donald, Commander, 103
Farragut, Admiral, midshipman on the *Essex*, 12 n., 275; ancestors came from Port Mahon, 15; long period on shore duty, 320
Farragut, Loyall, 154
Fisher, Lord, 102
Fisheries dispute, *see* Canadian fisheries dispute
Fishermen, hardy seamanship of, 260
Fiske, John, quoted, 198, 241
Flogging in the Navy, 20–1; abolishment of, 22–3
Florida, the, Confederate cruiser, 61 n.
Folger, William, Rear Admiral, letters of Luce to, on General Staff, and use of fleet as naval school, 282, 283; appreciation of Luce, 358–60
Fort Monroe, Artillery School at, 169, 170
"Forty-Oners," the, 35, 36
Foss, George E., 251, 252
Franco-German War of 1870–1, observation of French blockade of German coast by Luce during, 115 ff.
Fry, Joseph, 36
Frye, William P., Senator, 202

G

Galena, the, farewell dinner to Luce on board, 224
Gallinger, J. H., correspondence of Luce with, on the merchant marine, 257–66
Garibaldi, 270–1
General Board, the, 237–8, 242 ff.
General Staff, for the Navy Department, Luce's advocacy of, 230 ff.
German navy, influence of Mahan's *Sea Power* on building of, 302–3, 304
Germany, and the Monroe Doctrine, 307, 308; efforts to obtain a naval base in the Danish West Indies, 307 ff.
Gherardi, Bancroft, Admiral, 16 n., 219
Gibraltar, visit to St. Michael's cave at, 110
Gleaves, Albert, Rear Admiral, letter of Luce to, on Germany and the Monroe Doctrine, 307
Glisson, Admiral, 115, 116
Goldsborough, Admiral, 95
Goodrich, C. F., Rear Admiral, 174 n., 182, 183, 194; quoted on Luce's seamanship, 89–90; on Luce in connection with War College, 195
Gordon, George H., General, 181
Granite State, the, 160
Grant, Ulysses S., 105
Greely Relief Expedition, 178
Greytown, the *Jamestown* at, 63–4, 68
Grimes, Senator, 94
Guam, 280, 281

H

Habersham, Alexander, 17, 40, 48, 50
Hackett, F. W., Assistant Secretary of the Navy, correspondence of Luce with, on War College appointment, and the Schley court of inquiry, 285–7; congratulatory letter to Luce on his 90th birthday, 310–11
Hale, Eugene, Senator, 237, 251, 252
Hanus, G. C., Captain, 165
Harrington, P. F., Rear Admiral, quoted on Luce's seamanship and methods as an instructor, 87, 88–9 n.; quoted on Luce's system of instruction of apprentices on the *Hartford*, 146–7; on Luce's influence on reorganization of the Navy Yards, 250; on line and staff controversy, 336–7; appreciation of Luce, 357–8

Harrison, Benjamin, 225
Hart, Albert Bushnell, letter of, on Luce's *Story of the Monitor*, 287–9
Hartford, the, Luce in command of, 146
Hatteras Inlet, capture of Confederate forts guarding, by fleet under Stringham, 72–3
Hawaiian Islands, political situation of, in the forties, 43; provisional cession of, to the United States declined, 43; fall of monarchy in, 253
Hayti, Luce's adjustment of troubles with, in 1888, 220–3
Haytien Republic, affair of the, 220 ff.
Heap, Harris, 112, 113
Henley, Eliza, marriage to Luce, 62; death of, 355
Henley, John Dandridge, Commodore, 62 and n.
Herbert, Hilary, 276, 323
Heywood, Charles, Colonel, letter of Luce to, on maintenance of the Marine Corps, 346
Hilborn, Samuel G., letter of Luce to, regarding shoulder rifles, 277–9
Hillyer, Lady, 158
Hollingsworth, Dr. W. Wharton, originator of the idea of the Navy League, 243; letters of Luce to, 244–7
Holmes, Oliver Wendell, quoted, 3
Holstein, Fritz von, 304
Honolulu, stay of the *Vandalia* at, in 1851–2, 45 ff.
Hornet, the, running of blockade of New Haven by, 18 n.
Hovey, C. E., Midshipman, letter of Luce to, on Naval Academy Christian Association, 295
Hull, Isaac, Captain, 137
Hull, William, General, surrender of Detroit by, 326
Humphries, Joshua, designer of the *Constitution*, 334
Hunt, Ridgely, Lieut., quoted on naval education, 150–1
Hunter, "Alvarado," 15

I

Inland waterways, from New York to Norfolk, investigation of, by Luce, 219–20
Institute of Naval Architects in England, 333

J

Jamestown, the, cruise of, 1855–60, 63–70; in Training Squadron, 157; given to Marine Hospital Service, 160
Japan, unsuccessful effort to induce her to open her ports to American commerce in 1846, 19, 30–3
Japanese, recognition of military value of merchant marine by, 263; and Magdalena Bay, 308
Jarvis, James, Midshipman, 272, 275
Jeannette expedition, the, 140, 339
Jeddo Bay, the *Columbus* and *Vincennes* in, in 1846, 30–2
Jena, battle of, 172
Jenkins, Thornton A., Rear Admiral, 17; letter to Luce on presence of Garibaldi at Montevidio, 270–1
Joinville, Prince de, 13 n.
Jones, Catesby ap R., Captain, 65 n.
Jones, Pembroke, 36
Jones, Thomas ap Catesby R., Captain, 65 and n.
Juniata, Luce in command of, on European cruise, 1869–72, 107 ff.

K

Kamehameha III, King of the Hawaiian Islands, 33, 45, 46, 47, 48
Kearsarge, the, derivation of name of, 273

L

Ladrone Islands, 279, 280, 281, 282
Lamar, M. B., General, 63
Lansdale, Philip V., Lieut., killed in Samoa, 283, 284
Laughton, Professor, 152 n.
Lawrence, James, Captain, 327, 328, 356, 357
Lee, Robert E., General, at Gettysburg and Petersburg, 298–9
Levant, the, last yardarm execution of U. S. Navy aboard, 22–3 n.
Levy, Captain, 66 and n.
Lincoln, Abraham, 73, 234
Lincoln, Mrs. Abraham, 115
Line and staff controversy, the, 336–44
Lisbon, solar eclipse at, in 1870, 124
Little, William McCarthy, Lieut., 168, 179, 359

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Senator, letters of Luce to, on the War College, 190–1; correspondence with Luce regarding organization of Navy Department, 234–5; on the Pacific islands, 279–80, 281–2; on the Monroe Doctrine and the Danish West Indies, 308–10
Long, John D., Secretary of the Navy, 191, 236; creation of General Board by, 238
Los Angeles Public Library, Luce's sentiment with autograph to, 297–8
Lossing, Benson J., 154
Loyal Legion, Military Order of the, Luce on eligibility of midshipmen to, 274–5
Luce, Caroline, 351
Luce, Charlotte Bleecker, 352
Luce, John Dandridge Henley, 351
Luce, Rear Admiral Stephen B., progressiveness of, and his place in American naval history as founder of the Naval War College, and father of the Naval Training System, 4–6; birth and ancestry, 6; appointment as midshipman, 7; on board receiving ship *North Carolina* and early experiences and impressions of the service, 7 ff.; quoted on affair of Midshipman Spencer, 11; first sea duty in the *Congress*, 14–17; cruise in the *Columbus* and expedition to Japan, 18 ff.; trouble with a drunken water boat crew, 23–7; an irate captain, 27; in charge of market boat and the captain's wrath at loss of his chickens, 27–30; account of negotiations with the Japanese in 1846, 30–2; impression of the Japanese, 32–3; end of the cruise, 34; ordered to Naval Academy at Annapolis, 35; heart breaking reduction in numbers for boyish prank, 37; restoration to original rank, 38; ordered to *Vandalia* and promoted to Passed Midshipman, 39; cruise of the *Vandalia*, 1849–52, 40 ff.; reading of, and plans for the future, 41–2; extracts from his diary of the cruise, 42–58; stay at Honolulu, 45–50; astronomical work, 60; ill with yellow fever at Pensacola, 60; service on the Coast Survey, 60–2; marriage to Eliza Henley, in 1854, 62; promoted to Master and Lieutenant, 63; cruise in the *Jamestown*, 63 ff.; extracts from diary, 64–9; ordered to Naval Academy as assistant to Commandant, in 1860, 70; his career up to this time and his personal appearance, 70; ordered to the *Wabash* on outbreak of Civil War, 71, 72; at Hatteras Inlet and Port Royal, 72–5; attempt to rescue drowning sailor, 74–5; returns to Naval Academy as Head of Department of Seamanship, 76; promoted to Lieutenant Commander, 77; his book on *Seamanship*, 77–80; commands practice cruise of 1863, 80 ff.; estimates of his ability as a drillmaster and the high order of his seamanship, 87–90; in command of monitor *Nantucket*, 91 ff.; quoted on operations of the ironclads before Charleston, 91–2; introduction of new signal system by, 93; in command of the *Pontiac*, 96 ff.; ordered to cooperate with General Sherman, in Savannah River in 1865, 98–9; association with Sherman gives him conception of nature of a military problem and the way to solve it, 101–2; inception of idea of a War College, 102; Commander of Midshipmen at Annapolis, 103 ff.; summer cruises of 1866–8, 104–5; in command of *Mohongo* in the Pacific Squadron, 107; commands *Juniata* on European cruise, 1869–72, 107–33; extracts from his private journal of the cruise, 109 ff.; observation of French blockade of German coast during Franco-German War, 115 ff.; opinion on French and English ironclads, 119–20; official correspondence, 120 ff.; exhibitions of seamanship in foreign ports, 131; return to America, 131–3; on duty at Charlestown Navy Yard, 134–5; his work in the founding and organization of the Naval Training System, 135 ff.; apathy and opposition encountered by, 145; success of his efforts, 145–6; ordered to command of *Hartford*, 146; his belief in the sailing ship for school purposes, 147–8; in command of training ship *Minnesota* and the system of training on her cruise, 149 ff.;

Luce, Rear Admiral Stephen B.—*Continued*
medals and prizes, 154–5; promotion to Commodore in 1881, and ordered to command of Training Squadron, 157; quoted on the elimination of the Training Squadron, 159–62; letter to Captain G. C. Hanus on training ships, 165–7; letter of, to Secretary of the Navy proposing establishment of a post-graduate naval school, 168–70; his efforts for founding of the Naval War College, 171 ff.; assigned as President of the Naval War College, 177, 178; in command of North Atlantic Station in 1884 as Acting Rear Admiral, 177; efforts to counteract the operations of enemies of the War College, 183 ff.; again ordered to command of North Atlantic Station in 1886, 197; his part in the Canadian fisheries dispute in 1887, 199 ff., 367–70; collision with the Secretary of the Navy over questionnaire sent to British naval officer, 201–12; endeavors to make the Squadron a school of application, 217 ff.; investigates the inland waterways from New York to Norfolk, 219–20; affair of the *Haytien Republic*, 220 ff.; hauls down his flag, 224; goes on retired list, 225; holds record for percentage of sea service, 225; Commissioner General for United States at Columbian Historical Exposition in Madrid in 1893, 225–26; attached to War College Faculty, 226; agitation to reform the organization and administration of the Navy Department, 227 ff.; condemnation of the Bureau System, 229–30; need of the Navy of a Military Branch, 230–1; advocates a General Staff, 230, 234–5, 236–7, 238–9; continued efforts for betterment of naval administration, 242 ff.; letters to Dr. W. Wharton Hollingsworth and President Roosevelt, 244–8; service on naval commissions, 249–50; letters to Secretary of the Navy, 250–3; correspondence relating to the merchant marine, 254 ff.; selection from his letters, 267 ff.; declines offer of post of instructor in Japanese navy, 276–7; declines appointment as delegate to Geneva Red Cross Convention, 290; Civil War Campaign Badge conferred on, 297; letters to Secretary of the Navy on Staff Bureaus and the War College, 301–2; detachment from active duty in 1910, 303, 305; letters from Admiral Mahan to Luce on the development of his War College lectures and his naval history studies, 312–29; article on signals and signalling by, 331; and the establishment of the School of Naval Architecture, 331–6; and the line and staff controversy, 336–44; his views on the retention of the Marine Corps on sea service, 346–8; last years, 349–51, 352–3; his descendants, 351–2; death and burial, 354; appreciations of, 357–62; chronological record of, 363–6; text of his Canadian fisheries questionnaire and answers thereto, and letter to Minister of Marine and Fisheries at Halifax, 367–70
Luce, Mrs. Stephen B., 62, 355
Luce, Stephen Bleecker, Second, 351
Luce, Vinal, 6
Luce Hall, at Annapolis, 106, 361

M

McCawley, Charles G., U. S. M. C., 66 and n.
McIntosh, Commodore James, 65
Macedonian, the, flagship of practice squadron in 1863, 80 ff., 275
Mackenzie, Commander, and hanging of Midshipman Spencer on the *Somers*, 11 and n.
Maclay, E. S., *History United States Navy*, by, cited, 72
Macomb, Montgomery Meigs, Brigadier General, 49; marriage to Caroline Luce, 351; death of, 351
Madrid, Columbian Historical Exposition at, in 1893, 225–6
Maffitt, John Newell, Lieut., 61 and n.
Magdalena Bay and the Japanese, 308
Mahan, Alfred T., Rear Admiral, 180, 301–2; succeeds Luce as President of the Naval War College, 181; quoted on work of the College, 182, 183; effect of his *Influ-*

Mahan, Alfred T.—*Continued*
ence of Sea Power, 188, 269, 303; letter of Luce to, on Naval War Board, 236–7; Luce's assistance in publication of his *Sea Power*, 267–9; publication of his other works, 269; his letter of acknowledgment to Luce, 270; letter of Luce to, on War of 1812, 289–90; letter of Luce to, on the War College, 295–6; on the Monroe Doctrine, 307; letters of, to Luce, on the development of his War College lectures and his naval history studies, 312–29; his comment on the frigate actions of the War of 1812, 325–9
Mahon, Port, murder of sailing-master Lieut. John S. Patterson of the *Congress* at, 15; removal of United States Naval Station from, to Lisbon, 15
Maine, the, 299, 300
Mallory, Stephen, 66 n.
"Man behind the Gun, the," origin of the phrase, 323 n.
Man-of-war's man, type of early American, 9
Marine Corps, unsuccessful attempt to confine it to shore duty, 344–8
Marine international law, War College the best school of, 301
Marine schools, the establishment of, on schoolships, 140–2
Marion, the, in practice squadron of 1863, 80–1
Marseilles, riots at, 127
Marvin, Winthrop L., letters of Luce to, on the merchant marine, 255–7; quoted, 259
Masefield, John, quoted on the old seventy-four-gun ship, 7–8; on power of captain, 18; on flogging, 20–1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, establishment of School of Naval Architecture at, through efforts of Luce, 330–6
Matthews, E. O., Commodore, 80, 81, 163
Maury, Jefferson, 36
Mayflower, the, Admiral Luce's descent from William White, one of the passengers of, 6
Meagher, Thomas Francis, 64
Melville, George W., Rear Admiral, correspondence with Luce on the line and staff controversy, 339–42
Mends, Sir W. R., Admiral, quoted on passing of the sailing ship in action, 74 n.
Mercer, Captain Samuel, 71, 74
Merchant marine, training of officers for, as a reserve for the Navy in case of war, 135 ff.; Luce's correspondence relating to, 254 ff.; as a naval reserve, 258 ff.
Merrimac, battle with the *Monitor*, 3, 287–9
Mersey, the, White Star Line training ship, 161
Mexican War, the, 30, 34
Meyer, George von L., 245, 247, 249, 253, 297
Midshipmen, duties and conditions of, in the forties, 12–13, 41; of the "'41 date," 35, 36
Minnesota, the, training ship at New York, 146; Luce assigned to command of, and takes her to sea, 149; the system of instruction on, 150 ff.
Moltke, von, Field Marshal, 5–6
Monitor, battle with the *Merrimac*, 3, 287–9; foundering of, 40
Monitors, operations of, at Charleston, 91 ff.
Monroe Doctrine, the, and the Danish West Indies, 30–, 308
Monterey, capture of, in 1842, 65
Moore, J. Bassett, *International Law Digest*, by, quoted on indignity offered Biddle by Japanese, 33 n.
Mosquito Coast, the, 63

N

Nantucket, the monitor, Luce in command of, off Charleston, 91 ff.
Naval Academy, Annapolis, establishment of, 35; opposition of older officers of the Navy to, 35–6; moved to Newport, R. I., in 1861, 71, 94; practice cruise of 1863, 80 ff.; returned to Annapolis, 103; golden years of, 103–4; practice cruises of 1866–8, 104–5
Naval Academy Christian Association, 295
Naval Architecture, School of, 330–6
Naval Institute, proposal of post-graduate naval school in lecture before by Luce, 171
Naval Institute, papers by Luce published in, 229
Naval school at Philadelphia, 35

Naval Song Book, Luce's, 349
Naval songs, 151–3
Naval Training System, the 4, 5; Luce's work in the founding and organization of, 135 ff.; selection from the apprentices for the various services, 138; the establishment of schoolships, 140–2, 146; early attempts to found a, 144; the training ship *Minnesota* and the Training Squadron, 149 ff.; end of the Training Squadron, 159 ff.; establishment of training on shore, 165
Naval War College, 4, 5, 6; conception of, by Luce, 102; proposal for, in letter of Luce to Secretary of the Navy, 168–70; Luce's efforts for founding of, 171 ff.; order establishing the College on Coaster's Harbor Island, Newport, 176–7; difficulties in organizing, 179 ff. real beginning of work, 181; ordered consolidated with Torpedo Station on Goat Island, 183; transferred back to Coaster's Island, 186; continued opposition to, 189 ff.; sketch of its career by Luce, 192–3; rumor of transfer to Washington, 193; on a permanent foundation, 195–6; letter of Luce to Secretary of the Navy on needs of, in 1910, 301–2; Mahan's opinion on location and separation of, 317
Navy, the, exploits of, in War of 1812, 3; operations of, in Civil War overshadowed by those of the Army, 3-4; blockade by, made Appomattox possible, 4; beauty and nobility of the old seventy-four-gun ship, 7–8; conditions in, in the forties, 12; power of captains in the forties, 18; flogging, 20–1; amelioration of conditions of man-of-war life, 22–3; opposition of older officers to the Naval Academy, 35–6; in the Civil War, 72 ff.; inadequacy of dress uniform, 84–5; proportion of foreigners in crews of, in last half of nineteenth century, 144–5; joint maneuvers with Army, 213
Navy Commissioners, the, 231, 232
Navy Department, Luce's agitation for reform of organization and administration of, 227 ff.; Luce's condemnation of the Bureau System, 229–30; need of a Military Branch, 230–1; General Staff advocated by Luce, 230, 234–5, 236–7, 238–9; establishment of General Board, 237–8; Luce's continued efforts for betterment of naval administration, 242 ff.; recommendations of naval commission in 1909, 249; suggestions by Luce for promotion of efficiency of the service, 250 ff.
Navy League, the, 243, 244
Navy yards, reorganization of, 249–50
New Hampshire, the, in Training Squadron, 157 ff.; turned over to the New York Naval Militia, and renamed *Granite State*, 159–60
New Ironsides, the, 92
New London, unsuccessful effort to establish naval station at, 155 ff.; renewal of the effort, 159
New Orleans, battle of, 62 n.
Newport, R. I., Naval Academy moved to, in 1861, 71, 94; Luce's activity in civic affairs of, 349
Newport, the, schoolship, 161
New York, battleship, 94
Nordhoff, Charles, *Life on Board a Man-of-War*, by, 18 n., 33
Norfolk, Navy Yard at, 250
North American Review, papers by Luce published in, 229, 241, 350
North Carolina, line-of-battle ship, 7
North Dakota, superdreadnaught, 93, 233
Noyes, Boutelle, Lieut., letter to, by Luce on the Training System situation, 162–4; marriage to Charlotte Bleecker Luce, 352; death of, 352
Noyes, Robert Boutelle, 352
Noyes, Stephen Henley, 352

P

Palfrey, General, 180
Parker, William Hardwood, 10, 36
Patterson, Thomas H., 40
Pattison, Lieutenant John S., murder of, at Port Mahon, 15
Paulding, Captain Hiram, 19
Paulet, Lord, 43
Peabody, George, 111
Penthièvre, Duc de (Pierre d' Orleans), 82, 131
Perry, Commodore M. C., 7, 11 n., 33, 58; death of, 64

Personnel Act of 1899, 340, 341
Philadelphia, naval school at, 35
Philadelphia, the, in war against Tripoli, 18 n.
Philippine Islands, 279, 280, 281
Pickens, Fort, arranging of expedition for relief of, 234
Pim, Bedford Clapperton Trevelyan, British Admiral, 68 and n.
Pontiac, Luce in command of, 96 ff.
Port au Prince, Luce at, during Haytien troubles of 1888, 221–3
Port Royal, capture of, by fleet under DuPont, 75
Porter, Carlisle, 158
Porter, David, Commodore, 12 n.; his defense of the *Essex*, 326
Porter, David D., Admiral, 17, 66 n., 136, 172, 173; Superintendent of the Naval Academy, 103 ff.; letter to Charles A. Boutelle on training ships, 164–5; letter to Luce on the War College, 184–5; letter of Luce to, 185–6
Porter, Horace, General, 243
Portsmouth, the, in Training Squadron, 157, 158; turned over to New Jersey Naval Militia, 160
Powel, Miss M. E., quoted on the hanging of Midshipman Spencer, 11; on Luce's admiration for Lawrence, 356–7
Practice cruise, of 1863, 80 ff.; cruises of 1866–8, 104–5
Preble, George H., Rear Admiral, quoted on the rank of Commodore, 177 n.
Preble, the, cruise of, covering 100,000 miles, 41 n.
President, the, 285, 325, 326
Privateersmen, 263
Puleston, Dilworth, Captain, letter to Mrs. Noyes on memorial to Luce, 360–1
Putnam, Judge Wm. Lowell, 202 n., 209
Pythian, Robert L., 140

R

Radford, Admiral, 115
Ramsey, F. M., Commodore, opposition to War College, 174, 186–7
Ranger, the, schoolship, 161
Rawson, Professor, 154
Read, Jacob, Lieutenant, 40, 46, 47–8
Reader, W. H., Captain, 224
Rhodes' *History of the United States*, quoted, 3
Rice, Phineas A., congratulatory letter to Luce on his 87th birthday, 310
Richmond, the, Admiral Luce's flagship, 199
Rifles, shoulder, Luce's views on, 277–9
Roberts, Elmer, letter of, to Luce, on the German Emperor, 304–5
Rodgers, Commodore, 77
Rodgers, C. R. P., Lieutenant Commander, 74, 77
Rodgers, R. P., Rear Admiral, 193; letter of, to Luce, on his detachment from active service in 1910, 305–6
Roe, Francis A., 36
Rogers, Prof. Wm. B., correspondence with Luce on establishment of School of Naval Architecture at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 331–5
Roosevelt, Theodore, 144, 243, 252, 271, 285; correspondence with Luce on naval administration, 247–8; Executive order of, restricting Marine Corps to shore duty, 344–5
Root, Elihu, 247
Ropes, John C., 181
Royal School of Naval Architecture, English, 333

S

Sailing ship in action, the, passing of, 74 and n.
Sailors, training and education of, Luce's efforts to bring about a system of, 135 ff.
Sailors' Clubs, 142
St. Mary's, the, schoolship, at New York, 140, 142
St. Thomas, Danish West Indies, 308, 309
St. Vincent, Cape, battle of, 318
Samoa, engagement with natives in, in 1899, 283–4
Sampson, W. T., Rear Admiral, 82, 174 n., 276
San Francisco in 1852, 50
Sands, J. R., Rear Admiral, 64 and n.
Sandwich Islands, *see* Hawaiian Islands
Saratoga, the, in Training Squadron, 157, 158; given to Philadelphia as State schoolship, 160

Satterlee, Herbert L., 243, 247
Schley court of inquiry, the, 286–7
Schofield, Major General, letter of, to Luce on joint Army and Navy maneuvers, 213
School of Naval Architecture at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, established through efforts of Luce, 330–6
Schoolships, the establishment of public marine schools on, 140–2; the training ship *Minnesota* and the Training Squadron, 149 ff.
Schroeder, Admiral, 145
Schufeldt, R. W. Captain, 134
Scott, P. N., Captain, British naval officer at Halifax, Luce's questionnaire to, on Canadian fisheries question, 200–1; text of the questionnaire and answers, 367–8; letter of Luce to Minister of Marine and Fisheries at Halifax on the subject, 369–70
Seamanship, Admiral Luce's, 5, 77–80
Selfridge, Admiral, *Memoirs* of, cited, 74
Seventy-four-gun ship, beauty and nobility of, 7–8
Sheppard, F. H., Lt. Com., *Love Afloat*, by, 65 n.
Sheridan, P H., General, 126
Sherman, W. T., General, Luce cooperates with, at Savannah, 98 ff.; cuts communications of Charleston and causes its evacuation, 101–2
Sicard, Admiral, 236
Signal system introduced into the Navy by Luce, 93, 330
Signals and signalling, article on, in *Potter's American Monthly*, by Luce, 331
Sloat, Commander, 16 n.
Slocum, H. W., General, 99, 101
Smith, George Williamson, Chaplain, appreciation of Luce, 360
Smith, J. B., 36
Soley, Professor, 180, 182
Somers, hanging of Midshipman Spencer from yardarm of, for alleged mutiny, 10–11 and n.
Songs, naval, 151–3
Spain, misunderstanding with, regarding Cuba, in 1869, 108–9
Spanish-American War, War College put on trial by, 191–2; lack of naval preparedness for, 231, 235; vessels bought by government during, 262
Spencer, Midshipman, hanging of, for alleged mutiny, 10–11 and n.
Spencer, Captain W. A., 11
Stedman, E. C., *The Old Admiral*, by, quoted, 355
Stewart, Charles, Rear Admiral, 111, 272
Stewart, Sir Houston, 82
Stewart, John B., 40
Stockton, C. H., Commander, letter of, to Luce, on Pacific islands, 280–1
Strategy Board, the, of 1898, 235
Stringham, Silas H., Flag Officer, 72, 74; capture of forts at Hatteras Inlet by fleet under his command, 72–3
Sulzer, William, letter of Luce to, on the *Maine*, 300
Sumner, Charles, 135
Sumter, Fort, firing on, 71; engagements of ships with, 95; General Anderson hoists the flag on again, in April, 1865, 102; reasons for failure of Navy to capture, 234
Swinburne, Admiral, letter of, to Luce, on his detachment from active duty in 1910, 306
Symonds, Frederick, Lieut., 163, 168

T

Tacking, Luce on the history of, 273–4
Tattooing, 9–10
Taylor, H. C., Rear Admiral, 180, 276; appointed President of War College, 188; correspondence with Luce on General Staff question, 238–40
Taylor, Zachary, 37
Tennessee, the, Admiral Luce's flagship, 197
Tingey, Commodore, 271
Tracy, Benjamin F., Secretary of the Navy, 186
Training Squadron, the, 157 ff.
Tryon, Sir George, 188
Tunis, the *Juniata* at, in 1870, 112–13
Tupper, Sir Charles, 199

U

Underwood, E. B., Commodore, 307
United States, the, 325, 326
Upshur, Captain George Parker, 37
Upshur, John H., 17, 36, 71

Upton, Emory, Brigadier General, letter to Luce on proposal for post-graduate naval school, 170–1

V

Van Buren, Martin, 7
Vandalia, the, cruise of, 1849–52, 40 ff.
Victoria, Queen, 83, 128, 323
Vincennes, the, cruise of, with the *Columbus*, 1845–8, 19 ff.
Virginius, the, affair of, 231
Voorhees, Captain Philip F., 14; court martialled for capture of Argentine squadron and for illegal punishment, 16–17

W

Wabash, the, 71; on blockade of Southern ports, 72 ff.
Wainwright, Admiral, 253
Walker, J. G., Commodore, 172–3, 186, 198, 218, 219; official correspondence with Luce, 214–17
Walker, William, filibuster, 63
Walter, Howard, 351
War of 1812, exploits of the Navy in, 3; Mahan on the frigate actions of, 325–9
Washington, George, letter of, regarding appointment of John Dandridge Henley as midshipman, 62 n.
Wasp, the, and the *Frolic*, 18 n.
Welles, Gideon, 71
Werden, Reed, 40, 51
West Point, practice ships visit, in 1868, 105
Wetmore, Senator, 189, 193
Whitney, Wm. C., Secretary of the Navy, collision of Luce with, in Canadian fisheries question, 201–12
Whitthorne, General, Chairman of House Naval Committee, effort to reorganize Navy Department by, 227; letter of Luce to, 227–8
Wilde, Admiral, letter to, by Luce, on schoolships, 141–2
Wilhelm II., German Emperor, 302, 304–5
Wilson, Prof. G. G., 301
Wiltse, Captain, 253
World War, lack of naval preparedness for, 231; vessels bought and ordered built by government during, 266
Wyman, Captain Thomas W., 18

Y

Young, John, Premier of Hawaii, 45, 49

DATE DUE

THE KING'S LIBRARY
3000072940